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CHAPTER 1:

INTRODUCTION

This dissertation examines the history of a part of
Appalachia, the Upper Monongahela region of West Virginia.

In

order to provide a synthetic view of the region’s history, the
study traces political and economic development during the
preindustrial era, 1776 to 1888, but the main focus is on the
great transformation during the period of industrialization and
modernization, 1888 to 1933.1 Although the study is confined to
the ten-county Upper Monongahela region, particularly the six
northwestern counties, it addresses several broader issues in
West Virginia and Appalachian history, including the origin and
historical processes which led to regional dependency, the
significance of the West Virginia statehood movement, the role of
the coal industry in economic and political development, and the
impact of the 1920s mine war.
This introductory chapter is a discussion of various
approaches to regional development in Appalachian Studies and an
1Although most everyone appears to understand the meaning of
"industrialization," some confusion and a great deal of discussion
shrouds the term "modernization."
According to Kenneth Noe,
Southwest Virginia1s Railroad: Modernization and the Sectional
Crisis (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1994), 3-4, the term
has drawn widespread criticism, but like critic Raymond Grew, who
wrote that "a kind of common sense makes one hesitate to throw the
concept out," Noe retained the term. In this study, modernization
is used to describe changes in culture, institutions, and law which
precede and facilitate industrialization as well as those which
regulate and tame its abuses and injustices.
Thus, changes in
political culture and frame of government which occurred with the
creation of the state of West Virginia in 1863 can be characterized
as modernization. By the same token, adjustments in political and
economic institutions (unionization, promulgation of codes of
competition, revisions of labor laws) undertaken during the New
Deal are also considered modernization.
1
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evaluation of their applicability to this dissertation.

Concepts

from the so-called "new regional geography" are also discussed
and evaluated.

For this discussion, a somewhat artificial but

useful distinction is made between preindustrial and industrial
Appalachia.
In the first twenty years or so after Appalachian Studies
was institutionalized as a scholarly field of study, the study of
preindustrial Appalachia was inhibited by the persistence of an
romantic view of the region's culture and development.
According to this view, Appalachia was a land that time had
forgot, an isolated mountain region where a "traditional mountain
subculture," a subsistence farm economy, and an egalitarian
society persisted well into the twentieth century.2 Following
Henry Shapiro3, Mary Beth Pudup traced this understanding of
Appalachia back to the "local color writers" of the turn of the
century who traversed the hills and hollows of the backwoods to
find their "contemporary ancestors," frozen in a state of
"arrested development."

While the rest of America was marching

ahead at breakneck speed, the mountain people seemed fixed in the
eighteenth or nineteenth century.

They retained primitive

customs and lifeways, traits long abandoned by modem Americans.
2Mary Beth Pudup,
"Beyond the
'Traditional Mountain
Subculture': A Look at Preindustrial Appalachia," The Impact of
Institutions in Appalachia:
Proceedings of the Eighth Annual
Appalachian Studies Conference (Boone, North Carolina: Appalachian
Studies Conference, 1986), 114-116.
3Henry Shapiro, Appalachia on Our Mind:
The Southern
Mountains and Mountaineers in the American Consciousness. 18701920. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1978).
2
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They lived in a Jeffersonian society with few real distinctions
between individuals.

Isolated in their mountain fastness, they

spurned involvement with the modern world, relying instead on
subsistence farming and kinship networks to sustain them.
Like Shapiro, Pudup argued that these works were largely
impressionistic portrayals based on a romantic view of the
region, not empirically-derived historical or sociological
studies.

Citing John C. Campbell's ironic appraisal that

Appalachia is a "land about which, perhaps, more things are known
that are not true than any part of the country," Pudup argued
that this literature had created lingering stereotypes which
obscured serious study.

She wrote:

Appalachia is stereotyped in a remarkably diverse set
of images: from carefree hillbilly dirt farmers
operating moonshine stills, to chronically poor, but
irrepressible coal mining families. Popular media have
done much to promulgate regional stereotypes.
Scholarly work has contributed its own share of
"invented tradition," however, by analyzing Appalachia
variously as a backward, isolated subculture. . . ,4
Pudup probably exaggerated the influence of this romantic
view upon serious scholars engaged in the study of preindustrial
Appalachia.

It must be admitted, however, that two of the most

prominent historians in the field, Ronald Eller and John
Alexander Williams, advanced ideas remarkably similar to those
Pudup attacked.

In what has been acknowledged as an outstanding

synthesis of Central Appalachian history, Eller portrayed the
*Mary Beth Pudup, "Reinventing Regions: Toward a New Regional
Geography of Appalachia,"
(Morgantown:
Regional Research
Institute, West Virginia University, 1987), 3.
3
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region as a "quiet backcountry of the Old South," a land of
isolated agricultural communities and independent mountaineers.5
Like other Appalachian scholars, Williams embraced traditional
Appalachian values at the expense of m odem ones.

Writing in a

1970 Appalachian Journal review essay, Williams decried the
"corrosive impact" of modem values on "traditional cultures."
He asked how we can "integrate modem and traditional values in
such a way to make the latter stronger instead of subordinate."6
Veneration of the traditional has faded in Appalachian
Studies in the last decade.

A large number of works have been

published in recent years which, taken together, banish the
romantic view of preindustrial Appalachia.

Historians have

presented a more complex picture of Appalachia's early
development.

In "The Boundaries of Class in Preindustrial

Appalachia," Pudup demonstrated that nineteenth-century
Appalachia, even in one its most remote comers, Eastern
Kentucky, did not harbor an equalitarian society.
was considerable social differentiation.

In fact, there

Based on land

ownership, and on local trade and politics, an aspiring, marketoriented middle class developed early in the nineteenth

5Ronald D Eller, Miners, Millhands. and Mounta ineers;
Industrialization of the Appalachian South. 1880-1930 (Knoxville:
University of Tennessee Press, 1982).
6John Alexander Williams, "Appalachia as a Colony and as
Periphery: A Review Essay," Appalachian Journal 6 (Winter 1979),
161.
4
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century.7 The recent work of Robert Tracy McKenzie on East
Tennessee agriculture in 1860 demonstrates that the market
produced social and economic differentiation among farmers, the
supposed bastion of the "traditional mountain subculture."

Those

who were "commercially oriented" were better off in terms of
income than those who practiced subsistence agriculture.8 More
pertinent to this dissertation, Van Beck Hall found in the
Virginia Appalachians between 1790 and 1830 a "rapidly growing,
economically diversified, socially and culturally complex
Appalachian region [which] generated political programs that
attempted to reform the institutions of the state while using its
power to implement economic development and social change."9
And Altina Waller has demonstrated that even the Hatfield-McCoy
"feud," the source of one of the most enduring stereotypes of the
region, was based, in part, on differing responses to the market
economy.10
This growing body of work asserts a commercial orientation
for even the most isolated farmers in Appalachia.

Rather than a

7Mary Beth Pudup, "The Boundaries of Class in Preindustrial
Appalachia," Journal of Historical Geography 15 (1989): 139-162.
Robert
Tracy MacKenzie,
"Wealth
and
Income:
The
Preindustrial Structure of East Tennessee in I860,” Appalachian
Journal 21 (Spring 1994): 260-279.
’Van Beck Hall, "The Politics of Appalachian Virginia, 17901830," Robert D. Mitchell, editor, Appalachian Frontiers:
Settlement. Society. &. Development in the Preindustrial Era
(Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1991), 166.
10Altina L. Waller, Feud: Hatfields. McCoys. and Social Change
in Appalachia. 1860-1900 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press, 1988).
5
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traditional adaptation of its people, scholars have attempted to
explain the region's economic backwardness by reference to
barriers or obstacles which have led to developmental lag.

Paul

Salstrom cites barriers presented by a declining agriculture,
national banking policies, and a dearth of capital.11 Barbara
Rasmussen decries land laws and absentee ownership as causes of
underdevelopment in western Virginia.12 This study identifies
poor transportation, the lack of a "home market," and Virginia's
restrictive policy on internal improvements as the major barriers
to capitalist development in the Upper Monongahela region during
the preindustrial era.
More central to this study is the consideration of
theoretical perspectives related to Appalachia's
industrialization.

In an influential article published in 1978,

David Walls examined four theoretical models which have been
advanced to explain Appalachian underdevelopment.

Walls

justifiably dismissed the subculture of poverty model, epitomized
by Jack Weller's Yesterday's People13, as shortsighted and based
on false images and stereotypes.

He also rejected the "regional

development" model, as represented by the approach of the
Appalachian Regional Commission (ARC), because it failed to face
11Paul Salstrom, Appalachia's Path to Dependency: Rethinking
a Region's Economic History. 1730-1940 (Lexington: University Press
of Kentucky, 1994).
12Barbara Rasmussen, "The Absentee Legacy in Virginia's West
1781-1915," Ph. D. diss., West Virginia University, 1992.
13Jack E. Weller, Yesterday's People: Life in Contemporary
Appalachia. (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1965).
6
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the basic issues of "power and privilege in Appalachia."

The

"internal colonialism" model, as a reaction to the shortcomings
of earlier approaches, was developed to explain the political,
economic, and cultural domination of the region by outside groups
and forces.

Walls adroitly showed the inadequacy of the model by

comparing it with a strict definition of internal colonialism
developed by scholars of Third World underdevelopment and
neocolonialism.

Reexamining Appalachia's position in context of

the social theory of Jurgen Habermas and the economic theory of
Immanuel Wallerstein and the dependency school, Walls developed a
new model which retained the emphasis on outside domination but
which viewed Central Appalachia as a periphery, not a colony, of
"advanced capitalism."14
The regional development, internal colonialism, and internal
periphery models are relevant to the approach used in this study.
Each is considered below in light of their value in helping to
understand the industrialization of the Upper Monongahela region.
In the discussion, the focus is on how well each model addresses
basic questions relating to the agents, timing, predominant
patterns, and outcome of industrialization.
The internal colonialism model is based on the idea that
Appalachia was industrialized in a colonial-like manner as a
result of penetration, development, and exploitation by

14David S. Walls, "Internal Colony or Internal Periphery? A
Critique of Current Models and An Alternative Formulation," in
Helen Lewis, Linda Johnson, and Donald Askins, editors, Colonialism
in M o d e m America: The Appalachian Case. 319-349.
7
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outsiders.

Although it was surpassed in the 1980s, the so-called

colonial model left an indelible impression on Appalachian
Studies and, to a degree, informs this study.
historians,

It was adopted by

writers, and activists in the emerging field of

Appalachian studies in the 1970s and early 1980s to explain an
economic problem:

Why did Appalachia lag behind the rest of the

nation in income and a variety of other socio-economic variables?
Based on Marxist-Leninist precepts and C. Vann Woodward's New
South thesis15, the colonial model emerged in the 1970s with the
publication of two anthologies, Appalachia in the Sixties, in
1972, and Colonialism in Modern America:

The Appalachian Case,

which appeared in 1978.16 It reached maturity with the
publication of two influential monographs in the 1970s and early
1980s by John Alexander Williams and Ronald Eller.
While Eller's work17 relates to Central Appalachia and need
not be examined here, Williams's West Virginia and the Captains
of Industry is relevant because part of it focuses on two
figures, H. G. Davis and Stephen B. Elkins, who played a role in
the industrialization of the upland part of the Upper Monongahela
region.

In effect, Williams extended Woodward's interpretation

15C. Vann Woodward, Origins of the New South 1877-1913 (Baton
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1951).
16David S. Walls and John B. Stephenson, editors, Appalachia
in the Sixties: Decade of Reawakening (Lexington: University of
Kentucky Press, 1972); Helen Matthews Lewis, Linda Johnson and
Donald Askins, editors, Colonialism in Modem America: The
Appalachian case (Boone, North Carolina: Appalachian Consortium
Press, 1978).
17Eller, Mines. Millhands. and Mountaineers.
8
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of the New South from his original study area, the former
Confederate states, to West Virginia.

Like his mentor, Williams

concluded that a "colonial political economy" developed by 1900
which "marshalled both the political and economic resources of
the state for use beyond its borders."

Rather than a mature and

balanced industrial economy directed by the state's residents,
one developed that was based on the extractive industries and
controlled by absentees.

Williams attributed this tragedy partly

to the topography and "mountain environment" of the state, which
"presented serious obstacles to economic growth," and partly to
the national economic system, which failed to "adapt to the
special circumstances presented by this environment."

He heaped

most of the blame, however, upon the state's "captains of
industry," who, after initiating capitalist enterprises, turned
them over to outsiders for their personal and/or political gain.
These comoradores. or natives who colonized their own people,
were presented as the real villains in the state's historical
tragedy.18
With expositions such as those provided by Williams and
Eller, it is not surprising that the internal colonialism model
commanded such respect.

Corroboration for the theory came from

the Appalachian Land Use Task Force, which found that large
chunks of land, as much as two-thirds in some West Virginia

18John Alexander Williams, West Virginia and the Captains of
Industry (Morgantown: West Virginia University Library, 1976), 116.
9
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counties, were owned by absentees.19 Recent scholarship
reflects the continuing impact of this model.

Rasmussen

concluded that absentees brought the industrial transformation of
four West Virginia counties, (including Randolph and Tucker, the
upland part of the Upper Monongahela region) pushing the
indigenous farmers off their lands.20 In her study of John Fox,
Jr., Darlene Wilson concluded that this noted author "helped to
create and/or perpetuate myths of Appalachian 'otherness’" in
order to "1) facilitate corporate and class hegemony by
marginalizing indigenous peoples and existing socio-cultural
structures, and 2) to undermine local resistance to the 'new
order' and to absentee control by implementing land and political
policies that encouraged depopulation."21
A major problem in the application of the internal colonial
model to the Upper Monongahela region, as well as tc other parts

19Appalachian Land Use Task Force, Who Owns Appalachia?
Landownership and its Impact (Lexington: University of Kentucky
Press, 1983).
20Rasmussen, Absentee Legacy. 308-310; Rasmussen arrives at
these conclusions despite the fact that in 1930 the percentage of
families who owned homes in the ten-county Upper Monongahela
region, (including Tucker and Randolph, part of her study area) was
higher (51.1 percent) than that in the United States (46.8 percent)
and in West Virginia (45.1 percent). Figures from Oscar Chapman,
Report of the Committee on the Upper Monongahela Valley. West
Virginia. Mimeograph, 1934, Table 5 "Percentage Distribution of
Native White, Foreign-Born White, and Negro Families According to
Home Tenure For The Upper Monongahela Valley, West Virginia, And
The United States," 20.
21Darlene Wilson. "The Felicitous Convergence of Mythmaking and
Capital Accumulation: John Fox, Jr. and the Formation of an (Other)
Almost-White Underclass," Journal of Appalachian Studies 1 (Fall
1995), 5-44.
10
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of Appalachia, is that it often portrays the Appalachian people
as a single, exploited class.

Many of the works written in this

vein ignore the differentiated social structure of the region and
neglect or misrepresent the historic role of indigenous elites in
industrialization.

Richard Simon complained of the lack of

specificity in this type of analysis: " . . . Appalachia does not
stand in relation to the Metropolitan United States as workers
stand to capitalists."22 Pudup pointed out that this was, in
essence, a geographical fallacy:
Guided by a variety of theoretical frameworks, most
notably the internal colonialism model, Appalachian
studies have converged upon an essentially geographical
conception of social relations. Accordingly,
Appalachia has been the colony and victim of
industrialization while outsiders, comprised of
speculators, investors, and missionaries, have been the
agents of colonization. This sympathetic reading of
Appalachian history substitutes spatial relations for
social relations and transforms Appalachia into a
social class tout court— economically, socially, and
culturally exploited by outsiders.23
In her work on preindustrial Eastern Kentucky, Pudup demonstrated
that even the most remote part of Appalachia had "local elites"
which on the eve of industrialization "settled . . .

in

Prestonsburgh, Harlan and Hazard, building stores and hotels,
founding banks and newspapers, and financing construction of
streets and public utilities.1,24 Other historians of
^Richard M. Simon, "Regions and Social Relations: A Research
Note," Appalachian Journal 3 (Autumn-Winter 1983-1984), 25.
s Pudup, "The Boundaries of Class in Preindustrial Appalachia,"
141-142.
24Ibid., 159.
11
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Appalachian industrialization have presented similar conclusions.
Eugene Conti, in his study of East Kentucky, argued that "local
leadership pursued essentially a modernizing role, diffusing
change from the American metropolis to the Appalachian
hollers."25 In a study of the same region, Alan Batteau
asserted that "in every form of major development . . . the
pioneering entrepreneurs were not outsiders, but locally born and
raised entrepreneurs from such towns as Hazard and
Paintsville. ”26
Not only do proponents of the internal colonialism model
fail to recognize the principal agents of Appalachian
industrialization, but they also often misinterpret the timing
and principal patterns in the development process.

Part of the

reason for this is the singular geographical focus of many of
these studies.

Appalachia has been identified with the upland

parts of the region and with a strictly rural society.

Other

than stranded coal towns, urban places— the independent towns and
cities located mostly on navigable streams and other
transportation corridors— have been neglected.

This

preoccupation with the mountains, hills, and hollows has exerted
a narrowing influence not only on the study of industrial but
also preindustrial Appalachia.

If not disregarded, urban places

^Eugene Conti,
"Mountain Metamorphosis:
Culture and
Development in East Kentucky," (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Duke University, 1979).
26Allan Batteau, "Contradictions of a Kinship Community," in
R. Hall and C. Stack, editors, Holding on to the Land and the Lord
(Athens: University of George Press, 1971), 32.
12
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have been given short shift or dismissed by pejorative
characterizations.

For example, Eller has a single paragraph on

Appalachian towns in his book.

He described urban centers "such

as Charleston, Bluefield, Ashland, Paintsville, Bristol, and
Asheville," as bases of operation used by promoters of
industrialization "to launch their invasions of the outlying
rural districts."27
Preoccupation with the social and economic dynamics of the
rural hinterland of the region has obscured what has occurred in
the urban centers of the region.

While industrialization and

modernization may have come late to rural areas, the process
began much earlier in nearby urban centers.

Moreover, indigenous

capitalists residing in Appalachian towns and cities were often
the agents of industrialization.

Thus, in many cases— including

this study— the principal pattern of industrialization consisted
of penetration and exploitation of the rural hinterland by
capitalists within the region.

Although the work of Eller and

other historians working within the internal colonialism paradigm
has demonstrated that this pattern of inside-out development was
not universal in Appalachia, it did occur in some parts of the
region.

Appalachian urban places were the centers of political

power, of transportation and communication, and the points from
which modernizing influences spread to the rural hinterland.
They were also the places where many of the benefits of
industrialization within the region were realized.
27Eller, Miners. Millhands, and Mountaineers. 58.
13
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Urban Appalachia merits further study, not only for its own sake,
but also for the purpose of arriving at a fuller understanding of
the rural parts of the region.28
Despite these shortcomings, two elements of the internal
colonial model inform this study of Appalachian
industrialization.

First, it offers an explanation for the

eventual outcome of industrialization.

Although indigenous

figures often initiated the processes of development,
Appalachia's railroads, mines, factories, and financial
corporations were eventually taken over by capitalists from
outside the region.

However, the process by which this takeover

occurred was far more complicated than the internal colonial
suggests.

The explanation of this process in the Upper

Monongahela region is one of the principal tasks of this
dissertation.

In a dialectical manner, the internal colonialism

also illuminates a much neglected historical dynamic of
Appalachian industrialization:

the fight of indigenous peoples

against those who would colonize.

Defined as regionalism, this

historical struggle was manifested in the development of the
Upper Monongahela region in various contests with "outsiders”—
Virginia planters, absentee landlords or coal companies, union

^A measure of how convoluted Appalachian Studies has become
is that urban Appalachians are not considered people living in
Charleston or Logan, West Virginia, or even Hazard, Kentucky.
Instead, they are expatriates from the hills who have migrated to
cities outside the region, such as Cincinnati or Cleveland. See
William W. Philliber and Clyde B. McCoy, editors, The Invisible
Minority: Urban Appalachians (Lexington, 1981) for an example of
this literature.
14
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organizers, or railroad companies— during both the preindustrial
and industrial eras.

Legitimized and elaborated in political

culture and institutions as the cant of boosterism, the
xenophobia of nativism, or the protest of populism and union
militancy, regionalism played an important role in the economic
and political development of the Upper Monongahela region.
The second theoretical approach described by Walls and
relevant to this dissertation is the internal periphery model.
Since it brings to Appalachian Studies an array of useful
concepts borrowed from the dependency school, the internal
periphery model moves the discussion of Appalachia's subordinate
status within the nation from the level of analogy to that of
social theory.

The concern of the internal colonialism school

with fixing responsibility for Appalachia's problems becomes
secondary to understanding the process by which the region became
dependent.

For those in the internal periphery or dependency

school, questions relating to the agents of Appalachian
industrialization are secondary to those pertaining to timing,
patterns, and outcome.
Dependency theory is based on the core-periphery distinction
used by several schools of economic thought.

In his discussion,

Walls adopted Immanuel Wallerstein's concept of a global spread
of modern capitalism in which core and periphery regions develop
collaterally within the same institutional structure.

Dependency

is seen as a situation whereby the economy of a peripheral region
is conditioned by the development and expansion of another
15
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economy to which it is subj ected. While the core expands and
becomes self-sustaining, the economy of the periphery is
dependent upon that of the center.

It can expand only as a

reflection of the center's expansion.

While dependency does not

necessarily prevent development or necessarily cause poverty, it
does inhibit independent development.29
This line of inquiry was taken by Richard Simon, whose
unpublished dissertation, "The Development of Underdevelopment:
The Coal Industry and Its Effect on the West Virginia Economy,
1830-1930," cites "destructive competition" in the coal industry
as the chief cause of West Virginia's underdevelopment and
dependency.30 An extended discussion and critique of this work
will be provided because Simon's thesis is central to this study.
Like Salstrom's work and this study, Simon identified barriers
and obstacles in the path of the state's development in the
preindustrial era.

Bypassed by most major transportation

corridors, it remained isolated and undeveloped.

This position

of backwardness relative to the industrialized areas of the
country placed great obstacles in the path of the state's
industrialization.

While manufacturing centers in the North

^Paul Salstrom, Appalachia's Path to Dependency: Rethinking
a Region's Economic History. 1730-1940 (Lexington: University Press
of Kentucky, 1994), xiii-xxxvi.
30Richard Simon, "The Development of Underdevelopment:
The
Coal Industry and Its Effect on the West Virginia Economy, 18801939, PH.D. Diss., University of Pittsburgh, 1978.
Also see
"Uneven Development and the Case of West Virginia: Going Beyond
the Colonialism Model," Appalachian Journal 8 (Spring 1981): 165186 for a synopsis of the dissertation.
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attracted additional investments, the lack of capital and human
resources in West Virginia, along with a small home market,
greatly limited prospects for investment.

Thus, initial

backwardness prior to 1880 made it difficult for the state to
develop a balanced economy afterwards.
While Simon's characterization of preindustrial West
Virginia— isolation, the predominance of agriculture, and initial
backwardness— does not differ from that provided by the colonial
school, his analysis of what followed surely does.

While the

colonial school blamed out-of-state capitalists who monopolized
the state's resources or in-state compradores who sold out, Simon
fixed responsibility for underdevelopment upon an economic force,
"destructive competition," which characterized the state's coal
industry.31 How did destructive competition develop and how did
it impede the economic development of West Virginia in the 1880
to 1930 period?

To answer this, Simon first analyzes the

organization of capital in the coal industry on a national level.
Echoing the assessment of Herbert Hoover and the U.S. Coal
Commission that the coal industry was the "worst functioning
industry in the country," he explains that this was due to
overdevelopment.

Overdevelopment in turn was largely a result of

geographical and economic factors.

Coal was plentiful, available

31The term "destructive competition" was often used in the
1920s by Van Bittner to describe the situation in the coal
industry; e.g., "An Open Letter to the People of Northern West
Virginia," Fairmont West Virginian. March 23, 1926. Simon borrowed
the term from Joel Bain, Industrial Organization (New York: John
Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1959), 428-438.
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in many areas throughout the country.

It was relatively easy to

start a mine and thereby increase supply, but the demand for coal
was inelastic.

As national demand increased after 1880 and as

railroads were built, the West Virginia coal fields were
developed.

By about 1900, when the state's fields began to

produce large tonnages, an excess capacity developed in the
industry which exerted a downward pressure on prices.

Unlike

other industries which were able to combine in this period in
order to reduce competition and stabilize prices and production,
the coal industry was unable to concentrate mainly because the
mineral was so widely scattered that it was impossible for a few
firms to control it.

As a result, fierce competition for markets

developed in the industry.32
Rather than the benign form of competition described in
classic economics, the competition in the coal industry was
destructive, both to capital and labor.

It led to the

unnecessary expenditure of capital to open new mines in low-cost
fields, especially in Appalachia.

Rather than hastening

mechanization and leading to a leaner, more efficient industry,
destructive competition fostered the continuation of laborintensive methods, especially in West Virginia.

In fact, by

virtue of their success in the marketing game, the state's
companies played a leading role in perpetuating "cottage methods"
in the industry.

They obtained and held their edge in the market

largely by making direct and indirect cuts in wages.

This

32Simon, "The Development of Underdevelopment," 21-69.
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strategy was accompanied by a policy of maintaining a surplus
labor force and keeping the miners’ union out of the state.33
Destructive competition perpetuated itself and characterized
the West Virginia coal industry until 1930.

Simon recognizes

that the export-based coal economy could have led to self
sustained growth by pulling increased investment into the state,
but concludes that this did not happen.

A fully developed

economy and continuous prosperity did not materialize.
Underdevelopment of the state's economy was the result of
incomplete industrialization.

And, incomplete industrialization

was a direct result of the coal industry's peculiar condition of
destructive competition.

So constituted, there were several ways

in which the coal industry had a detrimental impact upon the
state's development.

First, since it was fastened upon West

Virginia when the state's economy was relatively undeveloped, the
enormous amount of capital that it absorbed impeded investment in
other sectors of the economy.

Simon demonstrates that as much as

one-third of the capital and labor invested in the coal industry
in the state was superfluous.

Although some manufacturing did

develop in the central and northern parts of the state, this
development came "in spite of, not because of, the presence of
the coal industry."34
The significance of Simon's work is that he has identified
an historical process or force, destructive competition in the
^Ibid., 149-170.
^Ibid., 285-339.
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coal industry, which produced underdevelopment and dependency in
West Virginia.

His thesis must be considered in any study of the

state's industrialization and modernization.

However, there are

weaknesses within his argument which cannot be ignored.
The first relates to his portrayal of destructive competition as
a relentless force which negatively affected the West Virginia
coal industry from the onset. In fact, until the early 1920s the
West Virginia coal industry was the beneficiary of destructive
competition.

That is, the state's coal industry was profitable

and coal companies were accumulating capital for reinvestment.
Until the economic crisis of the 1922 to 1933 period, the victims
of destructive competition were the northern, union coal
companies which were unable to compete with the lower-priced,
higher-quality West Virginia coal.

While the collapse of the

West Virginia coal industry in the 1920s was indeed a result of
overdevelopment and destructive competition, it is important to
recognize that prior to this time, the coal export economy,
considered on its own terms, was a success.
In light of this, Simon's argument that the coal industry
was responsible for the underdevelopment the state's
manufacturing sector needs to be reevaluated and qualified.

If

profits were being made in the state's coal industry before the
1920s, why was this accumulated capital not reinvested in other
state industries?

Simon's answer is that this capital was simply

reinvested in the coal industry, leading to its overexpansion.
This is undeniable in many cases.

With prospects of an expanding

20
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market for West Virginia coal, it was a rational investment
strategy.

There were, however, a number of state investors,

especially in the northern section of the state, who used capital
accumulated from coal ventures to invest in other industries.
They forged backward and forward linkages— mine machinery, iron
and steel fabrication, coke, and transportation— with the coal
industry, as well as investing in unrelated industries such as
non-ferrous metals and glass, to develop a more diverse economy
than in Southern West Virginia in the pre-1920 period.
Simon failed to fully recognize these efforts because he
ignored the distinction between indigenous and absentee
investors.

Like others in the dependency or internal periphery

school, Simon failed to come to grips with the question of agency
in industrialization.

He addressed this vital issue only in the

appendix, and here, in an oblique manner.

In a small section, he

debunked the "myth of the absentee owner as ogre and the local
capitalist as angel."

Using evidence from the U.S. Coal

Commission's assessment of the best and worst company towns in
the state, he demonstrated that large, absentee coal companies
provided better housing and other facilities for their employees
and followed a more humane labor policy than the smaller,
locally-owned ones.

From this evidence, he concluded that

absentee ownership was not the "foundation of the development of
underdevelopment in West Virginia."35
While recognizing the validity of Simon's argument on the
35Ibid., 392-401.
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level specified, it is also necessary to realize its limited
scope.

In considering the issue of the state's economic

development, the question of how miners were treated in company
towns is secondary to the question of how coal companies and
individuals invested the capital that they accumulated from
mining.

While absentee owners had only an economic incentive—

the prospects of profits— to invest in the development of the
state's non-coal industries or infrastructure, indigenous owners
had an additional incentive which came from residency.

In the

jargon of the time, they had a desire to "boost" the region in
which they lived.

In a footnote, Simon recognized that "absentee

ownership may have reduced the rate of investment in West
Virginia," but he failed to discuss the point.36
If Simon's failure to fully recognize the diversification
efforts of the coal capitalists from the Upper Monongahela region
in the pre-1920 period is misleading, so is his view that
manufacturing failed in the 1920s because of the overexpanded
coal industry.

These industries were incipient and

undercapitalized compared to those in neighboring northern
states, especially Pennsylvania.

Their failure to thrive in the

1920s can be attributed to locational disadvantages which could
not be overcome and the overall decline of the national economy,
not the overdevelopment of the coal industry.
Prior to evaluating Walls's third model, it is necessary to
examine another source of theory for this study, the so-called
^Ibid., 392, footnote 78.
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"new" or "reconstructed regional geography." This
interdisciplinary approach is represented by the programmatic and
substantive scholarship of Mary Beth Pudup, Ann Markusen, and
Anne Gilbert.37 Not only does this scholarship serve to enrich
and broaden Appalachian Studies, it also points the way to a
geographical restructuring of the field which will more
accurately reflect differences among the regions within greater
Appalachia.

Probably the most important contribution of the "new

regional geography" to this study is an approach termed "regional
identification" by Gilbert and "regionalism" by Markusen.

In

Gilbert's sense, regional identification is seen as an integral
aspect of the culture of a regional society.

Regional

identification is the basis for a sense of community built around
place; it is displayed historically in collective regional
expressions of social and political solidarity.38 Geographers
also refer to expressions of regional identity as "regional
consciousness."39 The development of regional consciousness and
37Mary Beth Pudup, "Arguments within Regional Geography,"
Progress in Human Geography 12 (September 1988), 370; Anne Gilbert,
"The New Regional Geography in English and French-speaking
Countries," Progress in Human Geography 12 (June 1988): 208-226;
Ann Markusen, Regions: The Economics and Politics of Territory
(Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman and Littlefield, 1987).
^Gilbert, "The New Regional Geography," 210-211.
39An exemplar of geographical scholarship on regional identity
is Anssi Paasi, "the Institutionalization of Regions: A Theoretical
Framework for Understanding the Emergence of Regions and the
Constitution of Regional Identity," Fennia 164 (1986): 105-146.
For an examination of how local and regional identity influences
economic development, see Kevin R. Cox and Andrew Mair, "Locality
and Community in the Politics of Local Economic Development,"
Annals of the Association of American Geographers 78 (1988): 30723

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

its incorporation into political culture and institutions is seen
as an important part of the formation and transformation of a
region.
Markusen's concept of regionalism, in which a "territorially
identified group of people" make political claims "against one or
several mechanisms of the state" is a special case whereby the
sphere of regional identification is expanded to include
political action.

In her book, Regions: The Economics and

Politics of Territory. Markusen demonstrated the importance of
territorial struggle in American history.

Markusen argued that

many American historians have overemphasized class conflict as a
primary force in American history.

In fact, the state has often

functioned as a political forum which has deflected class
conflict.

As a result, "territorial politics have consistently

displaced or preempted class politics as a national
preoccupation."40 Markusen argued that the unique political
structure of the United States, federalism, promoted regionalism
and territorial, rather than strictly class- or party-based
politics.

The fact that political organization on both the state

and national levels revolved around territorial units meant that
political claims were territorialized.

Capitalists, workers, and

other political advocacy groups were fractionalized— divided
among numerous, competing territorially-defined political units,
and their political demands could often be satisfied within the
325.
40Markusen, Regions, 1.
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regional setting.
American politics.

This made regionalism a principal motif of
As a result, the historical role of the

national government, according to Markusen, has been to mediate
regional conflicts.41
In addition to the unique structure of the state, a second
force which has encouraged regional differentiation and
regionalism was economic:

the development of capitalism.

A high

degree of sectoral specialization has emerged among regions.
Because of natural resources, location, and other comparative
advantages, regions have come to specialize in the production of
an individual commodity.

Markusen argued that this is apt to

lead to "regional economic solidarity," a rallying round the
region's export economy, because of the dependence of a large
number of people upon this base.42 Political elites within the
region strive to maintain and extend the export economy with
their political clout in state and federal politics.

Since the

preservation of the regional export economy is also contingent
upon the maintenance of internal social harmony, regional elites
use their power to impose an order in which surplus value is
readily given up by the working class.

With their control of

regional politics as the stick, and the booster ideology, which
promises prosperity for all, as the carrot, they sway the working
41In Regions Markusen provides three case studies of American
regionalism and regional conflict:
the encounters of Native
American groups and European colonists, the nineteenth-century
North-South sectionalism which culminated in the Civil War, and
frostbelt-sunbelt encounter of the 1970s.
42Markusen, Regions. 26-28.
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class.

The working class accepts its lot and falls in line with

the regional system because of its economic and political
dependence.

Thus, the export economy is maintained by regional

elites through political domination and ideological hegemony.
When Markusen explains that regionalism engenders a
"regional movement in opposition to some external entity, be it
another region, the larger state or national governments, or an
outside economic force," she has provided Appalachian Studies
with a conceptual tool to transcend the colonial model's narrow
preoccupation with a single outside force, intrusive capitalism,
and understand the struggle between indigenous people and outside
forces in broader terms.43 The Appalachian coal economy during
the 1890 to 1933 period can be seen as a prime example of the
operation of this type of regionalism.

As has been demonstrated

in Pudup's article "Waiting for the Revolution" in Appalachian
Journal, the coal industry engendered "fierce interregional
competition in the coal market."44 Producers in each coal
field, organized in coal operators' associations and supported by
political elites, strove to obtain and hold a competitive edge in
the tough market.

The function of regional political elites

within the realm of national politics was to preserve and defend
their region's competitive position and help producers capture
and hold markets.

The arenas for this type of regional politics

43Ibid.
^ a r y Beth Pudup, "Waiting for the Revolution," Appalachian
Journal 21 (Winter 1994): 178.
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included Congress (where politicians such as H.G. Davis and
Stephen B. Elkins fought the tariff on coal and other
"pernicious" legislation45), the Interstate Commerce Commission
(where freight rate differentials were hammered out), and the
courts (where much of the fight against the United Mine Workers
of America was waged). Appalachian regional elites also strove
to maintain the allegiance of the working class and repress those
outside influences which threatened social solidarity and the
entire regional system.

That this was no mean task is indicated

by the intensity of the struggle with the nationally-oriented
United Mine Workers of America.

Regardless of whether these

struggles against the union, the ICC, or reform-minded
politicians were, from a presentist perspective, irrational or
regressive, it must be recognized that in this period they— not
the fight against outside capitalists— were the primary
expression of Appalachian regionalism.
In the Appalachian context, it is important to discern the
historic scope of regionalism.

As Simon wrote, the only "actual

expression" of regionalism in Appalachia was the founding of the
Appalachian Regional Commission in the 1960s.46 While it is
true that the people of the Appalachian region have not
demonstrated an identity with the region as a whole or
participated in a pan-Appalachian regional movement, it is
nonetheless true that they have exhibited this type of
45Williams, Captains of Industry. 17-67.
46Simon, "Regions and Social Relations," 26.
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consciousness and behavior on a smaller geographical scale.

That

is, the people of the Upper Monongahela region, or the Upper
Kanawha Valley, or Logan County, have identified with their home
region, although not with Appalachia as a whole.
The recognition of geographical divisions in Appalachia
based upon regional identification, along with another concept
borrowed from the "new regional geography," may lead some in
Appalachian Studies to reevaluate how they define the Appalachian
region.

Following Pred, Pudup argues that regions "are not

merely analytical constructs __ but are products of human
history."

They are formed as the result of a "dynamic historical

geographical process.47 That is, regions are not created by
simply throwing boundaries around territories or drawing lines on
a map, such as occurs often in Appalachian Studies.

Rather, a

region takes shape through the agency of discernible, historical
processes.

Nor are the boundaries of a region immutable.

They

can and often do change with the passage of time in response to
political, economic, and cultural forces.
For the most part, scholars in Appalachian Studies have
failed to heed the diversity within the greater region and have
followed a singular path in delineating boundaries of study.
Perloff, et. al defined a region as "a group of geographically
contiguous areas which have certain common or complementary
characteristics or which are tied by extensive interareal
47Pudup, "Arguments within Regional Geography," 380; following
A. Pred, "Place as Historically Contingent Process," Annals of the
Association of American Geographers 74 (1984): 279-297.
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activity or flows."43 The spatial dimension of Appalachia has
been organized through the former, rather than the latter, aspect
of this definition.

The boundaries of the region have been set

by reference to the real or imagined "common" characteristics of
the region, not its "extensive interareal activity of flows."
Traditional regional geography understood Appalachia as a
physiographic province which stretched from Nova Scotia to
Georgia, the common element being its mountainous environment.
Henry Shapiro has described how the "local color writers" focused
on the southern part of this province and defined Appalachia in
terms of a perceived common culture.49 Although these simple
ideas were largely superseded in the 1960s and 1970s by
approaches which emphasized social and economic characteristics,
the notion that Appalachia must be a homogeneous entity was not.
The unifying principle used by the ARC to carve the region was a
set of common socio-economic variables.

For the colonial and

internal periphery school, the common thread which tied the
region together was its underdevelopment and dependence, a
defining concept similar to the ARC'S.

In "The Boundaries of

Class in Preindustrial Appalachia," Pudup took this approach to
the extreme by selecting three mostly noncontiguous highland
counties on the headwaters of three different rivers in East
Kentucky to form a "development cohort."

The unifying

Garvey S. Perloff, Edgar S. Dunn, Jr., Eric E. Lampard and
Richard F. Muth, Regions. Resources and Economic Growth (Lincoln:
University of Nebraska Press, 1960), 4.
49Shapiro, Appalachia On Our Mind.
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characteristic which tied these counties together was
inaccessibility, their isolation from the main avenues of trade
and communication.

Thus, the nearly universal approach in

setting the boundaries of Appalachia has been to isolate key
socio-economic or physiographic variables and lump contiguous
areas into the shape of a region based on the degree of
homogeneity of these variables among the constituent areas.
Acknowledging that this is a legitimate methodology in
regional studies, the question remains of how effectively it has
been in advanced our understanding.

Has this quest for

homogeneity, this effort to find the quintessential Appalachia,
paid off?

As argued earlier, this approach has led

practitioners to exclude by design significant components of the
region, which, by elemental reasoning, should be included.

Why

should the boundaries of Appalachia be drawn to exclude its towns
and cities, its navigable waterways, its transportation
corridors, and, its upper and middle classes?

Surely there is

something wrong with an approach which accepts such
gerrymandering as the norm.
What is needed is an approach which allows for socio
economic and cultural diversity, and recognizes spatial
differentiation within the greater Appalachian region.

As

suggested by yet another concept from the ’’new regional
geography,” the "structural” perspective, it is useful to view a
region as a social structure composed of various discrete parts.
The whole structure cannot be reduced to constituent parts
30
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because the whole is itself based on the relations between those
parts.

Thus, the structural perspective recognizes, rather than

excludes, diversity by understanding it within a single context.
A region need not be homogenous.

Adoption of the structural

approach allows us to focus on urban as well as rural Appalachia,
the middle and upper as well as the lower class, and the m o dem
and transitional as well as the traditional culture.
The adoption of the structural perspective will also provide
something of a corrective for another practice prevalent in
Appalachian Studies.

The works of Eller, Williams, and Simon

have been noted or reviewed to demonstrate that the development
of capitalism has been the primary historical process which has
shaped Appalachia, at least during the 1880 to 1933 period.

The

problem with these works, as well as other statements of both the
colonial and the internal periphery models, is that they view
Appalachian industrialization and modernization largely in terms
of the region’s relations with the outside, not as the result of
indigenous development.

While it is impossible to understand

Appalachian development without reference to the larger structure
of American capitalism, the fixation upon Appalachia’s
interregional relations has left intraregional political,
cultural and socio-economic patterns largely unexplored.
Appalachian regionalism has gone unheeded.

In studying

Appalachia from the outside in, historians have portrayed the
Appalachian people as having a limited role in their own history.
The adoption of the structural approach will allow us to
31
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heed regionalism, to recover Appalachia's intraregional patterns,
and give the Appalachian people a voice in their history.

This

method of viewing Appalachia from the inside out draws on the
second aspect of Perloff's definition:

A region can be defined

by reference to "extensive interareal activity or flows."

With

her study of preindustrial Eastern Kentucky, Pudup has shown the
way by demonstrating that class formation was an indigenous
process which predated the arrival of the coal industry.
more work along these lines needs to be done.

Much

To make this

effort productive, more attention needs to be paid to how
geographical boundaries are drawn.

Rather than a real or

ascribed homogeneity, areas can be grouped into a region by
reference to the historical, economic and physical links among
them.

For example, in her effort to show social differentiation

in the East Kentucky mountains, Pudup might have been better
served had she used the principle of "interareal activity of
flow" to define region.

In this manner, three contiguous

counties on the same watershed, rather than a "development
cohort" composed of three mostly noncontiguous counties on the
headwaters of three different rivers, would have been selected.
Since rivers— and the roads, and later railroads, which followed
along their banks— were the main arteries of trade,
communication, and transportation, and the loci of towns, such a
region would not only exhibit more internal, social and economic
interaction, but also greater social differentiation.
This nodal approach bears a great deal of similarity to
32

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Walls's third theoretical model, the regional development
approach.

Walls disdained the regional development approach

because of its connection with the ARC and the fact that
proponents had not come to grips with the issues of power in the
region.

These legitimate concerns can be met simply by

dissociating the approach from the ARC and focusing on issues of
power.

This approach, which organizes the spatial dimension of

Appalachia by reference to transportation links between town and
hinterland, common political and economic characteristics, and a
shared culture of regionalism, is an accepted methodology in
regional studies.

Until recently it has not been used widely in

Appalachian historical geography.

The recent publication of two

studies on the Civil War sectional crisis, Kenneth Noe's study of
Southwestern Virginia and John Inscoe's examination of Western
North Carolina, in which the territorial limits of study are
carefully delineated, suggests a movement to the nodal
approach.50
The use of a nodal approach requires a different methodology
than that which has prevailed in Appalachian studies.

If study

areas are to include urbanized areas, then we have to practice
urban as well as the "new rural history."

If the full structure

of Appalachian society is to be considered, then we have to
transcend the bottom-side-up approach of the new social history.
There is no reason, however, why the techniques of the new social
s0Noe, Southwest Virginia's Railroad: John Inscoe, Mountain
Masters. Slavery, and the Sectional Crisis (Knoxville: University
of Tennessee Press, 1989).
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history cannot be applied to the middle and upper classes.
Perhaps the methodological change needed most is a psychological
adjustment.

The Progressive, Socialist, or New Left orientation

of Appalachian studies has led to widespread acceptance of a mode
of interpretation which dehumanizes political and economic
leaders, often portraying them as scoundrels motivated by
selfishness and greed.

We cannot continue to paint caricatures

of the Appalachian elite and middle class if our goal is to
understand its role in the history and complex social relations
of the region.

We need to humanize these figures and make an

earnest effort to understand their motives, treating them with
the same respect and tenderness as has been reserved for "the
people."

This is necessary in order to bring human agency more

deeply into Appalachian studies.
One limitation of the nodal approach, however, is that it
makes it impossible to lump the entire region or even a
significant chunk of it, such as Central Appalachia, into one
study area.

The region is part of several watersheds.

Its

transportation corridors, which have spurred urban growth, flow
in different directions.

Its people have identified with

divergent places and ideas.

Based on its natural and historical

geography, the region should be divided into smaller subregions,
and each should be studied as a single structure.
should be seen as a house with many rooms.

Appalachia

This approach limits

the scope of study— and the level of generalization— to a single
subregion.

This limitation is required to correct a tendency in
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Appalachian studies to make overarching generalizations about the
entire region based on the study of a small part of it.

Let us

return to the basics of historical geography and build a
comprehensive view of the region inductively.
Such an inductive, particularistic approach should not,
however, portray each subregion as an isolated, detached
structure.

Relations with other Appalachian subregions and the

outside are important.

The problem with the colonial and

internal periphery approaches are that both are vague in
specifying what outside entities have actually been in
interaction with Appalachia.

This lack of specificity in the

analysis of Appalachia's interregional relations has been
fostered by the tendency to compare the region with the Third
World.

Although such an approach may promote political goals, it

does not add to our historical or geographical understanding of
Appalachia.

If the latter is our object, then we must pay more

attention to the historical interaction of Appalachian subregions
with their geographical neighbors.

For example, the development

history of the Upper Monongahela region becomes intelligible only
when we understand its political and economic relationships with
surrounding regions:

Eastern Virginia, Southwestern

Pennsylvania, the Baltimore area, and southern West Virginia.
The first two were rivals, the third an important source of
capital and trading partner, and the latter a field for expansion
in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
This study is an attempt to use the nodal approach as
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developed above to produce a development history of the Upper
Monongahela River region of West Virginia, focusing on the period
of industrialization and modernization.

While social, economic,

and geographical theory is used as a framework for analysis, the
format for most of the work is historical narrative and analysis.
The historical approach is used not only because it is inductive
and, thus, takes us closer to empirical reality, but also because
it allows a clear focus on real people— not simply a region's
development trajectory or inexorable forces.

In this humanistic

perspective, people— and the civilization they create— are the
"unit of analysis."

Human agency is recognized (along with

impersonal forces) as a "prime mover" of history.

In this

historical approach the region is seen not only as a territorial
society, but also as a territorial civilization.
One important goal of the study is to show how civilization
in the Upper Monongahela region differed from what has become
accepted as typical in Appalachia.

This is not the Appalachia of

Caudill, Eller, Weller, or even Williams.

It is the Appalachia

of Meredith Sue Willis, an author from Shinnston, an incorporated
industrial town near Clarksburg.

In an interview for the

Appalachian Journal in 1993, Willis described to Thomas E.
Douglass the "separate and special experience" of growing-up in a
middle-class family in this small town.

Her father, who was from

Lee County, Virginia, "signed on with Consolidation Coal" and was
a store manager for the company in Birdie and Jenkins, Kentucky,
and Pound, Virginia, "in the real Appalachias."

Then he was sent
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to Owings, West Virginia, a coal town four miles east of
Shinnston, where he stayed.

He "always had a suit on.

his way off the farm and into the middle class."

That was

Comparing her

experience, Willis said,
On second thought, after looking at Weller's book,
maybe I'm not really a Southern Appalachian. In
Shinnston, West Virginia, a third of the people were
first-generation Italians who came to work in the
mines, and that's a whole different world than Weller
is talking about. From the very beginning, I was well
aware of this group of people who had a different
background from my people. And there were people up in
the hollers who were different still. There was the
middle class, small-town Americans, and the people who
lived up there where you could hardly get there, and
then there were the Italians and some other various
groups. I was aware of a culture clash. . . . [m]y
part of West Virginia is not the Night Comes To the
Cumberlands part of West Virginia. It was an
industrial area. It was mixed culturally.51
Ultimately, every historian must tell a story, or have an
underlying theme or pattern to guide the narrative.

The

selection of an interpretive theme is based on historical
evidence, but also involves a value judgement.

Hostile to

modernity, historians of Appalachia have commonly portrayed the
preindustrial period as a "Golden Age" and modernization as an
unyielding force which brought decline.

In this dissertation,

the civilization of the Upper Monongahela region is portrayed in
the pattern of "rise and fall."

The argument presented herein is

that civilization, measured more or less precisely in terms of
the happiness, spiritual and literary development, self-

51Thomas E. Douglass, "Interview:
Meredith Sue Willis,"
Appalachian Journal 20 (Spring 1993): 287, 293.
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determination, peace (social harmony), and prosperity of the
people, reached its peak along the Upper Monongahela during the
industrial era, not prior to it.
The study is divided into eight chapters.

Chapter two

briefly defines the Upper Monongahela region, catalogues its
natural resources, and outlines its political and economic
relationships with Appalachian neighbors, particularly the Lower
Monongahela region of Pennsylvania.
Chapter three deals with the frontier, ante-bellum, and
Civil War periods in a synoptic manner, focusing on the political
and economic forces and events that led to the "making" of the
Upper Monongahela region.

What made the region unique?

How did

it differ from cismontane Virginia or southwestern Pennsylvania?
The role of the Upper Monongahela region in the statehood
movement, the nature of the revolution of 1863, and economic
development during the 1865 to 1888 period are also explored.
The period of rapid industrialization in the 1888 to 1920
period is the subject of chapter four.

The export base for this

growth was coal, an industry which was controlled by indigenous
capitalists, the so-called "captains of industry."

This chapter

also deals with the evangelist movement during the 1910 to 1920
period.
Chapter five focuses on labor composition, labor relations,
and the labor movement in the coal industry of the Upper
Monongahela region during the period of rapid industrialization.
It focuses on struggles for unionization in the 1890 to 1902
38

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

period and labor and ethnic unrest during the 1910s.

The chapter

closes with a look at the UMWA's successful organization campaign
in 1917 and 1918.
Chapter six deals with the economic and social decline of
the 1920 to 1924 period.

The causes of this decline, the

beginning of the mine war, and the rise of the Ku Klux Klan are
the main topics.

The 1919 strike, the Deckers Creek Valley

strike of 1920-1921, and the 1922 strike, signaling the beginning
of the region's mine war, are described in some detail.
Chapter seven focuses on the results of destructive
competition in the coal industry, focusing on the period of the
Jacksonville agreement from 1924 to 1927.

Accepted at first by

majority of coal companies in the region, the contract with the
UMWA was eventually abrogated by the companies, leading to a
bloody mine war.
The eighth chapter deals with the collapse of the regional
economy during the Great Depression and the reformation of labor
relations and politics during the early New Deal.

The

depression, which brought the ruin of many of the indigenous coal
capitalists, also led to takeover of the industry by outside
interests.

The UMWA, beleaguered by the open shop movement and

rival unions, eventually succeeded in reorganizing the region's
coal miners.
The concluding chapter of the dissertation is a brief
discussion of the implications of the collapse of the 1920s and
the reformation of the 1930s.

The demise of the indigenous
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capitalists, along with the collapse of the economy, brought the
end of independent development and placed the region in a
dependent position in relationship to northern, manufacturing
regions.
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CHAPTER 2: DEFINING THE REGION
Sunday and I climbed the highest hills. The
day is full of stillness and perfumed air and
dreamy sunshine, the sky is marbled with
white clouds against the blue. And through
the trees, I can see the silvery gleam of the
Monongahela River, sparkling and beaming in
the sunshine. The glimpse through the trees
is a picture that gives one an idea of its
beauty and majesty. When God created the
Monongahela some of his colors must have
dripped from his palette.
— Margaret Fowler, ca. 19271
The beauty and majesty of the Monongahela River, its
tributaries, and the land it drains, captured in this homespun
prose as well as in the paintings of Blanche Lazelle and the
sketches of David Hunter Strother, is indeed unsurpassed.
However, in this study it is necessary to forsake aesthetics and
consider only the utilitarian aspects of this Appalachian river
and the land it drains.

The purpose of this chapter is to

describe the Monongahela River and its basin, define the Upper
Monongahela region and catalogue its resources, and outline the
political and economic relationships between this region and its
Appalachian neighbors.
The Monongahela River is formed by the confluence of the
West Fork and Tygart Valley rivers just south of Fairmont, West
Virginia.

The name is probably derived from the Delaware word

1Margaret Fowler to C.E. Smith, n.d. ca. 1927, C.E. Smith
Papers, Box 29; Fowler was a coal miner's wife, a "cub reporter"
for Smith's Fairmont Times, and, for a short period, a union
organizer.
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"Mehmannaunringgehlau," or "river with high banks which fall
in."2

With a slightly different spelling, Monongalia, it is

also the name of a West Virginia county.

Descending from the

mountains of western Randolph and Upshur counties, the Tygart is
considered the parent stream.

It "plunges and roars over and

around rocks, and falls many feet in its passage," making it
unsuitable for all but downstream navigation.3 The West Fork,
typically sluggish and laden with yellow silt, rises in the hills
of Lewis County.

It falls gently, and is less of a navigation

challenge, except in times of low flow.
Like the New River, another Appalachian stream, the
Monongahela is one of the few rivers in the United States which
flows north.

From Fairmont the river weaves its way through the

hills of Marion and Monongalia counties.

With its steep banks,

the river is difficult to approach except where tributaries such
as Buffalo, White Day, and Deckers creeks enter.
narrow floodplain broadens.

Here, the

Just two miles past the Mason-Dixon

line, the Monongahela is joined by one of its two main
tributaries, the Cheat River.

The Cheat, with the exception of

these two miles, is entirely in the state of West Virginia.

It

rises in the mountains of eastern Randolph and Tucker counties,
and like the Tygart, flows precipitously through mountain
country.

On his 1784 journey to ascertain the "best

2Earl L. Core, The Monongalia Storv: A Bicentennial History.
Vol. 1: Prelude (Parsons, W.Va.: McClain Printing Co., 1974), 4.
Richard T. Wiley, Monongahela: The River and Its Region
(Butler, Pa.: The Ziegler Co., 1937), 14.
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communication or portage with the Atlantic waters" with the
"Western Waters,"4 George Washington noted in his journal that
there was a "repugnancy" for the dark waters of the Cheat and the
light waters of the Monongahela to mix, "as there is a plain line
of division betwn. the two for some distance below the fork;
which holds, I am told near a Mile."5

With its large flow, the

Cheat augmented the Monongahela to permit more regular navigation
than what was possible above its mouth.

This, along with the

absence of "Indian depredations," led Albert Gallatin in 1786 to
locate his "homeplace" and manufacturing establishments three
miles below mouth of the Cheat instead of in Virginia, where he
owned thousands of acres.6
After receiving the waters of the Cheat, the Monongahela
continues its course north.
with it.

At McKeesport the Youghigheny unites

The Youghigheny originates in western Maryland and a

small portion of eastern Preston County, West Virginia.

Below

McKeesport, the flood plain of the Monongahela broadens.

This

flat and alluvial land provides the best town and industrial
sites on the river.

At Pittsburgh, the Monongahela, after a 102

4George Washington to John Craig, March 29, 1785, John C.
Fitzpatrick, editor, The Writings of George Washington. 1745-1799
Volume 28; December 5, 1784-August 30, 1786 (Washington, D.C.: GPO,
1938), 118-119.
5George Washington diary entry September 24, 1784, John C.
Fitzpatrick, editor, The Diaries of George Washington 1748-1799.
Volume 2, 1771-1785. second impression (Cambridge, Mass.;
Riverside Press, 1925), 302.
6Dennis H. O'Brien, "Albert Gallatin and Southwestern
Pennsylvania," Unpublished manuscript, 70-71, on file at Friendship
Hill National Historic Site, Point Marion, Pennsylvania.
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mile journey, joins the Allegheny to form the Ohio River.7
The Monongahela River drains an area of 7,384 square miles.
This basin falls in two physiographic subdivisions of the
Appalachian province, the Allegheny plateau and the Allegheny
highlands.

The Allegheny highlands lie east of Chestnut Ridge,

which runs in a general northeast to southwest direction from
eastern Westmoreland County in Pennsylvania to southeastern
Upshur County in West Virginia.

This section is dominated by

high ridges and mountains with elevations ranging from 3,000 to
4,000 feet.

Although some of valleys and ridges are suitable for

agriculture, the mountainous terrain and lack of navigable
streams made this section relatively unattractive to settlers.
The Allegheny plateau lies west of Chestnut Ridge.

The

topography of this highly dissected plateau is hilly rather than
mountainous.

Hilltops reach approximately the same elevation,

1,200 feet, and descend 300 to 500 feet to the valley floor.8
Although the land is broken, "the quality of the Land," as George
Washington noted in 1785, "is inferior to none."

With its

valuable "seats" along the navigable Monongahela, this section
drew many settlers, and by 1785 it was already "much better
settled than any part of the country beyond the Alleghaney [sic]
Mountains."9
7Wiley, Monongahela. 15-16.
80scar L. Chapman, Chairman, Report of the Committee on the
Upper Monongahela Valiev. West Virginia. mimeograph (1934), 1-3.
9George Washington to John Craig, March 29, 1785, John C.
Fitzpatrick, editor, The Writings of George Washington. 113-119.
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Figure 2.1: The Monongahela Region, from U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, Pittsburgh District, 1988.
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In addition to this physiographic division, the Monongahela
River basin can be partitioned into two distinct regions on the
basis of political boundaries and the extent to which the
Monongahela River was navigable in its natural state.

The Lower

Monongahela region lies in Pennsylvania, below the head of
natural navigation on the Monongahela River.

With access to this

transportation corridor (which led from the mouth of the Cheat to
Pittsburgh and down the Ohio River to the west) and with its
political and economic ties to Philadelphia and Harrisburg, the
Lower Monongahela region emerged in the nineteenth century as a
part of the great American manufacturing belt.
The Upper Monongahela region consists of that part of the
basin south of the Mason-Dixon line.

Situated on the upper

reaches of the river system where only downstream navigation was
possible and bound by the regressive policies of the "Old
Dominion," the Upper Monongahela region developed in fits and
starts, and was not fully industrialized until the 1890s.
This study focuses initially on the ten counties of West
Virginia which constitute almost all of the Upper Monongahela
region.

Garrett County, Maryland has been excluded because of

its affiliation with that state.

The boundaries of this region,

defined initially by natural geography and political affiliation,
changed as the pace of political and industrial development
picked up in the second half of the nineteenth century.

The

eastern section of the region, consisting of the Allegheny
highland counties of Tucker and Randolph, sided with the
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Figure 2.2: The Upper Monongahela Region, from Chapman, Report
of the Committee of the Upper Monongahela Valiev. West Virginia.
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Confederacy during the Civil War.

Moreover, these two counties,

along with Upshur and Lewis, were drawn into a different
commercial orbit after the construction of the West Virginia and
Pittsburg Railway in the 1880s and the Coal & coke Railway in
1905.10 These four counties will not be accorded much attention
in the study.
Rather than the entire ten-county Upper Monongahela basin,
this study focuses on the six counties of the northwest known in
coal parlance as the "Fairmont Field" (see maps in Appendix).
Particular attention is given to the urban, industrialized center
of the region, an area embracing the towns of Clarksburg,
Fairmont, Morgantown, and Grafton.

This node is shaped much like

an inverted "Y"; the leg or bottom extends northward along the
Monongahela from Fairmont to Morgantown, and the two upper arms
of the letter extend southward along the Tygart and West Fork
rivers to Grafton and Clarksburg respectively.11 Although the
towns of the region's node never became the great cities
envisioned by civic boosters, they were always centers of
economic and political power and culture, the crossroads of river
and rail transportation, and the principal concentrations of
population.

From the perspective of economic geography, the node

was a center place within the region as well as a tributary to

10Paul Salstrom, "The Upper Potomac Coal Field," in Northern
West Virginia Coal Fields:
Historical Context. Institute for
History of Technology & Industrial Archaeology (1994), 67.
11Chapman, Report of the Committee on the Upper Monongahela
Valiev. 5.
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greater urban places in the northern and eastern manufacturing
belt.

The node drew upon the human and natural resources of the

hinterland and channeled them inward, drawing off some of surplus
value and sending the remainder to urban centers outside the
region.

As industrialization commenced in the late nineteenth

century, large-scale industrial enterprises were initiated from
the node, consumers were attracted from the hinterland, and the
urban center grew in wealth and population.

This growth spilled

over into the hinterland, where smaller scale urban places
developed.12
The Upper Monongahela region was not, of course, isolated
from other regions, but linked by transportation corridors,
trade, and political ties to neighbors.

Considering its

location, one would expect towns in the Lower Monongahela region
to be its principal trading partners.
case.

This, however, was not the

The Monongahela River, despite some downriver traffic in

lumber and other commodities in the late-eighteenth and earlynineteenth century, was never the main conduit for trade, even
after slackwater was extended to Fairmont in 1904.13 Rather
than a partner, the lower Monongahela, with Pittsburgh as its
node, was a rival.

The Pittsburgh region developed with few

12Peter Dicken and Peter E. Lloyd, Location in Space;
Theoretical Perspectives in Economic Geography. 3rd edition (New
York; Harper Collins, 1990), 25-45.
13|,Monongahela River Commerce, 1845-1920," Chart, with hand
written information providing an update until 1923, U.S. Engineer
Office, Pittsburgh District, Pittsburgh, Pa., dated August 27,
1921.
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inputs from its upstream neighbor.

Largely excluded from the

Pittsburgh market after about 1850, the trade and communications
of the upper Monongahela flowed mainly on an east-west axis,
first to Winchester, Virginia and Baltimore, Maryland via the
Northwestern Turnpike, then later on the Baltimore and Ohio
Railroad to Baltimore and to points west.

Because of its

economic connections to Baltimore, the Upper Monongahela region
could be considered a western hinterland of that important
seaboard city during the second half of the nineteenth century.
As rivalry and limited intercourse characterized the
economic relations of the Upper Monongahela region with its
powerful northern neighbor, its economic ties with another
neighbor, eastern Virginia (Tidewater and Piedmont) were even
more tenuous.

Little trade occurred between the Upper

Monongahela region and eastern Virginia.

Moreover, political

relations between the two regions were volatile.

Allied with the

Upper Ohio valley region and, at first, the Valley of Virginia,
the Upper Monongahela region was involved in a sectional struggle
with eastern Virginia throughout the ante-bellum period.

Rooted

in the basic socio-economic differences between the two sections,
that controversy waxed and waned over issues such as
representation, taxation, suffrage, and internal improvements.
Along with the realization that their region was falling behind
its northern neighbor, the sectional struggle brought the people
of the Upper Monongahela to a distinct regional consciousness in
the nineteenth century.

The political movement which this
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regional consciousness inspired ultimately led to the creation of
the state of West Virginia during the Civil War.

Along with the

frontier experience, this political movement is key to
understanding the region's ante-bellum history.
Before we examine these historical themes, it is necessary
to look briefly at the natural resources of the Upper Monongahela
region.

Today's "new regional history" tends to explain the

formation and development of regions by emphasizing social and
historical processes, ignoring "natural geography."

While the

movement away from environmental determinism is welcome, we
cannot afford to neglect topography, natural resources, and
location.

They remain the context for regional studies.

These

environmental factors do not rigidly determine a region's
development and identity, but they pose challenges and
opportunities to which a regional society must respond.
In the second half of the nineteenth century, those who
promoted the new state of West Virginia— and by implication the
Upper Monongahela region— pointed with pride to its "boundless
resources," which they proclaimed as a harbinger of unlimited
prosperity.14 And, indeed, the Upper Monongahela region was well
endowed with natural resources.

When the first European settlers

arrived, a nearly continuous hardwood forest covered the land.
Although some of this vast forest was cleared by the settlers,
who girdled the trees, much remained longer, and logging
continued as a major industry until about 1920.

A considerable

14Williams, West Virginia and the Captains of Industry. 2.
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portion of the region, particularly in the highlands, is rough
and steep.

However, enough rolling and level land exists in the

region to support agriculture.

The soils are thin, except in

the valleys and terraces, but rich enough for light cropping and
grazing.

Throughout the region, mixed agriculture was

practiced, but more successfully on the Allegheny plateau.

The

limestone soils of Harrison and Lewis counties made this area a
leading center of livestock production.
Much of the wealth of the region lies underground and was
not tapped until the second half of the nineteenth century.

Oil

and natural gas, especially the latter, are found in sandstone
beds in Harrison, Lewis, Marion and Monongalia counties.
Commercial exploitation of natural gas began here in the 1890s
and was the basis for the glass, carbon black, and other
industries.

Furthermore, all of the minerals required for the

production of iron are available.
throughout the region.

Limestone is plentiful

Iron ore is found in limited quantities

along Chestnut Ridge, a fact accounting for the location of a
massive ante-bellum iron industry there.

Iron carbonate ore was

extracted from three separate veins ranging in thickness from two
inches to three feet.

Clay suitable for the manufacture of

brick, tile, and pottery is present, as well as building stone,
and sand and gravel are widely available.15

15Chapman, Report of the Committee on the Upper Monongahela
Valiev. 50-54; James A. Barlow, "Geology of the Monongahela
Country," in Core, The Monongalia Story. Vol. 1: Prelude. 37.
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The most important mineral resource of the Upper Monongahela
region is bituminous coal.

It is part of the great Appalachian

coal basin which extends from the New York-Pennsylvania border to
central Alabama.

The richest "measures" in the world,

Appalachian coal was laid down in the Pennsylvanian period, 280
to 320 million years ago.

At that time the Appalachian region

was a vast trough or geosyncline.

Swamp forests thrived in the

carbon dioxide-rich atmosphere of that period and left large
deposits of peat.

As the level of the trough was lowered, the

swamps were inundated by shallow seas and the peat deposits were
covered by layers of sediment.

The alternating lowering and

raising of the level of the trough caused alternating deposition
of peat and sediment and produced the characteristic
stratigraphic column of alternating coal and rock seams that is
evident today.

The Appalachian Orogeny or uplift, which occurred

at the end of the Pennsylvanian period and established the
Appalachian mountain chain, brought the coal-forming era to an
end.

Heat and pressure during the mountain-building and later

periods caused the deposits of peat to be transformed into
bituminous coal.16
Geologists divide the columnar section of the coal measures
16Barlow, "Geology of the Monongalia County," 19-48. Much of
the pioneering work in the identification of the coal measures of
Appalachia was done by Israel C. White (1848-1927), professor at
West Virginia University and also State Geologist. In 1888 White
filed the report "Stratigraphy of the Appalachian Coal Fields" with
the U.S. Geological Survey. White's numerous publications, filled
with glowing reports on the quantity and quality of coal in his
home state and region, did much to promote the industry; Coal Age.
Vol. 2, No. 10 (September 7, 1912), 328.
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into discrete groups of alternating coal and rock veins called
series.

Each series, having been deposited at a different time,

is situated at a different level and has a different composition
of rock and coal veins.

Five distinct series of coal-bearing

rocks have been identified within the upper Monongahela region.
From top to bottom— youngest to oldest— the five are the Dunkard,
Monongahela, Conemaugh, Allegheny, and Pottsville series.

Only

three of these yield coal of sufficient thickness and quality to
be mined on a commercial scale.
The Dunkard Series, once known as the "Upper Barren
Measures" because of the dearth of minable coal seams, contains
only one minable seam, the Washington, which has been mined on a
small scale in western Monongalia County.
The Monongahela Series, or, as it was known in the
nineteenth century, the "Upper Productive Measures," is found
below the Dunkard.

It takes its name from the Monongahela River,

along which it outcrops, and is found mainly west of the
Monongahela and Tygart rivers.

Except for high knobs in Preston

County, as well as along Georges Creek in Western Maryland,
erosion has removed it in the eastern part of the region.

The

Monongahela series is 400 feet thick and contains six coal seams,
five of which are of commercial importance.

From top to bottom

the important seams are the Waynesburg, Uniontown, Sewickley,
Redstone, and the Pittsburgh.

The Sewickley and Pittsburgh are

similar in chemical analysis and have been extensively mined.
The Monongahela series contains the Pittsburgh, the most
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important seam in the region.

In the West Virginia Geological

Survey's Report on Coal. 1903, I. C. White acclaimed the
Pittsburgh seam, which extends into Pennsylvania, Ohio, and
Maryland, as being unsurpassed by any other in the world in
importance and value.17 Although figures are not available, far
more tonnage has been mined from this seam than from any other in
the region.

In the region's three most productive counties—

Monongalia, Marion and Harrison— the Pittsburgh seam has been
heavily mined.

In Marion and Harrison counties underground

mining has been largely confined to the Pittsburgh seam.
The Pittsburgh seam is favored for several reasons.

It is

thick, averaging about seven feet in height, and, unlike many
seams, it is free from major faults, dips and rolls.

It is also

a high-quality coal with an average analysis of 54.80 per cent
fixed carbon, 38.70 per cent volatile matter, 6.10 percent ash,
1.50 percent moisture, and 2.10 percent sulphur.

Pockets of

Pittsburgh coal with a lower sulphur content lie in parts of
Marion County.

Like most northern West Virginia coals,

Pittsburgh is a high-volatile coal.

The high proportion of

volatile matter in Pittsburgh coal made it a favored raw material
for gas producers during the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries.

It was more widely used in the manufacture of cement

and for steam-making, especially by the railroads.

The sulphur

content of the Pittsburgh seam makes it less desirable as a

17West Virginia Geological Survey, Vol. 2:
(Morgantown: Morgantown Post, 1903), 164.

Report on Coal
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coking coal, but under certain conditions good-quality coke has
been manufactured from it, especially after washing.
The Conemaugh Series, or "Lower Barren Measures" has only a
single minable seam, the Bakerstown, which has been mined on a
limited basis in Preston County.

The Allegheny series, or "Lower

Productive Measures," lies below the Conemaugh and is 600 feet
thick.

Although present throughout the Upper Monongahela region,

its great depth in the section west of the Monongahela River
makes mining it there impracticable.

East of the Monongahela

River, where the Monongahela series has a limited presence, the
Allegheny series outcrops, and here it has been heavily mined.
Of the six coal seams in the series, five have been commercially
mined— the Upper Freeport, Lower Freeport, Upper Kittanning,
Lower Kittanning, and Clarion.

The Upper Freeport and Lower

Kittanning have been the most favored seams.

Both generally

range from three to six feet in thickness and are slightly lower
in ash and sulphur than the Pittsburgh, making them better suited
for coking.18
The Pottsville Series lies below the Allegheny.

Like the

Allegheny, it is present throughout the region, but its great
depth makes mining impossible except in Randolph County, where it
tilts upward.

Here, the Stockton-Lewiston or Belmont, the

Coalburg, and the Winifrede seams were mined after the completion

18Ray V. Hennen, West Virginia Geological Survey:
Marion.
Monongahela and Tavlor Counties. (Wheeling: Wheeling News Litho
Co., 1913), 215-363.
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of the Coal & Coke Railway in 1905.19
In considering the region's "boundless resources," it is
important to note that its Appalachian neighbors possessed
natural resources of equal or greater value.

Even the most

acclaimed resource of the Upper Monongahela region, coal, is
generally inferior to that found in the coal fields which
surround it.

The Pittsburgh seam contains less sulphur in the

Connellsville District of Southwestern Pennsylvania and in the
Georges Creek field of Western Maryland.

And none of coals of

the Upper Monongahela region can match the low-ash and lowsulphur coals of the New River, Pochahontas, Logan, and Kanawha
fields of southern West Virginia.

In nearly every category, the

Lower Monongahela region had resources which surpassed those of
its upland neighbor.

Although it quickly lost its hardwood

forests to land-hungry settlers, the Lower Monongahela region
boasted more farmland for its size, a less broken topography,
more and better-quality iron ore, and supplies of white, as well
as red, clay for pottery.

The most important advantage of the

Lower Monongahela region, however, was location.

Situated on the

navigable portion of the Monongahela and at the forks of the Ohio
River, it was located on the nation's busiest ante-bellum
transportation corridor.
Thus, the settlers of the Upper Monongahela came to a land
endowed with the inputs for economic development, but lacking the

19Paul Salstrom, "The Elkins Coal Field," in Northern West
Virginia Coal Fields: Historical Context. 92.
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superior resources and favorable location of its northern
neighbor.

As a result, they would find themselves at a

competitive disadvantage in their quest for material prosperity
in the nineteenth century.
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CHAPTER 3:

THE MAKING OF A REGION

The Frontier Legacy
As the Upper Monongahela region became the storm center of a
great industrial and social upheaval in the 1920s, its "natives,"
many of whom were descendants of the first pioneers, recalled and
celebrated their frontier heritage.

The "thrilling exploits" of

Indian fighters such as David Morgan, Jesse Hughes, and Lewis
Wetzel were related.1 Receiving little of the sympathy which is
accorded them by contemporary authors, the Indians were portrayed
as a "noble, yet savage and heathen race" who deserved their
fate.

Even the sadistic feat of David Morgan, one of the

builders of Pricketts Fort near present-day Fairmont, was related
with no remorse.

Morgan became a frontier hero not only because

he slayed two Indians who threatened his family, but also because
he tanned their hides, using the material to make a shot pouch
and saddle skirt.2 Higher praise went to the "sturdy pioneers"
who cleared the forests and opened the farms, and who endured
innumerable hardships to create a civilization from the "howling
wilderness."

It was explained that these men and women were

"taught in the school" of self-reliance, "noble endurance, and

1One of the best of the local and county histories published
in this period was written by the Class of the 1916 of Fairmont
High School, Marion County in the Making (1917).
This book
features a foreword by, and is dedicated to, J.O. Watson, an
executive of Consolidation Coal Company and nephew of the coal
baron J.E. Watson.
2Ibid., 104; Colonel Morgan Monument Commission, Report
(Charleston, WV, 1924), 70-83; Charles Henry Ambler, West Virginia:
The Mountain State (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1940), 157-160.
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intrepid daring."3
The frontier was not only recalled, it was celebrated in
civic rite.

In 1923 the city of Clarksburg held a grand

historical pageant, "The Shawnee Trail," to promote its community
service project and to pay tribute to forbearers.

With a cast of

over three hundred community-minded volunteers portraying
historical figures, as well as "Forest Nymphs" and "Rainbow
Fairies," the pageant dramatized the history of the city and
Harrison County.

Over two-thirds of the play was devoted the

frontier and the early nineteenth century, and much of the
remainder to the statehood movement.

A "Prologue" written by

Judge Haymond Maxwell expresses the spirit of the pageant.
reading commences after "Dance Drama:

The

The Blue Grass Fields of

West Virginia,"
To the hills of northwestern Virginia came pioneers of
hardy stock— adventurous and sturdy. With broad vision
unobscured by the light chaff of social fiction, men
and women yearning for larger freedom and unhampered
opportunity defied hardships, conquered the wilderness
and laid deep and firm the foundations of true American
citizenship. The men were plain and unpretentious—
indefatigable in industry and undaunted in courage. By
their sides were women superb in personal charm,
unsurpassed in home-making, unafraid in the face of
danger, and withal consecrated to virtuous and noble
lives. Thus, without the mockery of assumed elegance,
but guided and controlled by principles of simple
living and plain dealing, there grew and flourished a
national spirit of loyaly [sic] and a community
sentiment of brotherhood that is our cherished

3Fairmont High School Class of 1916, Marion County in the
Making. 121-146; J.R. Dodge, West Virginia: Its Farms and Forests.
Mines and Oil-Wells (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott & Co., 1865),
9.
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inheritance.4
In the 1920s, descendants of "pioneers of hardy stock"
celebrated the virtues of frontier life.

They took pride in the

fact that the blood of the pioneers flowed through their veins,
and proclaimed that noble qualities were still present among the
best people of the region.

John W. Davis of Clarksburg, a native

son and the Democratic candidate for President in 1924, was "the
scion of a pioneer family," according to the Fairmont Times.
Davis' "liberal politics," the newspaper explained, were the
natural outcome of the fact that he was a "son of the Western
Waters."

Echoing the frontier thesis of Frederick Jackson

Turner, the newspaper stated that Davis grew up in the "valley of
the new democracy" in "more primitive democratic and
individualistic conditions than prevail further east."5
The frontier legacy was also used as an explanation for
conservative tendencies.

J.E. Watson, the coal baron who

"bravely passed on to his eternal sleep" in 1926 at his "beloved
High Gate," was eulogized for his "sturdy character," which he
inherited from his "sturdy ancestors."

Related to three of the

four most important pioneer families in Marion County, Watson was
the grandson of the "father of the West Virginia coal industry,"
James Otis Watson, himself a "sturdy oak."

"J.E.," as he was

called, was known for his quiet strength, and his "shrewd and

4City of Clarksburg Pageant Committee,
Program (Clarksburg, 1923), unpaginated.

The Shawnee Trail

5Fairmont Times. "Clarksburg Celebrates," July 10, 1924.
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conservative manner."6
No doubt this revival of the frontier spirit was related to
the impending social crisis of the period.

As an archaic

response to the turmoil and uncertainty of the times, the
renaissance was an attempt to revive traditional values.

If some

sought to instill a sense of community and promote social harmony
with traditional values, others sought to exclude, to marginalize
an increasingly militant ethnic population and a combative
miners' union.

We must postpone a discussion of the "testing

time" of the 1920s until later, however.
frontier period.

Now we must turn to the

Along with the Civil War and statehood movement

of the 1860s and the mine war of the 1920, the frontier era was a
watershed in the history of the region.

As illustrated by the

renaissance of the 1920s, the frontier left an enduring cultural
legacy:

an ethic of rugged individualism, which was both the

basis for the development of democracy and an aggressive
capitalist spirit, and a combative ethnocentrism.

This period

also marked the beginnning of the development of a socio-economic
order which differed from that of neighboring regions.
The Americans of Scotch-Irish, English, and German descent
who settled in the land drained by the Monongahela River during
the 1750 to 1800 period came predominantly from an earlier
frontier, the Great Valley of Virginia.

By about 1750 the best

lands in the Valley had been taken and the game had grown scarce.

6Fairmont Times. August 3, 1926; Watson died on the preceding
day.
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Driven by land-hunger, the desire for freedom, adventure and the
chase, the hardy pioneers "turned their faces longingly to the
west" and crossed the great Appalachian mountain barrier to
settle in the Monongahela wilderness.7 These men and women were
necessarily of hardy stock, resourceful and independent.

After

they crossed the mountains, they found themselves in a no-man's
land claimed by a number of competing groups.

Several Indian

tribes, the French, the English, as well as Virginia and
Pennsylvania, contested for the land.

Until the conclusion of

the Revolution and the resolution of the Virginia-Pennsylvania
boundary dispute in 1784, no government exercised sovereignty in
the Monongahela country.

As a result, the Monongahela frontier

remained in a state of nearly incessant warfare from the
beginning of the French and Indian War in 1754 until 1794, when
General Anthony Wayne's victory at the Battle of Fallen Timbers
eliminated the Indian threat.8
With no government to protect them, the settlers naturally
developed the sturdy, individualistic virtues of the frontier.
Asserting that individualism "produces antipathy to control, and
particularly to any direct control," Frederick Jackson Turner
claimed that "frontier individualism has from the beginning

7James C. McGregor, The Disruption of Virginia (New York: The
Macmillan Company, 1922), 7; Lucullus Virgil McWhorter, Border
Settlers of Northwestern Virginia from 1768 to 1795 (Hamilton,
Ohio: The Republican Publishing Company, 1915), 31.
sO'Brien, "Albert Gallatin and Southwestern Pennsylvania," 739; Core, The Monongalia Story, Vol. 1: Prelude, 156.
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promoted democracy."9 While political democracy can be more
clearly traced to English roots, there is little doubt that the
frontier engendered a more equalitarian society than that which
had developed in the East.

With a climate unsuited for the

cultivation of tobacco or other plantation crops, slavery failed
to take root in the Monongahela country.

Instead, the

patriarchal family became the primary social, economic, and
political unit.

According to historian Charles Ambler, the

western Virginia frontier was occupied and conquered by "bands of
congenial families."10 Each family took up land, usually a
tract of from 100 to 400 acres, cleared it for crops and soon
became largely self-sufficing.

Although families in the same

"band" often settled in the same vicinity and intermarried, no
towns similar to those which characterized New England developed.
Small communities sprang up at crossroads or near watermills, but
the population was largely dispersed about the countryside.

With

no plantation slavery and a limited town life, the rigid racial
and class distinctions of the East failed to develop.
While socio-economic differences between eastern Virginia
and the Upper Monongahela region were obvious by the time of the
Revolution, those between the Lower and Upper Monongahela regions
Frederick Jackson Turner, "The Significance of the Frontier
in American History," in The Frontier in American History (New
York: Henry Holt and Company, 1920), 1-39. This classic essay was
originally read at the meeting of the American Historical
Association in Chicago on July 12, 1893.
10Ambler, "The Cleavage Between Eastern and Western Virginia,"
The American Historical Review Vol. 15 (October 1909 to July 1910),
762.
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were less pronounced and took longer to manifest themselves.
Both regions were settled by pioneers of similar ethnic
derivation from the southern colonies of Virginia and Maryland.
Since it was unclear which colonial or state government actually
had jurisdiction in the Monongahela country until 1784, political
loyalties were of little importance.

However, after about 1768

demographic differences between the two regions appeared.

The

Lower Monongahela region received a great influx of settlers from
eastern Pennsylvania and New Jersey.

Few of this second wave of

settlers came to the Upper Monongahela region.11 A second cause
of differentiation was the greater population increase in the
northern region.

Although the population of the Lower

Monongahela region was undoubtedly more numerous prior to 1768,
its lead over the Upper Monongahela region dramatically increased
in the remainder of the eighteenth century.

In addition to the

more rugged topography, the Upper Monongahela appeared less
inviting to settlers because of Indian "depredations," which
continued until the 1790s.

No "bloody Indian forays" occurred in

the area of Fayette County, Pennsylvania after 1755.12 Other
parts of the lower region, particularly west of the Monongahela
River, were not as fortunate, but they remained more secure than
the upper region.
11Solon J. Buck and Elizabeth H. Buck, The Planting of
Civilization in Western Pennsylvania (Pittsburgh: University of
Pittsburgh Press, 1939), 3; O'Brien, "Albert Gallatin and
Southwestern Pennsylvania," 40-41.
12Veech, The Monongahela of Old. 98; O'Brien, "Albert Gallatin
and Southwestern Pennsylvania," 27.
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While the conditions of frontier life promoted an
equalitarian society, political democracy came to the Monongahela
country as part of the Revolution andthe formation of the first
governments during the 1770s.

The frontiersmen of the

Monongahela overwhelmingly supported the Revolution.

Ambler

declared that "[i]n Virginia the movement which culminated in
national independence was largely a revolt of the democratic
interior under the leadership of Patrick Henry, against the
conservative lowland, under the leadership of Pendleton and
Randolph.1,13 A disproportionally large number of Monongahela
pioneers fought in the war, either onthe home front against
Indians or as part of the Continental Army.

The famed Minute Men

drew volunteers from the Monongahela frontier.14
The Revolution inspired a democratic reform movement on the
Upper Monongahela frontier.

Allied with the Great Valley of

Virginia and the Piedmont against the conservative Tidewater, the
westerners pressed for general suffrage and other democratic
provisions during Virginia's constitutional convention of 1776.
They were disappointed with the Virginia Constitution of 1776,
which restricted suffrage to those who then exercised it (persons
owning twenty-five acres of improved or one hundred acres of
unimproved land), and gave the west little representation in the

13Ibid., 763.
14Core, The Monongalia Story. Vol. 2: The Pioneers. 91-93.
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General Assembly.15 The beginning of western discontent with
the political system of Virginia cam be dated from the
ratification of this essentially conservative document.
It was unclear in 1776, however, if the state of Virginia
actually had jurisdiction over the Monongahela country. The
lands drained by the Monongahela River were claimed by both
Virginia and Pennsylvania until 1784.

During the latter years of

the Revolution, partisans from both states roved the area near
the Mason-Dixon line, keeping the settlers in "continual
excitement."16

In the midst of this confusion, during the time

when Virginia was writing its 1776 Constitution, the settlers of
the Monongahela country proposed the creation of a "distinct and
independent province and government, by the name of
Westsylvania."

The bounds of this prospective state included

most of Pennsylvania beyond the Alleghenies, west Virginia, and
eastern Kentucky.
Congress, however.

The new state did not receive the sanction of
Virginia retained its claim to lands

southwest of the Ohio River, and in 1780 reached a partial
settlement with Pennsylvania.

It was not until 1784, however,

that the Mason-Dixon line was extended to the comer of the
southwestern comer of Pennsylvania and the boundary dispute was
settled.

The significance of the Westsylvania scheme was that it

was an early manifestation of sectionalism in the Monongahela

15Ambler, Sectionalism in Virginia. 29-30.
16Frederick Jackson Turner, The Significance of Sections in
American History (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1932), 104.
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country.17 As Turner noted in his lesser known work, The
Significance of Sections in American History: "the project for a
state in that region was too well founded to die out, as the
history of the state of West Virginia proves."18
After the Revolution a new wave of settlers came to the
Monongahela country.

While settlers came to the Lower

Monongahela over Braddock's or Forbes' roads, the most important
road which the settlers followed to the Upper Monongahela was
McCullough's Path, which was improved and became a state road in
1786.

Later known as the "Great Wagon Road," this route led from

Winchester and the Shenandoah Valley through Romney on the South
Branch, then across the mountains to Morgantown and Clarksburg.
From Clarksburg the road led westward down the Little Kanawha
River to Parkersburg on the Ohio River.

Winchester, the eastern

terminus, afforded the most convenient market for the western
settlers.

Here they could trade deerskins, cattle, whiskey, or

agricultural products for salt and other necessities.19
Differences between the two Monongahela regions became

17While Markusen in Regions. 79, 263, makes no distinction
between the terms section and region, Turner defines a region as a
"subdivision of a section" in The United States, 1830-1850
(Gloucester, Mass., Peter Smith, 1958), 12.
In this study,
Turner's distinction has been adopted.
Thus, regionalism is a
political movement opposing an outside entity which is confined to
a single region, such as the upper Monongahela.
Sectionalism
occurs when a region allies with another region against a common
adversary.
18Turner, The Significance of Sections in American History.
106.
19Ambler, West Virginia. 182; Lough, Now and Long Ago. 39, 102.
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pronounced after the Revolution.

While Southwestern

Pennsylvanians resented the centralizing tendencies of the
Federalists, Northwestern Virginians at first favored them.

The

vote on the ratification of the Constitution illuminates this
split.

Due to the political machinations of Pennsylvania

Federalists, southwestern Pennsylvania had no role in the
ratification proceedings.

Not a single delegate from the Western

counties was present at the Commonwealth's ratification
convention in 1788.

Had a western delegation been there,

however, it clear it would have voted against the Constitution.
Westerners disliked the centralizing features of the new frame of
government, and after the Pennsylvania convention they
participated in a movement to amend it to make it less
"objectionable."20 On the other hand, northwest Virginians
favored the Constitution and most of its delegates voted for it
at Virginia's convention in 1788.

They were unhappy with

Virginia's method of dealing with Indian problems, and they
wanted the frontier protection that a strong central government
would presumably provide.

During the Whiskey Rebellion in 1794,

many southwestern Pennsylvanians, in part because they had been
denied a voice in the ratification of the Constitution, rebelled
against Federal authority.

A Federal revenue office was also

20Raymond Walters, Jr. Albert Gallatin: Jeffersonian Financier
and Diplomat (University of Pittsburgh Press, 1957) 26-30; the
connection between southwestern Pennsylvania's role in the
ratification of the Constitution and the Whiskey Rebellion is
stressed in Michael E. Workman, "In Defense of the AntiFederalists," Constitutional Connections *87 Vol. 2, No. 2
(September 1987), 6-7.
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attacked in Morgantown, but few northwestern Virginians joined
the rebellion.

Northwestern Virginia remained in the Federalist

camp until 1795, the year of the signing of the Treaty of
Greenville.21 Led by Congressman Albert Gallatin, however,
southwestern Pennsylvania opposed Federalist policies from the
start.
By about 1800 the Upper Monongahela region was no longer a
frontier.

Immigration from the east continued, but the Indian

threat had ended and most of the choice lands along the
Monongahela River and its major tributaries, the West Fork and
Tygart, had been taken.

The earliest settlers found the mouths

of the major creeks along these streams especially attractive.
These sites had the best mill and town seats, level farm land,
access to the Monongahela River (which was navigable downstream
part of the year) , and a natural connection to the interior.
Those who came later were compelled to locate further in the
interior.22

Despite some concentration of population along the

major streams, the population was largely dispersed and small in
number.

Most of the region's mountainous interior was vacant.

Monongalia, Harrison, and Randolph, the three counties which had
been organized by this time, had a combined population of

21Ambler, West Virginia. 193-186.
22See Dorothy Davis, History of Harrison Countv. West Virginia
(Clarksburg, WV: American Association of University Women, 1970),
4-5, for a map showing the streams along which early settlers
claimed land in that county: the West Fork River and its two main
tributaries, Ten Mile Creek and Elk Creek.
70

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

15,164.23 By comparison, the Lower Monongahela region had a
much larger population.

Fayette County, Pennsylvania, for

example, had a population of 20,159 in 1800, while Monongalia
County, situated just across the Mason-Dixon line, held only
4,768 people.24 Since the topography and soils of Fayette and
Monongalia counties are similar, the main reason for the
population difference must have been locational.
situated on an important transportation artery:

Fayette was
Braddock's Road

(later the route of the National Road), which met the navigable
Monongahela River at Brownsville.

Monongalia County, despite its

connection to Winchester, was more isolated.

The First Industrial Revolution
As the frontier passed, the people of the upper Monongahela
turned from building forts and defending their rude cabins to

^Department of Interior, Census Office, Report on Population
of the United States at the Eleventh Census: 1890. Part I.
Population. Table 4, "Population of States and Territories by
Counties, at each Census, 1790 to 1890," 45. Monongalia, Harrison
and Randolph counties were carved up in subsequent decades as the
remaining seven counties in the region were created. Lewis County
was formed in 1816 from part of Harrison County? Preston was
created in 1818 from Monongalia; Marion in 1842 from Monongalia and
Harrison; Barbour in 1843 from Randolph, Lewis, and Harrison;
Taylor in 1844 from Harrison, Barbour, and Marion; Upshur in 1851
from Randolph, Barbour, and Lewis counties; and Tucker from
Randolph in 1856. E. Lee North, The 55 West Virginias (Morgantown:
West Virginia University Press, 1985); and William Thomdale and
William Dollarhide, Map Guide to the U.S. Federal Censuses. 17901920 (Baltimore: Genealogical Publishing Co., 1987), 367-373.
24Ibid., 36-37.
Fayette is the only county in Southwestern
Pennsylvania which lies entirely within the Monongahela basin, a
fact which makes it impossible to ascertain the total population of
the Lower Monongahela region.
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improving their lands, and constructing mills and iron furnaces.
The settlers' predominant occupation was agriculture.

Although

farm families had to build a homestead and learn how to meet
their own needs first, many were able to produce a surplus for
market.

The change from a subsistence to a market-oriented

agriculture occurred in the first decades of the nineteenth
century.

Surplus grain was fed to horses, cattle, and hogs,

which were driven in droves to eastern markets, particularly
Baltimore and Philadelphia.

After the wolves were thinned in the

1820s, sheep raising for wool became a major agricultural
specialty.

Especially lucrative was the cattle industry.

In

fact, by the 1820s cattle undergirded the region's economy and
provided capital for the building of mills, stores, and other
improvements.

A few families which later became prominent in the

coal and oil and gas industries, such as the Lowndes and Goffs of
Harrison County and the Watsons of Marion County, built up
sizable holdings of land and capital through the cattle
industry.25
The period from 1800 to 1860 was marked by the first efforts
at industrialization.

While the transition from frontier life to

an industrial economy based on water power and transport, wood,
and iron (the so-called first industrial revolution) did occur,
it was incomplete and mostly unsuccessful.

Despite a promising

start, by 1860 the region lagged well behind its rapidly

^Core, Vol. Ill, Discord. 471; Davis, History of Harrison
County. 776-80 on the importance of cattle as a market item.
72

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

industrializing northern neighbor.

As will be shown, lag was a

product of both economic geography and Virginia's sectional
politics.

The region's industrialists were handicapped by poor

location, lack of a "home" market, strong competition from
neighboring regions, and a dearth of transportation improvements.
Recognizing its backwardness, the region's leaders, with some
justification, placed the blame squarely on the shoulders of the
eastern Virginia planters, whose policies, especially on internal
improvements, seemed designed to retard development.
Fittingly enough, the last Indian seen in Marion County was
spotted in 1800 at Fort Hill, which rises above Buffalo Creek
near Fairmont, by a group of men digging the mill-race for the
Bamesville woolen mill.26 Although a few water-powered mills
were built in the frontier period, a great surge in mill
construction occurred during the first two decades of the
nineteenth century.

By 1820 watermills were situated on every

major stream and on many smaller ones in the region.
multipurpose mills:
wool.

Many were

they ground grain, sawed lumber, and carded

The importance of these early industrial plants would be

difficult to overemphasize.

Watermills provided communities with

flour and lumber; they also provided a way to transform
agricultural surpluses and forest products into exportable
commodities.

Lumber was probably the most important export of

26Fairmont High School Class of 1916, Marion County in the
Making. 117; "Bamesville Woolen Mill is Running at Full Force,"
Fairmont Times, July 13, 1924.
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the region in the ante-bellum period.

Settlers of the Lower

Monongahela region cleared the hardwood forests quite early, so
there was a demand for lumber, especially the hardwoods, oak and
chestnut, for construction and boatbuilding.

The lumber business

was important throughout the region but its center in this period
was the West Fork and its tributaries, where plentiful supplies
of white oak were found.
sawmills and boatyards.

Villages and towns grew up beside the
For example, Lumberport, situated at the

mouth of Tenmile Creek in Harrison County, became a center by the
1830s for lumber milling and the construction of flatboats.27
Prior to the construction of region's first railroads in the
1850s, the Monongahela River and its major tributaries served as
the conduit for the lumber trade.

Although unprocessed logs were

shipped, it was also common practice to square the logs and then
assemble them into a raft, usually three lengths long and twelve
logs wide.

When the streams rose to the proper stage, the rude

crafts were floated downstream to markets at Pittsburgh and other
boatbuilding towns along the river such as California or
Elizabeth, or further downstream to Louisville and Cincinnati.
In 1300 Virginia declared the Monongahela, West Fork, Tygart
River, and several tributaries navigable public highways.

Not

only lumber but also iron products, whiskey and flour were
shipped downstream.

For example, Benjamin Wilson testified in

1821 that in thirty years he had shipped more than 200,000 board

27Harvey W. Harmer, Old Grist Mills of Harrison County (NP,
1940) 28.
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feet of lumber from his West Fork mills to Pittsburgh.28
The men who built and operated the watermills were the first
great capitalists of the region.

Some were able to accumulate

good-sized fortunes through the local and export business.
Considering the fact that a mill was not only a paying
investment, but also a "good thing for the community," it is
interesting to see how many of the mills were built, owned, and
operated by public officials and other "very distinguished men."
Harvey W. Harmer, who prepared a profile of Harrison County mill
owners, related that "lawyers, and other public officials, such
as assessors, members of the County Court, County and Circuit
Clerks, Sheriffs and Deputy Sheriffs, members of the House of
Delegates, State Senators, Judges of the State Circuit and
Supreme Court, United States District Attorneys, Judges of the
United States District and Circuit Courts, members of Congress,
United States Senators, and a Governor" owned or operated mills
in Harrison County in the nineteenth century.29 Perhaps the
three most prominent Harrison County men who combined politics
with industry were Joseph Johnson of Bridgeport, who was elected
Governor of Virginia in 1852, John George Jackson, a Congressman
and important industrialist, and John S. Carlisle, who served in
both the U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate.

This

union of business and politics in the milling industry

28Leland Johnson, The Headwaters District (Pittsburgh:
Army Corps of Engineers, 1977), 48, 50.
^Ibid., iii.
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U.S.

established a pattern which would continue throughout the
region's development.

Harmar also noted which side the mill

owners choose during the Civil War.

None sided with the

Confederacy, and two, John S. Carlisle and Jesse Sturm, played
leadership roles in the West Virginia statehood movement.30
The processing of wood products into charcoal, potash, and
tan bark were also important industries.

Another prominent

leader in the statehood movement, Francis Pierpont, was engaged
in the tanning business.

A textile industry started in the

1820s; both flax and wool were processed and woven into fiber.
In addition, several potteries, salt works, boatyards, and
numerous stills were active.31 The rich deposits of coal which
outcropped along the banks of the Monongahela River were mined on
a limited basis.

Early deeds mention "coal banks," and whenever

coal was easily attainable it was used.

Near Fairmont, David

Morgan opened a coal bank as early as 1775; Boaz Fleming bought
land on "Cole run" in 1820; and Isaac White had a right of way
for "hailing coal" in 1826.

In the second quarter of the

nineteenth century as the forests were thinned and wood grew less
plentiful near settlements, farmers with coal outcrops on their
property opened coal banks, mining the black rocks for domestic
use and charging all comers a penny or two a bushel to dig all

30Ibid., 53-54; 216-217.
31Davis, History of Harrison County. 669-74; Lough, Now and
Long Aao. 441-45; Core, The Monongalia Story. Volume 2: The
Pioneers. 329-33 for information on early industry in the
Monongahela Valley.
76

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

they wanted.32 Besides domestic purposes, coal was also used to
a limited extent for the smithing of metal.

Occasionally some

enterprising person would ship a quantity of coal downstream to
Pittsburgh or even Louisville and Cincinnati, but the regular
coal trade did not develop until railroads were built in the
1850s.33
Next to milling and lumbering, the most important industry
in the region during the ante-bellum period was the manufacture
and processing of iron.

Until the 1850s, the region boosted the

largest iron industry in northwestern Virginia and offered strong
competition to the iron masters of neighboring Fayette County,
Pennsylvania.

Furnaces were built throughout the region, but the

industry was concentrated along Chestnut Ridge, chiefly in
eastern Monongalia and western Preston counties.

Here were

outcrops of iron ore, plentiful timber for the making of
charcoal, and limestone for flux.

The first furnaces, Rock Forge

and Pleasant, were built in Monongalia County near Morgantown in
1798.

In 1800 a nail factory was added to the Pleasant Furnace

industrial complex at Deckers Creek.

The most important and

enduring industrial complex, the Cheat Ironworks, was established
in 1809 by Samuel Jackson (no relation to John George Jackson), a
Quaker who came to the area from Brownsville, Pennsylvania.

He

built an iron forge near Ices Ferry on the Cheat River, later
32Glenn Frank Massay, "Coal Consolidation:
Profile of the
Fairmont Field of Northern West Virginia, 1852-1903,,, Ph D. diss.,
West Virginia University (1976), 3.
^Ibid., 29; Davis, History of Harrison County. 723.
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adding a nail factory, rolling mill, foundry, and wagon shops.34
Additional furnaces were built in the 1820s and 1830s, and by
1840 the Cheat iron industry included four iron furnaces, a
rolling mill, puddling and boiling furnaces, a nail factory,
foundry, machine shop, cooperage, wagon shop, blacksmith shop,
and raft-building yard.

During the 1840s the industrial complex

was expanded and improved under the ownership of the Ellicott
brothers of Ellicott City, Maryland.

They integrated the

ironworks by connecting the furnaces, iron and limestone mines,
and nail factory with a system of horse-drawn tramways.35 The
products of these factories more than met local demands.

Large

quantities were shipped in flatboats to Pittsburgh and even New
Orleans.

During the Ellicott period, a steamboat, the "Lady

Ellicott," was purchased to handle the downstream trade, but this
was not a success, as the boat could not ascend the Cheat
River.36
Next to Cheat, the most important industrial complex was
Mile's End or the "Factory" located on Elk Creek one mile east of
Clarksburg.

It was established by John G. Jackson, who was in

^James M. Swank, History of the Manufacture of Iron in All
Acres (Philadelphia: The American Iron and Steel Association, 1892) ,
270, notes that Jackson's rolling mill was the first west of the
Allegheny mountains outside of Pennsylvania.
The first in
Pennsylvania was Jeremiah Pears' Plumsock in Fayette County,
established in 1800. See Ellis, History of Favette County. 239240.
35Lee M. Maddex, "Men, Mountains and Iron: A Study of West
Virginia's Pre-Bessemer Iron Industry," forthcoming.
36Mrs S. Kussart, "Navigation on the Monongahela River," July,
1937, on file at Carnegie Library, Pittsburgh Pennsylvania, 8.
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many respects the most remarkable man of northwestern Virginia
during the ante-bellum period.

Jackson was both an outstanding

political leader and an industrialist, epitomizing the union of
business and politics which characterized the development of the
region.

His father, George Jackson, was a Scotch-Irish pioneer

who migrated from the South Branch of the Potomac in 1769 and
took up land on the Buckhannon River.

In 1784 George Jackson

purchased property on Elk Creek and built a grist mill.
became the leading politician of the region.

He also

A Federalist in

1788, Jackson was elected to the U.S. Congress in 1795 as a
Republican and served four terms.
carried on the Jackson dynasty.

His son, John George Jackson,
Raised on the frontier, he loved

hunting and the outdoors, but also studied law and surveying.
After serving in the House of Delegates of the Virginia General
Assembly, he succeeded his father in the House of Representatives
in 1804.
1816.

He was elected to a total of six terms between 1804 and

His forceful oratory and alliance with the Madison family

through his marriage to Mary Payne, sister of Dolly Payne
Madison, made him one of the leading politicians in the West.37
John George Jackson was a Republican, and like his colleague
Albert Gallatin was a promoter of internal improvements and
industry.

One of the "fathers" of the National Road, he was also

a leading figure in the Monongahela Navigation Company,
established in 1817 to improve navigation on the West Fork and

37Dorothy Davis, John George Jackson (Parsons, WV: McClain
Printing Company, 1976), 1-5, 48-49, 273-274.
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Monongahela rivers.

Recognizing that the scarcity of money was

holding back the economic development of the region, Jackson
helped organize the Virginia Saline Bank at Clarksburg in 1814.
Fascinated by machinery since his boyhood, in 1809 he began the
construction of an industrial complex at the family's Elk Creek
property.

Here he erected an iron furnace, foundry, blacksmith

shops, nail factory, flour mill, fulling mill with carding
machines, and oil mill.

He also had a saltworks nearby.

In 1814

he established the town of Mile's End on this property, but
contemporaries continued to call it the "Factory."

Jackson

worked his factory with both free and slave labor; he owned
thirty-one slaves in 1818 worth $16,600.38
Jackson's factory was a short-lived success.
labor he was able to undercut the competition.

With slave

There was,

however, a problem transporting the products to markets.

They

were shipped down the West Fork on flatboats to markets along the
Monongahela and Ohio Rivers, or transported overland to
Winchester and Baltimore in the east and Parkersburg in the west.
Jackson preferred the water route because it was less costly.
However, navigation of the West Fork, with its narrow channel,
steep banks and sharp bends, was tortuous, and because of low
water in the summer and fall, it was unreliable.

In 1815, on

behalf of a group of Clarksburg "commercial men," he petitioned
the Virginia General Assembly for a charter to improve the West

^Ibid., 250-251, 275, 394, 396; Davis, History of Harrison
County. 717-20.
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Fork.

The group hoped to use the Virginia Saline Bank to finance

the construction of locks and dams.

Jackson also proposed that

the water of the Buckhannon River be diverted via a three-mile
canal into Elk Creek, thereby increasing the waterpower of his
industries and providing the West Fork with eighteen inches of
slackwater.

In order to mollify the movement in the Northwest

for a Constitutional Convention, the Virginia Assembly chartered
the Monongahela Navigation Company in 1817 and set up the Board
of Public Works to administer a fund for internal improvements.
The capital stock of the Monongahela Navigation Company was set
at $150,000, but the Board of Public Works would supply twofifths of the capital only after the remaining three-fifths had
been subscribed.

Jackson was named a Director of the Board of

Public Works for the district west of the Allegheny Mountains,
and he later became President and principal stockholder of the
company.39
By 1818 Jackson and the stockholders of the Monongahela
Navigation Company, which had offices in Clarksburg, had raised
the necessary $90,000 and had begun constructing its first
dam.40 The Board of Public Works sent its chief engineer, Major
Thomas Moore, to survey the West Fork and Upper Monongahela
rivers and recommend a plan for improvement.

Moore recommended

that a total of seven locks and dams be built on the West Fork to
supply slackwater from Clarksburg to the mouth of the West Fork,
39Davis, John George Jackson. 250-251, 279-280.
40Johnson, The Headwaters District, 49.
81

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

and that the Monongahela channel be cleared of obstructions from
Middletown (Fairmont) to the Pennsylvania line.

The Virginia

engineer also found that many people in the West Fork valley
opposed the project:
The objections they urge against it are these; that the
fording places on the river will be destroyed; that it
will require a much greater freshet to pass the dams
with large flat bottom boats and rafts than is
necessary in the natural bed of the river, and
consequently, that the opportunities of getting their
boats and lumber to market will be less frequent, even
if the slopes to the dams should always be kept in
repair; but they contend, that where there are so many,
it may be expected that one or more will frequently be
in an impassable condition. They also suppose that it
may have a tendency to overflow the lands, and render
the country sickly.41
In the face of this opposition, Jackson undertook the
construction of the six dams himself, while continuing to serve
as president of the company.

The potential conflict of interest

was used by the opponents of the project, chiefly Benjamin Wilson
of Clarksburg, to urge that the Board of Public Works curtail its
support.

After contributing only a few hundred dollars, Virginia

stopped all state subscriptions to the company in 1822.

Jackson

mortgaged his properties at Miles' End, and almost singlehandedly
continued the construction of the slackwater system, completing
the dams by 1824.

However, in the same year, a near-record flood

swept down the West Fork and heavily damaged the structures.

In

an effort to repair the dams, Jackson overworked himself,
suffered from exposure, and died on March 28, 1825.

He had lost

41Virginia Board of Public Works, Fifth Annual Report (1820)
Monongalia [sic] Navigation Company Papers, 35-55.
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most of his estate and finally his life on the West Fork
project.42 After his death, there was no one who could rebuild
the dams or manage and keep in operation his mills and factories.
With the exception of two of the mills, which continued operation
under different owners, the whole industrial complex lay in ruins
by 1847, when the iron furnace was taken out of blast.43

A False Start
Jackson's failure was followed in two decades by the
collapse of the Cheat iron industry.

The Ellicotts went bankrupt

in 1848, and the remnants of the iron industry on Cheat declined
in the 1850s until all production ceased in 1868.

Although two

iron furnaces in the region survived the Civil War and made the
transition from charcoal to coke as fuel, the iron industry
virtually disappeared during the 1850s.44 Since iron was an
42Johnson, Headwaters District. 50.
43Harmer, Old Grist Mills of Harrison County. 60; Maddex, "Men,
Mountains, and Iron," 7.
^The two furnaces which survived the Civil War were the
Irondale furnace at Three Forks in Preston county, which used Upper
Freeport coal to make coke and lasted until ca. 1885; and the
Ironton or Waldorf Furnace in Taylor County, which converted to
coke in 1873 and was in blast until the 1890s. See I. C. White,
"Notes on the Geology of West Virginia," in "The Geological
Structure along the B&O Railroad between Newburg and Tunnelton,
Preston County," in Jed Hotchkiss, ed., The Virginias. Vol. Ill,
No. 9 (August, 1882);
Maddex, "Men, Mountains and Iron," 8-9;
Core, The Monongalia Story, Vol. II: The Pioneers. 265-69 for a
brief discussion of early eighteenth century iron furnaces in
Monongalia County; Core, The Monongalia Story. Vol. Ill: Discord.
144-47 on the Cheat Mountain iron works. The best source for the
Cheat Mountain iron works is James R. Moreland, The Earlv Cheat
Mountain Iron Works (Morgantown: Monongalia Historical Society,
1992) .
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ideal export, which if developed to the extent that it was later
in the Pittsburgh district would have established the Upper
Monongahela region as an industrial giant, its loss was a severe
blow to the regional economy.

Cattle and lumber remained as

exports, but neither had the great potential of iron.
Why did the region's iron industry fail?

This question is

worth examining because the answer reveals one of the most
critical problems that the people of the region faced in
developing their "boundless resources" and demonstrates the
principal cause of differentiation between the Upper and Lower
Monongahela regions.
technological changes.

The failure was unrelated to broader
The transition from iron to steel, the

Bessemer revolution, began in 1873 at the Steelton mill near
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, well after the demise of the Cheat
works.

Nor was the failure caused by the change to the much

purer Lake Superior ores.

This, like the switch to the Bessemer

was a post-civil War development which did not get underway until
the late-1870s.45 The iron industry of the Upper Monongahela
failed because of the region's location— its distance from major
markets— and its lack of improved transportation.
a limited "home market" for

There was only

products of the iron industry.

Despite steady growth during the first half of the century, the
population of the Upper Monongahela region was only 99,739 in

45James M. Swank, "Report on the Iron and Steel Industries of
the United States," Report on the Manufactures of the United States
at the Tenth Census (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1883) ,
108.
84

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

1850.

By comparison, that of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania was

138,290? Fayette County, Pennsylvania, 39,112.46 In the
important work Economic Development in the Philadelphia Region.
1810-1850. Diane Lindstrom demonstrated that the economic
development of the Philadelphia region was based largely on
intraregional, not interregional, trade.

With the construction

of transportation corridors, the city of Philadelphia attracted
the trade of a large hinterland.47

This successful development

required both a large urban node— a sizable market and shipping
center— and a rich hinterland.

The obstacle to the rapid

development of the economy of the Upper Monongahela region was
that, despite its rich resources and enterprising entrepreneurs,
it lacked an urban node.
dispersed.

Its population was not only small but

The three sister towns on the Monongahela River had a

combined population of only 2,883 in 1850.
From this perspective, the Upper Monongahela region was a
hinterland in search of an urban node, an exporting region
without markets.

To reach outside markets, the region needed

cheap and reliable transportation.

However, internal

improvements were slow in coming from Virginia, which was
dominated by Tidewater and Piedmont planters who opposed the
transportation improvements so desperately needed by the
Northwestern counties.

Virginia's efforts at improving

^Census Office, Report on Population of the United States at
the Eleventh Census; 1890. Table 4, 36-37; 45.
47Diane Lindstrom, Economic Development in the Philadelphia
Region. 1810-1850 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978).
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transportation were restricted to the construction of turnpikes.
In 1838 the state completed the Northwestern Turnpike, an
improvement of the state road which followed the old McCullough’s
Path from Winchester to Parkersburg, but it came too late.

The

National Road, completed to Wheeling in 1818, had channeled
east-west activity to points north of the region.

Although

cattle were driven on the turnpike, it was too costly to
transport bulky items such as lumber and iron on the road.

The

natural markets for the produce of the upper Monongahela were
Pittsburgh and cities on the Ohio River.

These were exploited to

some extent with downstream trade, but Virginia’s inability to
improve her section of the Monongahela limited what could have
been a much greater development.

The lack of river improvements

made it more difficult and costly for exporters in the Upper
Monongahela region to reach the Pittsburgh market.

As the

nineteenth century continued, they found the terms of exchange in
this trade less favorable.

This situation was both a result of

the failure of Virginia's Monongahela Navigation Company and the
success of Pennsylvania's Monongahela Navigation Company.
Pennsylvanians took advantage of river transportation even
before the age of internal improvements.

The Monongahela had

been used since the 1770s for transportation and the shipment of
goods.

Boatbuilding became a major industry, and by the 1810s

river steamers— and even ocean-going ships— were being built at
Pittsburgh and Brownsville.

Boat building continued at such a

large scale there and at other Pennsylvania river towns that the
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lower Monongahela earned the distinction of being the "cradle of
the inland river steamboat."48 Meanwhile, traders on the upper
Monongahela also used the river, but mainly for downstream trade.
Since shippers depended upon freshets to raise the river to a
navigable level, the downstream trade was irregular.
Obstructions and low water made the river very difficult to
ascend in its natural state, so each shipment required the
construction of a new boat.

Boatbuilding on the upper

Monongahela was confined largely to flat-bottomed rafts, although
a few keelboats (which could return to their point of origin),
were built in Morgantown.
Monongahela.

No streamboats were built on the upper

When one visited, such as the Reindeer to

Morgantown in 1826, the Napoleon to Morgantown in 1840, or the
Globe to Fairmont in 1850, it was a great event which was
celebrated with speeches and festivities.

The inability of ships

to ascend the river not only retarded boatbuilding but also made
products more expensive on the upper Monongahela.

Goods from

downriver were either hauled over a winding and poorly maintained
road from New Geneva or hauled from the same point on flatboats
pulled by horses.

Both of these were tedious and expensive means

of transportation.49
This natural obstacle to equitable trade between the two
regions, which could have been overcome by slackwater improvement

^Johnson, Headwaters District, p. 91.
49Kussart, "Navigation on the Monongahela River," 8, 10, 12,
16, 32-33.
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of the upper Monongahela, was transformed into an even greater
barrier after the slackwater system was completed on the lower
Monongahela.

While the efforts of the Virginia Monongahela

Navigation Company languished, that of Pennsylvania's Monongahela
Navigation Company proceeded with dispatch.

In 1836, the

Pennsylvania legislature provided for the incorporation of a
Monongahela Navigation Company which was authorized to build
locks and dams to the state line and further if Virginia
permitted.50 The Pennsylvania Monongahela Navigation Company,
unlike its Virginia counterpart, overcame several financial and
engineering obstacles.

By 1844 it had completed four locks and

dams and opened 60 miles of slackwater to Brownsville.

Tolls

collected from the river traffic permitted the company to pay its
debts, and in 1853 it began paying dividends to its stockholders.
With the construction of an additional two locks and dams, the
company extended slackwater to New Geneva in 1856.

Here its

work was stalled by the unwillingness of Virginia to provide
funding for an extension of the slackwater system across the
state line.51
The Pennsylvania Monongahela Navigation Company proved a
great commercial success.

By providing a reliable water route

from Brownsville to Pittsburgh, the company re-channeled trade
50Gannett Fleming Corddry and Carpenter, Inc., History of
Navigation Improvements on the Monongahela River (Pittsburgh: U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers, Pittsburgh District, 1980), 1-2.
51Johnson, Headwaters District, pp. 91-99; Gannett, et. al,
History of Navigation Improvements on the Monongahela River. pp. 25.
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and travel from the National Road towards Pittsburgh and away
from Wheeling, Virginia.

These improvements stimulated the

industrialization of the Pittsburgh area.

In 1860, traffic

through its locks totaled over one and one-half million tons,
approximately 90 percent of which consisted of coal.

This coal

helped Pittsburgh emerge as a major manufacturing center.

The

great bulk of it originated below pool No. 4 at Belle Vernon, and
very little or none came from the upper Monongahela.52
The completion of the lower Monongahela slackwater system
had a detrimental impact on trade and intercourse between the two
Monongahela regions.

With its tolls, the Pennsylvania

Monongahela Navigation Company had erected, in effect, a tariff
barrier between the two regions.

Although the downstream

shipment of logs and lumber continued until the turn of the
twentieth century, trade between the two regions diminished after
the 1850s.

The result was that the nascent capitalists of the

Upper Monongahela region found themselves locked out of markets
in Pittsburgh and on the Ohio River.

As illustrated by the

failure of the Jackson's Factory and the Cheat iron industry, the
lack of markets stifled industry.

While the industry and

commerce of Pittsburgh and other Lower Monongahela towns
blossomed and the region became part of the great northern
manufacturing belt, that of the Upper Monongahela region
languished.
52,,Monongahela River Commerce, 1845-1920," Chart, with hand
written information providing an update until 1923, U.S. Engineer
Office, Pittsburgh, Pa., August 27, 1921.
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"The Cleavage Between Eastern and Western Virginia"
While differences between the Lower and Upper Monongahela
regions were largely economic and did not lead to conflict, those
between the Upper Monongahela and Eastern Virginia were more
fundamental and ultimately led to a struggle which culminated in
the revolution of 1863.

Despite the fact that the "cleavage

between Eastern and Western Virginia" which led to creation of
the state of West Virginia has been well chronicled, it is still
necessary to provide a brief sketch of it in this study.

This

struggle was the stimulus which led the people of the region to
develop a distinct regional identity and unite behind a
modernizing political program of democratic reform.53
The roots of the sectional conflict between the transmontane
and cismontane sections of Virginia were fundamental social,
economic, and political differences.

East of the Blue Ridge,

slavery and the plantation were the dominant features of life.

A

conservative planter class, espousing a political philosophy of
limited government and states' rights, ruled this hierarchical
society.

Separated from the East by a "vast, extensive, and

almost impassible Tract of Mountains," western Virginia developed
along different lines.54 With a climate and terrain unsuitable
for tobacco or other plantation crops, the transmontane section
53Reference is to Charles H. Ambler, "The Cleavage Between
Eastern and Western Virginia," The American Historical Review. Vol.
15 (1909-10), 762-780.
54Quote from Ambler, West Virginia: The Mountain State. 127;
also see Ambler, "The Cleavage Between Eastern and Western
Virginia," 762-763.
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attracted few slaveholders.
on the family farm developed.

Instead, a mixed agriculture based
During the Virginia Constitutional

Convention in 1829-30, one conservative voice of the Tidewater,
Benjamin Watkins Leigh, expressed his disdain for the people west
of the mountains by describing them as a "peasantry."55
Leigh's characterization accentuated the differences between
the two sections; it did not give an accurate picture of the
social structure of the west.
from hierarchical,

Although western society was far

it was differentiated into classes based on

land ownership, wealth, status, and occupation.

As Van Beck Hall

has shown, by 1830 parts of western Virginia, including the Upper
Monongahela region, had developed a "farm and town" society.

In

addition to the "peasantry," which was itself divided into
different strata based on size of holdings, the west had a middle
and upper class.

In the Upper Monongahela region, Clarksburg and

Morgantown, founded in 1785, and Fairmont, founded in 1819 and
known as Middletown until 1843, had become the three principal
towns of the region.

Merchants, mechanics, tavern-keepers,

artisans, laborers, and lawyers lived and worked in these "sister
cities," as well as at other towns in the region.56 These
towns, which were also county seats, became the centers of
political power.

Officeholders, lawyers and merchants in the

towns, along with large landholders such as the Watsons and
55Granville Davisson Hall, The Rending of Virginia (Chicago:
Press of Mayer & Miller, 1901), 36.
56Van Beck Hall, "The Politics of Appalachian Virginia, 17901830," 169.
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Goffs, constituted a regional elite.57 Unlike the cismontane
elite, it was generally open to any ambitious white man.

Having

no common interests with the cismontane planters, this democratic
elite actively opposed their conservative, states-rights
policies.

Western politicians voiced their dissatisfaction with

the educational and internal improvement polices of the east,
which seemed designed to retard their social and economic
development, and consistently voted in Congress against staterights measures.58
These basic differences were the root causes of the "rending
of Virginia" during the Civil War, but most of the controversy in
the first half of the nineteenth century revolved around the
Virginia Constitution.

Adopted in 1776 and amended with a Bill

of Rights in 1788, the Virginia constitution reflected the
interests of eastern planters.

It was basically an undemocratic

document which limited suffrage and maintained a system of
unequal representation and taxation.

Eastern planters used their

slave population to augment their numbers for the purpose of
representation, but refused to allocate taxes on the same basis.
Sectionalism had been a feature of Virginia political life since

57Davis, History of Harrison County. 777-78, writes that "the
more enterprising citizens during the first half of the nineteenth
century used profits from the sale of cattle to buy, little by
little, acreage to increase the land on which to graze their
animals until great blocks of territory in the county in local
parlance were 'the Goff lands,' 'Maxwell farms,' 'Haymond
holdings,' 'Reynolds farms,' 'Lucas acres,' 'Gore land,' 'Lowndes
tracts,' etc."
58Ambler, "Cleavage between Eastern and Western Virginia," 764.
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the colonial period, and, prior to the Revolution, the Piedmont
and the Valley had opposed the rule of the Tidewater.

The

Piedmont region was integrated with the Tidewater by the time of
the Revolution, and it became part of the eastern section.

The

Valley and the transmontane sections remained united against
these two sections in an effort to obtain universal manhood
suffrage, increased representation in the General Assembly,
liberal appropriations for internal improvements, popular
election of officials, and the removal of tax discrimination
based on slave property.59
The movement to reform Virginia's political system had its
beginning immediately after the War of 1812.

Although the east

granted some concessions on senatorial reapportion during the
1816-1817 session, it was not until 1828 that the west obtained
sanction from the General Assembly for a Constitutional
Convention.

The resultant Constitutional Convention of 1829-1830

has been celebrated for the number of distinguished men in
attendance— James Madison, James Monroe, and James Marshall— but
from the perspective of the transmontane section it was an abject
failure.

Eastern conservatism, based on state's rights and the

defense of slavery, reigned.60 Although suffrage was extended
to leaseholders and house-keepers, reapportionment and other
59Ambler, Sectionalism in Virginia. 1-23; Richard Orr Curry,
A House Divided: A Study of Statehood Politics and the Copperhead
Movement in West Virginia (University of Pittsburgh Press, 1964),
13-14.
60James C. McGregor, The Disruption of Virginia (New York: The
Macmillan Company, 1922), 35-36.
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democratizing measures were defeated.

The referendum on approval

of the new constitution demonstrated the disapproval of the
transmontane.

No county in what is now West Virginia supported

the new constitution.

Soon thereafter, calls appeared in several

western newspapers for the division of the state, and the
citizens of Wheeling held a mass meeting to consider annexing
northwestern Virginia to Maryland.61 However, the vote of 1830
did signal a significant change in the sectional politics of
Virginia.

The Valley supported the new constitution by a

substantial majority, in part because of the growth of slavery
there.

After 1830, the sectional boundary of Virginia was the

Blue Ridge.62
In the 1830s and 1840s the sectional conflict revolved
around slavery, state's rights, and internal improvements.

The

Nat Turner insurrection in 1831 focused attention on the slavery
issue.

Westerners saw slavery as the source of their oppression.

They were not, however, abolitionists of the Garrison type.

They

opposed slavery not for moral reasons but as an economic evil,
and favored the gradual abolition plans of Jefferson.

In the

1831-1832 session of the General Assembly, westerners forced a
vote on a resolution in the House of Delegates declaring that it
was expedient to legislate for the abolition of slavery.

The

resolution was unanimously supported by western delegates, but

61Ambler, Sectionalism in Virginia. 168-173.
62Curry, House Divided. 20-21.
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failed 73 to 58.63
In the 1830s and 1840s, the Virginia General Assembly was
literally flooded with proposals from the West for the
construction of roads, turnpikes, canals, and railroads.

The

fact that neighboring states— Pennsylvania, Ohio, and New York—
had been successful in completing internal improvement systems
while Virginia, with the exception of turnpikes, had done nothing
was a source of dissatisfaction in the west.64 The most
important transportation corridor connecting the east and west,
the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, was built in spite of, not because
of, the state of Virginia.

To a large degree, the route of the

railroad was determined by sectional politics.

By 1842, the B&O,

which began construction of its trans-Allegheny road in 1828, had
reached Cumberland, Maryland, and was ready to push on to the
Ohio River.
take.

It was unclear, however, which route the road would

Pittsburgh was the favored terminus but Philadelphia

interests feared that the railroad would channel the trade of
Western Pennsylvania to Baltimore.

With Pittsburgh out of the

picture by 1843, the B&O turned its attention to a more southerly
route.

Both Parkersburg and Wheeling were considered as western

termini for the railroad.

The General Assembly, dominated by

Tidewater and Richmond interests, refused to grant a right of way
on "practicable terms" to the B&O because it wanted to draw the
resources of the west to Richmond rather than Baltimore.

In the

^Ambler, Sectionalism in Virginia. 188-199.
^Ambler, West Virginia. 252.
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1844-1845 session, the General Assembly passed a bill to
construct a continuous canal from the James River to the Kanawha
River, a visionary project which would connect Richmond to the
Ohio.

In the same session the General Assembly also granted the

B&O permission to construct its line in the state, but on a route
as far north as possible.65
After it was learned that the B&O would terminate in
Wheeling, rather than Parkersburg, and not touch most of the
Upper Monongahela region, there was a storm of protest.

Mass

meetings were held throughout the region, Richmond and Wheeling
were scorned, and, for the first time, a rift was opened with the
latter city.

One of the mass meetings at Clarksburg in May, 1845

passed a resolution which threatened dismemberment of the state
if the General Assembly adhered to this policy.66 The B&O also
favored a more southerly route.

To conciliate the West, the

General Assembly passed a bill allowing the railroad to construct
its railroad as far south as Fairmont.

This route did not,

however, satisfy citizens south of Fairmont.

In 1851,

capitalists from Parkersburg and Clarksburg succeeded in
obtaining a charter from the General Assembly for the
incorporation of the Northwestern Virginia Railroad.

The

railroad was to proceed from Grafton through Clarksburg to
Parkersburg, following the "air route" to the west preferred by
the B&O.

Construction began in 1853, one year after the B&O main

65Ambler, Sectionalism in Virginia, 240-243.
McGregor, The Disruption of Virginia. 53.
96

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

stem reached Wheeling.

Although Parkersburg capitalists and

local subscribers provided much of the capital initially, the B&O
took over the construction of the line in 1855.

It was completed

to Parkersburg on December 31, 1856.67
The fact that capitalists from Baltimore, rather than
Richmond or Philadelphia, built the B&O had important
developmental consequences for the Upper Monongahela region.

For

the latter, it meant that trade, communication, and personal ties
would be extended toward Baltimore and that the city's
capitalists would play an important role in its development.
Trade, like settlement, was destined to flow on an east-west
rather than a north-south axis.

Rather than the river, the

railroad would become the outlet for the trade of the Upper
Monongahela region.

The B&O, amended in subsequent decades with

branches and feeder lines, became the region's link to outside
markets.
Along with the arrival of the railroad, the gains of the
west at Virginia's constitutional convention of 1850 mollified
westerners and decreased calls for dismemberment of the state.
The convention reapportioned representation in the House of
Delegates on the basis of white male population, extended
suffrage to all white males, and made the governor and some
judicial offices elective by popular vote.

However, slaveholders

were still given tax discrimination, and senatorial districts

67Charlene Lattea, "A Day of Small Beginnings: The Building of
the Northwestern Virginia Railroad," unpublished manuscript (1991).
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were to continue being apportioned on the basis of slave and
white population until 1865, when the "white" basis would be used
if both houses of the General Assemblyor the electorate so
decreed.

The reforms of 1850 not onlysmoothed tensions in the

West, they also brought the Valley even closer to the East.
Another important development which can be attributed partly to
the constitutional convention of 1850 was the conciliation of the
southwest.

Here, particularly in the Kanawha Valley, slavery had

taken root and the population was more southern in origin.

This

division of the West had important implications for the future.
It meant that the Northwest would oppose secession alone and
launch the movement to create a new state.68

Significance of Ante-bellum Economic and Political Development
In assessing the economic and political development of the
Upper Monongahela region in the decade before the Civil War,
is instructive to compare it with other Appalachian regions.

it
By

1850, at the onset of a new age of railroads, coal mining, and
statehood, the Upper Monongahela region had undergone nearly
eight decades of political, economic, and social development.
Van Beck Hall's argument that the "traditional view" of
Appalachia did not apply to Appalachian Virginia can be applied
to the case of the Upper Monongahela region.

It was not a

"peculiar, crude, yet picturesque semifrontier region whose
^Curry, House Divided. 26; Gerald W. Johnson, "West Virginia
Politics: A Socio-Cultural Analysis of Political Participation,"
Ph.D. diss., University of Tennessee, 1970.
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isolated inhabitants found it difficult to build the towns or
organize the institutions that would enable them to create a
coherent political program or to fend off economic predators from
outside the region."

Instead, it was a "rapidly growing,

economically diversified, socially and culturally complex" region
which "generated political programs that attempted to reform the
institutions of the state while using its power to implement
economic development and social change."69
Compared to other parts of southern and central Appalachia,
the Upper Monongahela region was quite advanced.

With a total

population of 104,499 it was well-settled, though the population
was largely rural and concentrated in the northern counties.

The

agricultural economy was both subsistence and market-oriented.
Livestock, suitable for both home and market use, was the
principal agricultural product.

According to the census of 1850,

Harrison County, with its rich limestone soil, led in cattle and
cheese production among the counties which would later form the
state of West Virginia.

The northern counties of the region also

supported a viable agricultural economy.70 The region had also
developed a limited but diversified industrial economy.

Although

69Hall, "The Politics of Appalachian Virginia," 166.
70J.D.B. DeBow, Statistical View of the United States, being
a Compendium of the Seventh Census (Washington: Beverely Tucker,
Senate Printer, 1854): 320-29. The number of livestock (horses,
cattle, sheep, and swine) on farms in three counties in the region-Harrison, Barbour, and Preston counties— was above that of any
other transmontane Virginia county, except for the three northern
panhandle counties (Brooke, Hancock, and Ohio), where large numbers
of sheep were raised. Monongalia County lagged behind Harrison,
Barbour, and Preston.
99

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

the iron industry was in decline, overall the industrial sector
was advancing in the river counties— Monongalia, Marion, and
Harrison.

Each had an industrial labor force of over 100, which

was above that of other western Virginia counties except for
Ohio, Brooke, and Kanawha.

Commercial development also spurred

social development and differentiation.

As it created

differences in occupation, status, and wealth, commerce brought
about a more structured society.

Economic ventures and political

connections helped several families rise to prominence and form a
small but aggressive elite.

A middle class of tradesman and

professionals existed, especially at the three sister cities on
the Monongahela— Clarksburg, Fairmont and Morgantown.

The region

had a growing laboring and artisan class as well as a large
population of middling and small farmers.
However, the growth and importance of the market economy in
the Upper Monongahela region should not be exaggerated.

The

region lagged well behind its Appalachian neighbor to the north,
the Lower Monongahela region, in population, urbanization, and
industrial development.

It had lost its iron industry (which had

great potential as an export base) to Pittsburgh, which had
emerged as a hub in the northern manufacturing belt.

Instead of

manufactured goods, the region was sending resources— mostly logs
and lumber— down the river for processing elsewhere.
The inherent problems of the river trade were, however,
overcome by the construction of railroads.

From a broader

perspective, the existence of a capitalist economy in the region
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prior to the coning of large-scale coal mining had important
developmental implications for the region.

Rather than arriving

on the scene as an intruder that disrupted the traditional
economy (as occurred in other parts of Appalachia), King Coal was
received in the Upper Monongahela region as an invited guest.
Indigenous capitalists were able to set up mining companies,
build the trade, and control the industry, thereby insuring that
some of the benefits from the mining industry would remain in the
region.
As important as ante-bellum economic development was in
preparing the region for the upcoming industrial age, its
political development, stimulated by the sectional struggle with
the east, was even more consequential.

Dissatisfaction with the

policies of the Richmond government united the people of the
region behind a reform movement which sought political equality,
the abolition of deferential and particularistic politics, and
the initiation of a government policy fostering economic
development.

Mass meetings, "general agitation," and the vote

count on sectional issues indicate that the reform ideology was
held not only by the region's political leaders but also by a
substantial segment of the population.

The reform ideology was

the first expression of "regional consciousness," as well as the
basis for the statehood movement, which in turn established a
political framework for industrialization.

From the perspective

of the "new regional geography," the reform movement is a prime
example of Markusen's concept of regionalism, in which a
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"territorially identified group of people" make political claims
"against one or several mechanisms of the state."71 Thus, by
1850 the people of the Upper Monongahela region, through their
social, economic, and political differences with the East and the
resultant sectional struggle, had established a distinct
identity.

In their minds, political reform and economic

development were inexorably tied.

Neither seemed possible as

long as they remained tied to Virginia "slaveocracy."

The "Last Capitalist Revolution"
On January 4, 1861 Marshall Dent, founder and editor of a
Morgantown newspaper, the Virginia Weekly Star, wrote:
The people of West Virginia have borne the burden just
about as long as we can stand it. We have been hewers
of wood and drawers of water for Eastern Virginia long
enough, and it is time that that section understood it;
and it is time that our would-be leaders in our own
section understood it.72
In this polemic, Dent expressed the exasperation that many in the
northwest felt on the eve of the Civil War.

Northwestemers had

suffered a half century of oppression at the hands of the

71Markusen, Regions. 17.
^The Virginia Weekly Star. January 4, 1861 editorial, quoted
in Hall, The Rending of Virginia. 126. Marshall Dent, b o m in 1828
near Morgantown, was a member of the Morgantown bar.
He
established the above newspaper, which was also known as the
Morgantown Star, in 1856, and was its editor until it ceased
publication in January, 1862.
John Phillip Reid, An American
Judge. Marmaduke Dent of West Virginia (New York University Press,
1978), 5.
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Virginia "slaveocracy."

The "miserable negro policy"73 of the

Eastern planters, in which slaves were counted for the purposes
of representation yet not assessed ad valorem for taxation, had
forced Northwestemers to endure unequal representation in the
state legislature and "unjust, oppressive, and unequal
taxation."74 Now they were being asked to join a crusade to
preserve the slave power.

If Secessionists were committed to a

mad flight to treason, let them go alone.

The people of the

Northwest would form a new state or join Ohio or Pennsylvania.
As related in chapter one, the "internal colonialism" model
provided an interpretive framework for Appalachian Studies during
its formative period.

Yet, these scholars neglected an

important case of "internal colonialism"75 in Appalachia during
the ante-bellum period.

The sense of "intolerable oppression"

felt by Dent was shared by the majority of yeomen, as well as
most journalists, merchants, workers, and industrialists in the
Northwest.

In maintaining the interests of slavery and upholding

their exalted position, the planting class and their allies had
subordinated the people of the west to a position of political

73Wheeling Intel1iqencer. November 26, 1861; quoted in Hall,
The Rending of Virginia. 389-390; this phrase was penned by the
fiery editor of this Republican paper, Archibald W. Campbell.
74James W. Paxton at Wheeling Convention, June, 1861; quoted
in Hall, Rending of Virginia. 308.
^I use the term "colonialism" here as hyperbole, much the way
Appalachian scholars have. Neither case actually accords with a
rigid definition of the concept. See Walls, "Internal Colony or
Internal Periphery," 15-17 for a systematic critique of the use of
the concept in the Appalachian case.
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and economic inferiority.

Dent asserted that the "grievances of

the people of West Virginia against the state of Virginia are
tenfold greater than those of the South against the North."
calculated the costs:

He

from the $1,147,346.00 raised in 1860 in

the state, almost nothing was spent in the west, and $195,000,000
worth of slave property was annually released from taxation.76
The lack of internal improvements in the west remained a major
grievance; no state-built railroads or canals were to be found
west of the Alleghenies.
west.

There was no public education in the

The state education fund was devoted entirely to eastern

institutions, which were available only to wealthy planters*
sons.

Free enterprise was frustrated by a tax on wages and a

system of licenses for mercantile business.

The list of

"injustices" should be enlarged to include a "ruinous land
system," which retarded settlement and led to a century of
confusion, and vice voce voting at elections, which meant that
only those in independent circumstances could vote with
freedom.77 The people of the west had "borne the burden" of
this organized oppression for half a century.

They realized that

it had retarded the development of their section.

Virginia's

regressive policies posed as great a barrier to the development
of Appalachian Virginia in the first half of the nineteenth
century as absentee ownership ever would in the twentieth
century.
76McGregor, The Disruption of Virginia. 75.
^Hall, Rending of Virginia. 70-71.
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Appeased with partial compromises since 1817, the
dissatisfaction of the Northwest burst forth during the secession
crisis in 1861.

After Lincoln was elected, Governor John Letcher

called for an extra session of the Virginia legislature on
January 7, 1861.

The General Assembly adopted a joint

declaration proclaiming that if the North and South failed to
compromise their differences, then Virginia should unite with the
slaveholding states.

To provide for such an occurrence, the

General Assembly called for elections on February 4 for a state
convention to meet in Richmond on February 13.78 In northwest
Virginia (mostly counties bordering the Ohio, Monongahela, and
Kanawha rivers and the B&O railroad) news of the call for a
secession ordinance brought protest.

Mass meetings of Unionists

were held in the major towns; Clarksburg, Wheeling, and
Parkersburg held the largest demonstrations.

The Unionists first

favored a boycott of the convention, but decided to send
delegates who pledged opposition to secession.79
Elections were held on February 4, and the Richmond
Convention met as scheduled on February 13, 1861.

Of the one

hundred and fifty-two delegates, thirty-one were from the
northwest.

Delegates from the Upper Monongahela region,

particularly Harrison, Marion, and Monongalia counties, played
leading roles in the convention.

John S. Carlisle of Clarksburg

^Curry, House Divided. 28-30.
McGregor, The Disruption of Virginia. 78.
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and Waitman T. Willey of Morgantown emerged as champions of
Unionism, while Samuel Woods of Philippi (Barbour County) was the
leading northwestern Secessionist.
The delegates approached their task with great caution.
The convention was dominated by conservatism, and the delegates
continually introduced resolutions and debated, postponing a vote
on the secession ordinance until events overtook them.

In the

first month, northwestern delegates pressed for Constitutional
reform.

Even Secessionist Samuel Woods considered reform a

possibility, now that the East recognized the need to secure its
western flank.

But the prospects for reform were lost, and tide

began turned to turn to the Secessionists after the inauguration
of Lincoln on March 4 and the apparent failure of the Washington
peace conference.

Still, the convention continued to debate

until April 13, when the news of the firing on Fort Sumter
arrived.

Richmond went wild with excitement, and Henry A. Wise,

ex-governor (1856-1860) and one of the heads of the
Secessionists, forced the issue.

On April 16 the convention went

into secret session, and all resolutions hinting at
were rejected.

compromise

On the morning of April 17, Wise rose from his

seat, drew a "Virginia horse-pistol" and "proceeded to harangue
the body in the most violent and denunciatory manner."80 He told
the convention that the time had come to fight.

Along with John

D. Imboden, Wise had made arrangements earlier to seize the
federal arsenal at Norfolk.

Now he demanded the convention's

^Ibid., quoting Waitman T. Willey's account of the incident.
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approval.

Thrown into a "bewildering excitement," the delegates

approved Wise's request and passed the ordinance of secession on
the same day.

The vote was 88 for secession to 55 against.81

Of the thirty-one Northwestern delegates, twenty-four voted
against secession, five voted for it, and two abstained.82 The
ratification or rejection of the ordinance by Virginia voters was
set for May 23, 1861.

The Statehood Movement
The Richmond Convention remained in session until May 1,
passing various war measures, but the Northwestern delegates who
opposed secession decided to depart after the passage of the
ordinance in order to prepare "to meet force with force if
necessary."

Carlisle, now recognized as the leader of the

Northwest, made his escape on April 19; most of the others, after
a conference at the Powhatan Hotel and obtaining safe conduct
passes from the governor, followed two days later.

Upon their

return, the delegates found the people in great agitation.
Another round of mass meetings were held to consider a course of
resistance.

The firing on Fort Sumter had strengthened Union

feeling, and there was a great outpouring of support for
preservation of the union and "saving Western Virginia" from
being "dragged into the awful vortex of ruin."83 The interest
81Ibid., 124-176.
^Curry, House Divided. 34.
^Curry, House Divided. 34-35.
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in setting up a separate state increased, but the main concern
was preserving the bond with the Union.

The main centers of

Union sentiment in the northwestern section were the towns
situated on the B&O Railroad:

Wheeling, Fairmont, Grafton,

Parkersburg, and Clarksburg.84
Carlisle was the first to act.

At an assembly of a thousand

to twelve hundred men, he drafted the "Clarksburg Resolutions" on
April 22.

Volunteer express riders dispatched the resolution to

nearby points, and copies were sent on the B&O Railroad to
Wheeling, Parkersburg, and Martinsburg.

The resolutions issued a

call for a general convention at Wheeling on May 13, 1861 to
determine the course of action "the people of the Northwestern
Virginia should take in the present fearful emergency.1,85
Northwestern secessionists did not stand by idly while
Unionists organized.
late April.

They began to hold public demonstrations in

Ex-Governor Joseph Johnston held a meeting of

"Southern Rights Men" at Clarksburg on April 26.

This set off a

round of demonstrations by Virginia loyalists, who began to
organize themselves in militia.

Although they were a minority in

the territory north of the B&O line, Secessionists were strong
enough in Harrison, Upshur, and Lewis counties to challenge
Unionists.

Along with Barbour County, which remained loyal to

Virginia, these counties constituted a frontier between the North
and South.

To the south and east, the "backwoods" counties

McGregor, The Disruption of Virginia. 190.
85Curry, House Divided. 34; Hall, Rending of Virginia. 216-217.
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remained staunchly loyal to Virginia.86 No doubt the decision
to hold the upcoming convention in Wheeling, rather than
Clarksburg, was based on fear that it might be disrupted this
close to the southern boundary.87
With parades, enthusiastic crowds, and flag flying,
Wheeling, the "industrial emporium" and "Nail City," welcomed the
four hundred and thirty-nine delegates from western Virginia to
the Wheeling Convention on May 13.

The delegates, according to

the Wheeling Intel1igencer were not "political wireworkers and
schemers," but "the frugal farmer, the hard working mechanic, the
enterprising merchant and manufacturer, who had all been toiling
and suffering for years against the oppression of a government
which did not foster their interests, but instead, burdened them
with unequal taxes and unequal laws."88 The delegates assembled
on the state of Washington Hall in front of a "eager, expectant,
fluttering mass."

Seated in tables below the stage were

reporters from New York, Cincinnati, Pittsburgh, Cleveland, and
Chicago, as well as the northwestern towns.89 Twenty-four
Northwestern and three Valley counties sent delegates.

Each

county had determined the means of choosing its delegates, and
the selection process was irregular.

Most had been chosen at

^Curry, House Divided. 48.
87McGregor, Disruption of Virginia. 187.
88Wheeling Intelligencer. July 3, 1861; quoted in Charles H.
Ambler, Francis Pierpont (Chapel Hill; University of North Carolina
Press, 1937), 409, note 11.
^Hall, Rending of Virginia. 231-234.
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mass meetings, but a number attended without any popular mandate.
Carlisle, the most influential person in attendance, considered
the body as an authoritative convention which possessed the power
to act, while the more conservative delegates, led by John J.
Jackson of Parkersburg, saw it as nothing more than a
deliberative body.
Once the proceedings got underway, Carlisle was the first to
act.

He proposed immediate separation from Virginia and the

creation of a new state, "New Virginia,” consisting of the Tenth
and Eleventh Congress Districts, popularly known as the
Clarksburg and Wheeling Districts, and the county of Wayne.

John

J. Jackson, along with Willey and Francis Pierpont of Fairmont,
urged caution.

Willey's famous "triple treason" speech, in which

he contended that Carlisle's plan would bring ruin because it was
treason not only against Virginia, but also the United States and
the Confederacy, threw a chill on the new state movement.

Most

of the delegates were strict constructionists, and agreed that
best course was to pass resolutions stating their grievances and
condemning secession.

After the deliberations, they would

campaign against the ratification of the Secession Ordinance, and
then, after all peaceable methods had been exhausted, consider a
division of the state.

Resolutions to this effect were written

and passed, a second convention at Wheeling was set for June 4
(after the ratification vote on the secession ordinance), and a
"Central Committee," headed by Carlisle, was appointed.

Many of

the delegates were eager to return to their farms to plant corn,
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so after three days of deliberations, the first Wheeling
convention was adjourned.90
The vote on ratification of the secession, along with
general elections, occurred on May 23.

Northwestern Virginia was

invaded three days later by Union troops under the command of
General George B. McClellan, and occupied by Union forces
throughout most of the war.

The vote of May 23 was the last

opportunity Secessionists had to freely express their
convictions.

For this reason, the referendum returns are useful

for gauging the strength of both sides in the Northwest, as well
as in other counties which became part of West Virginia.
The problem with this inquiry is that there are neither
official statistics from the referendum, nor consensus among
historians on what the final count was.

Early pro-Union and pro

statehood historians, Granville D. Hall, who participated in the
events, and James Callahan, reported huge majorities against
secession in all but the southern counties, where they claimed
union voters were "coerced," but they were vague or misleading
when it came to providing actual numbers.91 James McGregor,
whose sympathies lay with the Old Dominion, contended that
Unionist sentiment was universal only in the Panhandle, and that
^Curry, House Divided. 38-45; McGregor, The Disruption of
Virginia. 192-205.
91Hall, Rending of Virginia. 284-285; James Morton Callahan,
History of West Virginia. Old and New. Vol. 1 (Chicago: American
Historical Society, 1923), 315-316, 351-353; a discussion of the
historiography of the election returns is provided in James H.
Cook, "The Secession Crisis in Harrison County, West Virginia,"
Master's Thesis, West Virginia University (1993), 6-12.
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the vote was evenly divided in the other western Virginia
counties.92
In 1964 Richard Curry reconstructed a plausible count from
newspapers and manuscripts.

Curry concluded that the fifty

counties which formed West Virginia opposed the secession
ordinance by a vote of 34,677 to 19,121, but the geographical
pattern of the vote showed a "house divided."

A large expanse of

the southeast, twenty-six counties, voted in favor of the
ordinance, while twenty-four northern counties opposed it.

The

geographical pattern of the vote, as well as the size of the
majorities in each county, demonstrated that the Northwest was
the seat of Union sentiment and the statehood movement.
According to Curry's figures, this section opposed the ordinance
30,586 to 10,021.

Of the ten counties of the Upper Monongahela

region, only Barbour, Randolph, and Tucker favored ratification.
The region as a whole opposed the ordinance by the same 3 to 1
margin, 10,341 to 3,833, as the entire section.93 The recent
discovery of poll books containing the popular vote on the
secession ordinance in Harrison County has cast doubt on the
reliability of Curry's figures.

The poll books, which record the

92McGregor, Disruption of Virginia. 81, 180-181.
93Curry, House Divided. County by County Voting Pattern on the
Secession Ordinance Referendum in (West) Virginia, May 23, 1861,"
49, 141-147. Curry's Northwest includes the following counties:
Brooke,
Clay,
Hancock,
Harrison,
Lewis, Marshall,
Mason,
Monongalia, Ohio, Pleasants, Pocohontas, Preston, Tyler, Wetzel,
Wood, Barbour, Braxton, Cabell, Calhoun, Doddridge, Gilmer,
Jackson, Kanawha, Marion, Nicholas, Putnam, Randolph, Ritchie,
Taylor, Tucker, Roane, Upshur, Wayne, Webster, and Wirt.
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Figure 3:1: County by County Voting Patterns on the Secession
Ordinance Referendum in'[West] Virginia, May 23, 1861, from
Curry, House Divided. 49.
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vote of nine of the ten polling places in the county, were
examined by James Cook, who concluded that the vote in John
Carlisile's home county was 1,033 to 1,023 against secession.94
Rather than the 3 to 1 margin reported by Curry, Unionists
prevailed by a mere ten votes!

The large Secessionist vote in

Harrison County, once thought of as a Union stronghold, supports
McGregor's proposition that the vote was "evenly divided" south
of the Panhandle.

A Middle Class Revolution
How can we account for the geographical pattern of union and
loyal counties in western Virginia revealed by the secession
ordinance vote?

Like McGregor and Ambler, Curry ascribes Union

sentiment to basic social, economic, and geographical differences
with Virginia, which led to the "sectional politics" of the
preceding half century.

The Union counties had been loudest in

their protests against Virginia's policies, and the war gave them
the opportunity to carry out a revolution.

Curry does not,

however, offer an explanation for the Union loyalties of two
Shenandoah Valley counties, Berkeley and Morgan.

He notes that

the "Valley moved toward the proslavery orbit" after the
convention of 1829-1830, but fails to explain why these two
counties voted to remain in the Union.95

94James Cook, "The Secession Crisis in Harrison County, West
Virginia," 163-174.
^Curry, House Divided, 21
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While there is no doubt that "sectional politics" and the
grievances of a half century played a decisive role in shaping
Union sentiment, the construction of the railroad also played a
role, and probably accounts for the defection of the two
slaveholding Valley counties to the Union camp.

As Carlisle

wrote, "iron bands and commercial ties" lead to common interests,
and it was the "iron bands" of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad,
linking Martinsburg in Berkeley County to Clarksburg,
Parkersburg, and Wheeling, which brought the two ostensibly
incompatible districts together.96 Unionism in Virginia
flourished in those counties situated along, or a short distance
from, major transportation corridors— the B&O and the Ohio, Great
Kanawha, and Monongahela rivers.

Secessionist counties, with the

notable exception of Jefferson, were the "back counties,"
isolated from the major corridors.

These corridors channeled

trade and communications to Baltimore and the Ohio River— not to
eastern Virginia.

They stimulated commercial and industrial

development, urbanization, and the influx of Irish and other
immigrants.

While secessionist counties remained sparsely

populated and rural, Union ones were more densely populated,
urbanized, and tied more closely to the cash market economy.
A more interesting question raised, but not answered, by
Curry's work relates to the social and economic backgrounds of
Unionists and Secessionists in western Virginia.
related to social class, occupation, or ideology?

Were loyalties
The personal

96Quoted in ibid., 21.
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accounts of those who witnessed the events indicate that were
distinctions between the two groups.

Captain Rutherford B.

Hayes, stationed at Clarksburg, claimed that,
the secessionists in this region are the wealthy and
well educated, who do nothing openly, and the
vagabonds, criminals, and ignorant barbarians of the
country; while the Union men are the middle classes—
law and order, well-behaved folks.97
There is little doubt that many old Virginia families supported
the South.

For example, Alpheus F. Raymond of Marion County, and

Leonard S. Hall of Wetzel County, who supported the Secessionist
cause at the Richmond Convention, were men of this mold.

In

Lewis County, the "representatives of some of the old families—
men like Dr. Bland, Captain Boykin, A.A. Lewis, Jonathan M.
Bennett and many others— sided with the Confederacy.”98 John W.
Shaffer, who examined the basis for Confederate sentiment in
Barbour County, attributed their loyalties not to social class or
religious affiliation but to a "heritage that was almost
exclusively Virginian."99 However, the leading western
Secessionist, Samuel Woods of Barbour County, was b o m in eastern
Canada and educated in Pennsylvania.

Woods's ardent defense of

the Southern cause can be attributed in part to his personal
rivalry with fellow Philippi lawyer, Spencer Dayton, the leading
97Quoted in Davis, History of Harrison County. 219; and Cook,
"The Secession Crisis in Harrison County, West Virginia," 9.
98Edward Conrad Smith, A History of Lewis County. West Virginia
(Weston: published by author, 1920), 294.
"John W. Shaffer,
"Loyalties in Conflict: Union and
Confederate Sentiment in Barbour County," West Virginia History
(1990), 124.
116

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Unionist in the town.
Were the followers of the "wealthy and well educated" old
family loyalists the "ignorant barbarians of the country"?

In

assessing the extent of Southern sympathy in western Virginia,
McGregor claimed that Secessionists "composed for the most part
the less substantial class of citizens, those who had no property
to lose."100 In the Upper Monongahela region, secessionists
lived in the "back counties," such as Randolph and Tucker, or in
the rural districts of the more urbanized ones.

Isolated from

the market by a dearth of good roads or other transportation,
they were more disposed to practice semi-subsistence agriculture
and barter-based exchange.

In an attempt to account for

yeomanry’s support of secession, J. Mills Thornton examined the
economic and political roots of secessionist sentiment in
upcountry districts of the South.

He found that the yeomanry

supported slavery because it permitted them to maintain an "ethic
of subsistence."

With their Jacksonian political distrust of big

business, banks, and the market, it protected "the communities of
semi-subsistence farmers from being sucked into the vortex of the
marketplace."101 The applicability of Thornton's thesis to the
Monongahela back counties and rural districts is problematic:
there is no clear evidence that a vote for Secession here was a
vote against "being sucked into the votex of the marketplace."
100McGregor, Disruption of Virginia. 81.
101J. Mills Thornton III, "The Ethic of Subsistence and the
Origins of Southern Secession," Tennessee Historical Quarterly.
Vol. 48 (Summer 1989), 80-81.
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However, the recent work of James Cook on district voting
patterns in Harrison County lends some support to Thornton's
interpretation, if indirectly.

While not addressing the

difficult question of individual motivation, Cook explained the
divided vote on the secession ordinance by reference to a
"conflict between the modernizing proclivities of a professional
and merchant class at the core [Clarksburg] and traditionalist
tendencies of the surrounding periphery."102
If loyalists were composed mainly of two groups, old
patrician families and backwoods yeomen, were the Unionists "the
middle classes"?

There is some evidence to suggest that the

middle class, along with "later comers," supported the Union.

In

Weston, the county seat of Lewis, a border county,
The later comers who had been attracted to the town by
reason of the advance of industry in the 'fifties and
especially through the location of the asylum in the
town, generally cast their lot with the Union.103
In Lewis and other counties bordering the railroad, Irish
workers, who had settled after the 1850s railroad construction,
were staunchly Union, along with the German population, which was
large in Preston County.
We can also see the middle class origins of Unionism in the
social positions and political affiliation of the leaders of the
statehood movement.

The makers of the state, if they were

politicians at all, were local figures, the second tier, the
102Cook, "The
Virginia," 57.

Secession

Crisis

in

Harrison

County,

103Smith, History of Lewis County. 294.
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West

"outs" of Virginia politics.

Men with state reputations, such as

ex-Govemor Joseph Johnston, cast their lot with the South.

The

delegates to the first Wheeling Convention were the "the frugal
fanner, the hard working mechanic, the enterprising merchant and
manufacturer," hardly experienced politicians.

William B a m s

argued that the war gave this second tier of men the opportunity
to challenge the old leadership, to "climb the status ladder more
rapidly than might otherwise have been possible."104 Perhaps
more to the point, Jaimes Cook interpreted the tightly contested
victory of Unionists in Harrison County as a resurgence of a
moribund Whig Party.105
No discussion of the middle class origins of Unionism and
the statehood movement in the Northwest would be complete without
reference to two institutions, the newspaper and the church.

The

statehood movement saw the first widespread use of the media in a
political campaign in western Virginia.

The press, particularly

the Wheeling Intel1iaencer and its fiery Republican editor
Archibald W. Campbell, functioned to crystallize public opinion
for the Union and statehood.106 Campbell's indefatigable work
promoting the new state, publicizing mass meetings, and promoting

104William D. Bams,
"Status and Sectionalism in West
Virginia," Part II, West Virginia History. Vol. 34, Number 4 (July
1973), 363.
105Cook, "The
Virginia," 53.

Secession

Crisis

in

Harrison

County,

West

106See John Lewis Kiplinger, "The Press in the Making of West
Virginia," West Virginia History. Vol. 6, No. 2 (January 1945),
127-176 for a profile of western Virginia newspapers.
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the Wheeling conventions, earned his paper the sobriquet of "the
paper that sired a state."

Other papers, including the Fairmont

National and Carlisle’s two papers, The Clarksburg Patriot and
The National Telegraph. were effective on the local and regional
level.107 In addition to the press, the pulpit, mainly the
Methodist Episcopal Church, North, but also the Methodist
Protestant Church, championed the cause of the North.

Both

churches denounced slavery and Southern institutions in general.
The political philosophies of both Francis Pierpont and Waitman
T. Willey were molded by the influence of the Methodist church.
Writing in 1910, Ambler noted that "many of the older residents
of northern West Virginia insist to this day that the 'Methodist
Episcopal Church dismembered Virginia.’"108
The connection between Unionism and participation in the
market economy appears to be strong, particularly in the Upper
Monongahela region.109 Many of the Union leaders were involved
in some way with industry or commerce.

I have already noted the

correlation between the ownership of mills and Unionism for
Harrison County.

John Carlisle not only owned a mill, but he

107John Alexander Williams, "The New Dominion and the Old:
Ante-Bellum and Statehood Politics as the Background of West
Virginia’s 'Bourbon Democracy,'" West Virginia History. Vol. 33,
No. 4 (July 1972), 354-355.
108Ambler, "Cleavage between Eastern and Western Virginia,"
771.
109See Williams, "The New Dominion and the Old," 350-351 for
information on the entrepreneurial activities of statemakers
outside the Upper Monongahela region.
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also had a financial interest in two newspapers.110 Historian
Dorothy Davis’ profile of the Harrison County's fourteen
delegates to the first Wheeling Convention, indicates that five
were directly involved in mercantile activities, three as
merchants, and the other two as a cattle dealer and a cheesemaker.

The remainder were lawyers, farmers, and a minister. In

Marion County, Jesse Sturm, a miller and bridge builder from
Worthington, was a local Union leader.111 Thomas Hough, who
served in the first Wheeling Convention, was a tinsmith in
Fairmont.112 Francis Pierpont, who emerged in the second
Wheeling Convention to become the "father of West Virginia,” was
an industrialist who had a tanning business and, in partnership
with James 0. Watson (another delegate at the second Wheeling
Convention), operated a coal mine and brickyard near
Fairmont.113 Harrison Hagans, delegate to the first Wheeling
Convention from Preston County, owned and operated an iron
furnace.114
The link between Unionism and the market economy, then, can
be demonstrated with both geography and socio-political analysis.
110Carlisie was not, however,
Curry, House Divided. 108.

a

successful

entrepreneur.

111Harvey C. Fourtney and Heisel M. Fox, History of Worthington
and Surrounding Communities (Parsons, WV: McClain Printing Company,
1968), 424-425.
112Fairmont Class of 1916, Marion County in the Making. 286287.
113Ambler, Francis H. Pierpont. 346.
114Maddex, "Men, Mountains, and Iron," 8.
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The railroad towns, dependent upon peaceful maintenance of trade
and traffic with Baltimore and northern cities, supplied the
greatest resistance to secession.

These towns were the homes of

most of the Union and new state leaders, many of whom had
commercial and industrial interests.

That the creation of the

new state of West Virginia was a bourgeois revolution can be seen
even more clearly in the objectives of the new state movement.
The Civil War presented the people of Northwestern Virginia with
the opportunity to rid themselves of the political and economic
domination which had held back capitalist development.

By

cutting the knot with Virginia, they expected to attract capital
to develop the new state, which would then take its place beside
other industrialized Northern states.115
When the second Wheeling Convention met on June 11, 1861,
the situation in western Virginia had changed dramatically.
Virginia had made only a half-hearted effort to hold the
Northwest, expecting the militia to rise up and defend it, and
McClellan's troops, along with Northwestern volunteers, quickly
prevailed.

The only battle in this early campaign took place in

the frontier zone of the Upper Monongahela region.

On June 3 the

First (West) Virginia Volunteers, under the command of Colonel
Benjamin F. Kelly, and the Fourteenth Ohio Regiment, commanded by
Colonel Frederick W. Lander, encountered the Confederate forces
of Colonel George A. Porterfield at Philippi, Samuel Wood's home
town.

After an artillery bombardment, the Confederates forces
115Curry, House Divided. 117-118.
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fled in confusion.

The "Philippi Races," the first land battle

of the Civil War, established the hegemony of the Union in the
Northwest.

Although the Confederates made attempts to reconquer

the area and Rebels raided the B&O Railroad on numerous
occasions, the Northwest remained Union territory throughout the
war.

This gave new state advocates the opportunity to accomplish

their goal.116
There is no need to describe in detail the work of the
remaining Wheeling conventions.

Once delegates circumvented the

provision of the U.S. Constitution prohibiting the formation of a
new state within the jurisdiction of another state by
reorganizing the Virginia state government under the "loyal"
auspices of Whig industrialist Francis Pierpont of Fairmont, they
faced the difficult question of how to form the boundaries of the
new state.

Small-state delegates, led by Carlisle, wanted a

state composed largely of Northwestern counties where Union
sentiment was strong and slavery weak.

Large-state advocates

proposed the inclusion of all counties west of the Blue Ridge, as
well as the Potomac River counties near Washington.

The latter

triumphed. The new state was eventually constituted to include a
vast expanse of territory, twenty-four southeastern counties with
about forty percent of the population, where southern sentiment
prevailed.

The extremely light turnout of voters in the these

southeastern counties in the new state referendum made their
inclusion little more than a "legal fiction," another case of
116Ibid., 56-57.
123

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

"colonialism" in nineteenth-century Appalachia.117
After establishing a boundary for the state and skirting the
slavery issue, delegates drafted a new frame of government.

Many

of its provisions were based on their aversion toward the
"aristocratic" constitution of the Old Dominion.

Legislative

representation was based on white population and suffrage was
granted to all white male citizens of legal age.
ballot was established in place of oral voting.

The secret
Other long-

sought western objects were attained with the provision of a
state-wide system of public schools and the prohibition of
discriminatory taxation.

These reforms were supported by annual

elections and other democratic measures.

The major structural

change was the substitution of the New England township system
for the county court system.118
The final steps to statehood came after the new state
constitution was approved in a referendum.

Then, Congress

approved a bill allowing West Virginia to enter the Union after a
provision providing for gradual emancipation of slavery was
amended to its Constitution.

Finally, West Virginia was

admitted to the Union on June 20, 1863.

At a ceremony at

Linsley Institute in Wheeling, the authority of the Reorganized
117The new state ordinance was ratified by an overwhelming
majority, 18,408 to 781. However, the vote represented only about
a thirty-seven percent turnout of the 52,000 voters in the fortyone counties.
Voting was extremely light in the seventeen
secessionist counties.
For example, Hardy County, with 1,655
potential voters, approved the ordinance 15-0; Curry, House
Divided. 86.
118Moore, Banner in the Hills. 136-147.
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Government of the state of Virginia was transferred to the
officers of the new state of West Virginia on June 20, 1863.119
No doubt Granville Hall expressed the feelings of many on this
day when he wrote in 1901,
The dream of generations had 'come true.' ... At last
we had come to the end of the toilsome road; the close
of the fierce, the bitter, the enduring struggle; ...
At last we were out of the wilderness; not only in the
sight but in possession of the promised land. ... [N]ow
all faces turned to the future, rosy in the dawn of
enfranchisement and progress!126
This fulfillment of the "dream of generations" brought to a
close an important chapter in the history of western Virginia and
the Upper Monongahela region.

In reflecting on its significance,

it is instructive to consider statehood as part of what Mary and
Charles Beard and Barrington Moore called the "last capitalist
revolution."

With the help of the Union army, the emergent

middle class and its followers had thrown off the yoke of semi
colonial rule, eliminated slavery and the traditional,
hierarchical social order that accompanied it, and established a
framework for self-rule.

Just as important, the revolution

removed the political and economic obstacles to industrialization
and modernization and established a framework for capitalist
development.

Such a road to modernity is described and compared

to other routes by Barrington's Moore in his seminal work The
Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. Of three routes,
The earliest one combined capitalism and parliamentary
119Moore, A Banner in the Hills. 204-207.
120Hall, Rending of Virginia. 513-515.
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democracy after a series of revolutions: the Puritan
Revolution, the French Revolution, and the American
Civil War .... I have called this the route of
bourgeois revolution ... . The second path was also a
capitalist one, but in the absence of a strong
revolutionary surge, it passed through reactionary
political forms to culminate in fascism. ... The third
route is of course the communist one.121
The bourgeois revolution provided statemakers with the
opportunity to provide internal improvements, develop infant
industries, build cities and towns, factories, workshops, and
schools— in short, to effect progress.

Statemakers propagated a

political culture of progress in which economic development was
seen as the basis for moral and social improvement.
While the West Virginia case conforms to the "last
capitalist revolution" interpretation in many respects, it is
important to recognize two areas in which it does not.
relates to the geography of the revolution.

The first

The impulse which

brought this bourgeois revolution to fruition was far from
unanimous in western Virginia.

The new state movement was

centered in the Northwest, particularly the B&O towns.
The people of the Upper Monongahela region largely supported the
Union and statehood.

Tied to the North and the market economy by

the railroad and the river, the three sister towns on the
Monongahela, Morgantown, Clarksburg, and Fairmont, were
strongholds of Unionist sentiment.

Each town provided a great

leader for the statehood movement:

Waitman Willey of Morgantown,

121Barrington Moore, Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and
Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modem World
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), 413.
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Francis Pierpont of Fairmont, and John Carlisle of Clarksburg,
who have been celebrated as part of a stellar group of seven
"Fathers of West Virginia.1,122 However, the new state was
constituted to include a vast expanse of territory, twenty-four
counties with about forty percent of the population, where
southern sentiment prevailed.

The inclusion of these counties

would provide the foundation for sectionalism in the new state
and ultimately cost northwestemers control of state
politics.123 Moreover, southern sentiment was strong even in
the Upper Monongahela region, mainly in the thinly-populated
upland counties, Randolph and Tucker, and in agrarian Barbour
County, but also in Harrison County, which not only gave John
Carlisle to the Union, but Thomas "Stonewall" Jackson to the
Confederacy.

Straddling the B&O's Parkersburg Branch (the

approximate boundary between North and South in western Virginia)
the southern part of the region was a frontier province during
most of the war, a fact which probably accounts for the militancy
of its leaders.
The second area in which the West Virginia case does not
fully conform to the "last capitalist revolution" pattern relates
to the duration of the new social and political order in ensuing
decades.

The route to modernity, the path of progress and

political equality, was littered with the roadblocks of economic
1220tis K. Rice, West Virginia:
(Hugheston, WV, 1971), 198-205.
123Curry, House
Politics," 42.

Divided.

138;

The State and Its People
Johnson,

"West

Virginia
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depression and political reaction.
the statemakers was short-lived.
reaction set in.

The political ascendancy of
After the war, the inevitable

Liberal Republicans and Democrats from the

Northwest forsook the Radical Republicans and joined the Bourbon
Democrats of the southeastern counties to sweep Republicans from
office.124 Almost immediately after the election of 1872 a call
for a constitutional convention was issued.

The 1872

Constitution, which was written primarily by conservative
Democrats, threw out the "yankeefied" constitution of the
statemakers and replaced it with one modeled on the Virginia
Constitution of 1851.125 The township system of local
government was abandoned and the state returned to the
traditional county court form.

The essentially conservative 1872

document provided for a weak executive, long ballot, and weak
legislature.

Repugnant to Republicans, it was ratified by only

4,567 votes out of a total vote of over 80,000.

Bourbon

Democrats gained office and remained in power in the state for
the following 20 years.126 As we shall see, a return to the
principles and high expectations of the revolution came during
the 1888 to 1920 period, but depression and the guest to defend
the regional economy from outside influences led to a major
reaction in the 1920s.

Considered from this perspective, the

revolution of 1863 also bears similarity to Moore's second route
124Johnson, "West Virginia Politics," 44-46.
125Williams, "The New Dominion and the Old," 318.
126Johnson, "West Virginia Politics," 46.
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to modernity.

The course of economic and political development

took the state and region "through reactionary political forms"
to culminate in the quasi-fascist order of the 1920s.
Despite the pronounced reaction of the nineteenth century,
statemakers left a more enduring legacy that is sometimes
thought.

They were the first to bring m o dem politics to the

state, to transcend the traditional "politics of kinship and
deference, isolation and parochialism" and employ techniques of
modem communications and bureaucratic organization to mobilize
the electorate by means of universal appeals.127 This remained-at least in the northern section of the state.

The modernizing

political culture, what John A. Williams called the "development
faith," an abiding belief that unfettered capitalist development,
acting under the influence of an "invisible hand," would bring
material as well as social and moral progress, remained as well.
This doctrine became the conceptual framework of politics in the
new era and was accepted as gospel by both Republicans and most
Democrats.

Nor did all statemakers fade into obscurity as

Williams suggests, especially in the Upper Monongahela region.
Pierpont and Carlisle disappeared, but were replaced by men of
equal vision and greater strength, if somewhat more conservative
politics.

The Watson-Fleming Democratic "ring," deriving its

power from a growing coal empire and exerting a large influence
over state and federal politics until the late 1920s, ably
replaced Pierpont in Fairmont as standard bearers of the
127Williams, "The New Dominion and the Old," 352.
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bourgeois revolution.

In Clarksburg, Nathan Goff, a Republican,

who served as Major of the Fourth Regiment, West Virginia
Volunteer Cavalry, as well as John J. Davis, a Democrat who
exerted a Conservative influence on statemakers, remained to
defend expanding industrial interests.

Just as important in

protecting the revolution were John J. Jackson of Parkersburg,
who served as Judge of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of West Virginia for forty-four years, and his
replacement, Alston Dayton of Philippi (son of Spencer Dayton,
who challenged Samuel Woods' power during the Civil War in
Barbour County), who defended the coal interests of the state
against "outside" interference.

These men and their sons,

grandsons, and proteges carried the torch of the revolution of
1863 forward through the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, growing ever more conservative until another
revolution, the New Deal, displaced them.

The Post-War Economy:

"Arrested Development"

Statemakers have also been criticized as Cassandras who
predicted a rosy economic future which never materialized.
true that many expected immediate results.

It is

John Carlisle

confidently told the second Wheeling Convention that "three years
will not roll around until our population will be quadrupled, and
there will be more people in the limits of [West Virginia] than
there is in the whole State of Virginia today."128 High hopes
128Quote from Williams, "The New Dominion and the Old," 352.
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for immediate prosperity were frustrated, however, both in the
state and in the Upper Monongahela region.

The economy of both

would not expand dramatically until the 1890s, after it had
fallen behind that of other regions.

The quarter of a century

which followed the revolution of 1863 was characterized by
economic stagnation.

As Ambler attests, the whole state was "an

area of arrested development."129 Its boundless natural
resources remained mostly untapped, its entrepreneurs frustrated
by lack of capital and a dearth of markets, and its farmers
stymied by competition from the more productive Midwest.

This

was true even for the more advanced north.
In the Upper Monongahela region, the coal industry, which
had shown so much promise before the war, faced the problems of
an uncooperative railroad company and a dearth of markets.

As

mentioned, Francis Pierpont and James Otis Watson, who later
became known as the "Father of the West Virginia Coal
Industry, "13° formed a partnership and opened a mine near
Fairmont in 1852.

Their Monongahela Mining and Manufacturing

Company had begun mining and stockpiling coal even before the B&O
arrived, and along with a second operation, the "O'Donnell Mine,"
was the first to export coal on the railroad from the region.
Their company enjoyed some success through the 1850s, but
129Ambler, West Virginia. 421.
130A.B. Fleming, "A History of the
Virginia Mining Institute, Proceedings
Massay, "Coal Consolidation: Profile
Northern West Virginia, 1852-1903,"
University (1970), 4.

Fairmont Coal Region," West
(1911), 253-254; Glenn Frank
of the Fairmont Field of
Ph.D. diss, West Virginia
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continual disruption of traffic on the B&O by Confederate raiders
made shipments uncertain during the war.131 Some growth did
occur in the nascent industry immediately after the war so that
by 1870 the eleven mines of Preston, Marion, and Harrison
counties employed 355 hands and produced 242,104 short tons.132
The Panic of 1873 and its lingering effects inhibited coal
expansion.

Hard times were probably responsible for the break-up

of the Watson-Pierpont partnership; in 1874 they separated and
never spoke to each other again.

Watson took as a new partner

his son-in-law, Aretas Brooks Fleming, a lawyer trained at the
University of Virginia, and continued in business by forming the
Gaston Gas Coal Company in 1874.

Fleming later recalled "1874

and for some years thereafter," as the worst period for the coal
business.

The main problem was the lack of markets.

The small

"home" market was supplied by small local mines, and would never
exert a significant demand.

As noted earlier, the Upper

Monongahela coal field is surrounded by other coal fields.

Until

the 1890s, Baltimore and other eastern markets were supplied
mostly by coal from the Georges Creek field in western Maryland.
In an effort to "get to the Lakes" with their coal, both Fleming
and Watson traveled the railroad lines west in search of markets,
but they found only a single gas company which would take a mere
half dozen cars of coal.133
131Massay, "Coal Consolidation," 11-12.
132U. S. Census of 1870. Vol. 3: Wealth and Industry. 789.
133Massay, 12-13.
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Just as serious as the lack of demand was the B&O's
"blighting policy" toward northern West Virginia shippers.

The

B&O had a monopoly on rail transportation in the region and it
showed little interest in developing the shipping interests of
the region.

It refused to build side-tracks and failed to

provide an adequate number of cars.

As Fleming wrote in 1911:

For many years but little consideration was shown local
shippers, or the communities through which the road
ran. When quite young I remember hearing it said that
it did not pay the railroad to bother with local
freights, that stopping trains to put on or off freight
and to put cars in and take them out of the sidings did
not pay. ... This policy of the railroad ... retarded
the growth and development of that part of our state
served by the B&O— then the only railroad in the
state.134
In this era before freight rates were regulated, the B&0*s rate
structure strangled business in the region.

Because of a

disparity of charges per ton mile between long and short hauls,
the cost per mile of shipping from West Virginia stations to the
seaboard was nearly double that charged to Midwestern
shippers.135 This penalized all shippers, and was a devastating
blow to farmers.

Despite the obstacles, there was some

development of the coal industry in the 1870s.

By 1880 there

were commercial mines in Preston, Harrison, Marion, and
Monongalia counties, and the annual production of these counties

134A.B. Fleming, "A History of the Fairmont Coal Region," 251252.
135Ibid., 56.
133
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stood at 523,671 short tons.136
The gradual development of the coal industry was, however,
the only bright spot in the economic horizon of the upper
Monongahela region in the 1870s.

Manufacturing languished.

Although the number of manufacturing workers in the ten-county
region increased from 1,550 in 1869 to about 2,000 in 1880, the
number of establishments, as well as the level of wages,
declined.137 Agriculture declined as well.

Although Harrison

and Lewis counties continued to rank among the state's leaders in
livestock and cheese production, farmers were hard hit by the
Panic of 1873 and by transportation difficulties.

The 1870s was

a decade of severe distress for farmers of the region.

Not only

did they have to contend with the transportation monopoly of the
B&O but they also had to compete with more efficient farmers of
the Midwest.

Midwestern competition damaged the export market,

and farmers in the region even found themselves unable to compete
with cheaper Midwestern products in their "home" market.

Many

farmers left the state, particularly in the hard times following

136U. S. Census of 1880. Vol. 15: Mining Industries. 670; 927930.
137Chapman, Report of the Committee on the Upper Monongahela
Valley. Chart 9: "Number of Manufacturing Establishments in the
Upper Monongahela Valley and the United States for Specified Years
Between 1869 and 1931 (U.S. Census)," 43; Chart 10: "Number of Mfg.
Wage Earners in Upper Monongahela Valley & U.S. for Specified Years
Between 1869 and 1931 (U.S. Census)," 45; Chart 11: "Wages Paid by
Manufacturing Establishments in the Upper Monongahela Valley and
the United States for Specified Years Between 1869 and 1931 (U.S.
Census)," 46.
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the Panic of 1873.138
The difficulties with the railroads led many people in the
region to reconsider river transportation.

Between 1850 and 1871

steamboats had reached Fairmont only ten times, and although
there was some downstream raft traffic in lime, bricks, and
lumber, it was not substantial.139 In February, 1871 the
Morgantown Post announced the advent of a new packet, the West
Virginia. Built by Morgantown investors, the sternwheeler made
two trips a week to Pittsburgh until 1874, when it was sold and
put in the Gallipolis and Kanawha River trade.140 The basic
problem was that there had been no improvement of the Monongahela
River.

West Virginia was no more successful than Virginia in

extending slackwater to the upper Monongahela.
the federal government for action.

Many looked to

In 1872, U.S. Congressman

James McGrew, a merchant and banker from Kingwood who had played
a role in the statehood movement and helped design the state
seal, with the aid of lobbyists from the Morgantown Board of
Trade, obtained an appropriation from Congress for extending
slackwater on the Monongahela River to Morgantown.

By 1879 Lock

and Dam No. 9 at Hoard's Rocks in Monongalia County was
138Paul Salstrom, Appalachia1s Path to Dependency: Rethinking
a Region1s Economic History. 1730-1940 (Lexington: The University
Press of Kentucky, 1994), 23; Festus P. Summers, Johnson Newlon
Camden. A Study in Individualism (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons,
1937), 277-293; William D. Bams, The West Virginia Grange: The
First Century. 1872-1973 (Morgantown, West Virginia: Morgantown
Printing and Binding, 1973), 17-33.
139Johnson, Headwaters District. 128, 130.
140Kussart, "Navigation on the Monongahela River," 59-62.
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completed.

The lock and dam provided slackwater to Morgantown,

but the tolls of the Monongahela Navigation Company, which
remained in place until 1897, discouraged shippers.141
In the face of this economic adversity, the population of
the Upper Monongahela region did not increase dramatically, much
less quadruple in a space of three years as Carlisle predicted.
By 1880, the ten-county region held 129,521 people, a mere
twenty-four percent increase over 1850.

Of the three sister

towns, only Clarksburg showed signs of vitality, increasing in
population from 895 in 1860 to 2,307 in 1880.

Fairmont went from

a population of 704 in 1860 to 900 in 1880; and Morgantown,
despite its slackwater and acquisition of the state's land grant
college in 1867, was stagnate, its 1860 population of 741
increasing only to 745 in 1880.142
The fruits of the revolution were a long time coming.
During the wait, West Virginians adopted their now famous
inferiority complex.

As A.B. Fleming put it, West Virginia

became known as "a kind of Nazareth from which no good could ever
come."143 But things would change, and West Virginians,
especially those who followed the emergent middle class and
embraced the development faith, would have their day.
141Johnson, Headwaters District. 128-130, 141; Gannett,
Fleming, Corddry and Carpenter, Inc., A History of Navigation
Improvements on the Monongahela River (Pittsburgh: U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers, Pittsburgh District, 1980), 5-10.
142U. S. Census of 1890. Table 4, 45.
143,,West Virginia at the Present and the Future," Fairmont
Times, June 13, 1910.
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CHAPTER 5 - INDUSTRIALIZATION
As we turn our attention to industrialization, particularly
the rise of the coal industry, in the 1888 to 1920 period, it is
necessary to revisit some of the issues broached in chapter one.
It was asserted that the internal colonialism model had only a
limited utility for this study, and that the Upper Monongahela
region bore few similarities with the Appalachia of Caudill or
Eller.

The preceding chapter demonstrated that the Upper

Monongahela region, situated on the well-traveled Northwestern
Turnpike-B&O route, was settled, had developed a ’’town and farm"
society and a commercial and industrial economy, and had
undergone a political revolution decades before the first local
governments were formed in the rural hinterlands of Central
Appalachia.

It should be no surprise, then, that the internal

colonial model, generated to explain development in Central and
Southern Appalachia, is of such limited value.
Yet, it is impossible to ignore the work of John A.
Williams, whose Captains of Industry focuses on the industrial
enterprises and political careers of H.G. Davis and Stephen B.
Elkins, two figures who played a role in the development of the
back counties of the Upper Monongahela region.

Williams focused

attention on the question of indigenous versus absentee control
of the state's resources, which, as already indicated, is indeed
a vital issue.

But, did a "colonial political economy" develop

in West Virginia by 1900 as he asserts?
question is yes and no.

The answer to this

In West Virginia, the Woodward-Williams
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"New South" thesis is more appropriate for the southern and
southeastern counties of the state rather than the Northwest (the
twenty four counties which opposed secession).

At the onset of

the Civil War, the latter section had a market-oriented economy
and a modernizing political culture, and, more importantly,
nascent capitalists who would initiate industrial development,
form partnerships with outside capitalists, and control
development— more or less— until the 1920s Depression.
It is important to keep in mind that West Virginia's
modernizing section was itself divided into discrete regions,
each with a nodal city, and each more or less dominated by a
regional elite centered in that city.

Wheeling was the leading

city of the upper Ohio region; Parkersburg commanded the
resources of the Little Kanawha and middle Ohio region;
Charleston was the center of the Great Kanawha region;
Huntington, which was not founded until 1873, became a
transhipment point and commercial center for the lower Ohio
region; Martinsburg was the leading industrial center of the
Potomac region; and Fairmont-Clarksburg tapped the resources of
the Upper Monongahela region.

Each region was led by a political

and economic elite, an interlocking group of politicians/lawyers
and businessmen who resided there.

This regional elite was

often headed by a national figure, such as Davis, Elkins, J.N.
Camden or C.W. Watson.

These figures attained their high status,

in part, because they were great developers.

As politicians,

they represented regional interests in the councils of state and
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national government.

As Williams has demonstrated with his study

of the tariff on coal in the 1880s and 1890s, regional interest
often superseded party loyalties.

Both Davis, the Democratic

standard bearer, and Elkins, the Republican, opposed the removal
of the tariff.1 Both Democrats and Republicans shared the
development faith.
Of course West Virginia's regional nodes were not comparable
to the cities of the seaboard or the northern manufacturing belt.
They were tributary to these great centers and too weak
financially to exert much economic influence beyond a few
adjacent counties.

As a result, the modernizing northwestern

section of the state failed to integrate the Secessionist
counties into its economic orbit.

Nor were the nodal cities

large enough to serve as the principal market for the products of
their region.

Rather, they were regional commercial and

transportation centers where the railroads converged and where
indigenous capitalists and their political allies, groups such as
the "Fairmont Ring," resided, extending their political and
economic power to localities within the region.

The bourgeois

revolution of 1863 had established the power of these modernizing
elites in state and regional politics.

It had also established

an institutional tie between politics and business, a partnership
which was dedicated to the great task of developing and "building
up" the state.

As Williams asserts, the state was led by

"captains of industry," men who achieved political prominence
1Williams, West Virginia and the Captains of Industry. 17-67.
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because of their ability to bring capital to bear on the
development of the state and their home region.

Knowing the sad

outcome of industrialization, Williams was cynical of the
motivations of these men, and, as a result, he has perpetuated
the idea that they were inspired solely by self-interest.

Of

course, men like Davis and Elkins did seek personal riches and
national honors, but they were just as devoted to "boosting"
their home town and region.

Such a devotion was, in fact,

fostered by American political institutions.

In a political

system organized around regional territorial units, power was
based not just on national connections and wealth, but on how
well elected officials and their allies promoted the interests of
their region.

In a region such as the Upper Monongahela where

most people eagerly sought development— and, in fact, effected a
revolution to get it— the power of the regional elite was based
on how well they promoted development, brought capital into the
region, and provided employment and progress to the people.

Not

only money and prestige, but also votes came to the captain of
industry who brought prosperity to his locale.
What of Williams's contention that native West Virginia
capitalists, after acquiring immense amounts of resources (coal
and timber lands), building railroads, and developing mighty
industrial enterprises, sold them off to out-of-state capitalists
just for profit?

This is partially true, but misleading.

As we

shall see, there was a "takeover" by out-of-state capitalists in
West Virginia's modernizing section, but it took place mainly
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during the tumultuous 1920s, a decade after Williams ends his
story.

Moreover, most state capitalists did not sell their

holdings for profit, but lost them, along with their positions of
political power, under extreme duress during the long depression
of the 1920s and 1930s.

This is true even of the subjects of

William's book, Davis and Elkins.

Although the West Virginia

Central and Pittsburgh Railway and the Davis Coal & Coke Company
were sold to the Gould interests in 1902 for a large sum, both
Davis and Elkins used the profits to invest in other state
railroads and mines:

Davis the Coal & Coke Railway and Elkins

the Morgantown & Kingwood.2 Moreover, Stephen B. Elkins' sons,
Davis Elkins and Stephen N. Elkins, continued to play leading
roles in state politics and industry.

In fact, the critical

sellout of the Elkins' interests occurred under duress in 1919—
not 1902— when Bethlehem Mining Corporation (affiliated with
Bethlehem Steel) purchased from Stephen N. Elkins the Morgantown
& Kingwood Railroad, as well as his coal mines and coal
properties in Monongalia and Preston counties.3 After changing
the operation of the coal mines from union to nonunion, the outof-state company launched the opening battle in the 1920s mine
wars.
In an oft-cited passage, Williams posed a series of
questions which have since provided the framework for the study

2Paul Salstrom, "The Upper Potomac Coal Field," 69.
3"Bethlehem will acquire Elkins interests," Fairmont West
Virginian. October 24, 1919.
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of the state's industrialization.

He wrote: "it is time for

historians as well as economists and sociologists to ask the
question:

What went wrong?

What was done, or not done, to

guarantee the failure of West Virginia's aspirations for their
proportionate share of the national wealth?"4 Confining my
answer to this question to the Upper Monongahela region and, for
the time being, to the nineteenth century, nothing was done that
might jeopardize the region's economic future.

Unfettered from

the domination of "colonial" Virginia, its captains of industry
eventually overcame the obstacles presented by the B&O,
competition from other regions, and the "outside interference" of
the miners' union, to develop a regional economy which by 1920
provided a "proportionate share of the national wealth."
However, in response to the second part of Williams' question, it
is obvious that two things were not done in the nineteenth
century which would have major economic repercussion.

The region

had irretrievably lost its iron industry to the Pittsburgh
region, and was thus faced with a large, initial disadvantage in
the effort to become a diversified "industrial emporium" such as
Wheeling.

This loss, and the general dearth of manufacturing

activity, placed the region in a position of backwardness
relative to the industrialized areas to the north.

As Simon

demonstrated, the manufacturing belt cities such as Pittsburgh
attracted additional investment because of their initial head

Williams, Captains of Industry. 2.
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start.5 At the beginning of its industrialization, the Upper
Monongahela region had little besides its natural resources to
attract investment.

The people of the region were faced with the

challenge of having to lift themselves up "by the bootstraps" in
order to achieve prosperity.

Without a manufacturing base, the

region would have to rely largely on exports of resources:
oil and gas, and lumber.

coal,

It was expected that exports would

provide the basis for a more balanced growth.

As Williams

writes,
West Virginia's development faith was in effect a
primitive version of what specialists would later call
the "sector theory" of economic growth. This theory
posits a symmetrical process of economic change, by
which the growth of primary industry (agriculture,
mining, process) creates the linkages of capital,
skills, equipment, and demand that call forth secondary
industry (manufacturing), which in turn generates
expansion in the service sector (trade, transportation,
banking and insurance, private and public services).
To be more specific, the boomers anticipated the
"leading sector" or "export base" variant of the sector
theory, which stresses the importance of an export
commodity or product whose earnings outside the
territory in question provide the bases of subsequent,
more complex growth.6
As we shall see, this strategy brought some success to the Upper
Monongahela region in the period from 1888 to 1920.
The second thing that was not done to ensure the prosperity
of the Upper Monongahela region related to river transportation.
Despite the fact that the monopoly of the Monongahela Navigation
Company was broken by a federal government buy-out in 1897, and

5Simon, "Development of Underdevelopment," 286-293.
Williams, Captains of Industry. 172-173.
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that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers extended slackwater to
Fairmont in 1904, the system was not completed early enough for
West Virginia coal shippers to take advantage of the Pittsburgh
market.

West Virginia coal played no role in the development of

the iron and steel industry in Pittsburgh.

After Carnegie and

Frick made their historic partnership in 1892, the enormous
quantities of coke consumed by the blast furnaces of the Carnegie
Steel Company and later United States Steel Corporation were
destined to come from the Connelsville region in Fayette and
Westmoreland counties.

The needs of the Pittsburgh region for

steam coal for the firing of power plants, making producer gas,
and other industrial purposes were met by the producers within
that region as well.

Had coal or coke been available from the

Upper Monongahela prior to the formation of the Camegie-Frick
alliance, the region may have become partner, rather them a weak
rival, of the Pittsburgh region.

As matters stood, the coal of

the upper Monongahela found no downstream markets, in Pittsburgh
or elsewhere.

As a result the railroads became the sole supplier

of transportation for the region's coal and other products.
River transport, which is one-third to one-half less expensive
for bulky commodities, was not revived until the late 1930s.7
7In fiscal year 1910-1911, the peak year between 1905 and 1931
of river shipment of coal through Lock & Dam No. 9 at Hoard near
the state line, only 40,209 tons of the Fairmont field's total
production of 12,147,843 tons passed down the Monongahela River.
Even this low tonnage disappeared by 1917, and no coal whatsoever
was transported down the Monongahela from West Virginia until after
the completion of Tygart Dam in 1938. Sand and gravel, followed by
stone and lumber, were the main commodities shipped downriver from
West Virginia in this period, but the shipments were never large,
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The Magnitude of Industrialization
After a quarter century of sluggish development, rapid
growth occurred in the economy of the Upper Monongahela region
beginning in 1888, when coal exports began to increase
dramatically as the result of national industrial growth and a
change in the policy of the B&O Railroad.

Sustained growth

occurred until the early 1920s, when an economic decline began.
Deferring the discussion of the collapse of the regional economy
until later in the study, the remainder of this chapter deals
with the

period of rapid industrialization and social change.

The rapidity of industrialization can be demonstrated
statistically with some dazzling figures.

The population of the

ten-county region doubled, increasing from 150,250 in 1890 to
309,649 in 1920.

Of the ten counties, the largest increases in

population came in three central, industrial counties:
Marion, and Monongalia.

Harrison,

The population of the Harrison increased

by 293 percent.8 Much of the growth in these three counties can
be attributed to urbanization.

Clarksburg expanded from a town

judging from the number of lockages.
For example in 1910-1911,
only 745 lockages downriver were recorded at Lock & Dam No. 9. In
contrast, 8,077 downstream lockages occurred at Lock & Dam No. 4 at
North Charleroi. It should be noted, however, that log rafts often
"jumped" the dams after freshets, so the tonnage and lockage
figures would not reflect these shipments. National Archives,
Record Group 77, "Records of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,
Pittsburgh District," Chief of Engineers, Annual Report. 1911-1931.
8Chapman, Report of the Committee on the Upper Monongahela
Valiev. Appendix A, Table 1: "Total Population and Percentage of
Increase or Decrease for the United States, for West Virginia, for
the Upper Monongahela Valley, and for Each of the Ten Selected
Counties, 1930-1890," derived from the U.S. Census.
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of 6,742 in 1890 to the state's fourth largest city with a
population of 27,869 in 1920.

Fairmont and Morgantown

experienced similar growth, the former rising from a population
of 1,023 in 1890 to 17,851 in 1920, and the latter growing from
1,011 to 12,127 in the same period.9 Grafton, Elkins, and
Weston, all county seats, grew at rates only slightly below those
of the three central towns.
four counties:

Urbanization was more pronounced in

Harrison, Marion, Monongalia, and Taylor.

Here,

the percentage of urban population ranged well above the
statewide figure.10
Urbanization within the regional node, the FairmontClarksburg metropolis, was actually much more significant than
these statistics indicate.

In 1903 the Fairmont and Clarksburg

Traction Company began construction of an interurban trolley line
which connected the two major cities with the numerous mining
towns in the Monongahela and West Fork valleys.

By 1911, the

company had 89 miles of track.11 By 1922 its lines reached
south to Weston, Lewis County, and north to Fairview on Paw Paw

9U. S. Census of 1920. Population. West Virginia, "Population
of Principal Cities from Earliest Census to 1920," 8.
10Taylor led the four counties with a 45.4 percent urban
population, followed by Harrison with 41.2, Marion with 39.4, and
Monongalia with 36.1. West Virginia had a population which was
25.2 urban in 1920, and the United States, 51.4 percent. Chapman,
Report of the Committee on the Upper Monongahela Valley. Appendix
A, Table 4: "Percentage Distribution of Urban and Rural
Populations, 1930-1900," derived from the U.S. Census.
11Fairmont & Clarksburg Traction Company, "Lines of the
Fairmont & Clarksburg Traction Company," (1911), Map Case 6, Drawer
4, West Virginia and Regional History Collection.
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Creek in northwestern Marion County.12 These lines connected
the cities and mining settlements in the Monongahela Valley and
turned the area, according to one booster, into "one large
city.1,13
Coal mining became the principal industry of the region by
1900, and by 1920, mining provided employment for over one-fifth
of the work force.

Production increased dramatically from

1,131,953 short tons in 1890 to 21,497,493 short tons in 1920,
the latter total representing about one-quarter of the state's
total production.14 Manufacturing also grew at a rapid rate,
insuring diversity in the regional economy.

The number of

manufacturing establishments in the region more than doubled,
increasing from 240 in 1889 to 680 in 1919, and the number of
wage earners went from 875 in 1889 to 22,480 in 1919.

The rate

of increase in manufacturing activity from 1889 to 1919, measured
in the nu m b er of wage earners, wages paid, and value added, was
more rapid than in the nation as a whole.

The average annual

manufacturing wage in the region in 1919 was $1,295.38, above the

12Joseph M. Canfield, editor, West Penn Traction (Chicago:
Central Electric Railfans' Association, 1970), Map: "FairmontClarksburg Division of the Monongahela West Penn Public Service
Company," 113. Morgantown had an interurban line which linked it
to the adjacent communities of Sabraton and Scotts Run, but not to
the Fairmont & Clarksburg lines. Grafton had a small interurban
line also.
13M.C. Lough, editor, "The F. and C. Traction Co.," The West
Virginia State Weekly (November 23, 1910), 4.
14West Virginia Department of Mines, Annual Report. 1950, "Coal
Production by Counties from 1888 to 1950," 203-205. This total is
for production in the ten counties of the region.
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figures for both the U.S. ($1,162.34) and West Virginia
($1,226.45) .15 As a measure of social welfare, the rate of
illiteracy in the region in 1920 was 5.4 percent, lower than both
the national (6.0 percent) and state (6.4 percent) figures.16
It is essential to understand the geography of development
during industrialization.

Based on the exportation of coal, and

to a lesser extent, lumber, coke, and other manufactured
products, development was dependent on, and followed, the
railroad.

Neither the river, nor the old Virginia turnpikes were

of much utility as shipping lanes.

However, many of the old

towns along these pre-1850 transportation corridors found new
life when the railroad arrived.
The railroad penetrated the region from two different
directions.

The most important route was the B&O trunk line,

which passed from Cumberland, Maryland through Preston County to
Grafton, where it split into two branches, the main stem passing
through Fairmont to Wheeling and the southwest branch passing
through Clarksburg to Parkersburg.

This corridor had existed

since the 1850s and had promoted some development, but the rapid
industrialization in the Clarksburg-Fairmont node occurred after
15Chapman, Report of the Committee on the Upper Monongahela
Valiev. 42-47; average annual wages calculated from Appendix B,
Table 16: "Statistics of Manufactures for the United States, West
Virginia and the Upper Monongahela Valley, 1931-1869," from U.S.
Census.
16Ibid., Table 24: "Percent of Illiterates for the Total
Population, 10 Years of Age and Over, by Color and Nativity for the
United States, West Virginia, the Upper Monongahela Valley, and for
Each of the Ten Selected Counties, 1930-1910," based on U.S.
Census.
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the construction of the Monongahela River Railroad in 1890, which
linked the two valley towns and tapped the Pittsburgh coal seam
along the West Fork River.

As a result, the territory within the

triangle formed by the three railroad towns, Grafton, Fairmont,
Clarksburg, became the regional center of industrial and
demographic growth.

Later, when the B&O network was augmented,

the regional orbit was expanded to encompass most of the area of
the six northwestern counties (Monongalia, Preston, Barbour,
Taylor, Marion, and Harrison) of the region.

Known to railroad

men as the Monongah Division and to coal men as the Fairmont
field, this was the principal area of development in the region.
It is also the main focus of this study.
Meanwhile, the eastern and southern hinterland of the
region, Tucker, Randolph, Upshur and Lewis counties, was being
developed from another direction.

In 1881, Henry G. Davis began

the construction of the West Virginia Central and Pittsburgh
Railway, which extended up the North Branch of the Potomac River
from the B&O main stem at Piedmont.

By 1885 the WVC&P crossed

the divide to reach the Monongahela watershed in Tucker County;
in 1889 it reached Elkins in Randolph County.

As the Coal & Coke

Railway, this line was extended southwest to Charleston in 1905,
tapping the lumber and coal of Lewis, Upshur, and other interior
counties.

Unlike the Fairmont Field, this territory had seen

little economic or political development prior to the coming of
the railroad.

When industrialization occurred, it was based

solely on resource extraction, coal and lumber, and bore little
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resemblance to the more balanced growth in the Fairmont Field.
The story of the development of this territory, the province of
H.G. Davis and Stephen B. Elkins, is not central to this
study.17

The Indigenous Developers
As its name suggests, the Fairmont coal field was developed
mainly by capitalists from Fairmont, the "Coal City."

Fairmont

also had a significant glass and mining machinery industry, but
it was noted as the home of the region's coal barons.

Many of

the coal companies in the region administered their business
affairs from offices in Fairmont's downtown district:

the Watson

building, an eight-story stone structure which housed the family
enterprises, the Jacobs' Building, the Hall Building, the Deveney
Building, the Professional Building, and the Home Savings Bank
Building.18
The Watson family was the leading coal dynasty in Fairmont.
Patriarch James Otis Watson (1815-1902), after parting with
Francis Pierpont in 1874, brought his son-in-law, A.B. Fleming,
and his three sons, Sylvanus Lamb (b.1848), James Edwin (1858-

17Williams' Captains of Industry deals with the development of
these two counties to a limited extent. See Paul Salstrom, "The
Upper Potomac Field," 63-87, and "The Elkins Coal Field," 91-109,
Northern West Virginia Coal Fields, for histories of the railroad
development and coal industry in this area.
18"The Fairmont Region of West Virginia," Black Diamond. Vol.
60, No. 25 (June 22, 1918): 535-569. Black Diamond was a coal trade
journal which periodically showcased the various coal fields in the
nation.
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1926), and Clarence Wayland (1864-1940), into the business.

The

latter became the "Big Four," the inner circle of the "Fairmont
Ring," which became the most powerful business and political
group in the region.

By 1920 the Fairmont ring, led by C.W.

Watson, ruled over a vast Appalachian coal empire which stretched
from Eastern Kentucky to Central Pennsylvania.

The Fairmont Ring

was also the most important group of developers in the region.
The Watsons and their allies invested their wealth not only in
fine homes, but also in the infrastructure, industry, and
commerce of the region.
any standard.

Their investments were substantial by

Not only did they build scores of mining towns,

but they also developed and operated the region's interurban
trolley line.

They reserved their greatest investments for

Fairmont, where they owned and developed real estate and held
stock in several industries, the town's leading bank and
newspaper, The Fairmont Times.19 As the region's greatest
developers, the Watsons and their allies were a principal agent
of industrialization.

Their investments were also the most

visible sign of the operation of the export base theory during
this period, providing the "linkage" between the export base

19Information of the Watsons' various enterprises is available
in Elinor Watson Carroll, "Coal: King in Marion County," in Marion
County Historical Society, Inc., Marion County Centennial Yearbook.
19-22; Massay, "Coal Consolidation:
Profile of the Fairmont
Field;" Fleming, "History of Fairmont Coal Region;" James Otis
Watson, III, The Valley Coal Story (Fairmont Printing Company,
1957); A.B. Fleming Papers, West Virginia and Regional History
Collection; and Harry M. Caudill, Theirs be the Power: The Moguls
of Eastern Kentucky (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1983),
67-84.
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(coal), and secondary industry (manufacturing).
Fairmont had other coal barons (twelve to eighteen who
became millionaires by the 1920s according to one somewhat
exaggerated account)20, but none were as powerful as the
Fairmont Ring.

Nor were they able— or willing— to invest in the

region as substantially as the Watsons.

The Hutchinsons, headed

by Clyde E. Hutchinson, was the second leading family in
Fairmont.

Besides the Hutchinson Coal Company, which was second

only to the Fairmont Coal Company in production in the Fairmont
field until the 1910s, C.E. Hutchinson and his eight sons
operated coal companies in Southern West Virginia, principally
Logan County.

Rolfe M. Hite (1867-1949), a lesser Fairmont coal

baron, founded the Virginia and Pittsburgh Coal & Coke Company in
1890, and with his four sons, Rolph M., Sam, Marcus, and John,
and his daughter Virginia (the sole female Fairmont coal baron),
operated several other coal companies.

John A. Clark (b. 1855)

organized the Clark Coal & Coke Company in 1889 and was also
president of C.W. Watson's Elk Horn Coal Company.

Later his sons

John, Jr. and Harry B. joined him in establishing other coal
companies.

Other notable Fairmont coal men were Seim Dunlop Brady

(1860-1931), Howard Showalter, C.H. Jenkins, Clarence D. and
Harry Robinson, T.W. Arnette and Harvey Hurst Staggers.21
Clarksburg had fewer coal barons.

It was better known for

its glass and other industry, banks, lawyers, and politicians.
20Watson, "The Valley Coal Story," 6.
21"The Fairmont Region of West Virginia," 535-69.
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The town was located in Harrison County, the only county of the
region where manufacturing, rather than mining or agriculture,
was the principal source of employment in 1920.22 The town did,
however, have a few important coal men, including the colorful
"Uncle Dan" Howard, one of the organizers and president of the
Central West Virginia Coal Operators' Association and president
of the Central Fairmont and Fairmont Big Vein Gas Coal Companies.
Virgil Highland was a Clarksburg banker and a director in the
Hutchinsons' Logan Mining Company, which operated in Logan
county, as well as in the Elk Horn Coal Company.23
Clarksburg’s leading development families, Goff, Lowndes,
and Davis, emerged after the Civil War, and like the Watsons,
they could trace their lineages to patriarchs who supported the
Union and statehood.

The most notable of the Lowndes family was

Richard T. Lowndes (1843-1930), who was acclaimed in 1964 as "the
man who perhaps did the most to develop the business of the
county."24 He established the Lowndes Bank and held not only
coal but also railroad, oil and gas, and milling interests.
Lowndes family intermarried with the Goffs.

The

Following in the

footsteps of patriarch Nathan Goff, jurists-tumed-politicians
Nathan Goff, Jr. (1882-1920) and his son Guy Despard Goff (1869^Chapman, Report of the Committee on the Upper Monongahela
Valiev. 26.
^The Fairmont Region of West Virginia," Black Diamond. 535569.
24This accolade was made by Edgar Hood of the Harrison County
Historical Society according to Davis, History of Harrison County.
674.
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1933) served in the U.S. Senate (as Republicans), where, among
other things, they worked to protect the state coal industry from
federal regulation.

Nathan Goff, Jr. had some investments in the

coal industry as well.

Although John J. Davis (1835-1916) had

some interest in banking, he and his son, John W. Davis (18731955), who became the Democratic nominee for President in 1924,
were primarily lawyers and Democratic politicians.25
Although the richest development of the Monongahela Series
found anywhere in the region is near Morgantown along Scotts Run,
the city saw little coal or even industrial development until the
twentieth century.

George T. Sturgiss made his name as an

industrialist and builder of the Fairmont, Morgantown &
Pittsburgh Railroad (1886), and, along with Stephen B. Elkins the
Morgantown and Kingwood Railroad (1905).

Sturgiss and Elkins

developed the tinplate mill at Sabraton near Morgantown, and had
mines and coke ovens along the M&K.

After the Scotts Run Railway

was built in 1917, Morgantown also became a coal center.
Probably the most prominent coal operator in the Morgantown area
was Samuel Pursglove (1875-1947), the peripatetic who came to
Scotts Run from Ohio and Pennsylvania in 1917.

Pursglove was

one of the first to open a commercial mine in the Scotts Run
district.

Other Morgantown coal men, whose interests were mainly

in Scotts Run were Benjamin Chaplin, Stephen Arkwright, John L.
Hatfield, Frank L. Bowman, James R. Moreland, Joseph L. Keener,
and Raymond Davis.

The Scotts Run operators, unlike Sturgiss,

^Ibid., 151, 161, 199, 674-676.
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invested mainly in the coal industry.
Morgantown was known as a center of geology and mining
education.

West Virginia University had a nationally-recognized

School of Mines.

In addition to training mining engineers, from

1917 the University taught extension courses in general mining,
rescue, and safety.

Affiliated with the university, Israel C.

White (1848-1927), was one of the nation's leading coal and oil
and gas geologists.

Through his publications, as well as

personal investments, White played a large role in the
development of the region's mineral resources.26
Grafton was principally a railroad town.

It was situated in

Taylor County, the only county in the region to have
transportation and communication as the major industrial sector
in 1920.27 John T. McGraw (1856-1920), a Democratic standard
bearer in the state from 1880 to 1916, was the town's leading
industrial developer.

A lawyer by training, McGraw had large

holdings of timber and coal lands in the interior counties, was a
stockholder in the town's bank, owned the West Virginia Midland
Railroad in Webster County, and had interest in various oil and
gas companies.

McGraw also built the Willard Hotel beside the

B&O Railroad's station in Grafton in 1910, and operated the

26"Morgantown's Wealth of Fuel," The Black Diamond Vol 72, No.
6 (August 11, 1923): 178-96; John W. Kirk, compiler, Progressive
West Virginians (The Wheeling Intelligencer. 1923), 145, 151, 191.
27Chapman, Report of the Committee on the Upper Monongahela
Valiev. 26.
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Grafton Coal & Coke, Rosemont, and McGraw coal companies.28
Further up the Tygart Valley River in Barbour County at
Philippi, Judge Alston Dayton held court for West Virginia's
federal northern district after 1905.

Dayton, a Republican who

was elected to six terms as Representative in the U.S. Congress
from 1894 to 1904, was also a director of Philippi's major bank,
and owned extensive coal properties.29 Dayton's protege was
Charles F. Teter, also a "prominent man in business circles as in
politics."

Teter was a seller of coal lands, and an officer in

the Philippi Coal Mining Company.30
Much more than outside interests, the "captains of industry"
in these upper Monongahela towns were responsible for the rapid
industrialization of the 1888 to 1920 period.

They were the

"progressive West Virginians" who "built up and developed the
state."3^ They formed an intermeshing economic and political
elite which ruled the region and represented its interests in
state and federal counsels.

The captains stood at the helm for

over three decades, commanding a ship headed for the promised
land of prosperity.
28Taylor County Historical and Genealogical Society, Inc., A
History of Tavlor County. West Virginia (Parsons, West Virginia:
McClain Printing Company, 1986), 304-305; West Virginia State
Weekly (November 23, 1910), 11.
^Men of West Virginia. Vol.
Publishing Company, 1903), 539-542.

2

(Chicago:

Biographical

30West Virginia State Weekly (November 23, 1910), 13.
31Robert E. Murphy, compiler, Progressive West Virginians: Some
of the Men who have Built Up and Developed the State of West
Virginia (The Wheeling News. 1905), ii.
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What was the event, the change in conditions, which brought
about the period of rapid growth?

According to A.B. Fleming, it

was a change in the B&C's "blighting policy," which occurred in
1887:
The B&O changed its policy about the time of the
election of Mr. Samuel Spencer, president, and Mr.
William M. Clements, general manager, . . .
Immediately life was infused into the coal business. .
•

•

•

Fleming did not explain why this occurred, but it is clear that
the change came only after the B&O’s monopolistic power in the
region was challenged by the region's captains of industry,
principally Johnson N. Camden (1826-1908), the railroad
developer, land speculator, oil tycoon, and politician based in
Parkersburg.

This great captain challenged the supremacy of the

B&O both as a politician and as a developer.

Camden had a plan

for the development of a network of railroads which would
penetrate central West Virginia and connect the central and
northern part of the state with the Pennsylvania Railroad or
other competitor of the B&O.33
Camden's initial venture in realizing this plan was the
Clarksburg, Weston & Glenville Railroad, which was completed from
Clarksburg to Weston in 1879.

This narrow-gauge line was then

32Fleming, "History of the Fairmont Coal Region," 252-253;
"Fairmont, a Live Town in a Live Community," Fairmont Index. April
15, 1892.
^Summers, Camden, 315-35. Camden admittedly had a proprietary
interest in developing the resources of interior.
In 1882 he
joined with Henry G. Davis and Stephen B. Elkins to acquire the
Caperton tract, 1,837,000 acres in Webster and Nicholas counties.
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extended south to Webster and Nicholas counties.

After it was

reorganized in 1892 as the West Virginia & Pittsburgh, the
company upgraded its lines to standard gauge.34 Meanwhile, a
group of Morgantown developers headed by George Sturgiss built
the Fairmont, Morgantown, and Pittsburgh Railroad from Fairmont
to Morgantown in 1886, linking the town to the B&O's main stem.
This line was, however, purchased by the B&O shortly after it was
completed.35
The construction of the FM&P presented an opportunity to the
Watson-Fleming interests, and they formed the Montana Coal and
Coke Company in 1886 and started the Montana Mine six miles north
of Fairmont.

The company installed a large coke plant and became

the first in the region to attempt large-scale production and
export of coke.

Coke making was a means by which the region's

coal shippers could reap a higher rate of return from their
product.

Coke sold at about double the price per ton as raw

coal, and, since the coking process reduced volume by about 33

^Ibid.; and David B. Reger, West Virginia Geological Survey:
Lewis and Gilmer Counties (Wheeling:
Wheeling News Litho Co.,
1916), 3-4. The line was taken to Flatwoods in 1891, to Camden-onGauley in 1892, and to Richwood in 1899. It was sold to the B&O in
1899 and became the B&O’s Richwood Branch.
35The railroad network was also extended by the construction
of the Grafton & Greenbrier Railroad, which was opened from Grafton
to Philippi in 1884. In 1892, after it was taken over by the B&O,
it was extended to Belington. Also in 1884, grading began on the
West Virginia Northern Railroad between Tunnelton and Kingwood in
Preston county; it was completed in 1887.
Ray V. Hennen, West
Virginia Geological Survey: Marion. Monongahela and Tavlor Counties
(Wheeling: Wheeling News Litho, 1913), 4-5; and Hennen, West
Virginia Geological Survey. Preston County (Wheeling:
Wheeling
News Litho, 1914), 27.
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per cent, transportation costs were reduced.

The coke produced

at Montana from the Pittsburgh seam quickly gained market
acceptance,36 and in 1890 the Montana plant produced 46,724
short tons of coke.37
Part of Montana's success can be attributed to the work of
regional booster I.e. White, who wrote a glowing report in 1887
about Montana coke.

In the report, White challenged a persistent

idea among iron men that Fairmont coke was inferior to the
Connellsville product.

In the report, White noted that "the

analyses of Upper Monongahela Valley coke [from the Pittsburgh
and Upper Freeport seams] show that it has more sulphur them the
best of the Connellsville, but at the same time we find that the
Monongahela coke has a greater percentage of fixed carbon and
also about 40 per cent less ash ... so that these results will
offset each other to some extent."

White also ventured the

prophesy that Monongahela Valley coke "must be depended upon for
the future supply of the Pittsburgh region itself after a few
more years, and also for all the Western region which is now
supplied from the Pennsylvania fields."38
White's prophesy was never realized, but his report and
sales of Montana coke in the Chicago and western markets, brought

36Massay, "Coal Consolidation," 20; Summers, Johnson Newlon
Camden, 365-66.
37West Virginia Department of Mines, Annual Report. 1889-90.
^I.C. White, "Report on the Coal Field of the Upper
Monongahela River Region," June 29, 1887, quoted in Massay, "Coal
Consolidation," 24-5.
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Camden into the coal and coke business.

In 1887 Camden organized

a syndicate to develop the West Fork valley; it eventually
acquired sixty thousand acres of coal lands.

This group (which

included A.B. Fleming but not the Watsons) brought the first
sizeable amounts of out-of-state capital into the area.

The

goals were to build a railroad in the West Fork valley and
develop what Camden called "a beautiful body of coal.1'39
Camden not only challenged the B&O in the field, but also in
Congress, where as U.S. Senator he pushed for passage of the
Interstate Commerce Act in 1887.

Although the Interstate

Commerce Commission did not assume the power of regulating
freight rates until 1910, its creation helped cow the B&O.

As

Fleming related, the railroad adopted a more liberal policy
toward Fairmont shippers, enlarging its rolling stock and
improving facilities in the region.

The railroad also came to

more sympathetic arrangement with Fairmont coal shippers on
freight rates.40 The struggle with the B&O and its monopoly
power did not end at this time, however.

As we shall see, it

remained a major theme in interregional relations throughout this
and the ensuing period.
By 1890 the Monongahela River Railroad Company had completed

and Clarksburg.

Meanwhile, the sister company, the Monongah Coal

and Coke Company had constructed two major mining plants, with
39Massay, "Coal Consolidation," 47-48.
40Summers, Camden, 277-335.
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two slope mines, fifty houses, a hotel, and 320 coke ovens, at
Briartown, just south of Fairmont at the mouth of Booths Creek.
In 1891 the booming town was incorporated as Monongah.

The

Monongah company leased its West Fork properties to several
operating firms, and within half a dozen years the whole valley
churned with activity as the Farnun, Pritchards, Fall Run, Glen
Falls, and Worthington mines all opened, affording support for
almost eleven hundred miners and their families.41 The 1890
coal production figures reflect the upsurge.

Coal production in

the Fairmont Field increased thirty percent from 1880 to 1890, up
to 745,157 short tons.42
Formerly used mainly for gas-making, Fairmont coal now saw
more use as coking, railroad and general steam coal.
shipped to distant markets.

It was

Surrounded by other coal fields,

which supplied the demand not only of their own region but
exported to neighboring ones, Fairmont’s shippers were forced to
send their product to Chicago or to the Great Lakes and
Baltimore, where it was often transhipped.

This made

41Massay, "Coal Consolidation," 20; Summers, Johnson Newlon
Camden, 365-66.
42West Virginia Department of Mines, Annual Report, 1890-1891.
57-58. The state of West Virginia provided production totals in
long tons, 2,240 pounds, until 1924.
In this report, all
production totals have been converted to short tons. These figures
are for the six counties in the Fairmont field— Barbour, Harrison,
Marion, Monongalia, Preston, and Taylor.
The three counties of
Upshur, Lewis, and Randolph are included as part of the Elkins
Field, and Tucker with the Upper Potomac Field in Michael Workman,
Paul Salstrom, and Phil Ross, Northern West Virginia Coal Fields:
Historical Context (Morgantown: Institute for History of Technology
and Industrial Archaeology, 1994).
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transportation costs higher than in other coal fields, and,
although the additional cost was borne by the consumer, it
nonetheless raised the price of the Fairmont product.

With this

handicap, Fairmont producers quickly learned that the key to
marketing success was in underselling their competitors.
Statistics do not reveal the spirit of development— the
culture which made it all possible.

For this, we must turn to

the newspapers, which played an important role in galvanizing
public opinion in support of development.

In 1892 the Fairmont

Index published a special edition of its paper which celebrated
the town's recent "floodtide" of growth.

After the fire of 1876,

which practically destroyed Fairmont, the town awoke from its
"Rip Van Winkle sleep,"
Now, brick structures replace the dilapidated wooden
ones. . . . The towns and villages which have sprung
into being all around us as though by the wizard's hand
have come so suddenly with their teeming population and
their busy hum of industry where before naught was
heard but the lowing of cattle in the fields or the
cheerful talk of husbandmen as they reaped or sowed.
Fairmont's prosperity, the newspaper asserted, was based on its
railroad lines and location, which had made the town an "entrepot
for the collection and distribution of the great wealth of the
interior of West Virginia," and its industry, mainly coal but
also oil and gas.

The coal and coking business, the paper

proclaimed, "employs 1500 and supports 5,000."

Monongah, which

had "grown up like magic in [the] past few years" held 1,500
people, and it, and the territory along the Monongahela River
Railroad "is all tributary to Fairmont."

Coal will continue to
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boom because Fairmont operators can "already undersell Pittsburgh
operators at a profit," and are "playing the deuce with
Pittsburgh operators who ship to Lake Erie."

The economics was

simple: Fairmont operators had lower production costs.

While

Pennsylvania coal lands cost one hundred to three hundred dollars
an acre, those in West Virginia were only twenty dollars an acre.
The only hope for Pennsylvania operators "is if the Pennsylvania
Railroad reduces its freight rate by 20 cents a ton."
According to the newspaper, Fairmont's prosperity was also
based on Marion County's oil and gas boom, which began in 1885
after I.e. White located reserves in the northwestern part of the
county.

Now Marion County had 200 producing wells, which were

providing natural gas to the town of Mannington and the two glass
plants in Fairmont.

In addition to the glass plants, the town

boosted other industries including a brick works, planing mill,
pottery, foundry and machine shop, and the B&O Railroad's repair
and maintenance facilities.
Fairmont, according to this booster edition, also owed its
success to great developers and to a community which shared the
development faith.

The town was built by men of "persistent

energy and intelligent effort" like James Otis Watson, who
organized the Fairmont Development Company in 1890 to develop the
South Side.

Fairmont was a "live town in a live community," not

a town of "croakers— men who try to blight all enterprises having
for their object the growth of the community and the prosperity
of the people."

It was full of "public-spirited men who invest
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their capital lavishly and succeed in attracting foreign
capital."
The newspaper predicted a period of "unrivalled growth" for
Fairmont and the surrounding area because of its many assets.
Its location— halfway between eastern markets in Baltimore and
New York and western markets in Chicago— its natural resources,
and the public spiritedness of its people would attract capital
and spur the development of a diversified economy based on not
just coal and coke, but also glass houses, machine shops,
potteries, and iron manufactures.
appeal to

investors.

The issue concluded with an

Quoting one capitalist who migrated to

Fairmont from Pittsburgh, "I located here because I think
Fairmont has the very best advantages for coal, location,
shipping facilities, limestone deposits— and it has no tax to
pay," the newspaper advised: "Invest capital here; don't be
lulled by false prophets of other communities."43
Despite the extensive development of the coal industry
during the late 1880s and early 1890s, another decade was
required before it became firmly established.

The Panic of 1893

and its aftermath posed yet another challenge to coal
capitalists.

The depression brought hard times once again to the

Fairmont region.

Demand for coal plunged; some mines were forced

to close while others experienced grave difficulties.

Although

tonnage figures for the field continued to increase slightly in
1893 and 1894, they declined in 1895 and 1896.

Competition with

43Fairmont Index, Special Edition, April 15, 1892.
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other producers, especially in the profitable Lake trade, became
intense.

Mine operators complained of a lack of profits.

In

order to stay in business, many firms cut production costs by
reducing wages.44
The hard times of the mid-1890s brought bankruptcy to most
of the railroad companies in the Fairmont field.

The B&O, which

had taken over some of the branch lines in the region in the
1890s, was forced into bankruptcy in 1896.

Camden's West

Virginia & Pittsburgh Railroad followed suit in 1898.

The

denouement of the collapse was the reorganization of the B&O in
1899 and the merger of Camden's two lines, the West Virginia &
Pittsburgh and the Monongahela River Railroad, with it.

The

reorganization marked the end of Camden's plan for an independent
carrier for the region.
term significance.

It also had another consequence of long

The Pennsylvania Railroad, which purchased 40

percent of the reorganized B&O's stock, became a factor in the
region's development.45
A critical factor in the recovery following the Panic of
1893 and in the industrialization of the Fairmont region was the
success of its coal operators in resisting an 1890s drive by the
United Mine Workers of America's to unionize the field.

Formed

in 1890, the UMWA enjoyed a tremendous growth in its first decade
by organizing the northern bituminous fields in Illinois,
Indiana, Ohio, and the Pittsburgh field of Pennsylvania, which
^assay, "Coal Consolidation," 59-62.
45Summers, Camden, 504-527.
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together became known as the Central Competitive Field.

In the

period from 1890 to 1902 the UMWA made a concerted effort to
organize the Fairmont field.

Four major organization efforts

were attempted: in 1892, 1894, 1897 and 1902.

All failed.46 By

keeping their mines free of the UMWA, the Fairmont operators
maintained wage rates lower than those prevailing in the
northern, unionized fields.

The nonunion policy enabled the

Fairmont operators to cut prices and undersell northern
producers.47 It also allowed them to produce during the oftenprolonged union strikes of this era.

With lower prices and

regular deliveries, customers were willing to pay the higher
freight charges for Fairmont coal.

As a result, Fairmont

companies were able to capture new markets in the late-1890s;
sales in the eastern "tidewater" market were supplemented by
those in the lucrative Lake and Chicago trades.
Production soared to 5,049,147 short tons in 1900, a
staggering 678 percent advance from 1890.

The seventy mines in

^assay, "Coal Consolidation," 281-83. Also see the following
chapter.
47The average price per net short ton of coal at the mine in
West Virginia was $0.81 in 1900 compared to $1.04 in the United
States as a whole. Simon, "Development of Underdevelopment," Table
23: "Average Price per Net Ton of Coal at the Mine, United States
and West Virginia, 1880-1939," 79. The coal of the Fairmont region
varied in price. The Upper Freeport coal of Preston and Taylor
counties sold for about $0.89 a short ton— above the state average.
However, the Pittsburgh coal of Marion, Harrison, Monongalia, and
Barbour counties went at around $0.67 per short ton, well below the
state average. Fairmont field prices calculated from West Virginia
Department of Mines. Annual Report. 1900-1901. 33. However, James
Otis Watson II, in The Valiev Coal Story (Fairmont:
Fairmont
Printing Company, 1957), 12, gives $0.80 a short ton as the price
of Fairmont coal in 1900.
166

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

the field provided employment for 6,594 miners and workers.

Coke

production increased to 390,019 tons, a 425 percent increase over
1890.48 The greatest concentration of mining centered around
the two relatively short, north-south railroad lines— the
Fairmont, Morgantown, and Pittsburgh 3ranch of the B&O and the
Monongahela River Railroad, which connected the Monongahela
Valley to the trunk lines.
Penetrating far-off markets was one thing but holding them
was another.

It took a further development, the consolidation of

most of the mines of the region into one powerful company, to
attain this end.

In this period, consolidation was occurring in

several other industries, most notably in railroads, and iron and
steel.

But the highly competitive coal industry, with thousands

of companies and mines scattered all over the country, presented
special difficulties.

In 1900 an injurious round of competitive

price-cutting by the various Chicago brokerage houses which
handled Fairmont coal led A.B. Fleming to initiate a
consolidation movement, both to control sales and to prevent
excessive competition within the region.

In fact, conditions in

the Fairmont field lent themselves to consolidation since most of
the coal frontage along the West Fork and Monongahela Rivers was
controlled by either the Camden or Watson-Fleming interests,
which had a history of cooperation.

Behind Clarence W. Watson's

lead, the Fairmont Coal Company was formed on June 20, 1901.

The

Watsons used the six companies they already owned (Montana, West
^Annual Report. 1900-01. 5-15.
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Fairmont, Briar Hill, Gaston, American and Highland) as the
foundation for the enterprise, and then they offered six million
in five per cent bonds which they used to buy, lease, and start
other operations.

The officials of the Monongah Company leased

their entire property to the new company, pushing Camden into the
background.

The Watson-Fleming interests held well over half of

the stock of the new company.49
The whole region thrived through the consolidation.

Some

less prominent operators sold their mines to the Fairmont Coal
Company, then started new ones.

The Hutchinsons, for example,

sold seven of their plants and used the proceeds to open new
mines near Clarksburg and in Logan county.

By 1903 the Fairmont

Coal Company owned or leased thirty-six mines and 1,060 coke
ovens, employed over 6,000 miners, and reached an annual output
of 3,800,000 short tons.50
After patriarch James Otis Watson died in 1902, a further
step in consolidation was taken in 1903.

Negotiations were

undertaken with the Consolidation Coal Company of Maryland, which
had operated in the Georges Creek field since 1863.

In January a

majority interest of the Fairmont Coal Company was purchased by
the older enterprise.

With financial backing from the B&O, the

Consolidation Coal Company also purchased the Clarksburg Fuel
Company in West Virginia, as well as the Somerset Coal Company in

49Massay, "Coal Consolidation," 87.
50Ibid., 83-84.
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southcentral Pennsylvania.51
Did this event mark the end of the indigenous control of the
industry and the beginning of outside dominance?

Not according

to historian Glen Massay, who wrote:
The fact that Consol purchased a majority of the shares
of the Fairmont company has led to the ideathat the
Maryland company absorbed the West Virginia company.
However, if one considers that on January 6, 1903
Clarence W. Watson, representing the Fairmont company,
replaced Charles K. Lord as president of Consolidation
Coal Company, one might question which organization had
really taken over the other.
In fact, the Fairmont Ring controlled the development of
Consol from the date of its organization until 1928.

In 1906

Clarence (C.W.) Watson headed a syndicate which bought the B&O's
stock in the corporation, some 52 percent of the shares, thereby
giving him and his group majority control of the corporation.
C.W. remained either president or chairman of the board of Consol
until 1928— with a three-year hiatus between 1911 and 1913 when
he served as U.S. Senator.

His older brothers, James Edwin

(J.E.) and Sylvanus (Bud) served long terms on the board of
directors, as did Sylvanus' son George T. Watson.

A.B. Fleming

was chief counsel for the corporation and served on the board, as
did his son, Brooks Fleming, Jr.52 Consolidation Coal Company,
51Charles E. Beachley, History of Consolidation Coal Company
(New York: Consolidation Coal Company, 1934), 40.
52Beachley, History of Consolidation Coal Company. 51.
In
1922, seven years after John D. Rockefeller, Jr. purchased a
majority share of the company's stock, C.W. Watson was the second
leading stockholder in the company with 4,625 shares. Rockefeller
and trust funds associated with him held 158,125 shares.
S.D.
Camden of Parkersburg, who had inherited his father's (J.N. Camden)
interests, had 1,031 shares; S.L. Watson had 2,107 shares; Brooks
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then, should not be considered strictly as an "outside interest,"
but as an extension of the influence of indigenous coal barons.
In a profile of all of the coal companies in the Fairmont field,
historian Glenn Massay shows that the numbers of out-of-state and
in-state investors in the Fairmont coal field in 1902 were about
equal, but the in-state investors were more "deeply involved in
the development.1,53 These in-state investors, chiefly the
Fairmont Ring, would continue to control the coal industry until
the collapse of the 1920s.
In light of the fact that much of the coal industry in other
parts of the state was established, or soon taken over, by
outsiders, the question arises:

How did the indigenous elite of

the Fairmont Field maintain its control?
protect its interests?

How did the elite

And what motivated them in this quest?

One problem encountered in answering these question is that the
leading family of developers, the Watsons, was famously close
mouthed, and not men of letters.

For example, patriarch James

Otis Watson, upon being asked by a New York reporter what he
would do if he had his life to live over again, replied, "I
wouldn't talk so much."

C.W. Watson, the great businessman of

the family, said that he did not write letters because a "letter

Fleming, Jr. had 709 shares; and George T. Watson, S.L. Watson's
son held 691 shares. Records of the U.S. Coal Commission, "Profits
and Loss and Surplus Statements," National Archives, Record Group
68, Entry 149, Box 369.
53Massay, "Coal Consolidation," 111. Massay's profile of the
coal companies was based on charters of incorporation.
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automatically answers itself in six months."54 Fortunately,
however, the papers of A.5. Fleming, one of the Big Four, and
C.E. Smith, U.S. marshal, editor of the Fairmont Times and
confidant of C.W. Watson, are available.

The former are valuable

in understanding the industrialization period, while the latter
are useful for the study of the 1920s.

The Challenge of Capturing Markets
The Watsons and their allies were capitalists
extraordinaire.

Their motives and behavior are discernible from

this elemental fact.

As such, their primary objective was to

capture and hold markets for their products.

Everything—

personal wealth and fame as well as the prosperity of the region-depended upon markets.

Gaining and holding markets was,

however, a challenge because of the natural geographical
disadvantages of the region.

There was no "home” market, so

Fairmont producers had to ship their coal a great distance,
necessitating higher transportation costs.

They had to compete

with the coal from established fields, which were located closer
to markets.

Since Fairmont coal was similar in chemical analysis

to that produced in the surrounding fields, competition was based
mainly on price.

The formula for success was simple: undercut

the competition.

Two strategies, both of which involved

political strategies, were followed to accomplish this objective.
54Interview of Bart Watson by author, May 6, 1991.
Bart
Watson, b o m in 1910, was the oldest of the sons of James Otis
Watson II. His grandfather was S.L. Watson.
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The first consisted of cutting the costs of production at the
mine; the second entailed containing the costs of transportation
(freight rates).
Like Andrew Carnegie, the Fairmont Ring understood the
importance of cutting the costs of production to the bare
minimum.

One advantage in this area was the lower cost of coal

lands in West Virginia.

However, in the labor-intensive coal

industry, labor costs amounted to about two-thirds of the total
costs of production.

To control labor costs, it was necessary to

keep the UMWA out of the region.

The Fairmont Ring steadfastly

opposed the UMWA, which they identified with "outside” influence.
The powerful nonunion regime that they forged after the struggles
of the 1890s remained the strongest in the state until 1918.

The

strategy of cost containment involved the use of the carrot and
the stick.

The latter was used against labor organizations in

general and the UMWA in particular.

In the Fairmont field,

affiliation with the UMWA was declared illegal, and the operators
fought the organization with the long arm of the law.
Organizers— "emissaries from outside the state"— were bullied and
jailed, then escorted out of the region, and known union men were
discharged then "blackballed."

The Fairmont Coal Company, as

well as many the independents in the region, fought the union in
the field with a "secret service" of spies and mine guards.
Meanwhile the "carrot" was used to ameliorate the living and
working conditions of the miners, to "provide for them" so they
would not rebel.

The Fairmont Coal Company built more than
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adequate houses and facilities for its employees and abandoned
the use of scrip and the ccmpany-store system in the 1890s.

The

construction of the trolley system in the 1900s provided miners
and their families with the opportunity to shop and socialize in
Fairmont and Clarksburg.

The trolley system not only overcame

the isolation which characterized most West Virginia industrial
towns during this period but also ensured that miners' earnings
had the maximum impact upon the regional economy.

This policy of

enlightened self-interest was designed to provide miners with a
stake in the larger community.
Another aspect of the cost-cutting strategy, practiced most
effectively by counsel, A.6. Fleming, was the fight against
government regulation and other "objectionable" legislation that
could lead to higher costs or limit the coal company's freedom of
action.

Fleming headed the fight against the West Virginia Tax

Commission and the tax reform movement in 1903-1904, and as a
Standard Oil retainer and lobbyist for Consolidation Coal Company
helped defeat a severance tax.

Fleming's role should be

understood in the context of his lobbying effort for Fairmont
Coal Company and his role as defender of regional interests.55
Fleming feared tax reform because of the severance tax, which
would hurt the Fairmont Coal Company as well as Standard Oil, but
he feared even more the possible influence of the political

55Williams, Captains of Industry. 222-229, 140, paints a dark
portrait of Fleming as West Virginia's leading "compradore." but a
more balanced view of the episode emerges when it is examined in
this context.
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alliance of labor and farmers, which backed the tax.56 This
populist coalition would not only "carry a knife for all
corporate interests," but would push for labor reform as well.57
Fleming was just finishing a court fight against the UMWA and
"Mother Jones and 30 to 40 other agitators, organizers, and
strikers," charged with violating Judge John J. Jacksons'
injunction during the 1902 strike, when the tax issue came to a
head.58 The UMWA, which established a base in the state with
its successful organization of the Kanawha field in 1902,
represented a grave threat.

The new tax bills, if passed, would

strengthen this radical element.

Fleming's conservative position

on the tax issue can more readily be attributed to his defense of
the Fairmont Coal Company, its new corporate ties to the
Consolidation Coal Company, and its nonunion labor policy, than
to his ties with Standard Oil.
Fleming continued to lobby for the corporate interests
against other "vicious legislation" throughout the 1900s and
1910s.

His law partner, Charles Powell, wrote to confirm that in

1905 "no bad labor laws, fellow servant law, railway laws, coal,

56See Clyde Johnson and Randolph Stalnaker to A.B. Fleming, May
28, 1903; John J. Cornwell to Fleming, September 7, 1903, Fleming
Papers.
57Thomas P. Jacobs to Fleming, July 4, 1904, Fleming Papers.
58A.B. Fleming to Stephen B. Elkins, draft, n.d., 1902.
Fleming repaid Jackson, in a small way, for his decision when he
consigned and shipped a car of Monongah lump coal, freight prepaid,
to him in January, 1904. A.B. Fleming to John J. Jackson, January
23, 1904, Fleming Papers.
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oil or gas tax laws," passed.59 In 1907 Fleming made sure that
a bill "requiring all coal to be weighed" as well as one
restricting the rights of coal companies to hire "special
guards," were defeated.60 Later that year after the Monongah
disaster, he was placed on the defensive.

Although he did not

"object to reasonable changes" in the law which would "make the
mines more safe," Fleming favored federal mining legislation as a
means of forestalling state regulation that would place the coal
company at a disadvantage vis-a-vis other states.61 In 1909 he
opposed the "peonage bill" and a bill to force the coal companies
to register their guards with the county clerk.62 Fleming was
so successful that he could write frankly to the Chandler
Brothers & Company, Bankers and Brokers of Philadelphia, in 1909:
The hostility [towards corporations] has not reached
the West Virginia legislatures, and I can say it has
not reached the people generally. . . . The state is
growing and the people generally desire it developed.
The municipal corporations desire their cities and
towns built up and have every motive to continue fair
treatment to business interests. If there is a state
in the Union from which I would expect fair treatment
to corporations it would be West Virginia.63

59Charles Powell to A.B.
Papers.

Fleming,

March 5,

1905, Fleming

^A.B.
Papers.

Flemingto C.W. Swisher,

January 25, 1907, Fleming

61A.B.
Papers.

Fleming to Neil Robinson,

January 3, 1908,

Fleming

62A.B.
Papers.

Flemingto W.S. Meredith,

February 1, 1909,

Fleming

^A.B. Fleming to Chandler Brothers & Company, May 20, 1909,
Fleming Papers.
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The Fight Against the B&O
There was, however, one corporate interest which Fleming,
however inconsistent it might appear, was willing to fight:
Baltimore & Ohio Railroad.

the

Fleming was prepared to lead a

contest against the monopoly power of this corporate interest
because it would promote the coal company's campaign to contain
transportation costs and force better service from the railroad
company.

This particular episode in the struggle with the B&O

occurred in 1909-1910, but it had its origins in 1896, when the
B&O went into receivership.

The issue was the freight rate for

coal bound for the Great Lakes.

In the 1890s, Fairmont and other

West Virginia coal had become an important competitive factor in
the Lake trade.

Producers in Pennsylvania and Ohio were alarmed

by the inroads on what they regarded as their markets.

In an

effort to work out an adjustment of an equitable tariff for all
Lake coal, all of the railroads interested in the Lake trade from
Pennsylvania, Ohio, and West Virginia held a series of meetings
in 1896.

The question at issue was not the reasonableness of a

particular rate, but the relationships between them— the
differential.

It was finally agreed that the differential

between Pittsburgh and northern West Virginia coal would be eight
and three-quarters cents.64 This differential was maintained
throughout the 1900s until 1912.

64W.L. Andrews, "Memorandum in Regard to Coal Rate Case,"
January 29, 1916, Fleming Papers.
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The revolt against the B&O involved more than freight rates,
however.

By 1904 Fairmont had become the largest originating

point of freight on the B&O.65 Yet, the B&O system was taxed to
the limits, and was providing poor service.

In 1905 the Fairmont

Coal Company filed a successful suit against the B&O in federal
court for failing to deliver railroad cars that it owned promptly
to its mines.66
The issue came to a head in March, 1909, after a meeting of
railroad traffic managers in New York City.

The Pittsburgh

operators were again alarmed about their losses in the Lake
market to the West Virginia companies, which they claimed had an
unfair advantage by reason of low capital and labor costs.

They

demanded that the railroad carriers increase the differential
between West Virginia and Pittsburgh coal.

The railroads

managers conceded and published a new West Virginia rate which
was initially a five-cent increase, but was later raised to ten
cents.67 Learning of this scheme, Fleming, after conferring
with other state coal operators and the officials of
Consolidation Coal Company, led a movement to challenge the
decision.

Consol filed a Bill of Complaint in April, 1909 in

Judge Dayton's court for the purpose of restraining the B&O
65J .H . Wheelwright to Oscar G. Murray, President, B&O Railroad,
December 11, 1904.
^A.B. Fleming to Thomas B. Davis, Vice President, Davis Coal
& Coke Company, December 2, 1905, Fleming Papers.
67Harvey C. Mansfield, The Lake Cargo Coal Rate Controversy:
A Study in Govemmenta 1 Adjustment of a Sectional Dispute (London:
Columbia University Press, 1932), 42-44.
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railroad from increasing its rates to the lake ports.68 Dayton
promptly granted an injunction, but it was later overturned by
the U.S. Supreme Court.

As Fleming explained later in a letter

to W.P. Hubbard, it was felt that the Pennsylvania Railroad,
which had acguired forty percent of the stock of the B&O in 1900,
was dictating the West Virginia increase, and that the B&O was
"falling down."69
Discontent with the freight rates and service of the B&O was
widespread in northern West Virginia, and the freight rate case
sparked a broad movement for reform.

The movement bore some

similarity to the revolt against the rule of Virginia in 1861.
Like that struggle, the

first great organizational meetingwas

held in Clarksburg.

January 11, 1910, over one hundred

On

shippers from every major town situated along the B&O in
northcentral West Virginia, "the largest gathering of shippers
ever held in West Virginia," met in an extraordinary convention.
Exporters of coal and coke, glass, lumber, foundry products,
stone, grain, as well as several importers of hardware and dry
goods, were joined by the leading politicians of the section,
including Governors William Glasscock of Morgantown and A.B.
Fleming of Fairmont, as well as John T. McGraw of Grafton. The
purpose was to "present an organized force to free NorthernWest
Virginia from —

intolerable conditions arising from the

^George W. Fleming to A.B. Fleming, April 17, 1909, Fleming
Papers.
69A.B.
Papers.

Fleming to W.P.

Hubbard,

January 6,

1910,

Fleming
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domination of the B&O Railroad by the Pennsylvania and the Union
Pacific system."

Fleming gave a speech in which he demanded that

the Pennsylvania Railroad be forced to sell its stock in the B&O.
Its control of the B&O was in opposition to Article XI of the
West Virginia constitution, which forbad any railroad corporation
from owning a parallel or competing line without obtaining the
permission of the state legislature.

Governor Glasscock promised

to call a special session of the legislature to consider the
situation.

After hearing other addresses, the assembly set up

the West Virginia Shippers Association and passed a resolution
requesting Congressmen Hubbard and Sturgiss to order an
investigation of the "sinister influence" of the Pennsy on the
B&O.70
Fortunately for Northern West Virginia shippers, the new
president of the B&O, Daniel Willard, was sympathetic to their
demands.

On January 25, the central committee of the newly-

formed West Virginia Shippers Association, including Fleming, met
with Willard in Baltimore.

Fleming told him that the coal

companies of the Fairmont field, for lack of transportation
facilities, had operated their mines only from one-third to onehalf the time in the past three months.

He complained that the

best miners of the region are leaving, having to "go only a few
miles to the mines on the Pennsy and have steady employment."71

70Fairmont Times. January 12, 1910.
71A.B. Fleming to Alston G. Dayton, January 28, 1910, Fleming
Papers.
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Willard listened sympathetically and promised improvement within
a "fortnight."

Convinced of his sincerity, the shippers

association called off the proposed Congressional
investigation.72
Willard was indeed a man of his word.

After borrowing

sixty-two million dollars, Willard embarked on the greatest
improvement program in the B&O's history.

The B&O east end was

double-tracked, additional locomotive power and cars were added
to the fleet, and new terminals, stations, and shops were
built.73 The freight rate question, however, was out of
Willard's hands.

Since Judge Dayton's injunction had been

annulled by the Supreme Court, the Fairmont coal companies
appealed to the Interstate Commerce Commission on December 20,
1910 to prevent the B&O from making the proposed increase in Lake
rates for Fairmont field coal.
until 1912.

The ICC postponed its decision

On March 12, 1912, three years after the issue was

raised, the commission ruled in favor of the Pittsburgh
operators.

Rather than raising Fairmont field rates, however,

the commission lowered the Pittsburgh rate by a ten cents.
Fairmont shippers would face a differential of eighteen and
three-quarters cents in the Lake market.74

^Fairmont Times, January 28, 1910.
^Timothy Jacobs, editor, The History of the Baltimore & Ohio.
America's Finest Railroad (New York: Crescent Books, 1989), 74.
74Mansfield, The Lake Cargo Coal Rate Controversy. 57-61.
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The Drive for Diversification
The whole Lake rate controversy directed national attention
to the situation in West Virginia and fueled the sectional battle
between the unionized Central Competitive field and the mostly
nonunion mountain state.

During the ICC hearings on the Lake

rate case, one of the principal officers of the Pittsburgh Coal
Company voiced the sentiments of many in the northern fields when
he said: "The opening of West Virginia coal mines was an
economical blunder and should have been postponed fifty
years."75 The phrase "economic blunder" was then repeated in a
mocking manner by West Virginia coal men and used as a call to
arms.

J.M. Dawson of the West Virginia Coal Association called

the situation the "greatest crisis that every confronted the
state of West Virginia," and proposed a proposition condemning
the "illegal combination outside of our borders, which is
attempting to destroy our coal industry.1,76 A different
response to the "economic blunder" reproach was provided by I.e.
White, who addressed the West Virginia Board of Trade on October
8, 1912 at Morgantown.
economic problem.

White admitted that the state had an

It was exporting its immense coal, lumber,

petroleum, and natural gas resources to other states, which were

^J.W. Dawson, "The Greatest Crisis That Ever Confronted the
State of West Virginia," Address before the West Virginia Board of
Trade, October 19, 1915 (Huntington, West Virginia: West Virginia
Coal Association, 1915) , 4. According to Mansfied, The Lake Cargo
Coal Rate Controversy. 49, this statement was made by Matthew
Taylor, Chairman of the Board of the Pittsburgh Coal Company.
76Ibid., i.
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using them to manufacture goods, and gaining little in return.
For example: "Some of its [West Virginia's] valuable timber is
shipped to Grand Rapids, Michigan, and the manufactured furniture
shipped back into West Virginia."

Citing Floyd W. Parsons,

editor of Coal Age. White proposed that state citizens endeavor
to "build up coal-consuming industries near at hand. ... The
wealth of West Virginia dammed back by a slight reduction in the
profit of mining coal, might flow toward industries which would
make the State almost free of the changes in freight rates and
wage scales because it would become in a larger measure a selfsufficing community."77
White's plea for diversification was well-received in the
Fairmont field, if not in the entire state.

While no one

proposed slowing the development of the coal industry, the
region's captains of industry began a movement to promote
diversification.

The civic and industrial leaders of the towns

along the B&O, particularly Fairmont, formed a partnership with
the railroad company with the goal of boosting "home industry"
through diversification and the promotion of scientific
agriculture.

The B&O built a beltline around Fairmont, which

served as an industrial spur.

The railroad company also expanded

its roundhouse, and built a car wheel shop in Fairmont in 1916.
The 1910s became the decade of diversification, particularly in
Fairmont.

The natural gas industry served as the base for the

^I.C. White, "Some Economic Problems for West Virginia's
Solution," address delivered before West Virginia Board of Trade,
October 8, 1912, UMWA, International Archive, District 17, 1912.
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development of the glass industry.

The Owens Bottle plant was

established in 1910, and, along with the Monongah Glass Company
and the Fairmont Window Glass Company and other small plants,
provided employment for nearly one thousand.

The glass industry

provided the impetus for the establishment of the Mid-West Box
Company in 1917.

A sulphuric acid plant was established and the

Fairmont Grain and Milling Flour Mill was enlarged in 1916.

The

growing mining industry provided the stimulus for the expansion
of the Fairmont Mining Machinery Company in 1910 and 1916, the
growth of the Fairmont Electric Service Company, and the
expansion of the Helmick Foundry in 1917.
Civic boosterism was enlivened with education and
advertisement of the town's assets.

The Fairmont Board of Trade

offered "a free factory site, cheap fuel, plenty of good water,
and good labor conditions" to the manufacturer.

It touted

Fairmont as the "Pittsburgh of West Virginia."78 In 1913
Fairmont's Leo Redding gave a series of lectures on the theme,
"How can I best serve my town."

In 1914 C.W. Watson and

Consolidation Coal Company executive Jere Wheelwright joined with
the B&O to sponsor an inspection of the region's industries by
over one hundred financiers in an effort to attract capital.

In

1917 Wheelwright offered a prize of two thousand dollars to be
awarded to the three most important industries to locate in Upper
Monongahela Valley in next six months.

In 1917 the "Fifty in

^Advertisement, West Virginia State Weekly. November 23, 1910,
16.
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Five" campaign, which set a goal of fifty million dollars of
investment in Fairmont in five years, was initiated with the help
of the Fairmont newspapers.

The campaign, along with the World

War I boom, produced quite tangible results.

In 1917 the

American Tank & Valve Company, the Monongahela Powder Company,
and the Fairmont Chemical Company built new plants along the
beltway.

The Monongahela Valley Traction Company, successor to

the Fairmont and Clarksburg Traction Company, built a producer
gas plant on the beltway in 1918, and a 50,000 kw power plant at
Rivesville in 1919 to supply the whole region with electricity.
In 1919, after three years of work by C.W. Watson, the Domestic
Coke Company completed a four million dollar million by-product
coke plant.

The decade of diversification was capped by the

construction of a multi-million dollar brass foundry by the West
Virginia Metal Products Company, in 1920.79
To some extent, this diversification was based on linkages
created by the coal industry.

The Watson-Fleming interests

invested heavily in non-ferrous metal manufacturing, utilities,
by-product coke, real estate, banks and construction.
barons did likewise, but to a smaller extent.

Other coal

This plowing back

of profits into the economy by the indigenous coal barons was the
principal manner in which the export base economy promoted

Matthew Kierstead, Christine Jones, Bill Gale, Michael
Workman, Industrial Fairmont: A Historical Guide (Morgantown:
Institute for History of Technology & Industrial Archaeology,
1993), passim: Fairmont Times, October 10, 1910; March 6, 1913;
March 25, 1914; April 9, 1917; April 16, 1917; July 5, 1917;
January 1, 1918; September 12, 1919; October 9, 1919.
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diversification.

With a few notable exceptions, the forward

linkages created by coal in the Lower Monongahela region (iron
and by-product coke) failed to materialize.

While the natural

gas industry spawned the glass industry, coal brought only a
single by-product plant and a few chemical plants.

Moreover,

most of the coal profits of the 1910s were simply reinvested in
the coal industry.

Most Fairmont coal capitalists were convinced

that the "up" coal market would continue indefinitely, so they
made no attempt to diversify.

They simply modernized their

plants and expanded their operations.

The Watson-Fleming,

Hutchinson, and Clark interests expanded into southern West
Virginia and eastern Kentucky.
The cooperative attitude of the B&O and its vast
improvements eased the transportation crisis of 1910, but the
rapid expansion of the coal industry in the 1910s taxed the B&O
system to the limit.

Increased demand for rail transport led to

an a second round of rail construction; by 1912 four other major
railroad companies had completed lines in the region.

In 1900

the West Virginia Short Line was built between Clarksburg and New
Martinsville on the Ohio River by H.H. Rogers of New York and
Professor J.M. Jackson of Clarksburg.

The line (sold to the B&O

in 1902) made connections with Camden's Ohio River Railroad,
thereby providing an additional western outlet for Fairmont
coal.80 In 1903 the Morgantown & Kingwood, a line promoted by

^ a y V. Hennen, West Virginia Geological Survey;
and Harrison Counties. 1912.

Doddridge
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George Sturgiss, was completed from Morgantown to Bretz in
Preston county? it was extended in 1907 to Rowlesburg, where it
made connections with the B&O.

In 1905 the Western Maryland

bought the Belington & Beaver Creek Railroad, which had built a
narrow-gauge line from Belington in southern Barbour county to
Elkins.

The Western Maryland upgraded this line to standard

gauge and incorporated it into its trunk line, which extended
from Baltimore.

This gave Fairmont shippers another outlet to

the eastern and tidewater market.81 The Western Maryland also
acquired trackage rights on the Fairmont, Morgantown & Pittsburgh
branch of the B&O, and during the World War I period it took over
and operated two short lines in northern Marion and southern
Monongalia counties.82 In 1915 the Little Kanawha Syndicate
completed the Buckhannon & Northern Railroad on the west bank of
the Monongahela River between Rivesville (near Fairmont) and the
Pennsylvania border.

This line, paralleling the B&O's Fairmont,

Morgantown & Pittsburgh Branch built on the right bank in 1886,
made connections with the Monongahela Railway in Pennsylvania,
with which it was consolidated in 1915, and thus provided
additional access to northern, principally Lake, markets.83

81David B. Reger, West Virginia Geological Survey: Barbour and
Upshur Counties and Western Portion of Randolph County (Wheeling:
Wheeling News Litho Company, 1918), 6.
^Harold A. Williams, The Western Maryland Story: A Chronicle
of the First Century 1852-1952 (Baltimore: 1952), 103.
^Coal Age. Vol. 4, No. 24 (Dec. 13, 1913), 897.
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Continued Expansion from 1910 to 1920
Despite the nationwide "Bankers Panic" in 1907, which
checked growth somewhat, the Fairmont Field underwent great
expansion in the 1900 to 1910.

Coal production doubled in the

decade to 12,147,843 short tons in 1910.
percent of the state's total tonnage.

This represented 23

In this age before the

widespread use of by-product ovens, the coke industry expanded as
well, but not as rapidly.

Coke production hit 577,700 short tons

in 1910.84
The Consolidation Coal Company led the advance.

After its

reorganization in 1903, Consol embarked on an expansion program
that made it the largest bituminous coal company in the world by
1927.

In addition to its coal plants and properties in Maryland

and in the Fairmont field, the company had a large holding of
coal lands near Somerset, Pennsylvania, docking facilities in
Boston, Hoboken, and several lake cities, and a fleet of both
canal and ocean-going vessels.

The fleet enabled the company to

serve the Lakes and the Tidewater and even to penetrate overseas
markets in England, South America, and Africa.
two million dollars annually.

Profits were over

In 1907 the company began

expanding into eastern Kentucky, the last large untapped tract of
coal lands in the eastern United States; by 1911 it had acquired

10

.

84West Virginia Department of Mines, Annual Report. 1910-1911,
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130,000 acres of coal and surface lands there.85 In the
Fairmont field, Consol acted through its subsidiary, the Fairmont
Coal Company.

Fairmont Coal owned 65,346 acres of coal and

leased an additional 22,999 acres.

It had forty-seven

operations, most of which were located along the Monongahela and
West Fork Rivers.86 In 1910 it produced 5,609,721 tons, or 46
percent of the field's total output.

Fairmont Coal was not,

however, a major coke producer, distilling only 72,864 of the
region's 916,070 tons of coke in 1910.
With the added shipping lanes and the increased demand for
coal during the World War I period, production continued to
increase during the 1910s, although not at the tremendous rate
that it had from 1890 to 1910.

The 1920 production was

19,197,198 short tons, 21 percent of the state's total.
a 63 percent increase over 1910's production.

This was

Marion county's

production leveled off and the expansion of this decade came
largely from areas along the edges of the field in Barbour,
Harrison, and especially in Monongalia county.

Consol still

reined supreme, but as the company shifted capital to its
properties in eastern Kentucky, its portion of the total Fairmont
production declined in 1920 to 3,466,623 short tons or 18

85Ibid.; "The Fairmont, W. Va., Coal Region," Coal Age. Vol.
1, No. 4 (November 11, 1911), 138-43; Beachley, History of
Consolidation Coal Company. 69. See Harry M. Caudill, Theirs be
the Power: the Moguls of Eastern Kentucky (Urbana: University of
Illinois Press, 1983), 67-84 for a full discussion of the
activities of the "Fairmont Ring" in eastern Kentucky.
“ Coal Age, Vol. 1, No. 4 (November 11, 1911): 138-143.
188

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

percent.
As Consol directed its capital to eastern Kentucky, it
opened the door for many new firms to enter the industry in the
Fairmont field.

The boost in production in this decade came from

a large number of new firms: the number of companies operating in
the field increased from 69 to 236.

Most of these firms were

small, however: only thirty-one had more than one mine, and only
nine had production of over two hundred thousand tons.

In

addition to Consol, the large firms were the Century Coal Company
with operations in Barbour county; the Hutchinson Coal Company in
Harrison county; the Consumer Fuel Company in Marion and
Monongalia counties; Four States Coal Company, Jamison Coal &
Coke Company, Monongahela Valley Traction Company, and Virginia
and Pittsburgh Coal & Coke Company in Marion county; and the New
England Fuel & Transportation Company in Marion and Monongalia
counties.87
In the 1910s Fairmont operators organized coal associations
to protect their interests.

The movement for organization began

after the West Virginia Shippers' Association was formed in 1910.
The coal men in the Shippers' Association continued their
meetings after the railroad crisis and formed the Central West
Virginia Coal Operators' Association in 1915.

Although it

included several operators from the Elkins field, the
organization was largely composed of Fairmont Field operators,
who nearly unanimously joined it.

The association promoted

87West Virginia Department of Mines, Annual Reports. 1920-21.
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Fairmont coal sales by developing a standard grading system and
by advertising.

It also strove to improve mining methods and

safety and provided a voice for Fairmont operators in legal and
political matters.88

Changes during the World War I Period
Policies to assure the autonomy of Fairmont operators were
largely successful until the World War I period, when a variety
of national trends and forces conspired to undermine their
independence.

The first force was economic and related to the

growing importance of outside investors in the region.

As

Fairmont coal gained wide acceptance in the 1910s in the major
marketing centers (such as Cleveland, Chicago, Philadelphia,
Boston and New York), major investments began flowing into the
Fairmont field from coal buyers, coal-marketing companies,
banking houses, and individuals who wished to participate in the
profit-taking or secure their supplies.

Investors were attracted

by the low cost of production, the quality of the coal, and the
proximity of the field (compared to Central Appalachia) to
northern markets.

There was a place for new investments in the

Fairmont Field partly because Consolidation Coal Company had
ceased its development there and had shifted its efforts to
eastern Kentucky.

The region had enormous coal reserves; even

the Monongahela Valley, the center of mining in the region, was
^Fairmont Times, January 12-28, 1910; Black Diamond, Vol. 60,
No. 25, (June 22, 1918): 535-70; Black Diamond, Vol. 62, No. 20
(May 17, 1919): 522.
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undeveloped in some areas, especially in Monongalia county.

As a

result, in the boom period from 1915 to 1922, scores of foreign
firms commenced operations in the Fairmont field.

The leading

outside coal companies were the Bethlehem Mining Corporation
(affiliated with Bethlehem Steel) which took over the Elkins
properties in 1919, the New England Fuel & Transportation Company
from Boston, Massachusetts, and the Pursglove and Paisley
interests from Cleveland.

In addition to the new firms, outside

capitalists gained a grip on the industry by purchasing stock (in
Consol and the larger companies) and making loans to indigenous
companies.

Indigenous operators welcomed the new capital since

it enabled them to modernize their plants and expand operations.
But as the boom turned to bust in the late 1920s, many found
themselves overextended and in debt to outside financial
interests.
A second development that undermined the independence

of

Fairmont operators, both indigenous and foreign, was the entry of
the UMWA into the field.

Paradoxically, it was C.W. Watson, the

kingpin of the "Fairmont Ring" and organizer of Consol, who
spurred this revolution.

A Democrat and a self-proclaimed

progressive, C.W. had political ambitions.

In 1911, after the

death of Senator Stephen Elkins, he was elected to the Senatorial
post by the state legislature to serve the remaining two years of
Elkins' term.

His bid for reelection in 1912 failed, however,

despite his national prominence and his good standing with
Woodrow Wilson.

West Virginia went Republican and the
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legislature elected Nathan Goff from Clarksburg.
relinquish the toga in 1913.

Watson had to

After the passage of the 17th

amendment in 1913 providing for the direct election of senators,
Watson resolved to make an appeal to the newly-broadened
electorate, a sizable number of whom were coal miners.

In 1918

he signed an agreement with the UMWA granting them permission to
organize Consol’s mines in the Fairmont field.89 Despite
initial opposition from coal operators and from the Central West
Virginia Coal Operators' Association, UMWA organizers were
successful in effecting a bloodless revolution.

In September,

1918, Fairmont mine workers ratified the first district-wide
agreement in the history of the field.90 At the same time, the
Central West Virginia Coal Operators* Association was dissolved
and the Northern West Virginia Coal Operators' Association formed
to replace it.

With 301 companies with an annual tonnage of

thirty million, the new association was the largest in the
country.91 It was more progressive in outlook than the old one,
and was given authority to negotiate with the union.

It soon

became the main voice of the operators in their dealings with the
federal government as well.
As the coal industry expanded in the Fairmont field in the
1910s and early 1920s, indigenous operators continued to play a
89Howard B. Lee, Bloodletting in Appalachia (Morgantown:
Virginia University, 1969), 143.

West

^''Fairmont Mine Workers Ratify Wage Agreement,'' United Mine
Workers Journal. Vol. 29, No. 18 (September 14, 1918).
91Fairmont West Virginian. August 1, 1918.
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leading role.

A profile of the companies operating in the field

in 1924 indicates that the fifty-fifty split in investments still
continued between indigenous and outside elements.92 In
addition to the Watson-Fleming clan (which had control of Consol,
the Monongahela Valley Traction Company, and several smaller
operations) other local families, such as the Hutchinsons, Hites,
Bradys, Robinsons, Clarks, and Showalters, continued to operate
companies with sizable tonnages.
The 1900 to 1920 period was profitable, and much of the
profit stayed within the region.

Some of the leading coal barons

built magnificent houses and adopted the style of English
aristocrats.

Befitting their status, the Watsons built

magnificent homes on the South Side of Fairmont on or near J.O.
Watson's "La Grange" estate on Fairmont Avenue.

After the

patriarch's death in 1902, C.W. acquired "La Grange" and
remodeled the house into a showplace in the Spanish Mission
style; it became known as "Fairmont Farms."

Here C.W. maintained

his famous show horses, including the world champion "Lord
Baltimore," which he raced and exhibited in America and Europe.
The grandest of the Watson homes was "High Gate," the estate of
J.E. Watson.

Designed by Philadelphia architect Horace Trumbauer

in the Tudor Revival style, it was completed in 1912.
Encompassing an entire block, it included a twenty-five room

^West Virginia Department of Mines, Annual Report. 1922-23;
Keystone Coal Catalogue Combined with Coal Field Directory
(Pittsburgh: Keystone Consolidated Publishing Company, 1923), 9621031.
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residence, a carriage house, formal gardens, and tennis court.
Not to be outdone, in 1914 Clyde E. Hutchinson completed his
grand mansion, "Sonnencroft" (home of sons), a twenty-eight room
replica of the Scottish castle "Inverness."93

The Evangelistic Movement and the Fight Against "Ole Barleycorn"
The industrialization of the 1888 to 1920 period provided
only a partial realization of the vision of statemakers.

In

addition to economic progress, they hoped that the revolution of
1863 would lead to moral and social improvement.
expectations fulfilled in this regard?

Were their

Certainly, bourgeois

culture, built on the firm foundation of Protestant evangelism
and moral perfectionism, made significant advances.

Reared on

the doctrines of Calvin and Wesley, natives in both the urban and
rural sections of the region renewed their faith during the great
revivals of the 1909 to 1920 period.

They also directed their

religious zeal into the secular realm and effected moral and
social reform.

The grand achievement was the passage of the

state prohibition amendment in 1912, but other reforms were
realized, many of which resembled those favored by Progressives
in the large cities.

For instance, both Fairmont and Clarksburg

93Elinor Watson Carroll, "The Fabulous Homes of Fairmont," in
Marion County Centennial Committee, Marion County Centennial
Yearbook (Fairmont: Fairmont Printing Company, 1963), 28-32.
Fairmont Farms, High Gate, and the home of J.O. Watson III are
still standing. High Gate was placed on the National Register of
Historic Places on April 15, 1982.
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were centers of the women's suffrage movement in the state.94
Both cities also adopted the commission form of government in the
early 1910s.

Although the region's leadership cared little about

tax or other reform on the state level, the Progressive spirit
was alive in the leading towns.

A remarkable number of

organizations were formed in the 1910s to "improve'' nearly every
facet of life.

Fairmont even had a "Rat Extermination League" of

116 members which charted its progress by the number of rat tails
turned in!95 Overall, however, the Progressive movement was
rechanneled and partially deflected by the much stronger,
conservative spirit of Protestant evangelism.
The evangelistic movement and the fight against "ole
Barleycorn" were irrevocably linked.

The tie was based on the

fundamental connection between capitalism and Protestant values,
first recognized by Max Weber in The Protestant Ethic and the
Spirit of Capitalism.96 In the American context, historian
Daniel T. Rodgers in Work Ethic in Industrial America 1850-1920
observed that work was the "gospel of the bourgeoisie, above all
of the Protestant bourgeoisie," and it was "one's social duty to
produce."

Work was the primary "creative act" which also "held

94"Equal Suffrage league opens state convention," Fairmont West
Virginian. April 8, 1915. In 1921 two women were elected to the
Worthington (Marion County) town council. Fairmont Times, January
7, 1921.
95"Rat Swatting Club elects officers," Fairmont West Virginian.
April 22, 1915.
96Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism
(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958 reprint).
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one back from the sink of idleness."97 For the Protestant
middle class, idleness was a venal sin.

And, as they saw clearly

in the drinking, boisterous behavior, and indolence of those who
frequented the saloons, alcohol was the "great evil" which led
men into the ways of idleness.
The city of Fairmont went dry in the spring of 1909, three
years before state voters approved the prohibition amendment.
The stimulus was the revival held at the Methodist-Protestant
Temple of Reverend J.C. Broomfield.

By January, 1908, Farmington

and Fairview also had passed ordinances of prohibition, but
Monongah remained wet.98 A much larger revival was held in
Fairmont in April and May, 1912, after Reverend Broomfield
invited Dr. Lyon and Dr. J.C. Goodrich to the town.

A tabernacle

was erected for the revival, which lasted over a month.

Dr.

Lyon's preaching "raised the roof," and thousands thronged to the
tabernacle to hear his "forcible sermons."

On May 13, the

revival reached its climax with a great Christian march through
Fairmont.

Over three thousand followed Dr. Lyon through the town

singing "Onward Christian Soldiers."

The Fairmont Times called

it the "greatest demonstration for Christianity that was ever
given in this city" and added that the "saloon was doomed in West

97Daniel T. Rodgers, Work Ethic in Industrial America 1850-1920
(Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 10-11.
^"Farmington and Fairview dry," Fairmont Times. January 8,
1909; "Great crowds at Temple revival," Fairmont Times, March 1,
1909.
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Virginia."99 The revival brought one thousand new members into
Fairmont area churches, and spurred a further "protest against
rum."100 This protest was capped by the visit of evangelist
Billy Sunday in November, 1912.

Invited to town by the

"Committee of 100" on the eve of the election to boost the
prohibition amendment, Sunday helped Marion County defeat the sin
by a vote of 6,465 to 2,449.101
Revivals and "protests against rum" were not confined to
Fairmont.

They were held in Clarksburg, Rivesville, Morgantown,

and many of the smaller towns in the region throughout the
1910s.102 Channeled into patriotic fervor during World War I,
the evangelical movement reached its peak in 1921 with the great
Billy Sunday revival, the biggest ever held in Fairmont.

This

revival reflected the manner in which the evangelistic spirit was
imbued with the Progressive proclivity towards organization.
The "woman's organizations" of the town, the Woman's Club of
Fairmont, the Woman's Christian Temperance Union, and church
groups, headed by Mrs. C.E. Hutchinson (wife of the coal baron)
"Fairmont Times. March 24, 1912; April 5, 1912; April 7, 1912;
April 8, 1912; April 11, 1912; May 13, 1912.
100"Church men plan Protest against Rum," Fairmont Times, May
26, 1912.
101Charles H. McCormick, "The Death of Constable Riggs: Ethnic
Conflict in Marion County in the World War I Era," West Virginia
History. Vol. 52 (1993), 36.
102For instance, the Fairmont West Virginian reported on March
25, 1916 that "Fairmont and Marion county are wide awake
religiously," and that three revival meetings were going on
simultaneously in Fairmont, Rivesville, and Fairview.
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prepared for the revival in November of 1920.

With the help of

Sunday's advance man, they perfected an organization which
included a Supreme Court for the Billy Sunday Drive, which was
the decision-making body, an Executive Committee, and committees
on prayer, building, bible study, finance, personal work, ushers,
music, women's work, shop work, entertainment, secretaries,
transportation, extension, autos, parking, hospital, and
nursery.103 Coal baron R.M. Hite headed the Finance Committee,
which included Brooks J. Hutchinson, son of C.E. Hutchinson, H.J.
Hartley, owner of Hartley's Department Store, and Dorsey Pople,
another coal operator.104 The city was divided into districts,
divisions, and sections, and neighborhood meetings were scheduled
for every Tuesday and Friday up to the campaign, which was
scheduled to begin in January.

On November 23, after the finance

committee raised twenty thousand dollars, construction of the
tabernacle began.
construction.105

Only union labor was used in the
On December 7 prayer meetings for the

campaign began; dances and card parties were tabooed for the next
two months.106 On January 2, 1921— as the Fairmont coal field

103"Woman's organizations ready for Billy Sunday," Fairmont
Times, November 22, 1920. Mrs. Hutchinson was unable to continue
as the head of the campaign, however, because she was placed in a
sanitarium the following week. Fairmont Times, November 29, 1920.
104November 30, 1920, Fairmont Times.
105,,Construction of tabernacle to begin," Fairmont Times,
November 23, 1920. The tabernacle was located at the corner of
Gaston Avenue and Fifth Street.
106Fairmont Times, December 7, 1920; December 13, 1920.
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ended the best year in its history— the Billy Sunday "Fairmont
for Christ" campaign opened.
William Ashley Sunday was b o m in Moundsville, West Virginia
in 1864.

He later moved to Winona Lake, Indiana and became one

of the leading evangelists in the "burned-over11 region of
Indiana, Ohio, Pennsylvania and West Virginia.

Sunday was a

conservative who represented the vanguard of what Ken Fones-Wolf
has called "coercive evangelicalism.1,107

Opposed to trade

unions, Progressive legislation, and the tolerant, ecumenical
spirit of Social-Gospel Christianity, Sunday preached a message
stressing individual salvation, piety and hard work.

While he

was noted for his campaigns against alcohol, Sunday also fought
radicalism of all stripes.

Called into Philadelphia by the

city's industrial elite in 1915, Sunday led a conservative,
nativistic reaction which helped wreck trade unionism.108 Like
the region's elite and middle class, Sunday advocated Bible
study, prayer, and prohibition as an answer to the social unrest
of the working class.

Sunday was a dynamic preacher whose only

self-professed weakness was a tendency to sweat profusely, a
condition which required that a bath tub be installed in the
tabernacle for him to bathe as he departed after evening

107Ken Fones-Wolf, Trade Union Gospel: Christianity and Labor
in Industrial Philadelphia. 1865-1915 (Philadelphia:
Temple
University Press, 1989), 126, 140, 184-188, 191.
108Ibid.
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109
services.,
uy

A choir of six hundred provided patriotic and spiritual
music, and five thousand attended the first service.

Sunday's

first sermon was devoted as much to civic boosting as praising
the Lord.

He praised Fairmont's prosperity:

had a panic and money was always available.

the city had never
He took credit for

making West Virginia dry: "Old John Barleycorn will never be the
champion he was— he has taken the count."

Sunday also directed'

one of his "Sun-rays" to the "foreigners in our midst:

If you

don't want to became an American, beat it."110 On January 4,
Sunday preached a sermon against Pharisees— those who practice a
religion of words rather than deeds.

Noting the large number of

working people, "many in their day clothes," in the congregation,
Sunday had a few words for them:

"I am not a Socialist, but I

have sympathy for the poor;" and, "God will hear the prayer of
the coal miner as quickly as that of the operator."

The Fairmont

Times noted the following day that the revival was attracting
people from a hundred mile radius, and many of the region's
newspapers were devoting space to it.111 On January 9 Sunday
expressed his distaste for "Knockers," those who knock everything
and will not work to improve society, as well as anything
109"Asner tells only a bath tub in tabernacle for Billy
Sunday," Fairmont Times. November 30, 1920.
110"Billy Sunday campaign opens here," Fairmont Times, January
3, 1921.
111"Billy Sunday meetings resume," Fairmont Times. January 4,
1921; "Out to make city uncomfortable for devil," Fairmont Times,
January 5, 1921.
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"Bolshevistic. "112 On January 13, the crusade was enlivened by
the attendance of Governor-elect Ephraim Morgan.

A quartet of

men from Consolidation Coal Company sang, and Sunday delivered a
sermon on the importance of mothers.113 A Clarksburg delegation
of 240 headed by John 0. Brooks, superintendent of one of the
Consolidation Coal Company mines near the city, attended.
sermon was delivered for the sake of men only.

The

Sunday condemned

Socialism and Eugene Debs, and announced that the next great
question which would face America was "the social evil" of
unregulated immigration.114
The climax of the campaign came on January 26 with "Miners'
Night."

Nearly one thousand miners, dressed in their calling,

came from as far away as Maidsville, north of Morgantown.
was no "color line."

There

With their lamps twinkling, they marched

from the street car stop to the Courthouse then to the
tabernacle.

They were led by Nick Aiello of Monongah, president

of UMWA Sub-District 4 and Glen McKnight of Hutchinson, who
"carried the Stars and Stripes."

The miners entered the

tabernacle to find Billy Sunday wearing a miners' cap and lamp
himself.

He gave a special sermon for the miners, stressing the

harmony of interests among capital and labor.
is the labor of yesterday.

"Capital of today

Many leading financiers started as

112"Sunday is against anything Bolshevistic," Fairmont Times,
January 10, 1921.
113"Billy Sunday applauded," Fairmont Times. January 14, 1921.
114"Fourth Sunday of Billy Sunday," Fairmont Times. January 24,
1921.
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laboring men."

Sunday spoke against strikes and lockouts: "When

capital strikes at labor it cuts off its right hand, and when
labor strikes at capital it cuts off its right hand."

Sunday

concluded by recommending that "the remedy for differences is the
gospel."

A large number of miners "walked down the sawdust

trail" and were converted that night.

The Fairmont Times hailed

the service a one which would "be long remembered."

It was the

"first time that coal miners in this section have been permitted
to take a prominent place in the religious life of the
community. "115
Sunday continued holding services until February 13.

At the

last service, many people "frankly shed tears when the time for
parting came."

The Fairmont Times proudly wrote that the town

had broken the record for "free will offerings, per capita."

The

paper claimed that the revival had had a profound effect on the
town and surrounding area.

Numerous Sunday school groups, Billy

Sunday Businessmen's Clubs, and Bible classes had been formed in
Fairmont, Farmington, Monongah, and other points.

The harvest of

souls amounted to around nine thousand— a "stack of conversion
cards 8 feet high."

The newspaper concluded that "[n]ever before

was the community so stirred-up, never before was the way better
prepared for sweeping changes in the manner the county

115"Miners plan spectacle for tabernacle," Fairmont Times.
January 18, 1921; "Miners' night boosted," Fairmont Times. January
20, 1921; "Mine lamps twinkled at Billy Sunday meeting," Fairmont
Times, January 27, 1921.
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lives.,|116
In many ways, 1920 was the height of both economic and
cultural development in the Upper Monongahela region.

The great

revivals, particularly the Billy Sunday campaign, had taken
Fairmont and surrounding towns to a spiritual peak and had united
miners and capitalists in the pursuit of an industrial New
Jerusalem.

After nearly three decades of repression, the

capitalist had agreed to a social contract with miners.
Organized under the banner of the UMWA, miners now had a voice in
the high counsels of the industry.

The post-World War I boom had

brought an unheard of prosperity to the region.

Even the miners,

it was said, were wearing fifteen dollar silk shirts.117
Furthermore, the industrial diversification of 1910s seemed to
guarantee a broad-based prosperity for the future.
However, there were problems ahead.

The social contract

with labor, signed during the extraordinary war period, was the
product of a contrived consensus.

Accustomed to operating their

mines independent of any "outside” interference, coal operators
would soon resent the controlling influence of the UMWA and
conspire to throw off its yoke.

The fight against "demon rum"

was based on more than a longing for the New Jerusalem; it was
part of a broader antipathy towards a mostly unassimilated
immigrant population.

When the economy stalled later in the

116"Fairmont broke record," Fairmont Times. February 14, 1921.
117C.E. Smith, "Good Morning!" Fairmont Times. October 10, 1947
in Hoffman, Marion County Centennial Yearbook. 74.
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1920s, and there was a need to blame and marginalize someone, the
foreign population became the target of a nativistic reaction of
large proportions.

Moreover, despite the diversification effort,

the economy of the region remained coal-based.

Had the coal

industry not expanded so rapidly during the World War I boom, or
if industrialization had continued for another two decades, a
more diversified economy may have developed.

The way matters

stood, coal was king— not a despot as in southern West Virginia—
but a monarch nonetheless.

As the king fell in the 1920s, the

whole house came tumbling down.
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CHAPTER 5:

LABOR RELATIONS DURING INDUSTRIALIZATION
I must still further pause, however, to note
the fact that in a few short months we shall
feel the throbbings of one of those great
arteries of internal communication which have
done so much to develop the resources of all
countries where they exist. The long wished
for railroad is at our door. We welcome its
advent. And yet, to us, there comes with it
some regrets. The venerable homogeneity of
our society will be broken. Our old time
hospitality and our earliest family-like
social relations will be marred.
— Waitman Willey, 1885

These words of warning were issued by one of the founders of
the state in an address at the celebration of the Municipal
Centennial of Morgantown.

Although Willey was optimistic that

Morgantown would prosper if "capital can be attracted" and
"invested in profitable industries," he was wise enough to
realize that industrialization would entail a cost.
At the onset of industrialization in 1890, the society of
the region was indeed homogenous.

Both the rural and urban

population were largely composed of white, Anglo-Saxon
Protestants.

There had been no influx of immigrants since the

1850s, when the Irish arrived to build the railroads.

The Irish

were assimilated, and by 1870 the region had a population which
was 95.1 percent native white.

During the next two decades, as

the region remained in a state of "arrested development," there
was very little immigration, and the native white population
increased slightly to 96.4 percent in 1890.1

The people of the

1Chapman, Report of the Committee on the Upper Monongahela
Valley. Table 22: Population, Number, and Percentage Distribution,
by Color and Nativity for the United States, West Virginia, and
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region spoke a common dialect, had a common heritage, and had
similar ideas on law and the purpose of government.

There were

distinctions in society, but they were based on wealth, property,
prestige, and intelligence rather than race, religion, language,
or class.

Social relations were indeed "family-like" because the

major economic unit remained the family farm or business.
Despite the growth of towns and some industry, social relations
were largely personal and cordial.

The "surplus extraction

relationship," which divided producers and nonproducers into
distinct classes in industrialized societies, had not yet
developed.2
Industrialization would change the "venerable homogeneity"
of society.

Industry required large numbers of workers who would

adopt the regimen of the mines and factories and readily give up
some of the value of their labor to the region’s captains of
industry.

If the export base economy were to succeed, labor1s

sacrifice would have to be great in order to compensate for the
region's initial disadvantages vis a vis other regions— a late
start, higher transportation costs, and no home market.
Upper Monongahela Valley, 1930-1870, U.S. Census.
was 73.0 percent the state’s, 93.2 percent.

Who

The U.S. figure

2Robert Brenner, "Agrarian Class Structure and Economic
Development in Preindustrial Europe," Past and Present. Vol. 70
(1976), 30-75; quoted in Pudup, "The Boundaries of Class in
Preindustrial Appalachia," 143-144. Brenner distinguished between
two facets of local class structure: the relations between direct
producers, and the relations between producers and a class of
nonproducers. The latter was the basis for the "surplus extraction
relationship," which defined the fundamental classes in society—
the direct producers and the "surplus-extracting or ruling
class(es)."
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would bear the cost?

What groups would constitute the mining

labor force from 1890 to 1920?
Native whites from the region supplied about half of the
labor requirements.

Although many natives served as common

loaders, others held the supervisory and mechanical positions in
the mines.

Undoubtedly, many had expectations of moving up in

the company, or even opening their own mine.

Immigrants from

Italy and eastern Europe supplied the second half.

They differed

from the natives in language, religion and cultural values.
Along with African-Americans, whose numbers were small until
after World War I, the immigrants, for the most part, loaded coal
and performed other common labor in the mines.

Because of their

differences, they had fewer opportunities to move up the
occupational ladder.
alien population.

Only a small minority were able to buy

property or homes.
companies.

Until the 1920s, they remained largely an

The remainder became tenants of the coal

Huddled in ethnic conclaves in the mining towns, the

immigrants remained unassimilated, a proletariat which was in,
but not of, society.
This chapter focuses upon labor composition, labor
relations, the labor movement in the coal industry of the
Fairmont Field during industrialization.

A great deal has been

written on coal towns and coal miners in Central Appalachia, but
other than the work of Glenn Massay and Charles McCormick, little
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of it is directly applicable to the Fairmont Field.3 As
Meredith Sue Willis said, conditions were different in
northcentral West Virginia.4 Rather than outside capitalists,
which were the bane of miners in Central Appalachia, miners in
the Fairmont Field dealt principally with indigenous figures,
whose political power in the region gave them an even greater
sway over labor.

They had a more vital interest in ostracizing

the UMWA, and erected a nonunion regime far more powerful than
"Czar” Don Chafin's Logan County machine.

In general, they were

also more concerned about promoting congenial relations with
their employees through welfare capitalism.
Another major difference between the Fairmont Field and the
Central Appalachian coal fields related to the composition of
labor.

Although other Appalachian coal fields had a segmented

labor force which was divided into native white, black, and
immigrant elements, the ethnic mix of the Fairmont Field
differed.

Compared to West Virginia as a whole, there was a

larger number of eastern and southern European immigrants working

3While Massay's dissertation, which is frequently cited in
this study, deals with the mining industry in the nineteenth
century, Charles H. McCormick, "The Death of Constable Riggs:
Ethnic Conflict in Marion County in the World War I Era," West
Virginia History. Vol. 53 (1993), 33-58, describes a single
incident which occurred in 1915.
Despite the limited scope of
McCormick's work, his thesis that labor and social relations were
characterized by ethnic conflict can justifiably be extended to
provide a theme for this entire period.
4Douglass, "Interview:

Meredith Sue Willis," 293.
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in the Fairmont Field.5 While some of the native miners
probably accepted regional boosterism and succeeded in moving up
the occupational and social ladder, the immigrants, for the most
part, did not.

As a result, not only did they become a

proletariat in the 1900 to 1918 period, but they also became the
main source of labor militancy.

This is in stark contrast to

southern West Virginia, where natives were the radical element in
the labor movement.

To a large degree, the conflict between coal

capitalists and workers during industrialization was based on
ethnic, as well as economic, divisions.

The First Strikes
Labor relations in the Fairmont Field have been
characterized by long periods of relative calm followed by bouts
of fierce struggle.

The Fairmont Field's productivity and its

geographic position— at the boundary between the largely
unionized North and the nonunion South— made it an important
theater in the conflict between capital and labor in the 1890 to

5For example, in 1910 the coal mining labor force of the sixcounty Fairmont Field was composed of 53.7 percent foreign
nationals; the state percentage was 36.2.
While Italians
represented 23.2 percent of the mining labor force of the Fairmont
field, they were only 8.9 percent in the state as a whole.
Eastern Europeans (Austrians, Bohemians, Hungarians, Lithuanians,
Litvitch, Polish, Roumanian, Russian, Slavish, Servian, Croatian,
Magyar, Horwatt, and Bulgarian) miners made up 28 percent of the
Fairmont field's labor force, and 16.3 percent of the state's. The
Fairmont field held a much smaller proportion of black miners, 2.4
percent, than the state, 17.7 percent.
Calculated from West
Virginia
Department
of Mines,
Annual
Report. 1910-1911,
"Nationalities of Persons Employed at the Mines and Coke Ovens, By
Counties," 105-106.
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1933 period.

The periods from 1892 to 1902 and from 1924 to 1933

were intense bouts of struggle as the UMWA attempted to organize
the field, then to reorganize it, against the coal operators1
fierce resistance.

These struggles and their outcomes had

profound consequences in the region, as well as an important
national impact.

The first ushered in the nonunion era in the

state and put the Fairmont coal capitalists at a competitive
advantage in marketing their product.

The second, the subject of

following chapters, was an important part of the UMWA
International's resurgence in the 1930s and a prelude to the New
Deal.
In the early years, 1852 to 1890, labor relations were
largely free of conflict, judging by existing documentation.
Strikes were rare, and they were usually short-lived and confined
to a single mine or company.

Labor difficulties plagued the

Newburg-Orrel Company mines in Preston County in 1878 and again
in the early 1880s.

The men struck for higher wages and were

successful in getting a small raise.
not spread to other mines.

But the Newburg strikes did

Cooperation among the mine workers of

the Fairmont region was retarded by the fact that most miners
lived on farms and viewed their jobs as seasonal.6 In addition,
the absence of a well-organized national miners' union limited

Massay, ''Coal Consolidation,” 235-236.
In 1890 there were
1,016 men employed in the mines with the region. The typical mine
employed between thirty and seventy-five workers. West Virginia
Department of Mines, Annual Report, 1890-1891, Table 2: "Showing
Number of Employees, etc. of Collieries in the First District of
West Virginia," 57.
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the possibilities for miners to unite.
With the organization of the first large mining companies in
the late 1880s and early 1890s, the demand for labor rose.

The

traditional source of labor no longer supplied enough workers, so
they were imported, chiefly from Italy and the nations of the
Hapsburg Empire.

The new workers did not have farms to help

support themselves and their families or to return to when an
economic downturn came.

They were dependent upon the coal

companies for their income and the company town for housing,
food, and nearly every other aspect of life.
The arrival of the first immigrants coincided with the
organization of the United Mine Workers of America in 1890.

The

UMWA was a merger of two earlier miners’ unions, the National
Progressive Union and the National Trade Assembly #135 of the
Knights of Labor.

Organized at Columbus, Ohio, the new union

aimed to "unite mine employees and ameliorate their condition by
means of conciliation, arbitration of strikes."

The main goals

of the miners' union were to secure higher wages, eliminate
payment with scrip, make the mines safer, and institute the
eight-hour day.7
After the UMWA was organized in 1890, union organizers made
regular visits to the Fairmont Field to gain recruits and
recognition for the union.

Significant strike efforts were

mounted in 1892, 1894, 1897 and 1902.

Coal miners in the

7Maier B. Fox, United We Stand: The United Mine Workers of
America. 1890-1990 (Washington, D.C.: United Mine Workers of
America, 1990), 22-23.
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Fairmont field had their grievances:

Monongah miners asked the

State Commissioner of Labor to "do away with the company store,
have two-week payments and a check weighman."8 But the chief
cause of difficulties between management and labor in the 1890s
centered on the question of recognition for the union— something
which management staunchly refused to accept.

"The company kicks

very hard against organization," one Monongah miner said.9
In 1892 the Fairmont Field was the target of a TJMWA
organizing campaign.

These "labor agitators," Camden complained

in a letter to UMWA President, John McBride, were "drumming the
miners every day."

They succeeded in organizing several locals

and inducing miners to strike at the Montana, Monongah, and
Hutchinson mines.

Camden explained to McBride that the Monongah

Coal & Coke Company had treated its "miners and laborers justly
and fairly," and that it would not deal with the mines’
organization.

He emphatically stated that the company had no

intention of recognizing the union, and was determined to operate
its mines independent of outside interference.10 This
determination was shared by other operators of the Fairmont Field
well into the twentieth century.

Camden, Fleming, and the

Watsons all strongly believed that the activity of union
organizers in West Virginia was a conspiracy, encouraged and
8"Report of Moses W. Donnally," Second Report of the State
Commissioner of Labor (December 1, 1892).
9Ibid.
10J.N. Camden to John McBride, May 30, 1892.
"Coal Consolidation," 241.

Quoted in Massay,
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financed by out-of-state powers to prevent West Virginia coal
from competing with the coal in the northern, union fields.

With

the higher cost of transporting their coal to market, Fairmont
operators were determined to keep labor costs lower than those
prevailing in the northern fields.

Camden, Fleming, and the

Watsons threatened to shut down their mines if the miners struck.
Their strategy worked, and J.E. Watson, who had assumed
responsibility for the operation of the mines of the interests in
1885, wrote to Fleming in August of 1892 that the strike was
"bursted [sic] completely."11
As prices declined after the Panic of 1893, the Monongah and
other coal companies in the Fairmont Field reduced wages.

In

1894 the UMWA once again made an effort to organize the field.
This time it appeared that dissatisfaction among the miners
because of wage cuts might bring success.

Camden, alarmed by the

threat of the UMWA and labor unrest in the rest of the country,
wrote that "strikes, disorganizations and communistic notions are
spreading over the land: almost every state and section has its
Coxey."12 In this strike, the businessmen of Marion County
joined with the operators to defeat the union.

They called a

11J.E. Watson to A.B. Fleming, August 18, 1892, A.B. Fleming
Papers.
12J.N. Camden to John H. Holt, July 1, 1894. Quoted in Massay,
"Coal Consolidation," 59. Camden was referring to Jacob S. Coxey,
the Ohio businessman who led a number of followers ("Coxey's Army")
on a march to Washington, D.C. in the spring of 1894 demanding that
the federal government initiate a public works program to end
unemployment. President Cleveland ordered the group dispersed and
had Coxey arrested.
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public meeting in Fairmont where a resolution was passed
condemning the "acts of the emissaries [union organizers] coming
from without the State" and urging the miners to remain at work.
The operators suggested to the governor that sheriffs be posted
along the Pennsylvania border to "be on the look out" for
invading union organizers.

Only a few miners at Monongah

responded to the strike call.

The operators raised wages

slightly and the strike fizzled.

With the Ohio and Pennsylvania

mines idled, the Fairmont companies were able to take advantage
of the strike and capture new markets.

In doing so, the Fairmont

operators were partly responsible for the failure of the 1894
strike in neighboring states.13
Once again in 1897 the UMWA ordered union miners of Ohio,
Indiana, Illinois, and Pennsylvania to lay down their picks and
shovels.

With the success of this strike contingent upon the

cooperation of West Virginia mines, the cry of the organizers
was, "On to West Virginia."

The UMWA sent its top organizers,

including Eugene V. Debs, former President of the American
Railway Union, into the Fairmont Field.
prepared for battle.

The Fairmont Ring

They raised wages, and for the first time,

resorted to a new and stronger weapon:

the injunction.

The

first injunction in the region was issued on July 26, 1897 by
Special Judge John W. Mason in the Circuit Court of Marion
County, granting temporary restraining orders.

The cases were

West Fairmont Coal and Coke Company vs. Eugene V. Debs et al.,
13Massay, "Coal Consolidation," 247-58.
214

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

and Monongah Coal and Coke Company vs. Eugene V. Debs et al.

The

court ordered the defendants to stop interfering with the
employees of the companies.

As a result of strike activity at

the Montana mine, the injunction was put to its first test.
After organizers from Monongah attempted to persuade the miners
to stop work, J.E. Watson had them arrested.

Twenty-eight were

taken before the court of Judge Nathan B. Goff, Jr., United
States Circuit Court, where A.B. Fleming presented the case of
the West Fairmont Coal and Coke Company.

He argued that the

defendants were conspiring to interfere with the operation of the
company's mines by preventing its employees from working.

Goff

ruled that the defendants were guilty of contempt for violating
the injunction and confined them to jail for three days.

With

the weight of civil authority behind the operators and the miners
receiving both higher wages and more work, the strike was beaten.
The operators rid their camps of "troublemakers" and the Fairmont
Field remained unorganized.14
After the organization of the Central Competitive Field in
1898, the UMWA and the northern companies grew alarmed over the
continual growth of the coal industry in West Virginia and the
infiltration of cheap coal into midwestem markets.

At the 1898

conference, the northern operators managed to extract a promise
from the UMWA "to bring about the same conditions in West

14Ibid., 258-276.
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Virginia" as existed in the central field.15 This agreement was
the basis for allegations by West Virginia operators that a
conspiracy to keep the state’s coal out of northern markets
existed between northern coal operators and the UMWA.
In 1902 the union made another concerted attempt to organize
West Virginia and the Fairmont Field.

The UMWA assigned the task

to national organizers William Warner and Thomas Haggerty, who
commanded a score of organizers, including Mary "Mother" Jones.
This time, however, the union faced a more formidable foe than in
1897:

the Fairmont Coal Company, a combine of most of the

region's mines under the Watson-Fieming corporate umbrella.

The

Fairmont Coal Company not only had the support of the community
and the courts, it had a "secret service" force.

As Haggerty

explained to the UMWA National Executive Board,
Detectives are hired to follow men and any miner found
talking to us is told he must cease or he will be
discharged. Even force is used. They write letters
and sign our names and give a box number for reply so
that they might get a reply and thus trap those who
have union sympathy.16
The union's call to "get in line" was heeded by some
Fairmont Field miners, however.

In June, 1902, after coal

operators of the state failed to show at a joint conference to

15Harry Donald Fox, "Thomas F. Haggerty and the Formative Years
of the United Mine Workers of America," Ph.D. diss., West Virginia
University (1975), 184.
16The detective force consisted of twenty-five men who had been
working side by side with the miners so as conceal their
identities. United Mine Workers of America, National Executive
Board Minutes, April 11, 1901.
Quoted in Fox, "Thomas T.
Haggerty," 187.
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negotiate a wage agreement, the UMWA issued a strike call.

Union

organizers found some support at Flemington (Taylor County),
where the miners at the Flemington Coal and Coke Company, an outof-state firm, struck and organized a UMWA local.

From here the

strikers, under the leadership of Mother Jones, undertook a grand
overland march to Monongah, some thirty miles west.
set up a base at the Willow Tree School.

Here they

Their activities, which

included daily marches up and down the Fairmont-Clarksburg pike,
attracted enough support to close down the Hutchinson Mine, owned
and operated by the Hutchinson family, in southern Marion County.
They also made some progress at Monongah, convincing a number of
Italian miners to lay down their tools.17
The Fairmont Coal Company stopped the "invading army" of
organizers with another injunction.

A.B. Fleming, as counsel for

the Fairmont Coal Company, secured an injunction at Parkersburg
from the Federal court of Judge John Jay Jackson.

One by one the

union leaders were arrested by federal marshals, brought before
Judge Jackson, and sentenced to sixty days in the Wood County
jail.

Mother Jones was spared incarceration.

Deprived of its

leadership, the UMWA was unable to continue the effort.

Union

members were summarily dismissed, and their places filled by new
men.18 As both the bituminous and anthracite fields in the
country (and the New River and Kanawha Fields of West Virginia)

17Edward M. Steel, "Mother Jones in the Fairmont Field, 1902,"
Journal of American History 57 (September, 1970), 294.
18Massay, "Coal Consolidation," 278.
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were on strike, demand for the product of the Fairmont Field
skyrocketed.

The region's miners took advantage of the situation

and continued to produce coal, deeming it unwise or unprofitable
to join in the strike.

As a Fairmont newspaper explained, "The

wages of the men are more, the work is better and the general
conditions are much ahead of those in other regions outside of
West Virginia."19
As Glenn Massay explained, regionalism was a much stronger
force than "labor solidarity" in the Fairmont field.
Four major efforts were made to give effective
organization to the Fairmont miners. Only one of
these, that of 1897, made even a respectable showing—
and ultimately all four were failures. The operators of
the Fairmont field prospered when other fields were
strike-bound, and they could afford to entice their men
back to work by simply raising wages. Would-be
organizers found themselves without followers and then
in jail. Perhaps it is significant that the unionizing
drive originated in the national labor movement, not,
apparently, among the local men. ... There was too much
obvious truth in the argument that union organizers
were 'emissaries of rival regions,' and it was too
clear that the best gains for Fairmont men came when
other fields were on strike. Local miners probably
sympathized with the national labor movement, but they
behaved in a spirit of regionalism and economic
individualism; they took work and wages when they could
get them.20

The "Carrot and the Stick"
While Massay emphasizes the "spirit of regionalism and
economic individualism" of the miners as the predominant factor

19Fairmont Free Press. June 12, 1902.
Consolidation," 278.

Quoted in Massay, "Coal

20Massay, "Coal Consolidation," 281.
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in the failure of the UMWA organizing campaign, Walter Wellman, a
Washington correspondent for the Chicago Record-Herald who
visited the Fairmont field during the strike of 1902, argued that
the strike failed because miners were "content with their work."
Wellman, the well known traveler, explorer and journalist, wrote
a series of four articles for the newspaper on the labor
situation in the Fairmont field and Judge John Jay Jackson.21
His report is based on his visits to the mines and offices of the
Fairmont Coal Company.

Altogether, the articles paint a rosy

picture of labor relations.
Although he had much to say about it, Wellman did not
believe that the injunction of Judge Jackson doomed the strike.
Rather, there was simply "no good reason" why the miners should
strike.

They were well paid, their "average earnings

considerably higher than in the anthracite field, their living
expenses smaller."

The policy of their employers was "humane,

even generous," and the "standard of comfort" among the miners
was "surprisingly high."
Wellman argued that one reason for the high standards was
the fact that the "men who manage the miners were b o m here."
The Watsons and their kin had "grown up with the business, knew
their employees by name, and had "personal control of their
mines."

Wellman compared this situation to that in the

anthracite fields, where foreign managers are "indifferent to the

21Walter Wellman, Fairmont Coal Region: A Treatise (Chicago
Record-Herald, 1902), 8.
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wants and welfare of their employees."

The "home managers" of

Fairmont Coal Company adopted a system of "friendly relations and
amicable settlement of all differences."
policy of "enlightened selfishness."

They followed a labor

They treated their men well

in order to keep the union out, to "manage their own business
without the interference of outsiders."22
Wellman described how the managers of the Fairmont Coal
Company dealt with their men on a personal basis.

Not only did

they know them on a first name basis, but they helped them when
they got into trouble.

The company employed a "trouble man" who

settled feuds or vendettas and bailed miners out of jail when
drink got the best of them.

The company employed an interpreter

to "straighten out" any difficulty with the foreign miners.

It

never fought damage suits, instead settling out of court,
investing money in the "good feeling" of the employee toward the
company.

The company provided for widows and their children, and

sent in nurses when sickness or an epidemic struck.
encouraged the native miners to own their own homes.

It also
Patriarch

James Otis Watson had purchased a tract of land near Monongah,
which he set aside for miners.

The company built their homes,

then deducted payments from their earnings.

One of the Watson

sons also endorsed the notes of a "score or more" miners who
wanted to buy homes.

The company also rented houses to the

miners, though it did not compel them to live there.

Its houses

22Ibid., 12-14.
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were "neat and comfortable," and in a good state of repair.23
Wellman claimed that the main reason for the contentment of
the miners was "fair wages."

He was allowed to examine the books

of the Fairmont Coal Company, and concluded that the "general
wages are as good as in the anthracite field, and the work much
steadier."

The miners who are willing can "put in an average of

twenty-five days a month."

The average earnings of all the men,

including miners, loaders, mule boys, trap boys, outside men, and
day laborers, was $2.23 per day and $55.78 per month, "high for
all classes of labor in the mining industry."24 After
deductions for rent, which was only $2.50 to $6.00 per month, the
company store, doctor, light, powder, oil, and fuel, all of which
averaged $18.59 per man, the miner drew a monthly pay of $55.78
per month.

Rather than scrip, the company paid in cash.

Considering the overall situation of the miner, Wellman
concluded,
... conditions here are unusually favorable to the
prosperity of labor. Men who are willing to work and
keep out of the saloons cannot only live in comfort,
but own their homes and accumulate a surplus against
the needs of old age or the rainy day. ... The humblest
of men, even the recently arrived foreigners, have a
"show" here. I have not seen anywhere else a region
^Ibid., 15-17, 23-24.
24Ibid., 21. Wellman also gives 90 cents as the wage rate per
car. It is unclear how many tons a car held, so it is impossible
to give the rate per ton. There were no scales at the tipples of
the Fairmont Coal Company until 1918, and, according to one 1912
report, even the managers of the firm did not know how much coal
their cars held. The average rate per ton in Marion County in 1900
was $0.45 per long ton, slightly below the state average of $0.45%.
West Virginia Department of Mines, Annual Report, 1900-1901, "Wages
Paid and Selling Price of Coal and Coke for 1900-01," 33.
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where poor men have better opportunities to share in
the blessings of prosperity and a free government.25
Although Wellman emphasized the "carrot” of paternalism, the
Fairmont Coal Company, as we have seen, also used the "stick" of
repression to thwart labor unrest.
successful:

Its policy was largely

there would be no strikes or labor difficulties at

the mines of the Fairmont Coal Company/Consol until the 1920s.
Other companies in the Fairmont Field followed its lead on labor
relations and put into place similar policies.

As a result,

strikes and labor unrest were rare in the Fairmont Field, despite
the continuing efforts of the UMWA.

In fact, the miners of the

Fairmont Field continued to act as de facto strikebreakers during
the strikes of the 1900s and 1910s; they not only resisted the
call for organization, but also produced extra tonnage during the
national strikes to supply markets that were otherwise served by
union mines.

For the most part, miners were quiescent, a posture

that can be explained by the welfare capitalism of the company
and the acceptance of the prevailing spirit of regionalism.
the political power of the company was just as important.

Yet
Not

only did the company employ a secret service, which, like Sheriff
Don Chafin's "thugs" in Logan County, kept the UMWA out by
intimidation, but it also had the support of the business
community of the region, as well as key politicians and judges.
An anecdote told by Fairmont Times columnist C.E. "Ned" Smith
reveals the power that the company possessed even over speech.

25Wellman, Fairmont Coal Region, 20.
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Smith wrote,
The Elks were giving a burlesque on Uncle Tom's Cabin.
Sam Leeper, we think, was Simon Legree and Ed Mayers
Uncle Tom. In the original script Simon Legree says:
"An't I your master? Didn't I pay twelve hundred
dollars, cash, for all there is inside your cussed old
black shell? An't you mine, body and soul?"
Tom replies: "No, NolMy soul an't yours, mas'r;
you
haven't bought it— ye can't buy it; it's been bought
and paid for by one that is able to keep it, and you
can't harm it."
In the Elk's version, which caused the trouble, Uncle
Tom's reply was in these words: "Yes, Massa, you might
own dis ole body of mine, but my soul belong to de
Fairmont Coal Company!"
After the first performance and before the boys had
removed their blackface and make-up, a coal company
bull brought in the orders to change that speech or
else. The speech was changed. The next night it was
God and not the Fairmont Coal Company who owned Uncle
Tom's soul.26

"Sadly in Need of Organization"
Although the UMWA was unsuccessful in the Fairmont Field
during the strike of 1902, it gained a foothold in West Virginia
by organizing seven thousand miners in the Kanawha Field.27
With its headquarters in Charleston, District 17 became a center
of UMWA strength in the state.

In the ensuing years, the

district waged a campaign to organize the miners in the state.
In the first few years the UMWA had little success, but in 1906

26C.E. Smith, "Good Morning!", Fairmont Times, February 8,
1934; quoted in Marion Countv Centennial Yearbook. 17.
27Maier B. Fox, United We Stand: The United Mine Workers of
America 1890-1990 (Washington, United Mine Workers of America,
1990), 65.
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it gained some political strength which it attempted to use in
gaining adherents.

The establishment of a labor weekly, the

Labor Argus, in Charleston in 1906 gave the UMWA and the aspiring
state labor movement a much needed voice.

In the 1906 elections

in Kanawha County, Adam Littlepage, Democrat and chief counsel
for District 17, was elected to the State Senate, and John
Nugent, President of District 17 and the West Virginia Federation
of Labor, won a seat in the House of Delegates.

Nugent had come

to Charleston from Michigan as an international organizer in
1902, and had emerged as the leading figure in the state labor
movement. From the Fairmont Field, Samuel B. Montgomery, who grew
up in the mining and railroad town of Newburg in Preston County,
was elected to the state senate.

Montgomery was also a champion

of labor and the UMWA.28 In the next four years, these three
men led the fight in the state legislature for revision of the
mining laws, statutes against peonage, scrip, and company guards-the "vicious legislation" which A.B. Fleming worked so hard to
defeat.29
Soon after his election to the legislature in 1906, Nugent
spearheaded a statewide UMWA organizational campaign.

On

28Frederick Allan Barkey, "The Socialist Party in West Virginia
from 1898 to 1920: A Study in Working Class Radicalism," Ph. D.
diss., University of Pittsburgh (1971), 55; "Labor’s Victory,"
Labor Arcrus. November 6, 1906; "Nugent to Resign," May 30, 1907.
^Barkey, "The Socialist Party in West Virginia," 55; A.B.
Fleming opposed all four labor bills that Littlepage introduced in
the 1909 legislative session. "There is no good in any of them," he
wrote. A.B. Fleming to W.S. Meredith, February 1, 1909, Fleming
Papers.
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December 3, he journeyed to Morgantown where he joined T.H. Shay
of Hiorra in Preston County, and J.A. Springer of Flemington for
two weeks of campaigning in the Fairmont Field, which, according
to Labor Arcrus was "sadly in need of organization. "30 The
organizers found it tough going, but gained some success in
Preston and Monongalia counties along the Morgantown & Kingwood
Railroad.

By March, 1907 miners at the Rock Forge mine of

Deckers Creek Coal & Coke Company, and at the Richard and Bretz
mines of the Elkins Coal & Coke Company, as well some at the
Merchants Coal Company at Tunnelton, had joined the UMWA and
formed locals.

The Elkins company, according to the Labor Argus,

recognized the union because they would rather do business with
UMWA officials than "Tom, Dick, and Harry."

The union brought

them a "better class of men," who "lose less time and are more
sober and industrious."31
In May of 1907, International President John Mitchell
placed a "score or more" national organizers in the West Virginia
coal fields in an effort to organize the state.

Mitchell visited

the state later in the month to supervise the work.32 The
campaign led to some gains— the addition of over one thousand new
members by the end of August and the recognition of the UMWA
local at Tunnelton by the Mercants Coal Company— but, overall, it
30"Nugent to Morgantown," Labor Argus. Nov. 29, 1906.
31"Good News for miners from upper end of state," Labor Argus.
Feb. 28, 1907.
32"0rganize the State," Labor Argus. May 9, 1907; "President
John Mitchell Coming," Labor Argus. May 16, 1907.
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proved to be a failure.33 Nugent resigned from his post as the
head of District 17 in May to head the state Commission of
Immigration.

He later journeyed to Great Britain and Europe to

secure a "better class of miners" for the state.34 The UMWA had
no success with the miners employed by the Fairmont Coal Company.
When UMWA national organizers, William H. Rodgers, William Little
and Aramando Pellizzari came to Fairmont on July 20, they were
"shadowed" by Fairmont Coal Company guards.

The guards taunted

the trio, "walking as closely to the men as possible, sometimes
butting against them" and pointed them out to spectators, who
would "point at them as though they were criminals."

After three

days of this harassment, the UMWA organizers decided to leave
Fairmont.35
In September, 1907 the UMWA all but acknowledged the failure
of the campaign.

An editorial in the United Mine Workers of

America Journal blamed the "great combinations of capital which
control the affairs of the state" for holding back the
campaign.36 The fusion of politics and business in the state,
consummated in 1863, was a boon to capitalists but it became the
bane of the working man.

One of the figures who represented this

33"The Mine Workers," Labor Arcrus. July 25, 1907, August 22,
1907.
William Dawson to A.B. Fleming, August 22, 1907, Fleming
Papers.
35Adam B. Littlepage to A.B. Fleming, August 27, 1907, Fleming
Papers; "President John Nugent resigns," Labor Argus, May 30, 1907.
^Quoted in Labor Argus. Sept. 19, 1907.
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fusion was Judge Alston Dayton of Philippi, who replaced the
'•Iron Judge," John Jay Jackson, at the (federal) Circuit Court of
the Northern District of West Virginia in 1905.

In response to a

strike at the Hitchman Coal and Coke Company mines near Wheeling,
Judge Dayton issued a ruling which, in effect, outlawed the UMWA
in northern West Virginia.

Dayton issued a temporary restraining

order preventing the UMWA from organizing the Hitchman mines on
October 23, 1907.

The precedent-setting ruling established the

legal standing of individual or "yellow dog" contracts, which
expressly forbade employees to join unions.37 On February 5,
1909 Dayton used the same weapon, a "blanket injunction," to
prevent the union men at Tunnelton from picketing the Merchant
Coal Company mines.

As a result, twenty-five were blacklisted

and forced to move on.38 In April, 1908 the champion of the
UMWA in Preston County, Sam Montgomery, was defeated in his bid
for renomination for State Senate.

According to the Labor Argus.

Fairmont Coal Company, along with the B&O, M&K, and West Virginia
Northern railroads and the "Whiskey Ring," beat Montgomery with

37Richard D. Lunt, Law and Order vs. the Miners: West Virginia.
1907-1933 (Charleston, West Virginia: Appalachian Editions, 1992) ,
15; Paul Salstrom, "The Northern Panhandle Coal Field," 121.
Writing to obtain a copy of the Hitchman injunction, A.B. Fleming
boasted "I have always taken a great interest in this class of
cases. I believe I obtained the first injunction against strikers
which was granted by Judge Jackson, I believe in 1894 [actually
1897].
That and the subsequent injunctions of like character
granted by him gave him the name of the Iron Judge." A.B. Fleming
to George E. Gilchrist, November 4, 1907, Fleming Papers.
3811Judge Dayton enjoins strikers," Fairmont Times. February 6,
1909; "Miners blacklisted," Labor Argus. May 13, 1909.
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the foreign and "negro vote" in the primary.39
With the failure of the Tunnelton strike and the defeat of
Sam Montgomery, the Fairmont field remained the "capitalist
property" of C.W. Watson, who was elected to the U.S. Senate in
January, 1911.40 The "sell-out" of John Nugent to the coal
companies had tarnished the image of conservative unionism and
enhanced the reputations of his critics.41 Those who were
sympathetic to labor and reform in the state turned to the left,
a shift which was propelled by Dayton's autocratic ruling.

The

Labor Arcus was taken over by Socialists in 1909, and District
17, with the rise of Frank Keeney and Fred Mooney, came under
socialist influence.

In the 1910 elections, Socialists in

Kanawha County elected three of their members to county
offices.42 In Marion County, a Socialist candidate for the
legislature nearly beat a Republican in the same election.43 By
1911 Clarksburg had a strong Socialist party, with a socialist
newspaper, the Clarksburg Socialist. The town's party included a
Finnish Branch composed of forty-five workers from the tinplate
mill, and it hosted a "great mass convention" of state Socialists

39"Fairmont Coal Company doing all it can to defeat Senator Sam
Montgomery," Labor Arcus. March 26, 1908; "Story of defeat of
Montgomery from Tunnelton," Labor Arcus. April 26, 1908.
40Labor Arcus. June 13, 1911.
41Barkey, "The Socialist Party in West Virginia," 57-60.
42Ibid., 46.
43"Marion County makes plutes uneasy," Labor Arcus. November
10, 1910.
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in December.44 In Fairmont, Socialists fielded a whole slate of
candidates for election to county offices in 1911.

On the eve of

the election, Dr. J.C. Broomfield, minister of the MethodistProtestant Church and the town's leading exponent of the Social
Gospel, delivered an address: "Is Socialism as a Protest
Justified?"

A large crowd heard his answer, "protest spells

progress," but none of the Socialist candidates prevailed.45
The Socialist Party of the state achieved its greatest
success between 1912 and 1915.

The Paint Creek-Cabin Creek

strike of 1912-1913 radicalized miners in the Kanawha field.

In

the 1912 presidential election, the Socialist candidate Eugene
Debs garnered 5.7 percent of the vote in the state.

The center

of Socialist strength in the election in the Fairmont field was
Preston County, which gave 30 percent of its vote to Debs; Marion
and Harrison counties recorded 9.0 percent for Debs.46
Socialist strength in Harrison and Marion counties can be
attributed to the large number of skilled workers— particularly
glassworkers— living there.

Preston County's strong support for

Debs is more difficult to explain.

The large number of railroad

workers in the county may account for some of the vote, but not
^"Clarksburg Finlanders dedicate Socialist Hall," Labor Arcrns;
July 20, 1911; "Great Mass convention of Harrison County
Socialists," Labor Argus. Dec. 7, 1911.
45"Socialists," Fairmont Times,
July
15,
1911;
"Dr.
Broomfield's strong sermon to Socialists heard by large crowd,"
Fairmont Times, November 4, 1911.
^Barkey, "The Socialist Party in West Virginia," 120. See West
Virginia History Vol. 52 (1993) for a discussion of the visit of
Eugene Debs to West Virginia in 1913.
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all.

Perhaps the UMWA organizational drive and the long strike

at Tunnelton radicalized some of the miners living there.
Socialists also gained victories in several of the region's
towns.

In Morgantown, the Socialists, with support from

glassworkers in the Second, Fifth, and Fourth wards, elected a
Councilman in April, 1912.47 In the same year, Socialists won
the entire municipal ticket at Adamston, an industrial town near
Clarksburg with a concrete block factory and large glass
industry.48 In the municipal elections in Fairmont in 1913, a
Socialist, along with several Progressives, landed seats in the
City Council.49 Eugene Debs spoke in Clarksburg in 1914,
drawing a large crowd of "miners, millworkers, laborers,
businessmen, lawyers, doctors, and preachers who received the
message with great enthusiasm."50 In 1915, the Socialists of
Star City, a small town near Morgantown with a large glass worker

47Morgantown Post Chronical, April 1, 1913; quoted in Barkey,
"The Socialist Party in West Virginia," 124.
^Stephen Cresswell, advisor, Socialists in a Small Town: The
Socialist Victory in Adamston. West Virginia (Buckhannon, West
Virginia: Ralston Press, 1992), 3.
49"Fairmont Municipal Election," Fairmont Times. December 10,
1913.
50"Socialist leader draws full house," Clarksburg Daily
Telegram. April 3, 1914; Debs's visit to West Virginia is discussed
in Roger Fagge, "Eugene V. Debs in West Virginia, 1913:
A
Reappraisal," and David A. Corbin and Roger Fagge, "Debs's Visit
Challenged in Historical Interpretation," West Virginia History.
Vol. 52 (1993), 1-32.
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population, won control of the town.51
Conservatives in the region were quick to react.

Clarksburg

and Fairmont passed laws which forbade public addresses without
the special permission of the mayor or police chief.

A

Socialist, Fred Strickland, was arrested in Clarksburg when he
spoke without gaining the mayor's permission.52 The
Consolidation Coal Company continued to use its "secret service"
to bully both UMWA organizers and Socialists.

In 1913 special

agents Bob and Frank Shuttlesworth shot UMWA organizer John Brown
in the stomach.

Later, when J. Verve Johnson, a Harrison County

Socialist, and J.H. Snider, a Marion County Socialist leader,
were beaten, the Socialist press blamed the coal company's
"thugs."53
Repressive tactics by the coal capitalists and their
political allies were not, however, the only reason for the
decline of the Socialism in the Fairmont Field.

After the

Farmington strike and Black Hand trials of 1915, Socialism and
radicalism of any stripe came to be associated with ethnic
rebellion.

The Farmington strike is significant not only because

of the great fright it put into the Protestant captains of
industry and their middle class allies, but also because it was a
51"Socialists of Star City celebrate hilariously," New Dominion
(Morgantown), January 11, 1915. See Stephen Cresswell, "When the
Socialists Ran Star City," West Virginia History Vol. 52 (1993),
59-72, for a full discussion of the Socialist victory in Star City.
52Barkey, "The Socialist Party in West Virginia," 170.
53Wheeling Majority, July 3, 1913; quoted in Barkey,
Socialist Party in West Virginia," 170.
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"The

harbinger of what was to come in the 1920s.

The Roots of Ethnic Conflict
The ethnic conflict of 1915 had its roots in the 1890s, when
the Fairmont coal operators began to employ large numbers of
foreign miners.

With the simultaneous growth of other sectors of

the economy, there was not enough native manpower to supply the
great demand for labor.

The operators had little choice but to

recruit labor from outside the region.

By 1910 over half of the

mining labor force of the Fairmont field was composed of foreign
nationals.

Only 4,857 members of the total labor force of 12,957

were native-born or naturalized, white citizens.

Unlike southern

West Virginia, blacks were not employed in large numbers:

in

1910 there were only 310 blacks (2.4 percent) in the mining labor
force.54 The largest group of foreigners were Eastern Europeans
(Austrians, Bohemians, Greeks, Hungarians, Lithuanians,
Litonians, Poles, Roumanians, Russians, Slavs, Serbs and
Croatians). The Eastern European segment numbered 3,221,
accounting for 51.9 percent of the foreign group and 24.9 percent
of the total labor force.
predominated.

Hungarians, Poles, Austrians and Slavs

In addition to the Eastern Europeans, the Fairmont

companies employed a large number of Italians.

They were the

second most numerous foreign group in the Fairmont labor force in
54It was the policy of the Monongah Coal and Coke Company not
to employ blacks. J.N. Camden advised that the "Monongah district
is an old settled country, and would protest furiously against an
introduction of colored labor there; ... ." J.N. Camden to L.R.
Doty, June 23, 1890; quoted in Massay, "Coal Consolidation," 238.
232

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

1910.

The 2,463 Italians made up 42.9 percent of the foreign

group and 19.0 percent of the total labor force.

The number of

foreign nationals from northwestern Europe working in the mines
was quite small— only 250.55
The new immigrants came principally to the mining towns of
the region, though considerable numbers also moved into the
industrial towns, particularly Clarksburg.

The two mining and

industrial counties, Marion and Harrison, received the greatest
influx.

These two counties, along with Tucker County in the

Upper Potomac coal field, were the only ones in the region to
have over 10 percent foreign-born in their population in 1910.56
As indicated in the opening of this chapter, the mining
labor force was segmented between immigrants and native miners.
The latter, unlike the natives, were given little opportunity to
advance, socially or economically.
even to contemporary boosters.

This division was obvious

According to an article in the

Washington Post in 1916 about Consolidation Coal Company, the
company operated over 100 mines in four states with a labor force
that was 50 percent native and 50 percent immigrant.
lauded both groups, but particularly the natives.

The article

They were

55Calculated from West Virginia Department of Mines, Annual
Report. 1910-1911, "Nationalities of Persons Employed at the Mines
and Coke Ovens, By Counties," 105-106.
56Chapman, Report of the Committee on the Upper Monongahela
Valiev. Table 22: Population, Number, and Percentage Distribution,
by Color and Nativity for the United States, West Virginia, and
Upper Monongahela Valley, 1930-1870, from U.S. Census. Harrison
had 10.5 percent foreign-born, Marion 11.0 percent, and Tucker 16.1
percent.
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"descendants of the early pioneers who originally settled across
the Alleghenies,... a strong, manly class, reputable citizens,
proud of their work, loyal to their families and employers, home
loving and well-satisfied."
from this group.

The company recruited its managers

They worked their way "up the ranks."

A

"youngster" started to work when he was about 18 and served as a
trapper boy or track layer.

If he demonstrated "executive

ability," he was gradually promoted and made a fire boss, then an
assistant foreman, mine foreman, and finally, a superintendent.
The "foreigners" who worked for the company, according to the
article, had been in the United States five to fifteen years.
Most spoke some English and were "good workman, law abiding, and
after being naturalized, very good citizens."

In many cases,

they had saved money and sent for their wives and families in the
"old country."

As years went by and the second generation grew

up, the whole family was "gradually Americanized."

It is clear

from reading between the lines of this article that only native
"youngsters" were provided with the opportunity for moving up in
the coal company.57
Immigrants, along with blacks who arrived in the late 1910s
and 1920s, generally filled the unskilled jobs in the mines.

The

supervisory positions and most of the semi-skilled jobs (machine
runners) were held by natives.

Since the 1890s, when the

Monongah Coal and Coke Company installed cutting machines in its

57This article was considered an "splendid write-up"
summarized in the Fairmont Times, July 6, 1916.
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and

mines, mining had become more of a mechanized industry with a
growing division of labor.

By 1910, 43.0 percent of the coal

mined in the Fairmont Field was cut by machine, and by 1920, 63.5
percent.58 Along with cutting machines, electric drills, which
were mounted on the machine, were introduced by 1904.59 The
division of labor was also increased after the Monongah disaster
in 1907 by the practice of employing certified shot firers.60
While the nineteenth century miner cut, drilled, shot, and loaded
coal himself, the "machine miner" of the 1910s simply loaded.
Semi-skilled labor handled the rest of the chores.

The coal was

cut by the "machine man," drilled by his helper, and shot by the
shot firer.

The semi-skilled, along with the supervisory and

managerial, positions were held largely by natives.
A study of the 1920 manuscript census reports for 219 coal
miners living at Montana, a mining town six miles north of
Fairmont established in 1886, and Maidsville, a community north

58West Virginia Department of Mines, Annual Report. 1910-1911,
"Comparative Statement of the Pick and Machine Mined Coal, by
Counties, 1910," 43; Annual Report. 1920-1921, "Comparative
Statement of the Pick and Machine Mine Coal, Number of Mine
Machines Used, and the Number of Men Employed for the Year Ending
June 30, 1920," 165.
59John Wagner to A. B. Fleming, November 10, 1904, Fleming
Papers.
Wagner wrote that both the Fairmont Coal Company and
Pittsburgh Coal Company had adopted electric drills.
The West
Virginia Department of Mines did not provide information on the use
of electric drills, so it is impossible to ascertain when the other
companies in the Fairmont field adopted them.
William A. Ohley to A.B. Fleming, January 15, 1908, Fleming
Papers.
Ohley wanted the Fairmont Coal Company to delay its
employment of special shot firers until after the state legislative
session because it might influence pending mine legislation.
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of Morgantown which did not have large-scale mining until after
World War I, demonstrated that only 1 of the 106 immigrant miners
or 21 black miners, a German, held a supervisory job.
held jobs which involved operating a machine:

Only three

at Montana an

Italian ran an electric motor (which moved mine cars to the
outside), and at Maidsville, a German and a Swede ran cutting
machines.

The remainder of the immigrants and blacks were simply

listed as miners.61 The ninety-four natives held the semi
skilled positions of motorman, cutting machine runner, fireboss,
and motorman, the supervisory positions of stable foreman,
superintendent, and foreman, and the managerial positions of
office clerk and night watchman.

As a measure of how well the

immigrants had been Americanized, only 8 of the 106 had been
naturalized.62
The immigrant and small black population were at the bottom
of the pecking order in the mining towns.

According to Massay,

the pattern of layoffs revealed the social strata.

When work was

short, bachelors were laid off before the married men of whatever

61In this era, a miner could either be a "machine" or "pick"
miner. The machine miner simply loaded coal, while a pick miner
cut, drilled, shot, and loaded coal. In the Fairmont Field after
about 1910, pick miners were typically used for "pulling pillars,"
a dangerous task which required considerable skill. Unfortunately,
there is no way of knowing whether those who listed their
occupations as miners in the census returns were pick or machine
miners.
^Fenton B. Harrison, enumerator, Fourteenth Census of the
United States, Marion County, Winfield Magisterial District,
January 8, 1920; Charles B. Wade, enumerator, Fourteenth Census of
the United States, Monongalia County, Maidsville Precinct, JanuaryFebruary, 1920.
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social standing.

If more reductions were necessary, men were

sometimes released according to their positions in the various
levels of society:

blacks, southern or eastern Europeans,

northern Europeans, and finally Americans, in that order.
Although distinctions were not always clearly defined, there
seems to have been four general levels:
first and most important were the members of
management— the "bosses." They were usually of the socalled Anglo-Saxon stock and lived in the best houses
if they stayed in the camp, although often they resided
in the nearby communities away from the dirt of the
plant;
second were the white miners of American, Anglo-Saxon,
and sometimes northern European stock;
third were the white miners of eastern and southern
European background;
fourth and on the bottom level of camp society were the
Negroes.63
Although most of the immigrants lived in enclaves in the
mining towns, there was no rigid segregation between them and the
native population.

The trolley system permitted miners living in

the Fairmont-Clarksburg area to shop and attend social functions
in Clarksburg and Fairmont.

After about 1900 most of the major

coal companies paid in cash, though they did not eliminate the
company store credit system.
money" was distributed.

Once a month a "wagon load of

For example, on April 26, 1909 the

Fairmont Times reported a "banner day" in the region as $450,000

^assay, "Coal Consolidation," 207.
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was handed to miners.64 In 1912 Consolidation Coal Company and
some of the larger independents began paying twice a month, but
other companies retained the monthly system because many miners
declined to work on payday.65

On payday and on Saturday, many

of the miners and their families would take the interurban line
to Fairmont, Clarksburg, or one of the smaller towns such as
Farmington, and spend the day shopping.

At Fairmont, they might

also go to the races or the circus, spend time at "Traction
Park," or gather in front of the courthouse to socialize.66 The
"bulky envelopes" of the miners brought trade and prosperity to
the incorporated towns.67
The regular visits of the immigrants to the towns brought
them in contact with the native middle class, which did not
always approve of their behavior.

The attitudes of natives

toward foreigners were often less than hospitable.
often demonstrated a nationalist or local bias.

Newspapers

Whenever an

accident occurred in a local mine, the name of the victim was

^"Banner Day in Region," Fairmont Times. April 26, 1909; "Pay
day was big in Clarksburg and Fairmont districts," Fairmont Times,
Oct. 25, 1909.
65"Payday," Fairmont Times, August. 27, 1912: "Colored miners
are much given to travel when they have the funds, and some spend
all their money, so they had to write back to coal companies for
enough to bring them home."
^"Payday brings out crowds," Fairmont Times, August 23, 1909;
"Circus will attract miners," Fairmont Times. April 24, 1912;
"Monster Merry throng of Folks here Saturday," Fairmont Times, May
5, 1912.
67"Payday at Monongah," Fairmont West Virginian. August 2,
1916.
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generally given, but, sometimes, when the name was foreign, it
was not given.

Thus, "a Pole" was injured or "a Slav" killed.

The Fairmont Index reported on June 9, 1893:

"A Polander, whose

name we did not learn, got his foot badly mashed last Wednesday
in No. 1 by a fall of coal."

On June 5, 1914 the

Clarksburg

Daily Telegram related that a foreign miner with "unpronounceable
name" was admitted to the Miners' Hospital with a broken leg.
Americanization efforts were undertaken either from the
bottom-up by the immigrants themselves or by the coal companies
or other civic organizations.

Columbus Day was an opportunity

for Italian immigrants to express their love for their native
land as well as their allegiance to their "American homes."

In

October, 1911, the city of Fairmont gave the "compatriots of
Columbus" the "freedom of the city."

Under the auspices of the

Societa Cristoforo Colombo of Fairmont, which promoted
citizenship and "higher ideals" among Italians, a parade of 1,000
"sturdy sons of Italy" was held.

The Societa Vittorico Emmanuele

II of Monongah, as well as the Societa Unione e Fratettanza of
Morgantown, sent delegations which marched in the parade.68
However, the newspapers related far more episodes of
immigrant disorder and crime than celebrations of solidarity.
Incidents of immigrant-on-immigrant crime were reported with some
ire, such as the case of an Italian inflicting "fourteen hatchet

68,1Italian allegiance to their American homes shown by
celebration," Fairmont Times. October 14, 1911; "Sturdy sons of
Italy pay tribute," Fairmont Times. October 13, 1913; McCormick,
"The Death of Constable Riggs," 36.
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wounds" on a compatriot at a fight in Farmington in 1911,69 or
with scorn, as in 1914 when six foreigners at the Grant Town mine
with "names that sound like a sausage mill," not liking the
"efforts of their culinary artist, roasted the cook on the
stove."70 However, the greatest indignation was reserved for
cases of immigrant-on-native crime.

In July, 1911 an Italian,

who was "almost a stranger," stabbed a mine foreman at Monongah.
Bloodhounds were brought in, and the culprit was captured.71
According to the Fairmont Times, the severe stabbing "created
more than the usual condemnation among the Americans as well as
the law-abiding foreigners of the region."

The newspaper also

took the opportunity to apprise its readers of the need for
stricter law enforcement,
For some time in the region as well as in Fairmont and
Clarksburg, it has been generally remarked that a
certain lawless element of the foreign population was
being allowed too much latitude, and that trouble would
result unless they were checked. It is now hoped that
... those foreigners who believe they can do as they
please in this country will be taught their proper
place in no uncertain manner by the authorities ...
While conditions are said to be worse in the small
mining towns, it often occurs in Fairmont that
foreigners become unruly, and rude upon the streets,
much to the discomfort and disgust of the pedestrians.
It has been noticed of late that gangs would take up
the entire sidewalks, compelling ladies and others to
pass around them.72

69Fairmont Times, January 14, 1911.
^"Foreigners placed their cook on red-hot stove," Fairmont
Times, November 11, 1914.
71"Bloodhounds trail Italian," Fairmont Times. July 12, 1911.
^"Feeling is High," Fairmont Times, July 14, 1911.
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In less than two weeks this incident was followed by a more
gruesome case of immigrant-on-native crime.

On July 21 a

Monongah police official "sent a bullet into his own brain" after
receiving two mortal wounds at the hands of an Italian.

The

"murder" was believed to have been planned and executed by the
Black Hand.73 Other incidents involving the "lawless element of
the foreign population" were related by the newspapers with
alarming frequency between 1911 and 1915.74

The Farmington Strike and Kilarm Black Hand Trials
The whole matter of native-foreigner relations came to a
head in late-1914 and 1915 as a result of three concurrent
developments.

In July, 1914 the Yost Law, which provided for the

enforcement of prohibition, went into effect.

Very few

immigrants backed the dry law, which denied them one of the
essential elements of their old world culture.

Many continued to

imbibe, getting their spirits from native moonshiners or from

^"Officer sent bullet into own brain," Fairmont Times, July
22, 1911.
74"t w o men butchered on streets of Clarksburg," Fairmont Times.
August 17, 1911; "Foreigner killed, others wounded in fusillade
following card game at Monongah," Fairmont Times, March 17, 1912;
"Dragnet thrown out for other Black Handers," Fairmont Times, June
27, 1913; "Clarksburg has Bland Hand Mystery," Fairmont Times. July
28, 1913; "Foreigner nearly lynched near Farmington," Fairmont
Times. November 14, 1913; "Italian merchant dying from attack,"
Fairmont Times, December 18, 1913; "Keg party victim dies of
gunshot wound," Clarksburg Daily Telegram. March 12, 1914; "Race
riot on Washington St as Negroes and Italians mix it up with Irish
Confetti," Clarksburg Daily Telegram. December 3, 1914.
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adjacent Pennsylvania.75 In August, the European war started.
Some immigrants— probably less than one thousand— returned to
their homelands.76 The sympathies of the region's natives were
with the Allies, and this gave them yet another reason to
distrust the immigrants from Italy and the Austro-Hungarian
Empire.

The final development was a recession which struck in

the last months of 1914, which made work scarce and added to the
growing tensions.
During the winter of 1914-1915 the conflict between natives
and the "lawless element of the foreign population" reached a
peak in Marion County with the Farmington strike and the Kilarm
Black Hand trials.

The Farmington strike has been ably described

by Charles H. McCormick, so there is no need to provide more than
an outline here.

It began on February 15, 1915 at the three

mines of Jamison Coal and Coke Company near Farmington, along the
B&O main stem west of Fairmont.
triggered the strike.

A dispute over explosives

The coal company, which had been supplying

free powder to the miners, was unhappy about the excessive
breaking of the coal into small sizes, so it ordered the miners
to pay for their own in order to limit use.

The company granted

a pay raise of four cents per car to offset the cost.

As a

result,

McCormick, "The Death of Constable Riggs," 36; "Demise of
John Barleycorn," Clarksburg Daily Telegram. July 1, 1914.
76"Local men going back to fight," Clarksburg Daily Telegram.
August 4, 1914; "Many Italians go home for Christmas," Clarksburg
Daily Telegram. December 5, 1914.
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... three to six hundred Farmington strikers took to
the county roads. Side-by-side from mine to mine to
the accompaniment of drum and bugle marched Italians,
Poles, Russians and a large contingent of Croatians or
Serbo-Croations. Brandishing stout hickory clubs or
pick handles studded with lethal spikes or iron bolts,
and perhaps carrying concealed pistols and daggers,
they followed an American flag mounted above a red flag
and a banner inscribed "United We Stand; Divided We
Fall. Give Us Justice; or Nothing at All."77
According to McCormick, the leaders of the strike were Italians
and Croatians.
Four days after the walkout began, reports of violence were
brought to the attention of Marion County Sheriff, C.D. Conaway,
who led a force of a dozen armed officers to the scene with "John
Doe" warrants to arrest the culprits.

After arrests were made,

the posse found itself surrounded by a force of angry foreign
miners, who swarmed over them, clubbing them as they fired their
guns wildly.

All of the officers were badly beaten, and

Constable William Riggs later died.

According to McCormick,

Riggs was targeted for the most severe beating because he was
well-known to the immigrants as an enforcer of the Yost Law.
After Riggs died on February 24, a veritable army of five hundred
"special officers" rounded up the supposed culprits.
134 were indicted for murder or assault.

A total of

McCormick noted that

"every name on the list appeared to be Slavic or Italian."

In

mid-April the rioters were tried at the Marion County Courthouse
for murder and lesser offenses.

By May 18, convictions,

confessions and plea bargains had sent almost fifty immigrants to

^McCormick, "The Death of Constable Riggs," 38.
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the state penitentiary for terms of ten months to life on a range
of offenses.78
The Farmington riot was a spontaneous outburst rather than a
well-planned rebellion or part of a union campaign.
claimed no role whatsoever in the strike.

The UMWA

As the Fairmont Times

pointed out, Riggs, as well as another injured deputy, were union
members.79 The episode was clearly a case of ethnic conflict,
as McCormick demonstrated.
both sides.

It provided some hard lessons for

The natives were frightened, and, as a result,

became even more determined to enforce the laws.

And, as

McCormick wrote,
The legal proceedings stemming from the Farmington
riot taught the Italian and Croatian communities hard
lessons about American law and who had life and death
power over them. At the same time, rigorous
enforcement of prohibition laws against them
demonstrated another way by which the native, middleclass community intended to control them and lay down
the rules for becoming American.80
A second manifestation of the ethnic conflict of 1915 was
the arrest and trial of the Kilarm Black Hand gang for murder and
violation of the Red Man act.

Although the Black Hand preyed

mostly on Italians, it terrified natives nearly as much as the
"red flag" of the Farmington strikers.

Both represented the

threat of anarchy to the law and order-minded native middle

McCormick, "The Death of Constable Riggs," 40-48.
^Fairmont Times. Feb. 26, 1915. Riggs was a member of the
"Railroad Conductors for twenty years" and Deputy Buckley was union
stogie maker in Fairmont.
“ ibid., 48.
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class.

The Black Hand gained a presence in Marion and Harrison

counties as the result of a large influx of Calabrian and
Sicilian immigrants, a few of whom brought with them the old
world crime syndicate, the Mafia.

The natives called the

organization the Black Hand because that was its characteristic
signature, but members called it the Famalie Vagabonda.

There

were Black Hand organizations in Fairmont and Clarksburg and in
some of the mining towns, such as Kilarm, Monongah, and
Enterprise.

The group engaged in extortion, operated brothels,

and sold alcohol and narcotics.

John McKinney, who was a police

detective for the city of Fairmont and active in the Black Hand
investigations of the 1920s, explained that the Fairmont
organization operated a "resort" in town.

Its headquarters was

in the rear of a barber shop on Water Street along the
Monongahela River.

Both the Fairmont and Clarksburg

organizations had ties to a Baltimore group.81 But as the
occasional turf wars which broke out between the local groups
indicate, the Black Hand was hardly the monolithic organization
that many natives imagined.
The Black Hand made its first appearance in Marion County in
1908.

Its first headquarters was in Kilarm Hollow, an "out-of-

the way" mining town on a spur of the old Monongahela River
Railroad on the Harrison-Marion county border.

Kilarm, according

to the Fairmont Times, held the "title for badness" in Marion

81John C. McKinney,
Yearbook. 42.

"Black Hand!" Marion County Centennial
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County.

Bootlegging was done in the open, there was gambling and

"Sunday violations."82 The Black Hand organization there
engaged in extortion, dynamiting homes and beating and torturing
those who dared to resist.

It was temporarily broken up in 1908

by a sting operation undertaken by the Marion County prosecuting
attorney, but it was subsequently revived.83 The episode in
1915 involved a murder committed by a trio of Black Handers from
Kilarm and nearby Enterprise, another mining town.

A total of

eleven were arrested on the murder charge or for violation of the
Red Man law, which made it a misdemeanor to belong to any
organization which conspired to commit personal injury or
robbery.

The acknowledged head of the Kilarm organization was

"domo" Sam Palma, described by the Fairmont Times as a "handsome,
dark-haired Italian.,,8A
The trial began in March, 1915, shortly after that of the
Farmington strikers.
attended.

The Times noted that the sessions were well

The audience included "a bevy of [Fairmont] Normal

school girls," who studied the case.
the charge of second degree murder.

Palma was tried first on
His testimony indicated that

the Black Hand was headquartered in a boarding house in Kilarm,
and that the murder came about as a result of an ongoing battle

^Fairmont Times, March 27, 1917.
^Ibid.
^"ll accused in Mafia Murder," Fairmont West Virginian. March
8, 1915.
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between it and a another Black Hand boarding house in
Enterprise.85
The most damaging testimony was given by John Torcha, one of
the defendants who turned state's evidence.

Torcha was a true

vagabond, having changed his address twelve times since coming to
the region.

He belonged to two orders of the Famalie Vagabonda.

one in Preston County and a second in Harrison county.

Torcha

described the manner in which he was initiated into the
organization.

He came to a meeting at the boarding house in

Kilarm, where the oath of secrecy was administered.

The members

of the society formed a circle around a "colored hanky on the
floor covered with stilettos."

Torcha took the oath as he leaned

over and placed his palm of his right hand on the blade of the
dagger.

The trial ended with five convictions for second degree

murder, including that of Palma, who was sentenced to life
imprisonment, and a conviction for violation of the Red Man
act.86
Neither the convictions of the Fairmont strikers or the
Kilarm Black Hand gang ended the menace of the "lawless element

85"Witnesses for Palma," Fairmont West Virginian. March 19,
1915.
^Fairmont West Virginian. March 23, 1915. The Red Man law was
passed by the state legislature in 1882 in response to the
activities of the "Red Men" of Wetzel County.
This secret
vigilante group engaged in various acts of intimidation in Wetzel
and Marion counties during the 1870s and 1880s. See Waitman T.
Willey, "Law and Lawyers— Their Relation to a Republican Form of
Government," Constitution and By-Laws of the West Virginia Bar
Association (Morgantown, West Virginia: New Dominion Steam Printing
House, 1886), 118 for a brief reference to the "Red men."
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of the foreign population,” however.

A minority of foreigners

continued to toy with various shades of radicalism, and the Black
Hand maintained its grip on the region until the 1920s.

The

impact of this ethnic rebellion was to place a great fear into
the hearts of the ”old stock" middle class.

Even the most

powerful element in society, the coal barons, were not exempt
from the terror.

In 1916 a plot was discovered to blow up the

homes of prominent Fairmonters, including the Watsons.

The plot

was thwarted by a young boy, who overheard the conspirators and
alerted the sheriff.

Dynamite and blasting caps were

confiscated, and armed men posted to guard the homes of the great
capitalists.

The trio of conspirators escaped, however, by using

cayenne pepper to throw the pursuing hounds off their scent.
They found refuge in the old O'Donnell mine in Fairmont, the
traditional "haunt for murderers."87

The UMWA Organizing Drive
The ethnic uprising also put a new light on the
organizational efforts of a more conservative UMWA.

According to

Sam Montgomery, who continued to play a leadership role in the
affairs of District 17, the Farmington strike led to a change in
sentiment in the Fairmont region in favor of the union.

At a

November 22, 1915 meeting of District 17 field workers at
Charleston, Montgomery told the organizers that the time was ripe
to "invade" the Fairmont field.

He declared that "lawyers,

87Fairmont Times. July 17, 1916.
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doctors, preachers, professional and business men in general”
were in sympathy with the union movement.

The change in

sentiment had come both because of the "hoggishness” of the
Consolidation Coal Company and because, after the Farmington
strike, the "people did not want a repetition of the Colorado
situation."

International Executive Board member Thomas

Haggerity, who chaired the meeting, told the group that he and
President Cairns had recently returned from Flemington, where
they had held an enthusiastic meeting with a large crowd "headed
by a brass band."

They conferred with the superintendent of the

mine, who agreed to sign a contract with the UMWA for 800 men.
When they returned later to finalize the agreement, they found
that the detectives of the Consolidation Coal Company had
intimidated the superintendent from doing any further business
with the union.

Haggerity agreed with Montgomery that the time

was right to organize the Fairmont Field.

It was decided to

pursue the organization effort and appeal to the International
Executive Board for funds.88
The 1916 UMWA campaign bore some fruit in the Fairmont
Field.

Economic conditions were favorable to organization:

prosperity had returned, and there was a labor shortage.

In May,

the union sent organizers to Taylor and Preston counties, an area
where they had attained some success in 1907-1909.

After holding

a meeting with three hundred miners at Grafton, the organizers

^"A Meeting of the Field Workers," Charleston, West Virginia,
November 22, 1915, UMWA, International Archive, District 17, 1915.
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succeeded in getting an agreement with the Maryland Coal Company,
a medium-sized company which had operations at Wendell in Taylor
County.89

The liberal views of the president of the company,

J.W. Galloway, who would become the director of the Bituminous
Coal Distribution Division of the U.S. Fuel Administration during
World War I, may have been responsible for this turn of events.
In response, Consolidation Coal Company and many of the
independents announced a wage increase to allay miners.

This

defused the UMWA campaign, but the victory at Wendell proved to
be an opening wedge which would lead to the organization of the
eastern part of the Fairmont Field.
The entry of the United States into the war in April, 1917
was the critical event that changed the course of labor
relations.

The war brought capitalists and laborers together in

support of a common cause.

As George T. Watson, who headed the

West Virginia operations of Consolidation Coal Company said, "the
get together spirit” was in the air.90 The ethnic conflict of
previous years seemed to fade away as miners demonstrated their
patriotism by purchasing Liberty bonds and joining in patriotic
rallies.91 Middle-class values of work and dedication to God
and country became paramount.

The Americanization efforts of the

89”Grafton," Fairmont Times, May 9, 1916; "Strike of Maryland
Coal Company miners ends," Clarksburg Daily Telegram. May 10, 1916.
^ Fairmont West Virginian. May 10, 1918.
91,,Fine spirit at Monongah," Fairmont Times. June 6, 1917;
"Citizens of Grant Town raise nation's flag," Fairmont Times. June
25, 1917; "Consol Honor Roll, Fairmont Times, October 27, 1917.
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coal companies and civic organization were stepped up.

Work, the

quintessential middle-class virtue, was made mandatory for all.
In June, 1917 the state of West Virginia passed a vagrancy law
which required all able-bodied men above sixteen to work thirtysix hours a week.

Sam Montgomery, state Commissioner of Labor

and friend of the working man, announced that he would rigidly
enforce the anti-vagrant law.92
The high demand for coal, the scarcity of labor, the
sympathetic attitude of the Wilson administration toward unions,
along with the "get together spirit," rejuvenated the UMWA and
aroused miners in the Fairmont field.

On May 1, 1917 about eight

hundred miners in the so-called "Thin Vein" sub-field (with
operations in the Upper Freeport and Lower Kittaning seams) in
Preston and Taylor counties, along with about twelve hundred in
the Flemington sub-field between Grafton and Clarksburg, went on
strike.

Seventeen coal companies were affected.

The miners

demanded union recognition, increased pay, the eight hour day,
and payment by the short ton.93 The Central West Virginia Coal
Operators Association, which represented the coal companies of
the Fairmont Field, responded to the strike by granting all
miners a wage increase and the eight-hour day.94 The striking

92Fairmont Times. July 21, 1917.
93Benjamin F. Squires to W.B. Wilson, June 18, 1917, Department
of Labor, Division of Conciliation, Records of the Federal
Mediation and Conciliation Service, Record Group 280, Dispute Case
Files, File Folder 33/390, National Archives, Suitland, Maryland.
94Fairmont Times. May 4, 1917.
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miners demanded more and continued their walk-out.

Governor John

J. Cornwell telegrammed the Secretary of Labor, W.B. Wilson, to
ask for a representative to mediate.

Two Department of Labor

representatives arrived to find the miners firm in their
insistence upon union recognition.

District 17 of the UMWA,

which claimed no responsibility for the strike, then sent
organizers into the field.

On May 5 an agreement was reached

between the UMWA-represented miners and the operators in the
Flemington sub-field, but the operators in the Thin Vein sub
field, claiming economic hardship, refused to grant the miners'
demands.

Finally, after the intercession of Sam Montgomery and

the President of District 17, Frank Keeney, the coal operators
signed a contract providing for recognition of the UMWA, the
eight hour day, payment by the short ton, and higher wages.

A

total of eight companies in the Flemington sub-field and seven in
the Thin Vein sub-field signed union contracts.95
The coal companies of the more central part of the Fairmont
field, Monongalia, Marion, and Harrison counties, dominated by
Consolidation Coal Company, remained nonunion.

This situation

^Sam Ballantyne, J.M. Zimmerman, and P.F. Gatens to John P.
White, June 19, 1917; Benjamin M. Squires to W.B. Wilson, June 18,
1917, UMWA, International Archive, District 17, 1917. The eight
companies in the Flemington sub-field were the Maryland Coal
Company, Pittsvain Coal Company, Simpson Creek Coal Company,
Rosemont Coal Company, Stafford Gas Coal Company, White Horse Coal
Company, Robinson and Phillips Coal Company, and the Harrison Coal
Company. The seven in the Thin Vein sub-field were the Merchants
Coal Company, Albright Smokeless Coal Company, Austin Coal and Coke
Company, Gorman Coal and Coke Company, Hiorra Coke Company,
Virginia-Maryland Coal Company, and Horchler Coal Mining Company.
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changed in 1918, however, after C.W. Watson underwent his
historic change of heart.

It all started in March, when C.W.

applied for a commission in the U.S. Army ordnance reserve
officers corps.

Watson, widely known as the "leading businessman

and capitalist of West Virginia," was accepted for service as a
Colonel.96 As the Fairmont West Virginia editorialized, Watson
"could not fight for the government with one hand and oppose
government plans for efficiency [which included unionization]
with the other."97

On May 10, C.W.'s nephew, George T. Watson,

announced that Consolidation Coal Company's West Virginia
division had signed a new compact with its men designed to
"ensure continuous operation and promote amicable relations."
Watson said the company's West Virginia mines would be run on the
open-shop:

the compact included a provision which permitted

employees the right to "membership or non-membership in labor or
other organization."

He noted that "this is a step between the

present conditions and straight unionism, which is likely," and
said that the coal company, which had opposed the UMWA for nearly
three decades, "removed the barriers which had been placed in the
way of organizers in this region."98 Coal Age, a leading coal
journal, noted the significance of the about-face:
Consol has always been a model employer, but it has
resolutely combatted the unionization of its workmen,
96Fairmont Times. March 12, 1918, March 15, 1918.
97Fairmont West Virginian. May 10, 1918.
^Fairmont Times. May 10, 1918; Fairmont West Virginian. May
10, 1918.
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feeling that a union meant an organization of
discontent. They feared discontent would become
chronic wherever an institution was formed with the
purpose of keeping such discontent alive. ... Much
water has passed over the wheel since the U.S. entered
the world conflict."
C.W. Watson's motive for recognizing the UMWA came under
scrutiny later in the month of May when he announced that he
would enter the race for the U.S. Senate.

It was later charged

that the agreement with the UMWA was the result of a deal,
trading Watson's acceptance of the union for the union's
political support.100 The UMWA did show its appreciation by
supporting Watson in the November election.

Frank J. Hayes wrote

a letter to Frank Keeney endorsing Watson because he had "adopted
a broad, liberal attitude toward labor."101 However, the
support of the UMWA was not enough.

In the eyes of his fellow

operators in southern West Virginia Watson was guilty of a gross
betrayal of their common cause, and they joined together to help
defeat him.102
Following the announcement of Consol's decision, the Central
West Virginia Coal Operators Association met on May 14 to
""The Labor Situation," R. Dawson Hall, Coal Age: quoted in
Fairmont Times. May 21, 1918.
100Howard B. Lee, Bloodletting in Appalachia (Morgantown: West
Virginia University, 1969), 143.
The suspicions of those who
supposed it to be a political deal were raised by the fact that
Consolidation Coal Company did not recognize the UMWA at its mines
in eastern Kentucky, central Pennsylvania, or western Maryland.
101"Labor pledges its support to Watson," Fairmont Times.
October 28, 1918.
102Lee, Bloodletting in Appalachia. 143.
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consider adopting the open-shop plan.

Some of the operators were

"not exactly enthusiastic" about the plan, but it was
approved.103 On May 26, the officials of Consol met with UMWA
officials at the Watson Building in Fairmont to hear the union's
plans for organization.

In this historic meeting, C.W., J.E.,

and George T. Watson gave International President Frank Hayes and
District 17 President Frank Keeney approval to launch a campaign.
After nearly three decades of repression, the coal operators had
assented to a peaceful revolution in labor relations.

According

to the United Mine Workers Journal. what followed was the
"greatest organization drive in the history of West
Virginia."104
The organization drive was directed not only to coal miners,
but to practically every craft in the region.

Fairmont, as well

as Clarksburg, had a union craft tradition which dated to the
1890s.

Brick masons, letter carriers, carpenters and joiners,

painters, railroad workers, and flint glass workers had
previously formed locals, but many craft workers remained
unorganized.

On the same day as the historic meeting between the

Watsons and the UMWA officials, the Monongahela Valley Trades and
Labor Council, American Federation of Labor, was formed to
coordinate the various organization efforts.

Soon, barbers,

street car employees, butchers, carpenters, clerks, machinists,

103Fairmont West Virginian. May 14, 1918; May 15, 1918.
104"West Virginia Mines now being organized," United Mine
Workers of America Journal. Vol. 39, No. 6 (June 13, 1918), 5.
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and workers of other crafts were organized into the appropriate
AFL unions.105
The UMWA campaign got underway in late May.

The union sent

six or seven International organizers, including Mother Jones, to
help Frank Keeney and Fred Mooney of District 17 with the effort.
The miners were generally receptive to the union pitch.

However,

as Keeney related, at some mines the miners "did not want to
organize, but the superintendent got busy and told the miners
they could organize if they wanted."

Some miners also balked at

the UMWA initiation fee, which was regularly ten dollars, but
reduced to one dollar.

Another problem was that the AFL also

sent organizers, and there was some conflict with the UMWA
men.106
Mother Jones, who was eighty-eight years old, played a
predominant role in the campaign.

She pledged not to leave— as

she had sixteen years before— until all of the miners in the
Fairmont Field were organized.

The meetings which she led were

always attended by a bevy of reporters.

She spoke out on a

variety of issues at a June 9 miners’ meeting at Haywood
Junction, near Lumberport in Harrison County.

Expressing her

disdain of middle-class women reformers, the Women's Christian
Temperance Union, and suffragettes, she told miners that the

105 ,
’Archives of Fairmont Labor Temple No. 1885," Huett Nestor
Papers; "West Virginia Mines now being organized," United Mine
Workers Journal. 5; Fairmont West Virginian. May 27, 1918.

106Fairmont West Virginian. June 10, 1918; "Mine Worker Notes,"
Fairmont West Virginian. June 24, 1918.
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"labor movement has done more to humanize and Christianize this
country than all the churches, universities, and capitalistic
institutions."107 At a scale convention held in Fairmont on
July 25, Mother Jones informed the miners that they had a long
way to go:
You have only entered the kindergarten of the labor
movement as yet. Your are going to have a full course
of school. You will graduate from one class to
another. I want you to study hard, to read, to think.
The labor movement is the most instructive school in
the country.108
At scores of meetings across the region at mining towns such
as Monongah, Watson, Simpson, Pinnickinnick, Haywood Junction,
Owings, Enterprise, Bingamon, Middleton, Riverdale, Viropa, Glenn
Falls, Serepta, Opekiska, Annabelle, Gypsy, Wilsonburg, Wolf
Summit, Worthington, Rivesville, Reynoldsville, Everson,
Carolina, Laura Lee, and Dakota, the UMWA organizers stood before
the polyglot masses of miners and proclaimed the "union gospel."
The union was performing its historic role of uniting the miners,
traditionally divided into ethnic enclaves, into a single
working- class organization.

Rather than radical ideology, the

union leaders proclaimed doctrines which Fairmont's old stock
Protestants would heartily approve.

Keeney stressed patriotism:

"The war has got to be won at all hazards."

His platform was

"organize, educate, negotiate, conciliate, and arbitrate."

107"Meeting addressed
Virginian. June 10, 1918.

by

Mother

Jones,"

Fairmont

West

1°8"Miners holding scale convention," Fairmont West Virginian.
July 25, 1918.
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Keeney spoke against strikes, and both he and Mother Jones were
lauded by the newspapers for stopping wildcat strikes.109 The
miners were called "industrial soldiers."

They were instructed

not to be a "slacker, the worse that a man can be called," and
told to keep away from whiskey and practice thrift, industry,
integrity and patriotism— the virtues of American
Protestantism.110
By September, a large part of the seventeen thousand miners
in the Fairmont Field had been brought into the UMWA.

The union

celebrated the "greatest year in the history of the labor
movement in West Virginia" with a grand Labor Day.

A "monster

parade, miles in length," was formed at Monongah and the miners,
nearly ten thousand strong, marched to Traction Park in Fairmont.
Everyone was on foot except Mother Jones, who rode in an auto.
At the park, the miners were addressed by William Rogers,
President of the West Virginia Federation of Labor, and Mother
Jones.

Following the morning session, lunch was spread under the

shade trees.

After hearing another round of addresses, the

miners spent the afternoon watching a baseball game, listening to
concerts by the Greater Fairmont band and the Polish band of

109"Watson mines hear UMW officers," Fairmont West Virginian.
June 5, 1918.
nonpinnickinnick miners organized," Fairmont West Virginian.
June 7, 1918; "Addresses miners at Gypsy," Fairmont West Virginian.
July 17, 1918.
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Monongah, or dancing.111 Much organizing work remained to be
done, however.

As it turned out, a bloody and divisive mine war

would be fought before all miners were organized under the UMWA
banner in 1933.112

As Mother Jones pointed out, in 1918 the

region's miners were still in the "kindergarten of the labor
movement."

They would receive a "full course of school" in the

tumultuous 1920s.

111"Labor Day observed," Fairmont West Virginian. September 2,
1918.
1120rganization Reports,
District 17,
1916-1935,
UMWA,
International Archives.
These reports gave the date of the
organization of the locals, as well as its first officers.
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CHAPTER 7:

THE ONSET OF DECLINE 1920-1924

The industrial transformation which had brought the Upper
Monongahela region to the verge of equal standing with the great
industrial districts of the north came to an abrupt halt in the
early 1920.

The so-called "golden age" of prosperity and social

harmony, which was initiated with the World War I boom,
unionization, and the great revivals, proved to be a momentary
accord, lasting only until 1922, when the regional economy went
into recession.

C.E. Smith recalled that the crash actually

occurred in December of 1921 while he was vacationing in Europe
with C.W. Watson.

Like numerous others during the early 1920s

who sought to take advantage of coal prices of ten dollars a ton,
he had just opened up

a coal mine, which he operated in

partnership with C.W.

Watson and John A. Clark.

The mine was

just getting in production when the partners decided to take a
transoceanic cruise on the Olympic. Smith recalled that the bad
news caught up with them in London, after a week's stay at the
Ritz Hotel.

Watson received

coal boom had "busted

a cablegram which related that the

higher than a kite."

After informingthe

others,
Watson had nothing more to say except to call a waiter
and order up some rum and hot water. "Good drink," he
commented when he smacked his lips over the brew. "You
can't beat it in the cold weather." It wasn't cold at
all. A warm, drippy evening was what London had to
offer. The cold he was thinking of was back in the
coal fields at home.1
1C.E. Smith, "Good Morning!" Fairmont Times-West Virginian.
January 19, 1957 in Hoffman, Marion Countv Centennial Yearbook. 7475.
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The economic decline of the 1920s would eventually lead to
the doom of coal capitalists such as C.W. Watson and C.E. Smith.
The recession of 1922 revealed the basic weakness of the economy
of the region:
outside markets.

its dependence upon the national economy and
As the national economy cooled down following

the war boom, demand for coal and other products of the region
declined.

Not only were coal miners idled and the great coal

profits of 1920 turned into losses, but many of the new
industries which had been established as part of 1910s
diversification movement failed.

Although a recovery occurred in

1923, another recession in 1924 weakened the economy further and
initiated the downward slide which culminated in the Great
Depression of the 1930s.

Statistics demonstrate the magnitude of

the industrial collapse.

While in 1919 there were 630

manufacturing establishments in the ten-county region, by 1931,
the number had declined to 238, even less than in 1869.

In the

same 1919 to 1931 period, the number of manufacturing wage
earners decreased from 17,354 to 10,198, and the value of
products sank from $81,089,000 to $44,487,000.2 The collapse of
manufacturing can be attributed not to an overdeveloped coal
industry, as Simon contended, but to locational disadvantages and
the overall decline of the national economy.3 The products of
2Chapman, Report of the Committee on the Upper Monongahela
Valiev. Appendix B, Table 16: "Statistics of Manufactures for the
United States, West Virginia, and the Upper Monongahela Valley,
1931-1869."
3See Simon, "The Development of Underdevelopment," 285-339 and
discussion in chapter 1.
261

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

these new industries had found a place in the market only because
of the overheated war economy.

When the boom turned to bust and

prices plummeted, they were unable to compete with the older and
more favorably located firms.

While some were simply shut down,

others, including the Watson's Monongahela Power and Railway
Company (interurban traction and power company), were taken over
by outsiders— a fate which would also befall many of the coal
companies.4
This chapter focuses upon the causes and consequences of the
(over)development of the coal industry in the Fairmont Field
during the 1919 to 1924 period.

The war boom led to an

overexpansion of the industry, which, in turn, produced the
destructive competition and breakdown of cooperative labor
relations which were the hallmarks of the 1920s.

The social

consequences of this decline are another topic of the narrative.
Just as social and moral progress had come as a result of the
great economic expansion of the late 1910s, turmoil, the revival
of ethnic tensions, and the first battles in the mine war ensued
in the early 1920s as the regional economy broke down.

Rapid Expansion of the Mining Industry
In response to the high prices for coal, the coal industry
underwent considerable expansion during World War I and the post-

4West Penn Traction Co. of Pittsburgh purchased the common
stock of the company in 1923; Canfield, West Penn Traction. 85;
"Radical changes in Watson Building," Fairmont West Virginian. May
6, 1922.
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war boom.

While 75 firms produced coal in the Fairmont field in

1910, by 1920 258 were in the mining business.

Much of this new

development took place in new territory in Monongalia and
northern Marion counties along the Monongahela Railway,
especially in the Scotts Run sub-field.

As Phil Ross has

demonstrated, this new railroad was a major agency for
"unchecked development" in the Fairmont field.5 The Monongahela
Railway was a "railroaders' railroad."

It was owned and operated

by railroad companies primarily for the purpose of obtaining
railroad fuel.

The construction of the line was originally

undertaken in 1901 by the Little Kanawha Syndicate, a group
headed by George Gould and Joseph Ramsey which planned to expand
the Wabash Railroad into a transcontinental line.

The Little

Kanawha Syndicate made little progress because of a lack of
financing, and in 1913 its properties, which included one hundred
thousand acres of coal lands, were taken over by three railroad
companies, the Pittsburgh & Lake Erie, the Pennsylvania, and the
Baltimore & Ohio.

The new syndicate set up two separate

railroad companies to build the railroad line.

Under chief

engineer Samuel D. Brady, a figure who would play a key role in
the upcoming mine war, the Buckhannon & Northern Railroad Company
completed the West Virginia section of the railroad in 1914, and
the Monongahela Railroad Company built the line in Pennsylvania.
In 1915 the two were consolidated to form the Monongahela Railway
5Phil Ross, "The Scotts Run Coalfield from the Great War to
the Great Depression: A Study in Overdevelopment," West Virginia
History Vol. 53 (1994), 35.
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Company.

In 1925 the Scotts Run Railway, which was built in 1917

to tap the rich coal reserves in western Monongalia County, was
taken over by the Monongahela Railway Company.

With its seventy-

ton cars (twenty tons larger than many of the B&O) and direct
connection to Lake Erie which permitted lower freight rates than
the B&O, the coal road provided easy access to Canadian and New
York markets.6
With coal prices reaching ten and even twenty dollars a ton
during the 1918 to 1921 period, the Monongahela Railway sub-field
grew at a remarkable rate.

Production in Monongalia County went

from 2,878,052 tons in 1920 to 4,398,929 tons in 1921, a 65
percent increase which came largely from the Monongahela Railway
mines.

By 1923, thirty-seven mines operated along Scotts Run,

and twenty-eight mere along the West Virginia section of the
Monongahela Railway main stem.7 In that year, Black Diamond. a
national coal marketing journal, devoted a large part of one of
its numbers to the coal industry in the Morgantown area.

The

lead article in this nineteen page spread was written by regional
booster, Dr. I.e. White.

White described "Morgantown's wealth of

6When the construction of the Buckhannon & Northern was
announced in 1913, Coal Age noted that the Fairmont, Morgantown,
and Pittsburgh Railroad, which was built in 1386, ran along the
"wrong side of the Monongahela River." With the exception of a few
scattered areas near Montana and Opekiska, the Monongahela Series
disappeared on the east side of the river. The new line tapped the
extensive reserves of Pittsburgh and Sewickley coal on the west
side. "A New Coal Railroad," Coal Age Vol. 4, No. 24 (December
1913), 897.
7Ross,
"The Scotts Run Coalfield," 27; West Virginia
Department of Mines, Annual Report, 1923-24, "Directory of Mines in
the State of West Virginia for the Year 1923," 16-41.
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fuel" and acclaimed it as "one of the greatest coal areas in the
United States."

After describing the four seams of coal of the

Monongahela Series which outcropped there, he went on to say,
It is the presence of these four splendid coal seams of
Scotts and Robinsons Runs on the west bank of the
Monongahela river near Morgantown that has brought
about the most wonderful coal development in the last
five years that the entire Appalachian field has ever
witnessed.8
As the 1920s wore on, it became apparent that the "wonderful"
development was one of the primary causes of the Fairmont
Field's overdevelopment.
The mining labor force of the Fairmont Field grew in
response to the expansion of the industry.

From 1910 to 1920,

the labor force more than doubled, increasing from 12,681 to
26,275.

The proportion of foreign nationals dropped off

considerably due to two trends.

Many of the foreigners became

U.S. citizens, while a smaller number returned to their native
countries.

In 1920, 9,762 foreigners accounted for 37.2 percent

of the work force.

The Eastern European segment— 5,312—

accounted for 54.4 percent of the foreign total and 20.2 percent
of the total work force.

The 3,438 Italians accounted for 35.2

percent of the foreign group and 13.1 percent of the total work
force.

The most dramatic change from 1910 was a large increase

in the numbers of blacks in the labor force.

While there were

only 310 in 1910, the number of blacks increased to 2,209 in

8I.C. White, "Morgantown's Wealth of Fuel," Black Diamond Vol.
11, No. 5 (August 11, 1993), 178.
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1920, 8.4 percent of the total work force.9
Many blacks came to the Fairmont field during World War I
when there was a labor shortage, and then in.1919 and 1920 in the
aftermath of the failed strike in Alabama.10 William J.
Croston, who worked at the Austen Coal & Coke Company mine in
Preston County from 1911 to 1922, explained that after the flu
epidemic of 1918 killed the miners "like flies," the company "got
a bunch of colored fellows in from Frederick [Maryland]."

A

problem developed, however, because "you couldn't get any work
out of them.

All they wanted to do was sing and dance."

Although they were "awful nice fellows," they were "satisfied
with low tonnage."

A few of them "stuck," but most ended up

going back to where they came from.
Austin was segregated.

Croston also said that

Americans lived above the railroad tracks

and foreigners and "coloreds lived in the bottom."11 More
blacks arrived in the 1920s as strikebreakers.

Brooks Shoemaker,

who drove, loaded, and ran a motor at Fairmont & Cleveland Coal
Company's Parker Run mine near Rivesville during the 1920s,
related that many blacks were shipped in from Alabama on box cars
during the 1924 strike.

"Some got run-out and some stayed and

^est Virginia Department of Mines, Annual Reports. 1910-1911,
1920-1921. Figures on nationality for each mine are available from
1907 to 1924.
10Ronald L. Lewis, Black Coal Miners in America; Race. Class,
and Community Conflict. 1780-1980 (Lexington: University Press of
Kentucky, 1987), 109.
11John Stealey, III, "Interview of William J. Croston," January
15, 1967; tape at West Virginia and Regional History Collection,
West Virginia University, Morgantown.
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joined the union,11 he explained.

Shoemaker, who moved to Bertha

Hill on Scotts Run in 1934, added that some of the coal
companies, such as the Continental Coal Company, would not hire
blacks.12 James Walter Brown, who worked at Tropf Coal Company
at Randall at the mouth of Scotts Run, and Roy Brooks, who worked
at Cassville, at the head of Scotts Run, also told of an influx
of black strikebreakers in the 1922 to 1924 period.13
In January, 1923, the Consolidation Coal Company took a
census of miners working at its twenty-nine mines in the Fairmont
Field.

The results (Table 7.1) show the diversity of the

company's labor force and reflect the upsurge in the number of
black miners.

Borris Emmet, the U.S. Coal Commission field

worker who prepared the report on labor relations in the Fairmont
Field, considered the most "interesting fact" revealed by the
census the "considerable proportion of colored men."

Exceeded

only by native whites, they made up about fourteen percent of the
total employed.

Emmet noted that the colored group created some

"difficulties in the mines" when blacks served on mine
committees.

According to the scale agreement, only citizens, or

men who had declared their intention of becoming citizens and who
spoke the English language, could serve on mine committees.
Since many of the foreigners were ineligible, typically one or
more blacks served.

Many native West Virginia miners disliked

12Stealey, "Interview of Brooks Shoemaker," May 4, 1967.
13Stealey, "Interview of Roy Brooks," April 29, 1967; Stealey,
"Interview of James Walter Brown," May 4, 1967.
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serving on the same committee with "ignorant niggers who just
came from the South," and refused to follow orders issued by a
black committeeman.

Emmet noted that this racial animosity is

"sometimes encouraged by the operator on the old theory of divide
et empera."

While emphasizing racial divisions in the labor

force, which was largely a new development in the Fairmont Field,
Emmet also noted a continuance of the old ethnic tensions.

He

explained that Italians, who constituted the largest group of
TABLE 7.1: NATIVITY OF MINERS IN TWENTY-NINE MINES OF
CONSOLIDATION COAL CO.
Nativity_______ No. of Miners

Nativity_______ No. of Miners

Americans White
"
Colored
Italians
Hungarians
Polish
Slav-Servians
Austrians
Spanish
Russians
Turks
German
Lithuanians &
Estonians
Syrians

Horwats
English
Bohemians &
Croatians
Greeks
Irish
Scotch
Ukranian
Welch
Roumanians
Mexicans
Jewish
French
Finnish

1579
548
367
253
201
167
80
70
47
31
25
24
15

TOTAL:
Source:

13
12
10
9
3
3
3
3
3
1
1
1
1
3 .970

Borris Emmet, "Final report on Labor Relations in West
Virginia, Fairmont Section," (1923), 13, Records of U.S.
Coal Commission, National Archives, Record Group 68, Box
123, Box 204.

foreign miners in the field, "for some reason or other" were the
"hardest to get along with."

Nonunion companies, which had
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emerged in 1922, refused to hire Italians because of this.14
Black miners were relegated to the bottom of the social and
occupational ladder, taking a place below foreigners.

Their

arrival contributed to the segmentation of the labor force.

The

prevailing racism of natives, along with the general lack of a
union tradition among blacks, made it difficult to achieve
working-class solidarity tinder UMWA auspices.

In general, blacks

were not well received by the native population.

In a January 1,

1922 editorial, the Fairmont West Virginian, a paper generally
more sympathetic to the working man than the Fairmont Times.
called the "influx of Negroes" a "restless wandering of
irresponsible, careless individuals who desire to be on the move.
Any employer of labor can vouch for the instability of these
migrants."15 Yet, as one black miner related, blacks were
transients not just because of "restless wandering."

The problem

was that the "colored miner would have to move around to find
jobs."

The black miner would "work for two years or so and get

laid off."16
The 1919 Strike
As important as they were, the influx of blacks and the
rapid expansion of mining capacity during the post-war years were

14Borris Emmet, "Final report on Labor Relations in West
Virginia, Fairmont Section," (1923), 13, Records of U.S.
Coal Commission, National Archives, Record Group 68, Box
123, Box 204.
15"Negro Migration," Fairmont West Virginian. January 1, 1922.
16Stealey interview fragment, no name or date.
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not the leading stories in the region in the early-1920s.
Headlines and the front pages of the region's newspapers were
devoted to stories relating to labor relations in the coal
industry:

strikes, rumors of strikes, UMWA meetings and

activities, negotiations, and pronouncements of operators and
their associations.

With the onset of the open shop movement and

the 1919 and 1922 strikes, the historic 1918 agreement between
the UMWA and the coal operators— and the social contract that it
embodied— proved to be fragile.

The 1918 agreement, tied to the

nation-wide Washington Agreement, was to be effective "for the
period of the war" or until November, 1920, whichever came first.
After the armistice was signed in November, 1918, the UMWA began
to press for wage adjustments to compensate for the rising cost
of living.

The operators refused to negotiate, claiming that the

agreement should remain in effect until a peace treaty was
signed.17 At its September, 1919 convention in Cleveland, the
UMWA demanded a sixty percent increase in wages, the six-hour
day, and a national contract with no sectional settlements.

In

addition, the UMWA policy committee, under the influence of John
Brophy, recommended the nationalization of the mines.

If a

satisfactory wage adjustment was not reached before November 1,
1919, the convention announced, the UMWA would strike.18

17,lSummary of Wage Negotiations," n.d., Clarence Edwin Smith
Papers.
18James P. Johnson, The Politics of Soft Coal: The Bituminous
Industry from World War X Through the New Deal (Urbana: University
of Illinois Press, 1979), 101-102.
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To the nation's conservatives, the strike threat, with the
union1s demand for nationalization of the mines, smelled of
revolution.

They had good reasons to believe that the coal

strike would be the opening volley.

With the revolutions in

Russia and Eastern Europe, the general strike in Seattle, the
wave of bombings of prominent public figures, and the nationwide
steel strike, the nation was plunged into near hysteria.19 In
West Virginia, conservatives were alarmed by the militancy of
some UMWA miners, who threatened to march into Logan and Mingo
counties in October and organize the nonunion mines by force.

On

October 2, 1919 the Fairmont West Virginian announced that
Bolsheviks were in Marion County. A band of twenty-five Russian
miners at the Consumers Coal Company at Downs, near Farmington,
refused to work because a committee of Russians threatened them
with death if they did.

Also, some Russians at Jamison Coal &

Coke Company's No. 7, No. 8, and No. 9 mines, where the 1915
Farmington riot occurred, failed to work.

The hotbed of

radicalism, according to the newspaper, was Jamison No. 9 near
Farmington.

Deputies moved in to the area and confiscated

"Russian literature."

On October 16 Federal Marshall C.E. Smith

of Fairmont received a list of West Virginia subscribers to the
anarchist publication Cronaca Souversiva from the U.S. Department
of Justice.

Smith used the list, along with other evidence, to

mount an investigation.

He hired four or more operatives to

discover whether these radicals had formed organizations or
19Ibid.
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planned to overthrow the government.20
After President Wilson's October 25 message calling the
strike order "a grave moral and legal wrong," Governor John J.
Cornwell appealed to District 17 President Frank Keeney in a
public letter to halt the strike and "avert calamity."21 Keeney
wrote back on October 27 to inform the governor that the UMWA,
because of the "increased cost of living and the arbitrary stand
of the operators," was compelled to "effect the policy outlined
by the Cleveland convention."22 Cornwell then sent a letter to
the sheriffs of every county and the mayors of every town in the
state, calling upon them to form a "Committee of Public Aid and
Safety" composed of "public-spirited citizens, men who can be
trusted and whose loyalty to the government and its institutions
is beyond question."

The committees were instructed to

"alleviate the inevitable sufferings that will follow in the wake
of a prolonged coal strike" and quell any "general internal
disturbances."23 In Fairmont, Sheriff A.M. Glover organized
four squads of ten men each under the authority of deputies.

Joe

20”List of men subscribing to extremist anarchist publications
and among the correspondents of Dominic Crotti, anarchist," U.S.
Department of Justice to C.E. Smith, October 16, 1919; "#37 to C.E.
Smith, October 25, 1919; "Report of #33, #38, and #14," October 28,
1919, C.E. Smith Papers, Series 1, Box 1.
21John J. Cornwell to Joseph Tumulty, Secretary to the
President, Telegram, October 26, 1919, Cornwell Papers, Box 108,
File Folder 3.
22C.F . Keeney to John J. Cornwell, October 27, 1919, Cornwell
Papers, Box 108, File Folder 3.
^Clarksburg Daily Telegram. October 30, 1919; Fairmont West
Virginian. October 30, 1919.
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Craddock, Mayor of Clarksburg, appointed a "Committee of 25."
Similar committees were set up in Lumberport, Bruceton,
Tunnelton, Terra Alta and other towns across the region.24
On November 1 the whistles at the mining plants in the
Fairmont field were blown, but no one reported for work.

It was

the first time in history that all of the mines of the region had
been closed by a strike.25 Rather than the revolutionary surge
that many feared, the miners simply stayed at home or spent time
in Fairmont or Clarksburg.

The coal companies, for the most

part, did not even post guards at their mines.

Consolidation

Coal Company took the opportunity to spruce up its mining towns,
employing any miner who wanted work to construct concrete
sidewalks and grade streets.26
Meanwhile, on November 8 Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer
secured an injunction ordering the UMWA leadership to cancel the
strike.

After a seventeen-hour session of the UMWA executive

committee on November 10 and 11, the new president of the UMWA
International, John L. Lewis conceded: "We cannot fight our
Government."27

Despite the fact that union miners in the

24A.M. Glover to John J. Cornwell, October 31, 1919; A.O.
Goldstrom to John J. Cornwell, November 5, 1919; Mayor of Terra
Alta to John J. Cornwell, November 4, 1919; Joe Craddock to John J.
Cornwell, November 4, 1919, Cornwell Papers, Box 108, File Folder
3.
^"Strike closes Fairmont mines," Fairmont West Virginian.
November 1, 1919.
26"Consol building concrete walks in several towns," Fairmont
West Virginian. November 11, 1919.
27Johnson, The Politics of Soft Coal. 104.
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northern fields and parts of southern West Virginia held out,
miners in the Fairmont field heeded Lewis's call.

On the

following day one hundred mines in the Fairmont field were once
again producing coal.28 On November 14, Secretary of Labor
William B. Wilson assembled a joint conference of operators and
union leaders to discuss a wage increase.

A fourteen percent

increase was suggested by the government, but the union balked,
holding out for a thirty-one percent raise.29 Despite the
impasse, miners in the Fairmont Field continued to return to
work.

With the help of UMWA District 17 officials, nearly every

mine in the field was in production by November 24.30 Finally,
on December 7, the strike was settled.

Palmer convinced Lewis to

accept the fourteen percent increase in return for a promise by
the government to set up a commission to reconsider the wage
issue.

Miners across the nation finally returned to work, a full

two weeks after those in the Fairmont Field.

Later, on April 2,

1920 the Bituminous Coal Commission erased the fourteen percent
increase, and awarded the miners an increase of twenty-four cent
per ton for tonnage workers and one dollar per day to day
workers.

These rates were to remain in effect until March 31,

281,ioo mines in district are working today," Fairmont West
Virginian. November 12, 1919.
^Johnson, The Politics of Soft Coal. 104-105.
3°eiFairmont region is practically
Virginian. November 24, 1919.

normal,"

Fairmont West
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1922.31
Although the strike, according to a Fairmont West Virginian
editorial, was "without rancor," law enforcement officials seized
the opportunity to round up seventy radicals, whose identities
had been revealed by C.E. Smith's investigation.

The "red-hot

anarchists," as the newspaper termed them, were lodged in the
Marion and Monongalia county jails while the Immigration Bureau
investigated.

It was expected that most would be deported, and

the remainder would be charged with violating the Red Man act.
Most of the "plotters" were Russians, members of the Russian
Workers Union, but some were Austrians.

It was believed that

they were plotting the overthrow of the government.32
However, on December 15 after examinations of the prisoners
were completed, it was found that only one was "an avowed enemy
of the existing order."

He would be deported.

were found to be "mild men" and were released.

The remainder
The West

Virginian explained why the Russians had become members of the
Russian Workers Union:
The Russian peasants of this class knew nothing of the
Russian government except as an instrument of
oppression. Lucky to get two years of education, many
had none. They were oppressed by the government and a
corrupt priesthood. The United States was a haven. In
the U.S., government was remote from daily life, and
the peasant did not understand it. He dug coal, lived
31The day rate was supplemented by a $1.50 increase on
September 8, 1920. "Summary of Wage Negotiations," 1, C.E. Smith
Papers.
32"29 Radicals picked up," Fairmont West Virginian. November
17, 1919; "38 Reds now in jail," Fairmont West Virginian. November
18, 1919.
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well, sang his folk songs and was happy. The Federated
Union of Russian Workers movement for him was what the
West Virginia societies of New York and Washington mean
to West Virginians sojourning in these places. The
union allowed those who had lost touch with their
kindred during the war to congregate. Violence was
never advocated. Not one in 70 of these men resisted
arrest. These men are simply inoffensive miners.33
The "Red Scare” in the Fairmont field had been just that— a
scare.

Nonetheless, radical aliens were put on notice that they

were being watched and would be deported for revolutionary
activities.
Conservatives in the region and state continued to rally
behind the leadership of Governor Cornwell.

On March 4, 1920 the

state's conservative political and business leaders set up the
American Constitutional Association (ACA), a "defensive and
offensive alliance of American business men."34 The purpose of
the association was "to inculcate in the minds of our people,
both native and foreign-born, the true spirit of Americanism."
The association aimed to eradicate radicalism and stem the tide
of Bolshevism, eliminate strikes, and fight the UMWA's plan for
the nationalization of the coal industry.

The organization also

endorsed Judge Gary's (President of U.S. Steel) American Plan,

^"Examination of Russian union men completed," Fairmont West
Virginian, December 15, 1919.
^"Defensive and Offensive Alliance of American Business Men,"
Speech of John J. Cornwell before the first Meeting of the American
Constitutional Association, March 4, 1920, Cornwell Papers, Box
107, File Folder 1.
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which provided for the open shop.35 E.M. Showalter, judge and
capitalist from Fairmont, I.e. White of Morgantown, and Howard
Gore of Clarksburg, who would become governor in 1924, were the
leading supporters of the association from the region.36 The
Northern West Virginia Coal Operators Association also supported
its work.37
The role of the ACA, as well as other educational and
patriotic groups, in launching the open shop movement in West
Virginia has been ably described by John Hennen in "The
Americanization of West Virginia.38"

Hennen demonstrated how

these groups used public relations tactics and a pro-business
ideology to promote a type of Americanism which found no place
for unionism.

While these groups and their campaigns nurtured

the open shop movement by creating a favorable political and
philosophical climate, they were not its driving force.

As we

shall see, in the Fairmont Field the economic concerns of

35Edwin M. Keatley, Secretary of American Constitutional
Association, to Wm. B. Schiller, President of National Tube
Company, December 7, 1920; "American Constitutional Association:
Declaration of Purposes," March 4, 1920, Cornwell Papers, Box 107,
File Folder 1.
toward Gore and I.e. White were elected to the Board of
Directors on March 18, 1920, Edwin M. Keatley to E.W. Oglebay,
March 20, 1920; Judge E.M. Showalter delivered an address before
the association, "American Ideals," n.d., Cornwell Papers, Box 107,
File Folder 1.
37Phil M. Conley to John J. Cornwell,
Cornwell Papers, Box 107, File Folder 1.

February 21,

1921,

38John C. Hennen, Jr., "The Americanization of West Virginia:
Creating a Modern Industrial State, 1916-1925," Ph. D. diss, West
Virginia University, 1993.
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operators— the fear that the "artificially high" wage rates
demanded by the UMWA would ruin them— were paramount. The UMWA
was perceived by operators and their elite and middle-class
allies as a threat to the continued growth of the regional
economy.

The Deckers Creek Valley Strike
The first large company to operate on the open-shop plan in
the Fairmont Field after 1918 was the Penn Mary Coal Company, a
subsidiary of Bethlehem Steel Company.

On October 29, 1919— the

eve of the nationwide strike— the company purchased from the
Elkins interests the Morgantown & Kingwood Railroad, along with
the Elkins Coal and Coke Company, for four million dollars.
Bethlehem had been purchasing Upper Freeport coking coal from
these operations for some time; it made the purchase to cut costs
and assure its supply.

Six mines along the Morgantown & Kingwood

Railroad were included— four in Preston County and two in
Monongalia County.39 This takeover of an indigenous company by
a large out-of-state corporation brought the first battles in the
1920s mine war.
On November 13, 1919, as the miners employed at the six
mines of Penn Mary returned to work following the strike, they
were greeted with a notice outlining the company's policy.

The

notice informed the miners that the company would no longer

39"Bethlehem will acquire Elkins interests," Fairmont West
Virginian. October 24, 1919.
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collect the check-off (money deducted from an employee's check
for UMWA dues, fines, or assessments and transmitted to UMWA
offices), nor have any dealings whatsoever with the UMWA.

It

would continue to pay the wage scale agreed upon in the Fairmont
Field, however, and "endeavor to give all our men a square
deal."40 Along with Bethlehem, other companies along the M&K,
including the second largest, the Connelsville Basin Coal & Coke
Company at Rock Forge, went open shop at the same time.

The

officers of the locals notified union officials in District 17
and acting President John L. Lewis of the trespass.

Several also

wrote to Governor Cornwell asking for government intervention.41
On December 30, Keeney wired the Department of Justice to inform
officials of the situation.42 Neither state nor federal
officials bothered to investigate, however.
Only 175 of Penn Mary's 1,500 employees protested the
company's labor policy by striking.

Apparently, economic

considerations outweighed loyalty to the UMWA.

The company did

not ask for wage reductions, and with the elimination of the
check-off, miners— if they quit the UMWA— stood to earn more than
before.

The UMWA-sanctioned strike was led by R.M. Williams, a

UMWA organizer and controversial figure who would later play an
40C.A. Manning, President of Local #4127, to John L. Lewis,
November 18, 1919, UMWA, International Archive, District 17, 1919.
41H.D. Carroll to John J. Cornwell, December 5, 1919; John J.
Cornwell to S.J. Jones, December 9, 1919, Cornwell Papers, Box 107,
File: Coal Strikes.
42"Miners after Bethlehem," Fairmont West Virginian. December
30, 1919.
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important part in UMWA politics.

Known for his intelligence,

wit, and speaking ability, Williams was one of the few UMWA
officials in District 17 with any higher education.

He attended

Oberlin College for two years and graduated from Mountain State
Business College at Parkersburg.

His education and keen

intellect helped him emerge as a leader in a UMWA open forum and
discussion group that was organized in 1918 at Norton, a mining
town in northwestern Randolph County near Elkins.

This group,

which represented approximately ten locals, met once a month to
discuss union policy.43 In 1919 Williams moved to Deckers Creek
and became an organizer for District 17.

Williams faced a

difficult challenge when he took charge of the Deckers Creek
strike in 1920.

Not only were the miners lukewarm in their

support of the UMWA, but Bethlehem was one of the most powerful
companies in the nation.
As the strike got underway, Bethlehem Steel made a second
acquisition of coal properties in the Fairmont Field.

In April,

1920 the company purchased two mines of the Jamison Coal & Coke
Company in Marion County:

Jamison No. 7 near Barrackville and

No. 10 at Dakota, five miles north of Fairmont on the Monongahela
Railway.

Bethlehem announced that it would use the coal from

these two mines to make producer gas at its steel plants. The
steel company would operate these two mines "as a separate unit"
from the mines on the M&K, however, and would not attempt to
43Betty Snyder Hall, "The Role of Rhetoric in the Northern West
Virginia Activities of the United Mine Workers, 1897-1927," M.A.
Thesis, (1955) West Virginia University, 105-107.
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impose the open shop.44 Later, in November, the steel company
purchased the Manley Hotel in Fairmont for a headquarters for its
new coal empire.45
The Deckers Creek Valley strike continued through 1920 and
1921.

The centers of UMWA strength were the locals at Dellslow

and Rock Forge.

The UMWA provided relief for the strikers, and

R.M. Williams organized demonstrations and picket lines near the
mines.

The strike came to a head in October, 1920.

On October

11, H.P. (Pat) Blevins, who had organized the Dellslow local and
was its president, was attacked as he and his wife were driving
from Richard to Dellslow.
held at gunpoint.

Blevins was beaten while his wife was

The three attackers let the couple go after

threatening to kill Blevins if he was ever seen around Richard
again.46 A week later Blevins, along with eight companions,
dynamited the water tank and tipple of the Connelsville Basin
Coal & Coke Company at Rock Forge.

After the explosions, a small

battle took place between Blevins and his men and the company
guards.

From 50 to 200 shots were fired.

A state police

detachment, which had been stationed at Rock Forge since July 12,
broke up the fight and captured Blevins and his companions with

^"Bethlehem Steel gets two local mines of Jamison,” Fairmont
West Virginian. April 20, 1920; "Bethlehem will operate Jamison
plants as separate unit," Fairmont Times, April 24, 1920.
45"Bethlehem Coal Co. purchases Manley Hotel for its offices,"
Fairmont West Virginian. November 13, 1920.
^"Blevins claims he was beaten-up," Morgantown Post. October
11, 1920.
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the aid of bloodhounds.47
Pat Blevins escaped conviction on these charges, but in
February, 1921 he was shot and killed— the first casualty in the
Fairmont Field mine war.

No arrests were made, but it was

conjectured that the three men who threatened him on October 11
were the culprits.48 Blevins' father, Hugh, later blaimed UMWA
organizer R.M. Williams for his son's death and the loss of the
strike.

In a letter to the Morgantown Post. Hugh Blevins

declared that he was in favor of conducting the strike in a
"quiet, dignified manner," but that a group led by Williams
decided to conduct it under a system which would "be a disgrace
to hell."

According to Blevins,
He [Williams] has spent $600 or $700 of union funds for
the purchase of guns and has distributed them among his
bad men who may shoot into houses where women and
children are in their midnight slumbers.49

Blevins also charged Williams with squandering union funds on
personal expenses, paying for repair of his Ford roadster with a
relief check.

Blevins concluded his letter by announcing his

resignation,
And so long as such men as R.M. Williams are in the
organization, I will never hang my tail to your kite
again. I have been with the UMWA for twenty-three
47"Water tank at Monongalia county mine blown-up," Fairmont
West Virginian. October 18, 1920; "Nine men are arrested in
connection with explosion," Morgantown Post. October 18, 1920.
^Fairmont West Virginian. February 6, 1921; "Open-Shop
Movement Gains Some Headway in Northern West Virginia," Coal Age
Vol. 20, No. 18 (November 3, 1921), 732.
49"Hugh Blevins makes charge," Morgantown Post. December 6,
1921.
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years, and it grieves me very much to be driven out
after being a member so long.50
With the UMWA strike a failure, Bethlehem faced no
opposition when it reduced wages in 1921 in response to the
recession.

The dramatic decline in coal prices, along with the

"first serious pinch" of competition from the nonunion fields,
led the Advisory Board of the Northern West Virginia Coal
Operators Association to ask District 17 President Keeney to
consider a reduction in wages.

On July 3, Keeney replied that

there could be no adjustment in wage rates unless it was agreed
upon first by the Central Competitive Field.

During the late

siammer and fall of 1921, there were several meetings of the
Association's Advisory Board and the UMWA District 17 officials
at Deer Park, Maryland to discuss the wage reductions, but no
changes were made in the wage scale.51

The 1922 Recession and Strike
By January, 1922 the Fairmont field was in the "doldrums."
The price of coal was "dirt-cheap," ranging from $1.25 to $1.50
per ton of run-of-mine coal.

Many miners had not worked in

nearly a year, and the most fortunate were working but two days a
week.52 The West Virginian declared that "[n]ever in the

50Ibid.
S1C.E. Smith, "Summary of Wage Negotiations," 2; Fairmont West
Virginian. March 27, 1922.
52"Fairmont Field is in doldrums," United Mine Workers of
America Journal. Vol. 32, No. 25 (January 15, 1922), 6.
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history of West Virginia has suffering been so prevalent."

The

newspaper estimated that three thousand miners were in desperate
need.53 The UMWA assessed all miners working five days a month a
fee of one dollar, those working ten days a month $1.50, to
provide relief for needy miners.

District 17 officials

telegraphed President Harding and appealed for aid for "starving"
miners.54
Fairmont operators blamed the two traditional bugaboos,
freight rates and the union, for the economic problem.

Lisle

White, President of the Northern West Virginia Coal Operators
Association, claimed that the Fairmont field was "hemmed-in on
all sides by freight differentials."55 Meetings were initiated
with the B&O for a reduction.

One operator, T.W. Arnett,

expressed a common sentiment among operators when he revived the
out-of-state conspiracy theory.

Arnett pointed out that Fairmont

operators were at the mercy of the Central Competitive Field on
wage rates, yet most of their competition was from nonunion
fields in Central Pennsylvania.

He decried the fact that the

Fairmont Field had been made subordinate to the Central
Competitive Field.56
53,,Miners will discuss relief for the needy," Fairmont West
Virginian. January 11, 1922.
54"UMW holds meeting here," Fairmont West Virginian. January
14, 1922; "Grafton," Fairmont West Virginian. January 31, 1922.
55"Readjustment of freight
Virginian. February 22, 1922.

rates

sought,"

Fairmont

West

56"Local operator points out handicap of union," Fairmont West
Virginian. March 4, 1922.
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Many of the companies asked their men to take wage cuts,
but, for the most part, their requests were met with refusals.
The operators argued that the miners were being unreasonable,
that they should take reductions as other trades had, and that
their refusal showed that they "preferred idleness."57 Despite
the defection at Deckers Creek, it appears that most miners
preferred to stick with the union.

Many had taken Mother Jones

to heart and schooled themselves in unionism.

The UMWA provided

each of its members with a copy of the Journal. which explained
the union's philosophy and policies, disseminated mining news,
and provided a forum for the miners' letters.

The bi-monthly

magazine, which included translations of its lead articles in
four foreign languages, appealed to miners' wives as well with
cooking and fashion hints.

Along with frequent UMWA meetings and

conventions at the mining towns, the Joumal inculcated miners
with the spirit of unionism.
However, as the economic situation worsened in January,
1922, some of the coal companies were able to open their mines on
a nonunion basis.

In addition to the companies on the M&K,

several small ones on the Monongahela Railway went nonunion.

The

miners, some of whom were "thinly clad in the way of shoes"
agreed to work for the 1917 scale.

However, when the Gilbert-

Davis Coal Company, with the approval of its employees, attempted
to open its No. 2 mine on an open shop basis on January 3, union

57"Meeting at Gilbert-Davis," Fairmont West Virginian. January
7, 1922.
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marchers, led by R.W. Williams, prevented it.

Several hundred

union miners, headed by a brass band, marched up Scotts Run from
Osage to Guston Run for a demonstration.

They convinced the

Gilbert-Davis miners to stick with the union.

No. 2 remained

idle.58 The open shop movement continued nonetheless.

On

February 1, operators on the West Virginia Northern Railroad in
Preston County in the Thin Seem sub-field, where the 1917 strike
had led to the first union contracts in the Fairmont Field,
announced wage cuts of nearly fifty percent.

Without much

resistance from the UMWA, these companies succeeded in reopening
their mines on the open-shop basis.

By March 4, fifteen of the

nineteen mines along the railroad were working.59

Later in

March, the newspaper noted that two companies in Barbour County
along the Belington Branch of the B&O had begun to work
nonunion.60
The open-shop movement was institutionalized in February,
1922 with the organization of the Monongahela Coal Operators'
Association.

Composed of operators with mines along the

Monongahela Railway from Fairmont to the Pennsylvania state line,

58|,Miners march on Guston Run," Fairmont West Virginian.
January 4, 1922; "Quiet prevails on Scotts Run," Fairmont West
Virginian. January 5, 1922; "Meeting at Gilbert-Davis," Fairmont
West Virginian. January 7, 1922; "Miners Threaten to March," Black
Diamond Vol. 68, No. 2 (January 14, 1922), 26.
59"Northem West Virginia Miners loading more coal now,"
Fairmont West Virginian. February 11, 1922; "Working Nonunion,"
Fairmont West Virginian. March 4, 1922.
^"More miners at work on nonunion basis," Fairmont West
Virginian. March 7, 1922.
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including Scotts Run, the new association was formed as the
result of a split in the Northern West Virginia Coal Operators
Association.

The conservative members, dominated by

Consolidation Coal Company, agreed that wages were "artificially
high," but they were willing to seek reductions through
negotiations.

The separatist members, representing companies

which started operations in this new territory during the boom
years following the war, were unwilling to abide by the social
contract of 1918.

Formed ostensibly to bring its members "into

closer touch with one and other respecting problems peculiar to
the field," the major objective of the new association was to
effect a break with the UMWA.

On February 3, 1922 the

association announced that its members would operate their mines
according to the open shop.61 On February 5, members of the
association posted notices at their mines announcing the open
shop policy, due to begin on April 1.

The check-of would be

eliminated and wages would be reduced thirty percent.

In a

statement, the association blamed the union for stifling
production and claimed that the reduction was "eminently fair."
The statement concluded:
The leaders of the mine workers have apparently shut
their eyes to the wage adjustments that have been made
in other industries. They have refused to recognize
these wage changes and are unwilling to bear their
share of the burden of deflation. ... The insistence on
high wages makes it impossible for operators in the
district to dispose of their product in competition
with other districts where wages are much lower, where
61"Monongahela Coal Association," Coal Age Vol. 21, No. 6
(February 2, 1922), 232; Fairmont West Virginian. February 4, 1922.
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workers have voluntarily accepted reductions.62
Shortly after the open-shop announcement of the Monongahela
Coal Operators' Association, the annual UMWA International
Convention met at the union's headquarters in Indianapolis to
determine a policy in upcoming negotiations.

The proceedings

revealed basic divisions in the union along ideological and
geographical lines.

Conservatives, led by International

President John L. Lewis, espoused a business union philosophy and
accepted existing social and political arrangements, while John
Brophy-led liberals desired basic changes in the economic and
political system, including nationalization of the mines.

The

geographical division, which was tied to the ideological one, was
between the centralizing tendencies of the International and the
demands of various districts for increased autonomy.

Alex Howat

of Kansas and Frank Farrington of Illinois were the leading
district dissidents.

District 17 representatives also challenged

the International, particularly on the issue of the mechanics of
collective bargaining.

Since the formation of the Central

Competitive Field (Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, and Pennsylvania) in
1898, the International had excluded both UMWA officials and coal
operators in outlying fields from initial negotiations.

Only

after a contract with Central Competitive Field operators was
signed were UMWA districts allowed to negotiate with the
operators.

International officials typically played a leading

62"Monongahela Association names new scale," Fairmont West
Virginian. February 4, 1922; "Scotts Run to Lower Wages 30
percent," Coal Age Vol. 21, No. 8 (February 16, 1922), 297.
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role in these district negotiations, ensuring that the district
contracts did not undermine the national compact with a lower
wage scale (although slight differentials were allowed). The
International also had the authority to approve all district
agreements.

This system placed UMWA officials in the outlying

districts in a subordinate position to those in the center, a
situation which they resented.

At the convention, District 17

delegates, led by R.M. Williams, asked for admission to the
Central Competitive Field or the authority to conduct independent
negotiations with West Virginia coal operators.

Williams also

appealed for the creation of a separate subdistrict in the
Morgantown area, adding to the two already in existence in the
Fairmont Field.

The convention defeated both appeals,

however.63 Despite the divisions revealed by this and other
disputes, the UMWA convention expressed more unity in demanding
the right to an "American standard of living" and the maintenance
of the existing wage scale.

It concluded with an invitation to

Central Competitive Field operators for a conference at Cleveland
to negotiate a new contract.64
Coal operators around the nation, like those in the Fairmont
Field, were clamoring for wage reductions.

There was widespread

63"News from Indianapolis," Fairmont West Virginian. February
16, 1922.
Sub-district No. 3 consisted of Barbour, Taylor, and
Preston counties, while No. 4 included Harrison, Marion, and
Monongalia counties.
^ a i e r B. Fox, United We Stand: The United Mine Workers of
America 1890-1990 (Washington, D.C.:
United Mine Workers of
America, 1990), 238-239.
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disenchantment with the UMWA.

With the boom "busted higher than

a kite," and demand plummeting, prices sunk.

Union operators in

the Central Competitive Field complained that they could not
complete with the cheap nonunion coal from Central Appalachia.
With the overproduction of coal, the Harding administration did
little to prevent a strike.

Despite an attempt by Secretary of

labor Davis to get operators to the table, the Cleveland
conference convened without representatives from southern Ohio
and western Pennsylvania.

Negotiations stalled and the

conference was a failure.

By March 10, the International had

abandoned all hope of averting a strike when the current contract
expired on March 31.65
Rebuffed by the failure of the UMWA convention to invite
them to the Cleveland conference and hoping to avoid a strike,
the Northern West Virginia Coal Operators Association insisted on
a meeting with District 17 officials at Baltimore on March 13.
George S. Brackett, secretary of the association, issued a
statement explaining how the coal companies had provided nearly
one hundred thousand dollars worth of "benevolences" to the
miners "when the clouds of adversity rolled up" in 1921.

He

explained that the companies were "in harmony" with their
employees and did not want a strike.66 At the conference,
Keeney appeared sympathetic to their appeal, but claimed that his
65Johnson, The Politics of Soft Coal. 113-114; "Miners voting
100 to 1 for strike," Fairmont West Virginian. March 9, 1922.
^"Union Leaders Stirring Up Men," Black Diamond. Vol. 28, No.
10 (March 11, 1922), 227.
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hands were tied by the International.

But rather than closing

the door on a district agreement, Keeney proposed a delay in
negotiations until March 25, to which the operators agreed.
Charles Batley, chief International representative in the
Fairmont Field, wrote Lewis to inform him of the March 13
conference.

Batley suspected that Keeney was involved in

machinations with the operators, but doubted that he would
succeed.
operators.

Batley also informed Lewis of the division among
He believed that the Northern West Virginia Coal

Operators Association would rather enter into an joint agreement
with the UMWA, than "go into a fight on the 1st of April."

He

thought the situation "on Scotts Run and around Morgantown" was
different, however.

"I think that they would rather enter into a

fight for an open shop," he wrote.67 Despite high expectations
on the part of the operators, Keeney announced at the March 25
Baltimore conference that the International would not sanction a
separate scale agreement.68 A strike was now a certainty.
On April 1 the miners of the Fairmont field observed
Mitchell Day, the traditional miners' holiday in honor of former
UMWA president John Mitchell and his greatest accomplishment, the
eight-hour day.

Along with nearly six hundred thousand miners in

both the anthracite and bituminous fields, they also launched the

67Charles H. Batley to John L. Lewis, March 15, 1922, UMWA,
International Archive, District 17, 1922.
^"Keeney unable to
Virginian. March 26, 1922.

avert

strike

here,"

Fairmont
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West

five-month long strike of 1922.69 The strike was nearly a
complete success in the first two weeks.

A few of the existing

open-shop operations on the M&K and West Virginia Northern
continued production on a small scale, but little coal was
actually shipped.70 As analysts explained, there was little
demand for coal anyway.

There was some picketing, but most of

the miners worked on their gardens, went fishing, or congregated
at Fairmont, Clarksburg, or Morgantown.

Even Penn Mary Coal

Company was unable to operate because of the lack of manpower.
However, as April wore on a host of newly-formed, small
companies began to ship coal.
mines opened.

Several surface or "steam shovel"

By April 18, seventy-seven mines were working and

nonunion production was 108 cars.71 Penn Mary imported
strikebreakers from Pennsylvania, and by May 12, its mines were
in operation.

On April 21 Rosedale Coal Company, which had a

mine near Maidsville, became the first company in the Monongahela
Coal Operators Association to attempt to open its mines according
to the association's stated policy.

The company delivered

eviction notices to twenty-two union miners at its mining
settlement of Rosedale, and called upon Sheriff Posten to enforce
69Johnson, Politics of Soft Coal. 114; "8 hour day observed,"
Fairmont West Virginian. April 1, 1922.
^The UMWA permitted union mines which served regional markets
to continue production.
Only two mines, Baxter No. 2, which
supplied the Rivesville power plant, and the Washington Irving Coal
Company, which shipped its product to Weirton Steel Company,
operated under this provision. "Little effort made by Fairmont
operators to open mines," Fairmont West Virginian. April 3, 1922.
71Fairmont West Virginian. April 18, 1922.
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them.

The UMWA appealed the cases, but on May 8, the miners were

ordered to leave the houses.

The UMWA provided tents, and by May

18 the twenty-two families were living in the region's first tent
colony.

Rosedale made "elaborate precautions" for the protection

of their property, including the installation of large
searchlights on the tipple and on the hillside above the mine.
On May 24, the company resumed production, the first large
operation to go from union to nonunion during the strike.72
The UMWA began paying benefits to striking miners in May,
when the first confrontations occurred.

Each of the two sub

districts received four thousand dollars a week from the District
to handle both relief work and legal costs.73 As the price of
coal rose, tripling in the month of April, the incentive to
reopen grew.

The union miners remained determined to carry the

strike to a successful conclusion, however.

In addition to the

occasional picketing and union meetings, union miners in the
Fairmont and Scotts Run areas began to organize marches in May.
As newspaper reports confirm, immigrant rather than native miners
took the most active role in these marches, as well as in other
militant activities during the strike.

On May 3, seven to eight

hundred miners from Rivesville, Baxter and Dakota marched on
Hoult (near Fairmont), where the nonunion Shamrock Coal Company
loaded three or four cars a day on the Monongahela Railway.
^Fairmont West Virginian, April 22, 1922; May 6, 1922; May 18,
1922.
^Charles H. Batley to John L. Lewis, June 2, 1922, UMWA,
International Archive, District 17, 1922.
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Marches to other nonunion mines came later in the month.

The

marches, which Sheriff Glover of Marion County claimed were
composed of "practically all foreigners," were often effective in
halting production.74
On June 1, William Petry, Vice President of District 17,
paid an unexpected visit to Fairmont.

With no prior approval

from Lewis or any other International official, Petry announced
that the union had a plan to end the strike in less than thirty
days.

The Fairmont newspapers then circulated a rumor to the

effect that the UMWA would accept a thirty percent reduction.
After learning of the situation, Lewis wrote Charles Batley on
June 7 to reiterate the International's position.

There would be

no wage reductions and no negotiations for a contract until a
joint conference was held with Central Competitive field
operators.75 Batley wrote Keeney to insist that he disavow
Petry's statement, particularly because the membership in the
Fairmont field "had practically little experience and are easily
excited by false rumors."76 Keeney, accompanied by Sam
Montgomery, visited Fairmont on June 6-9 principally to campaign
for the labor champion, who was running for governor.

Keeney

issued a statement disavowing Petry's statement on the wage
74"Miners march at Hoult," Fairmont West Virginian. May 4,
1922; "300 march on Hoult mine," Fairmont West Virginian. June 14,
1922.
^John L. Lewis to Charles Batley,
International Archive, District 17, 1922.
76Charles Batley to C.F. Keeney,
International Archive, District 17, 1922.
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reduction, but said nothing about the idea of an independent
agreement between District 17 and the Northern West Virginia Coal
Operators Association-77 Batley wrote Lewis to inform him of a
"scheme" to "try and change the basing point of our joint
agreements from the Central Competitive fields to northern West
Virginia, southern Ohio, and western Pennsylvania."78
Although there were reports of disorder in May and early
June, the first real violence in the Fairmont Field during the
1922 strike occurred on June 23, the day following the Herrin,
Illinois massacre.79 The Hudson Coal Company’s Lewis Mine,
situated between Reynoldsville and Wolf Summit, eight miles west
of Clarksburg, was the site of this confrontation, which
resembled the 1915 Farmington strike in some respects.

The

incident occurred after the Hudson Coal Company, which was one of
the most modern in the region, attempted to reopen its mines with
nonunion labor.80 Sheriff Young had been warned of possible
'"'"Men satisfied with situation, take no reduction." Fairmont
Times, June 6, 1922, clipping attached to Charles Batley to John L.
Lewis, June 6, 1922, UMWA, International Archive, District 17,
1922.
^Charles Batley to John L. Lewis,
International Archive, District 17, 1922.

June

9,1922,

UMWA,

TOThe Herrin Massacre occurred in Williamson County in southern
Illinois on June 21 and 22. Twenty nonunion miners, guards, and
bosses, along with three union members, were killed in one of the
most ghastly episodes in American history:
Fox, History of the
UMWA. 240. Both the Fairmont and Clarksburg newspapers carried the
story on June 22, so it may have been one of the sparks which set
off the Lewis Mine incident.
80In 1924 the Hudson Coal Company employed a Japanese mining
engineer who had traveled there to observe "one of the most modern
mining plants in West Virginia." Fairmont Times, June 23, 1924.
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trouble, so he sent four deputies to the nine in the morning to
protect it.

When the deputies realized that the street car

carrying nonunion workers was late, they started back on the line
towards Clarksburg to find it.

They found it standing between

Waldo and Glady's stops surrounded by a "mob" of two hundred men
and women, "all foreigners."
As it was later determined, the trouble started at Glady's
Stop, when three women and a man, "all foreigners and bearing
clubs," boarded the street car.

They entered the smoking

compartment, where J.M. Orr, his son John, three deputies and
other mine officials were seated.

After the male intruder

attacked one of the mining officials, the fight started.

It

continued with the car in motion until it neared the Waldo stop,
where a miner leaped on the steps of the car and dragged down the
trolley pole, stopping the car.

The two hundred foreigners

swarmed the car and tried to board.
attack, wielding clubs and pokers.

Women took the lead in the
Clubs, iron rods, bricks,

stones, and missiles of every description "flew thick and fast."
The doors of the streetcar were t o m down and windows smashed.
Some succeeded in entering the car and broke down the door of the
smoking compartment, where they engaged the coal company
officials and deputies.
fists ensued.

A hand-to-hand battle with clubs and

When two Italians from outside crashed through the

windows, John Orr shot them dead.

The appearance of several

deputies in another car and the deaths of the two miners cowed
the crowd, which scattered.

The deputies arrested seventeen men
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and three women and conducted a house-to-house search for
others.81
On June 27, funeral services were held at St. Johns in
Clarksburg for the two slain Italian miners.

In addition to the

Catholic burial service, the UMWA ceremony was given by UMWA sub
district officials.

With three to five thousand in attendance at

the cemetery, it was the largest funeral in the history of
Harrison County.

John Orr was later charged with murder, but a

grand jury was unwilling to indict him.82
In July, public sentiment, which had been for the miners
during the first three months of the strike, turned against them.
In addition to the Lewis Mine killings and the "Herrin horror,"
on July 17 a "howling mob of foreigners" from Pennsylvania
attacked the Richland Mine Company near Cliftonville in Brooke
County, West Virginia, killing Sheriff H.H. Duvall.83
Beginning on July 1, President Harding mounted a "final
effort" to settle the strike.

Harding asked both sides to resume

work, and to allow a coal commission to arbitrate wages and
working conditions.

The commission would also mount an

exhaustive investigation of the industry.

After both sides

81"Two foreign strikers killed in fight," Fairmont West
Virginian. June 23, 1922; Emmet, "Labor Relations in West Virginia
(Fairmont Section)," 9.
^"Miners bury two of their dead," Fairmont West Virginian.
June 27, 1922; "John L. Orr arrested," Fairmont West Virginian.
June 30, 1922.
^Paul Salstrom, "The Northern Panhandle Coal Field," in
Northern West Virginia Coal Fields. 122; "Sheriff killed," Fairmont
West Virginian. July 17, 1922.
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rejected the offer, Harding requested the governors of the
twenty-eight coal mining states to protect the coal mines that
were operating.

Governor Ephraim Morgan sent a letter to each of

the state's fifty-five sheriffs and asked for their
cooperation.84 Later in the month, the National Guard was
called in to various potential trouble points in the state.

On

August 6, four hundred troops of the 1st Battalion of the 150th
Infantry arrived at Barrackville, near Fairmont.85
With this protection, the open-shop movement of the
Monongahela Coal Operators Association gained steam in July.
On July 21, a Morgantown newspaper reported that a hundred miners
had agreed to vacate company houses at five different mining
plants along the Monongahela Railway.86 These evictions had
been held up by appeals of UMWA lawyers since the first of June.
Later in the month, a new bundle of eviction notices were sent
out.

With 191 nonunion mines— most of them quite small— in

production by August 1, coal production hit a new high of 471
railroad cars.87
^Johnson, The Politics of Soft Coal. 114-115; "Governor
pledges support to Harding in strike," Fairmont West Virginian.
July 19, 1922.
85,,National Guard expected," Fairmont West Virginian. August
4, 1922.
^In addition to Rosedale, Brady Coal Corporation, New England
Fuel & Transportation Company, John Y Coal Company, and Randall
Coal Company, were involved in the settlement. Morgantown New
Dominion. July 21, 1922.
87The first eviction suits in Marion County were at the
Fairmont & Cleveland Coal Company mine near Rivesville, Fairmont
West Virginian. July 27, 1922.
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On August 1, John L. Lewis launched his campaign to end the
strike.

Lewis announced that he had assurances from operators in

the four states comprising the Central Competitive Field that
they would answer a call for a meeting to negotiate a new scale.
He then called for a conference at Cleveland on August 7.

The

Cleveland conference convened with no representation from coal
operators associations in Illinois and Indiana.

However, Lewis

confidently predicted that individual operators in these two
states would sign the agreement reached at the convention, even
if they had to break from their associations.

Representatives of

five coal firms from the Monongahela Railway district which had
been unable to open their mines under the Monongahela
Association's open shop plan attended the conference in order to
"force a seat."

Although the convention adopted a rule ejecting

all operators who were not from the Central Competitive field,
the five were allowed to remain.

After a week of wrangling the

delegates came to an agreement on August 15 for a continuation of
the status quo. Wage rates would be maintained, and a fact
finding commission would be set up.
Supplementary contracts were required in the outlying
districts.

Rather than the two coal associations, individual

coal operators in the Fairmont Field signed the agreement.
Consolidation Coal Company signed on August 17, the coal
companies "stampeded to sign the agreement."

Only a few
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After

companies, including Penn Mary and Hudson, refrained.88 The
1922 strike was finally over.

Coal Age considered the new

agreement a victory for the miners, a judgement which was
generally shared by newspapers in the Fairmont Field.89 Miners
had remained firm.

The operators thought they might hold out for

six weeks, but they held out for triple that time— despite the
fact that the period before the strike provided little
opportunity for saving.

This was a lesson which the operators

might well heed.90
The 1922 strike was a divisive episode which nearly
shattered the social contract of 1918.

Not only did the strike

reveal basic differences between union miners and coal operators,
but it also demonstrated that both sides were fraught with
internal divisions.
nonunion camps.

Coal operators were divided into union and

Despite the fact that the Monongahela Coal

Operators Association returned to the union fold, it would soon
revive its open shop policy.

Divisions among Fairmont Field

operators would multiply as the decade wore on, culminating in

^''Northern West Virginia Mines Ratify Union Pact,” Coal Age
Vol. 22, No. 10 (September 7, 1922), 372; ”Consol accepts new
agreement,” Fairmont West Virginian. August 17, 1922.
89R o s s claimed that these were the only West Virginia operators
at the conference. The five coal firms which sent representatives
were Cleveland & Morgantown, Brady, Gilbert-Davis, Soper-Mitchell,
Connellsville By-Product, Bertha, and Warner. Ross, "The Scotts
Run Coalfield," 30; "Lewis Abandons Four State Contract to End Coal
Strike," Coal Age Vol. 22, No. 7 (August 17, 1922), 257-258; "Six
coal firms at Cleveland meeting," Fairmont West Virginian. August
7, 1922.

^"Cost of Strike," Fairmont West Virginian. August 19, 1922.
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the anarchy of the early-1930s.

The strike also exposed tensions

in the UMWA between District 17 and International officials.
This rift would also grow and provide the basis for the "dual
unionism" of the late-1920s and early-1930s.

Perhaps the most

significant result of the 1922 strike was the transformation of
the Fairmont Field into the state's leading union field.

The

UMWA lost the New River field and most of the Kanawha field, its
traditional source of strength, as a result of the open shop
movement.

In a space of five years, the Fairmont Field had been

transformed from a nonunion bastion to the UMWA's last line of
defense in the state.

The Overdevelopment of the Coal Industry
The crisis in the coal industry in the 1920s was caused by a
simple problem.

According to the U.S. Coal Commission, created

by President Harding in 1922 to make an exhaustive study of the
industry, the problem with the coal industry was its notorious
overdevelopment:
The Fact of Overdevelopment. Is stated most simply and
most commonly by saying that, whereas the maximum
annual demand for bituminous coal thus far, as measured
by production was 579,000,000 tons, the mines are
equipped and manned to produce from 700,000,000 tons,
at the lowest estimate, upward to more than 800,000,000
tons of bituminous coal per year.91
There were "too many mines and too many miners."

While

approximately 650,000 miners toiled in the nation's mines, only

91U.S. Coal Commission,
Commission. Vol. 1, 228.

Report of the United States Coal
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500,000 were needed to meet demand in an efficient manner.

The

excess capacity of the nation's mines was estimated to be thirty
percent or more.

The oversupply of coal exerted a pressure on

prices, which plunged from an average of $3.75 per ton in 1920 to
about $2.00 in 1922.92
The basic problem of overproduction in the coal industry was
simple and well-understood, but it defied solution in the 1920s.
Unlike steel or other industries which were regulated by cartels
or combinations, coal was highly competitive.

The mineral was

widely available, it required little investment to start a mine,
and there were no barriers to trade.

The coal industry was an

example of free enterprise gone wild; no governmental or
industry-wide agents had the authority to restrict production in
an orderly manner.

John L. Lewis and the UMWA argued that the

only way to stabilize the industry was through unionization.

By

forcing all firms to pay equivalent wages, the less efficient
ones would be forced out of business.

Since a higher wage

structure would also induce coal companies to substitute capital
for labor and become more efficient, unionization would also
promote mechanization and rationalization of the industry.93
To be effective, Lewis' prescription required complete
unionization— something which became less likely as the decade
wore on.

The federal government, which had promoted unionization

92Simon, "Development of Underdevelopment," 62.
93John L. Lewis, The Miners' Fight for American Standards
(Indianapolis; Bell Publishing Company, 1925).
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during the war, reverted to a laissez-faire policy.

Without

government support, the UMWA found it impossible to organize the
highly productive Central Appalachian coal fields.
Left to swim or sink on its own, the coal industry sank.
It regressed into a pattern of destructive competition.94 As
prices declined, firms struggled to maintain or increase their
market share by cutting costs.

Some companies, particularly

those in the union fields, sought to increase efficiency through
mechanization, chiefly by installing loading machines.95
However, the surest cost-cutting strategy lay in cutting wages
since they amounted to about two-thirds of the cost of producing
a ton of coal.

This was the strategy adopted by the operators of

Central Appalachia, western Maryland, central Pennsylvania and
other nonunion fields.

In the 1920s, operators from the mostly

southern, nonunion fields increased their market share at the
expense of the northern, union operators.

Thus, the destructive

competition of the 1920s intensified the contest between coalproducing regions and sections.
The dynamic of destructive competition, which was the
antithesis of the "invisible hand" doctrine accepted as gospel by
many coal capitalists, had disastrous repercussions for coal
operators, labor, and society as a whole.

Operators had no

choice but to cut costs if they were to survive.

Not only did

94Simon, "The Development of Underdevelopment," 59.
^See Keith Dix, What's a Coal Miner to Do? The Mechanization
of Coal Minina (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1988).
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this often mean waging war with the union and degrading labor,
but it often required the adoption of ”dog-eat-dog" business
practices.

The competitive struggle, which laissez-faire

capitalists believed to be inherently beneficent, became a
sinister force which led coal capitalists to devour one another
as well as labor.

The tragedy for coal operators was that as

they struggled to keep their firms in business, in many cases by
producing coal below cost, they brought ruin to the industry by
aggravating the oversupply problem.
The overdevelopment of the industry and the resulting
struggle between capital and labor which developed in coal
industry in the 1920s resembled the dire scenario of Marx for the
self-destruction of capitalism:

overproduction followed by the

"pauperization” of the proletariat, then class warfare followed
by revolution.

Although economic conditions brought the

pauperization of miners and the UMWA-led resistance to wage cuts
produced a warfare with class dimensions, social and political
arrangements, as well as the dominant political culture,
prevented a full blown class war and a revolution.
scenario did not unfold as predicted.

The Marxist

Amplified in the following

chapters, the reasons for this are not difficult to discern.

In

the Fairmont Field, as in other coal fields, the working class
was segmented along ethnic and racial lines, so it failed to
achieve a united front in the battle with capital.

Moreover,

miners, for the most part, did not press for social and political
revolution.

They eventually settled for the Progressive-type
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reform of the New Deal.

To a large extent, the UMWA, with its

philosophy of "100 percent Americanism'1 and its alliances with
mainstream political and business leaders, was responsible for
directing the labor movement into moderate channels and thwarting
the Marxist revolution.

In this respect, the UMWA performed the

same function as the coalition of capitalists and politicians in
1919 and 1920:

it purged the region of "raving reds."

Revival of Ethnic Tensions
While the coal industry, particularly during the strike of
1922, remained the principal concern of the region's newspapers
and political leadership during the early 1920s, other events
attracted attention.

Another round of revivals, the renewed

activities of the Black Hand, and the rise of the Ku Klux Klan in
this period were symptomatic of a divided society.

In these

troubled years, the rift between native Protestants (principally
the upper and middle but also much of the working class) and
foreign, working-class Catholics became more pronounced.

The

social harmony of the World War I era broke down in conjunction
with the regional economy.
Many natives continued to find reassurance in fundamentalism
and evangelism.

Revivals were once again front-page news.

The

towns of Marion and Harrison county remained the center of the
"burned-over" district.

Billy Sunday clubs, which were organized

in Fairmont as well as in the towns of the surrounding counties
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spread the revival movement to the more remote mining
villages.96 The great revivalist himself made a visit to the
region in March, 1922 to plead for peace as the strike
approached.97
In 1923 Fairmont witnessed another great revival.

This one,

involving eleven different churches with a membership of sixtyfive hundred, was heralded to be the largest in the city's
history.

No great evangelist such as Billy Sunday was invited,

however, and the city's own religious leaders led the month-long
campaign.98 As the Fairmont west Virginian editorialized, these
were great days in the religious life of Fairmont.

As Sunday

asserted in the 1921 revival, the paper equated the town's
prosperity with the morality of its citizens— "ninety-nine
percent upright, sober, honest, Christian people."99 Attacks on
mam, idleness, and lawlessness assumed a prominent place in the
sermons.

Noting that "Jesus Christ was the greatest worker in

96"Billy Sunday Club to be at Monongah," Fairmont West
Virginian. January 1, 1922; "Big crowd at Baxter to attend Billy
Sunday Club No. 3," Fairmont West Virginian. May 22, 1922; "Billy
Sunday business Men's Club," Fairmont West Virginian. August 4,
1922; "Billy Sunday Bible Class plans dinner," Fairmont Times.
February 21, 1924.
97,,District 17 Convention addressed by Billy Sunday," Fairmont
West Virginian. March 21, 1922.
98"Fairmont's simultaneous evangelistic campaign," Fairmont
West Virginian. January 24, 1923.
""Our Revival Service," Fairmont West Virginian. January 27,
1923.
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history," one revivalist denounced idleness as a sin.100 After
censuring card playing and dancing, Reverend Burke Culpepper
condemned foreigners who disregarded the laws:
The foreigners fruit stand, open on Sunday, is just as
much a desecration as would be the dry goods store. If
the bunch that runs it doesn't like our Sunday rules,
let them go back across the big ditch. We are better
off without them.101
These great outpourings of the spirit, like those of the
1910s, were driven by social concerns.

What upset the Protestant

middle class more than anything were "foreigners who disregarded
the laws."

Notwithstanding Reverend Culpepper1s diatribe against

the fruit stand, the most feared foreign lawbreakers at this time
were members of the Black Hand.

Although Fairmont's Black Hand

organization was broken up in 1915, it was subsequently revived.
Moreover, Black Hand organizations continued to operate in the
mining towns.

The organization's activities came to light

periodically.

In 1920, the murder of a Mannington woman,

Isabelle "Belle" Lemmon, who operated a "disorderly house" on
Water Street in Fairmont, by members of the organization in
Baltimore led to the arrest of three members in Fairmont, but
their cases never went to trial.102 Occasionally, arrests of
suspected Black Handers were made as in April, 1922, when two

i°0dDoctor Grisemer delivers s t e m message," Fairmont West
Virginian. February 14, 1923.
101

"Culpepper hits foreigners who disregard laws," February 14,

1923.
102McKinney, "The Black Hand!" 43-44.
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Italians were arrested in a murder plot.103
The most dramatic expose took place in 1923, after a turf
war broke out between the Fairmont and Clarksburg organizations.
The war started in the summer of 1922 when "Big Jim" Centeniene,
the head of the Clarksburg lodge, was gunned down in front of the
Clarksburg pool room which served as the lodge's headquarters.

A

total of seven murders took place in the next six or seven
months, and the Fairmont gang gained control.

The prosecuting

attorneys of Marion and Harrison counties initiated an
investigation.104 Using information attained in the Belle
Lemmon case, they mounted simultaneous raids of Black Hand lodges
in Fairmont, Clarksburg, Baltimore, and Uniontown, and made
seventeen arrests in February, 1923.

When the cases when to

trial, one of the Black Handers, Rocco Fiorello, turned state's
evidence and revealed an "orgy of crime" by the organization.
The organization had engaged in drug traffic, white slavery,
extortion, and committed a score of murders.

Fiorello's

disclosures led to the convictions of five of the defendants on
murder charges.105 The five men were subsequently executed at
the state penitentiary in Moundsville.

Fiorello was provided

with protection by the Clarksburg police for several months, but
103"Two men held in Black Hand plot," Fairmont West Virginian.
April 18, 1922.
104McKinney, "The Black Hand!" 43; "Number of crimes laid to
Black Hand," Fairmont West Virginian. February 16, 1923.
1°5"Arrests reveal orgy of crime by Black Hand," Fairmont West
Virginian. February 12, 1923; "Witness tells of Black Hand,"
February 14, 1923.
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in July, 1924 his body was found riddled with bullets.106
Along with radicalism, the Black Hand and "foreigners who
disregard the law" put considerable fear in the hearts of the
native Protestant middle and working classes.

These fears, along

with the upsurge of nationalism, nativism, and conservatism after
World War I, provided fertile ground for the growth of the Ku
Klux Klan.

After lying dormant for more than four decades, the

Invisible Empire rose again in the fall of 1915.

Essentially a

new organization, the Klan was brought to life in Georgia by
Colonel William J. Simmons, an Alabama native who had failed as a
Methodist minister.

It remained a small organization of five

thousand members until 1920, when Simmons hired two publicity men
who converted it to a business enterprise.

By 1922 the Klan had

a membership of over one million and was growing at a rate of
thirty-five hundred new members every day.107 The second Klan
was as anti-Catholic, anti-Semitic, and anti-foreigner as it was
anti-black.

Simmons proclaimed:

We exclude Jews because they do not believe in the
Christian religion. We exclude Catholics because they
owe allegiance to an institution that is foreign to the
Government of the United States. To assure the
supremacy of the White Race, we believe in the
exclusion of the Yellow Race and the disfranchisement
of the Negro. By the same scheme of Providence, the
Negro was created as a serf.108
106McKinney, "The Black Hand!" 43; "Informer of Black Hand Gang
victim," Fairmont Times, July 22, 1924.
107Irwin Suall, Hate Groups in America: A Record of Bigotry and
Violence (New York: Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, 1982),
73-74.
10SQuoted in ibid., 73.
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The exclusionary aspect of the Kian's philosophy has been
justifiably emphasized by its critics.

The Klan was involved in

hundreds of bombings, kidnappings, lynchings, and other violent
incidents across the country.
something.

However, the Klan also stood for

Ironically, the Klan stood for law and order and the

preservation of traditional, Protestant values.

The violence in

which it was engaged was aimed at those who were guilty of
violating the moral and social law— as the organization
interpreted it.
In West Virginia the Klan gained strength in those areas
most impacted by industrialization— where large numbers of
immigrants and blacks had come to work since the opening of the
twentieth century.

Although the Klan made some noise in Logan

and Mingo counties, it was stronger in the urban industrial
centers of the northwest.

It drew many of its members from the

countryside, but it was just as much an urban as a rural
organization.

The Klan had strong organizations in Wheeling,

Charleston, Beckley, Hinton, Clarksburg, Fairmont, Grafton,
Morgantown, and Elkins.109
In the Upper Monongahela region, the Klan was tied to the
revival movement of the 1910s and early 1920s.

With praise and

109David M. Chalmers, Hooded Americanism: The History of the Ku
Klux Klan (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1987),
156-157.
The geographical breakdown of Klan strength in West
Virginia appears similar to that in Indiana, the state with the
largest Klan organization in the nation. According to Leonard J.
Moore, Citizen Klansman: The Ku Klux Klan in Indiana. 1921-1928
(Chapel Hill: The University Press of North Carolina, 1991), 57,
the Indiana Klan was strongest in those areas "that had been most
altered by the process of industrial development."
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monetary contributions, the Klan ardently supported revival work.
It also fought the sins of lawlessness and radicalism so roundly
condemned by Billy Sunday and his urban middle class followers.
Unlike the revivalists, the Klan went beyond mere words to fight
sin.

Klansmen took their responsibility as "Christian Soldiers"

quite literally.
Although Fairmonters filled the Grand Theater to capacity
when "Birth of a Nation" premiered in 1916, the Klan made little
headway in the region until 1922.110 Chapters of the
organization, Konklaves, were formed in Morgantown and Clarksburg
in March, but authorities prevented the Klan from holding a
meeting in Fairmont.

On April 4, the West Virginian reported

that a "white flaming cross" was seen the previous night atop
Palatine Knob, just east of Fairmont.

The cross burned for

several minutes with a brilliant, white light which illuminated
the surrounding hillsides, and then just before it died out, the
color turned to a ghastly red, "which has been considered by some
as a threat against law-breakers."

The newspaper also noted that

there had been rumors of a Klan presence in Marion County.111
The authority which thwarted the Kian's meeting in Fairmont
was Marion County Circuit Court Judge Emmet Showalter.
Showalter, who delivered an address on the state of Marion County
at the beginning of each term of court, denounced the Klan as a
11°||Grand Theater crowded to capacity," Fairmont Times, March
3, 1916.
111"Announcement of organization of Ku Klux Klan expected,"
Fairmont West Virginian. April 4, 1922.
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band of men "who usurp the powers of the government and take away
the power of the law."

He asserted that "there is no place in

the county for such an organization as the Klan."112 Although a
local representative of the Klan, Oran Fear, talked to the judge
and read him the organization's constitution and by-laws, the
judge remained opposed.

With Showalter's opposition, the Klan

found it impossible to find a meeting hall in the city.

The

Masonic Temple, as well as the County Courthouse and Ravine Park,
denied the Klan the use of their buildings.113 Although the
Klan formed a Kohklave in Fairmont, it abandoned its attempt to
meet in the town.
Judge Showalter and the political powers in Marion County,
including the Fairmont Ring and its allies, continued to oppose
the Klan.

None of the leading families of the town were

connected with it.

While the elite and its middle class

followers may have supported a revival of traditional values and
the "old-time religion," they could not countenance the Klan.
They may have agreed with its principles, but they opposed the
Kian's methods.

More than anything, they resented the challenge

that the Kian's "supergovernment" presented to their
authority.114 Moreover, politics in Fairmont was not all
112Ku Klux Klan denounced
Virginian. May 9, 1922.
113"Scheduled meeting
Virginian. May 24, 1922.

of

by

Showalter,"

Fairmont

West

Klan

opposed,"

Fairmont

West

114The term "supergoverament" was used in a letter from the
editor of the Chicago Daily News to C.E. Smith, columnist and
editor of the Fairmont Times. January 29, 1924, C. E. Smith Papers,
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conservative.

The town had a strong liberal element, represented

by Matthew Neely, who began his political career in 1908 as mayor
of the town, and Dr. J.C. Broomfield, Methodist minister and
advocate of the Social Gospel.
The Klan held its first educational meeting in Marion County
at Burt's Theater in Mannington on August 12, 1922.

The lecturer

was Dr. J.H. Hawkins, a native of Marion County who had resided
in Newport News, Virginia for the last several years.

Hawkins

presented a lecture entitled, "The Truth about the Ku Klux Klan,"
and laid out its guiding principles.

First, he established its

close ties with Protestantism. "The Christ who died upon Calvary
is the guiding character of the Ku Klux Klan," he exclaimed.
Then, he enunciated the four principles of the organization.

The

first: "we believe in absolutely 100 percent pure Americanism.
No man who is not a native bom, white, gentile, protestant
American citizen can belong to the organization."

From this

principle, Hawkins derived the Kian's position against
Bolshevists and foreign radicals.

The second principle for which

the Klan stood was the "supremacy of the white race."

The Klan

opposed unchecked immigration, as well as miscegenation.

The

third principle: "We believe in the separation of the church and
state.

When any priest or rabbi or preacher steps down from the

pulpit and attempts to lay hands on the reins of government, we
oppose that."

The fourth principle of the Klan was the "sanctity

of the home."

Hawkins insisted that "there is no place in our

Box 4.
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organization for the man who does not respect womanhood. ...
Neither is there room for boot-leggers or lawbreakers.”

Hawkins

concluded by referring to the efforts of Judge Showalter to keep
the Klan out of Fairmont:

"Judge Showalter is too late in his

fight; the Ku Klux Klan is already in Marion County and is here
to stay.”115
The Klan spent 1923 building up its organization in the
region.

The Klan was, of course, a secret organization, so it is

difficult to gauge its true strength.

On May 8, 1924 Clem Shaver

of Fairmont, manager of John W. Davis' presidential campaign,
wrote to Governor Cornwell asking him to "get a census of the
Klansman" in the eastern Panhandle district in order to "see how
serious a menace" it presented in the upcoming elections.

Shaver

declared that there was "not so many over this way [Marion and
Harrison counties], but perhaps 2,000 to 2,500 in Monongalia,
Preston, Barbour, and Randolph counties and I should guess 60
percent Reps [Republicans]."116 By 1924, the newspapers
revealed the existence of active Klan organizations in
Blacksville and Morgantown in Monongalia County; Masontown in
Preston County; Grafton in Taylor County; Monongah, Shinnston,
and Fairmont in Marion County; and Clarksburg and Bridgeport in
Harrison County.

The headquarters of the Klan in the region,

designated as Provinces No. 1 and No. 2, Realm of West Virginia,
115"Ku Klux Klan Lecturer Profoundly Impresses Big Audience at
Mannington," Manninoton News. August 12, 1922.
116Clem Shaver to John J. Cornwell, May 8, 1924,
Papers, Box 131, File Folder 1.

Cornwell

314

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

was at Shinnston, where Reverend O.E. Jones, paster of the
Methodist Episcopal Church, held court as General Kleagle.117
The Klan, so its members ardently insisted, was a peaceful,
law-abiding organization.
lawful.

Indeed, most of its activities were

Members spoke out against violations of prohibition.

In

June, 1923 the Fairmont Klan sent letters to the sheriff of
Marion County and C.E. Smith, editor of the Fairmont Times,
protesting the lenient treatment given to Robert Hutchinson, son
of coal baron Clyde E. Hutchinson, in a liquor-law violation
case.

Hutchinson was sentenced to serve sixty days, but spent

only a few hours in jail.

The Klansman demanded an explanation

for the "uneven law enforcement in the county."118
The Klan also aimed to clean up "putrid politics" in the
region.

In January, 1924 the Klan supported the Citizen's Party

against the People's Party in the Monongah municipal elections.
The Citizen's Party, considered by the Times as reformers,
campaigned for stricter law enforcement.

With the support of the

Klan, prominent ministers in the county and women in the
community, the Citizen's Party won the election, electing the
mayor and three of five councilmen.119 The Klan also protested
the "corrupt use" of the black vote by "crooked politicians" in

117”Klan chief held," Fairmont Times, August 9, 1924.
118Fairmont Klan, Knights of Ku Klux Klan, Realm of West
Virginia, to J.D. Charlton and C.E. Smith, July 27, 1923, C.E.
Smith Papers, Box 3.
119"Reform ticket at Monongah wins in day's hottest fight,"
Fairmont Times, January 4, 1924.
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Monongah.

Soon after the election victory, the Klan sent a

letter to Mary Lewis, a prominent Monongah black.

The letter

contained twenty-seven dollars, apparently for her personal use.
It said:
The Klan has burned several crosses and exploded some
dynamite in your neighborhood and understand you are
concerned. We hold no malice to the colored race.
Corrupt politicians have used your race to further
their own selfish ends. We propose to see that negroes
receive an education and are protected against those
who would use you. Believing, of course that the white
race should and always will remain supreme. We hope
that whenever there is a cross burned or dynamite
exploded in your community, you will know that it is
not meant for you or any of your race in
particular.120
Judging from the newspapers, the Kian's principal activity
in the first four or five months of 1924 was supporting the
revival movement.

Accounts of Klan "benevolence" were more

prevalent than other Klan activities, even cross-burnings.
Typically, Klansmen or members of the women's auxiliary, Ladies
of the Klan, would walk into a church during a revival
unannounced.

Wearing the full regalia, robes and masks, they

would solemnly work their way down the aisle and offer the
minster an envelope containing a donation of from $20 to $100.
In some cases, the envelope contained a letter which the pastor
was instructed to read aloud.

Then, the pastor would often offer

a prayer on behalf of the Klan movement, the congregation would
rise and sing, "America," and the robed and masked figures would

i20"Kiansman and local Negroes
Fairmont Times. February 12, 1924.

against

putrid

politics,"
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slowly file out of the church-121 The Klan had its favorite
preachers.

Reverend O.F. Nease, pastor of the Methodist

Episcopal Church at Enterprise (in northern Harrison County near
Shinnston), was presented with donations on at least three
occasions in 1924.122
Although much of the Kian's activities in 1924, such as the
almsgiving, took place in the public eye, it remained a secret,
vigilante organization.

Dedicated to enforcing its code of

racial and ideological purity, the Klan also conducted
clandestine operations in the darkness of night.

The cross

burnings and dynamitings, some of which were reported by the
papers, were intended to frighten or "run-off" trespassers.

More

ominously, the Klan also administered justice itself to those who
broke the code.

In 1924, members of the Fairmont Klan nearly

killed a black man, Daniel Washington, assistant chef at the
Fairmont Hotel, for making advances to a white waitress.

The

episode, which resulted in the arrests of thirteen Klan members,
a public trial, and the conviction of Kleagle Jones, probably
121"Reverend Gainor gets check from Klan," Fairmont Times.
January 18, 1924; "Success of revival at Lumberport," Fairmont
Times, January 23, 1924; "Rivesville revival meetings," Fairmont
Times, February 26, 1924; "Taylor County Klan women visit revival,"
Fairmont Times. March 7, 1924; "Klansman pay visit to local
Church," Fairmont Times, March 9, 1924; "Enterprise revival,"
Fairmont Times, March 14, 1924; "Klansman and Women attend two
churches," Fairmont Times. March 18, 1924; "Klan members visit
church," Fairmont Times. April 15, 1924.
122Nease received visits from the Klan at each of his revivals;
"Reverend Nease closes series of revival meetings at Hoult,"
Fairmont Times, April 3, 1924.
Nease also presided at a Klan
funeral service in April; "Reverend Nease at Owings," Fairmont
Times, April 18, 1924.
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checked the Kian's rise in the region.
The case started in March, 1924 when Washington, who had
come to Fairmont from Tennessee in 1923, left a note for Olive
Brown, a waitress at the brand-new Fairmont Hotel.

Referring to

her as "Little Rosebud," Washington asked Brown to be his
"unknown secret friend."

Mrs. Brown's husband, Robert C. Brown,

a Fairmont barber and member of the local chapter of the Klan,
found the note.

Brown took the note to the head of the Fairmont

chapter, Exalted Cyclops, Guy Utterback, another barber in town.
After a meeting with Kleagle Jones, Utterback and two other
Klansman assured Brown that "it would be taken care of."
was instructed to have his wife lead Washington on.

Brown

She arranged

a rendezvous with Washington several days later.
When Washington arrived at the rendezvous point about four
miles east of town on March 1, he was directed by "Little
Rosebud" to a hay stack in a nearby field. Here, he was
surrounded by fifteen to twenty Klansman infull regalia.
tried to run, but was shot in the back.

He

He was then dragged to a

small ravine where the Klansman performed a ritual over his body,
then left him for dead.

Washington was able to make his way to

the highway, where a passing motorist picked him up and took him
to a hospital.123 On the following day, the West Virginian
reported that the shooting, along with the Kian's denial, had
deepened "the mystery of the strange affair."

The paper also

i23"Kiansmen on trial today," Fairmont Times. September 30,
1924.
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announced that the prosecuting attorney was mounting an
investigation.124
Five months later, on August 9, thirteen Klan members,
including Robert and Olive Brown, Cyclops Utterback and Kleagle
Jones, were arrested on the charge of conspiracy to murder Daniel
Washington.

The trial in Judge Showalter's court started on

September 30.

Some of the group were charged with attempted

murder, others with violation of the Red Man act.

The state's

star witness was Olive Brown, who told of the "Little Rosebud"
letter and of the conspiracy to set up Washington.

Other

witnesses told of the inner workings of the Fairmont and Shinston
organizations.

According to the testimony, Kleagle Jones was the

"boss" of ten thousand Klan members in Provinces Nos. 1 and 2,
which covered the twenty counties of northern West Virginia.
This total included members of the Klan's women and junior
auxiliaries.125
Most of the defendants were able to avoid convictions with
"air-tight" alibis.

Kleagle Jones was not so fortunate.

"playmate" Neil Ferguson testified against him.

His

Raised in

Shinnston and Enterprise, Ferguson worked at a millery, and had
"taken up" up with Jones after he rose to power.

Jones made the

mistake of dumping her, so she was eager for revenge.

Her

testimony led to Jones' conviction of the charge of attempted
124,1
2, 1924.

Klan denies shooting Negro," Fairmont West Virginian. March

125"'Little Rosebud' state's star witness," Fairmont Times,
October 2, 1924.
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murder.

He was sentenced to five years at the Moundsvilie

penitentiary.

Four other Klansmen were convicted, but received

only fines or minimum sentences.126
The "Little Rosebud" case revealed the identities of a score
of Klan members.

Their occupations— two barbers, two grocers, a

preacher, a postal clerk, a carpenter, a waitress, a petty coal
operator and several farmers— indicate that the Klan held members
of two native groups: the petit bourgeois and farmers.

The two

native groups who apparently contributed most to Klan membership
had played no role in the rapid industrialization of last onethird of a century.

They resented the influx of strangers and

the movement away from traditional values.127 They opposed the
easy morality of a coal baron's son as much as they did the
racial faux pas of an unfortunate black man.

Although its growth

was checked by the scandal of the "Little Rosebud" case, the Klan
would continue to influence the political and social life of the
region.

As we shall see, the Klan and its nativist philosophy

played a prominent role in the 1924-1927 mine war.

126"Prison term faces Jones," Fairmont Times, October 10, 1924;
"Klan cases dismissed," Fairmont Times, October 21, 1924.
127Moore, Citizen Klansmen, 188, came to a similar conclusion
in regard to Indiana Klansmen: "Those who joined the Klan did so
because it stood for the most organized means of resisting the
social and economic forces that had transformed community life,
undermined traditional values, and made average citizens feel more
isolated from one another and more powerless in their relationships
with the major institutions that governed their lives."
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CHAPTER 8:

THE JACKSONVILLE "ACCORD" 1S24-1927

Far down in the valley I can see the tents of
the evicted miners, now and then a washing
flutters on the line, women with their
sleeves rolled above their elbow, doing their
daily work, perhaps praying that on tomorrow
all will be well. Think of the thousands of
children that are out of homes. Think of the
thousands of radical foreigners that are
insulting our flag, our boys who tramp from
town to town begging bread, people dying. No
good in their lives, no hope. All this is
happening under the protecting folds of Old
Glory.
— Margaret Fowler, ca. 1927
This passage from a letter written by Margaret Fowler,
"Oracle of Murray Mine," characterizes mining life in the
Fairmont field during the tumultuous 1920s.1 From 1924 to 1933
theregion was

the arena of "one of the most remarkable struggles

in the history of

American labor."2 Strikes and lockouts,

marches and counter-marches, evictions, gun battles, sabotage,
and intrigue became commonplace in the coal fields.

It was an

era of class and ethnic conflict, a "testing time" for the
people.3
The issue which provoked this mine war, fittingly enough,
was comparable to that which pitted "brother against brother" in
1861: loyalty to the union.

This time, however, the union was

1Also known as Scottdale and later Jordan, Murray was located
five mines north of Fairmont on the Fairmont, Morgantown &
Pittsburgh Branch of the B&O; Margaret Fowler to C.E. Smith, n.d.
ca. 1927, C.E. Smith Papers, Box 29.
2"Miners of Northern West Virginia stand loyally behind the
International," United Mine Workers Journal Vol. 39, No. 16 (August
15, 1928), 3.
3"Interview of Betty Harr Koontz," by author, January 16,
1990.
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the UMWA.

Under attack by the open shop movement, the

beleaguered miners' union made a stand in the Fairmont Field from
1924 to 1933.

From 1924 to 1927, the union sought to enforce the

Jacksonville agreement, a variation of which most of the coal
operators of the region had signed.

As economic conditions

worsened in 1924-1925, the coal operators sought to abrogate the
contract and operate their mines "free of outside interference."
A bloody and divisive mine war was the result.
Historians have long recognized the importance of West
Virginia as a theater in the struggle between capital and labor
in the coal industry during the 1910s and 1920s.

However, the

leading works on the topic focus on southern West Virginia.4
With the exception of Howard Lee's Bloodletting in Appalachia—
which contains a section on the 1925 strike— until recently the
secondary literature was silent on events in the Fairmont
Field.5 One could mistakenly conclude that the West Virginia
mine wars ended with the Armed March of 1921, and that the UMWA
did not return to West Virginia until 1933.
farther from the truth.

Nothing could be

As Phil Ross has shown with his study of

the Scotts Run sub-field, the struggle in the Fairmont Field, and
to a lesser extent in the Panhandle and Kanawha Fields, continued

4David A. Corbin, Life. Work, and Rebellion in the Coal Fields
(Urbana:
University of Illinois Press, 1981); Eller, Miners.
Millhands and Mountaineers. Winthrop D. Lane, Civil War in West
Virginia (New York: Arno and the New York Times, 1969).
5Howard Lee, Bloodletting in Appalachia
Virginia University, 1969), 141-161.

(Morgantown: West
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throughout the 1920s and early-1930s.6 In fact, the events
which transpired in the 1931-1933 period in the Fairmont Field
played an important role in the resurgence of the UMWA.

This

chapter deals with the first phase of this mine war, 1924 to
1927, the period of the infamous Jacksonville agreement.
It is important to understand the struggle between the UMWA
and coal operators in the Fairmont Field as an aspect of the
union's larger effort to organize all of the mines in the nation
under its banner.

As previously related, the UMWA made the

organization of the West Virginia coal fields a priority in 1898
when it became apparent that the state's producers were stealing
the markets of union producers.

The resistance of state

operators prevented this, however.

Although a foothold was

gained in 1902 in the Kanawha field, it was not until 1918 that
the UMWA was able to organize a significant part of the state's
production.

Even then, despite a major effort in Mingo County in

1920, the union was unable to organize the mines south of the
Kanawha field— the highly productive Logan, Williamson, Winding
Gulf, and Pocahontas fields of southern West Virginia.7 The
Armed March of 1921, which was an invasion of nonunion territory
by seventy-two hundred union miners, marked the high water mark
of the union's territorial expansion.

The miners reached Blair

6Phil Ross, "The Scotts Run Coalfield from the Great War to
the Great Depression: A Study in Overdevelopment," West Virginia
History. Vol. 53 (1994), 21-43.
7In 1920 the UMWA had 42 percent of the state's miners
enrolled
in
its
organization;
Simon,
"Development
of
Underdevelopment," 182.
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Mountain in Logan County but were turned back by Sheriff Don
Chafin, thousands of anti-red volunteers, and twenty-one hundred
Federal troops.8
In 1922, when the industry began to experience the effects
of overproduction, the UMWA began its decline in the state.

As

nonunion producers in southern West Virginia stepped up
production, the union producers in the north, strapped to the
higher wage scale, found it difficult to compete.

Union

operators in the fields bordering the citadel of nonunion
territory, southwestern West Virginia, felt the pressure first.
In 1922 the New River field, along with much of the Kanawha
field, reduced wages to the 1917 level, and began to operate
open-shop.

By the time the strike was over, the Fairmont Field

remained the only predominantly union territory in the state.9
As its only foothold in the state and a crucial "border district"
between the union north and the nonunion south, the UMWA was
determined to hold it.10

8Lon Savage, Thunder in the Mountains (South Charleston, West
Virginia: Jalamap Publications, 1984), 107.
According to a 1924 report of the Kanawha Coal Operators
Association, nonunion mines produced 73.3 percent of the state's
tonnage in 1923; quoted in Fairmont Times. January 20, 1924.
10John L. Lewis used the term "border district" in "Testimony
of John L. Lewis," in Hearings Pursuant to S. Res. 105. A
Resolution to Investigate Conditions in the Coal Fields of
Pennsylvania. West Virginia, and Ohio. Vol. 1, Senate Committee on
Interstate Commerce, 70th Congress, 1st sess., 1928 (Washington,
DC: GPO, 1928), 381, hereafter referred to as Conditions in the
Coal Fields: also see "Testimony of Percy Tetlow," Conditions in
the Coal Fields. Vol. 1, 1445, for a discussion of the geographical
spread of the open-shop movement.
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On March 30, 1923, the coal operators, either individually
or through the region's two coal operators' associations,
negotiated a one-year agreement with the UMWA which, like the
1922 accord, maintained the status quo on wages and working
conditions.

However, many coal operators voiced dissatisfaction

with the restraints imposed by the union.

The operators resented

the fact that they could not negotiate district-wide agreements
with the UMWA.

They claimed that the wage scale was "out of all

reason and incompatible with the production of coal at reasonable
prices."11 They complained of frequent wildcat strikes and of
the inability to get rid of "undesirable employees."12 They
also complained that the union was restricting production by
placing quotas on miners, and by preventing the introduction of
labor-saving machinery, particular the arc-wall cutting
machine.13
Fairmont operators had more problems than just the union,
however.

They were losing markets.

Once again, they complained

of being "hemmed-in" by freight rate barriers.

Despite the

11Emmet, "Final Report on Labor Relations in West Virginia
(Fairmont Section)," 23.
12Emmet listed forty-two "local stoppages" in the Fairmont
field between November, 1918 and April 30, 1923, ibid., 41-44.
Both the Cleveland-Morgantown No. 2 and Gilbert-Davis No. 2 mines
on Scotts Run were plagued with "petty strikes" in 1922 and 1923.
UMWA officials were unable to stop those at Gilbert-Davis, and were
forced to revoke the charter of the local. Nick Aiello and James
McCleary, "Report on revoking charter of Local Union 4775," October
28, 1922; Sam Pursglove to John L. Lewis, July 17, 1923, UMWA,
International Archive, District 17, 1923.
13Emmet, "Final Report on Labor Relations in West Virginia
(Fairmont Section)," 24-25.
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efforts of the Monongahela Valley Association (a revival of the
1910 Shippers' Association) to gain a revision from the B&O, the
ICC refused to lower the differential to the Lakes in 1923
because of strong opposition from Pittsburgh and the Ohio No. 8
district operators.14 The freight differential, which was only
twelve cents a ton versus Pittsburgh in 1912, had been increased
to eighteen cents by 1924.15 Only producers along the
Monongahela Railway, with lower freight rates than the B&O, were
able to increase their tonnage to the Lakes.
market had shrunk as well.

The tidewater

New England, which had provided an

outlet for ten to twenty percent of the region's coal in the
past, was being invaded by cheaper coal from southern West
Virginia and central Pennsylvania.16

Thus, some coal companies

were feeling the pressure of losses or smaller profits by 1923.
For example, the Hutchinson Coal Company lost money in both 1921
and 1922, as did the Maryland Coal Company.

Consolidation Coal

Company recorded profits of only $2 million in 1922.

Although

this was a respectable showing, it was the company’s lowest

14''McVann addresses Clarksburg Coal Club on Coal Rate,"
Fairmont Times. January 29, 1924.
The case of the Fairmont
operators against the Pittsburgh and Ohio operators was
consolidated with two other cases in Docket 15007, Lake Cargo Coal
Rates, 1925. See the next chapter for a discussion. Mansfield,
The Lake Cargo Coal Rate Controversy. 88.
15"Northern West Virginia sets new record for production in
1923," Coal Age. Vol. 25, No. 3 (January 17, 1924), 101; Mansfield,
The Lake Cargo Coal Rate Controversy. 264.
16"Brackett makes
November 2, 1924.

report

on

coal

case,"

Fairmont
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Times,

profit margin since 1915.17
C.W. Watson continued his reign as the region's kingpin,
both in the coal business and politics.

In fact, C.W. was

probably the nation's most powerful coal baron until his fall in
1928.

He continued to serve as president of Consol, expanding

its production so that it became the largest bituminous coal in
the world by 1927.

He also owned and operated several smaller

coal companies with mines in eastern Kentucky and the Fairmont
Field.

Under his leadership, Consol had adopted an seemingly

inconsistent position on unionization.

Consol had permitted the

UMWA to organize its West Virginia division— the old Fairmont
Coal Company— in 1918, but remained adamantly opposed to
organization at its other divisions in western Maryland, central
Pennsylvania, eastern Kentucky, and southern West Virginia.
Thus, any losses incurred in the Fairmont Field by "artificially
high" wages could be offset by profits from the company's
nonunion mines.

Naturally, this advantage allowed Consol to

continue its ties to the union— and maintain C.W. credibility,
which was questioned after his 1918 about-face— longer than other
Fairmont Field companies.
Watson, like the other Fairmont coal barons, was "living the
high life."

C.W. was an avid sportsman, and made frequent

17According to the reports provided to the U.S. Coal
Commission, the Hutchinson company had a net income of -$25,455.68
in 1922 and -$780,461.43 in 1921; the Maryland Coal Company $101,597.74 in 1922 and -$311,180.02 in 1921; Records of U.S. Coal
Commission, "Profit and Loss and Surplus Statement," Entry 149, Box
369.
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fishing expeditions to the Florida coast.

He also took cruises

on luxury liners to Europe, as did some of the lesser lights,
including C.E. Hutchinson.18

Although C.W. occasionally

dropped by Fairmont to inspect the company's offices and mining
plants, he left the day-to-day operations of the company to
nephew, George T. Watson.19 J.E. Watson's High Gate, with its
English gardens and tennis court, served as the social center for
the Fairmont Ring and their high-flying set.20 In March, 1924
R.J. Abbaticchio, a former Fairmonter who had become a Washington
lawyer, visited his hometown to examine business conditions.

In

a letter to John Cornwell, he explained that the coal barons were
living on borrowed time:
... I found that the coal people on account of having
made so much money several years ago, have acquired the
habit of high living for themselves and families and
that this condition prevailed generally and was
participated in by most of the people. As a result,
having been accustomed to liberal spending, the people
generally are still living high, but this is
accomplished at the expense of the butcher, the baker,
department store owners, etc. The purchasers have
curtailed little on purchasing, but have altogether
stopped paying therefor and must be carried by the
18The Hutchinsons took a cruise with "Clark's Around the World
Cruise" aboard the S.S. Laconia in 1924. C.L. Watkins to Mr. and
Mrs. Clyde E. Hutchinson, January 23, 1924, Hutchinson Papers.
19"Watson satisfied he is doing his share in building up
Fairmont," Fairmont Times. April 26, 1924.
20See Harry M. Caudill, Theirs be the Power: The Moguls of
Eastern Kentucky (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1983), 6784 for a discussion of the Fairmont Ring's ostentatious lifestyle
and its activities in eastern Kentucky. Also, the author's "The
High Gate Carriage House Property: Historic Structure Report &
Preservation Plan," Technical Report No. 1 (Morgantown: Institute
for History of Technology & Industrial Archaeology, 1992) contains
information on life at High Gate.
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business people. In other words, most everything is on
a credit basis.21
C.W. Watson continued his involvement in state and national
Democratic politics.

Although he had lost his bid for the Senate

in 1918, C.W. still had his political ambitions, if not for
himself for another regional Democratic champion.

With his

recognition of the UMWA in 1918, Watson had blossomed as a
Progressive Democrat.

After A.B. Fleming retired, C.W. turned to

fellow Fairmonter and Democrat C.E. Smith for political advice
and support.

Smith, who was U.S. Marshal for West Virginia's

Northern District and an editor for the Fairmont Times. became
Watson's traveling companion and confidante.22 In 1924 the two,
along with Cornwell, Clem Shaver of Fairmont, and other state
Democrats, scored a political coup for the region and state with
the nomination of favorite son John W. Davis to the presidency.
The campaign for Davis, who had gained a national reputation as
21R.J. Abbaticchio to John J. Cornwell,
Cornwell Papers, Box 130, File Folder 2.

March 25,

1924,

^Clarence Edwin Smith was b o m in Fairmont in 1885.
He
attended Fairmont's public schools then attended VPI and graduated
from the University of Virginia. He became a "cub'' reporter for
the Times in 1909, and served as U.S. Marshal from 1914 to 1924.
In 1925 he began writing the "Good Morning!" column, which dealt
with a variety of topics, including labor violence, in an H.L.
Mencken-like manner.
Smith was an active capitalist with
investments in the West Virginia Metal Products Corporation, the
Fairmont Hotel Corporation, the Big Four Coal Company, the Fairmont
Chemical Company, the Ravine Park Amusement Company, and the
Fairmont Building and Investment Company. Smith was a Democrat and
held local offices as well as serving as a delegate to the
Democratic National Convention from 1920 to 1956. He was appointed
by President Roosevelt in 1935 to the Bituminous Coal Commission.
Smith was also a founder of the Marion County Little Theater. He
died in 1959. Hoffman, Marion County Centennial Yearbook. 75; C.E.
Smith Papers, passim.
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ambassador to Great Britain, had actually begun prior to the San
Francisco Democratic National Convention in 1920.

Watson and

Smith enlisted the West Virginia state delegation in the Davis
for President scheme, and got Cornwell to nominate him in San
Francisco.23 Davis was praised as a "home bred ... good stock
progressive" who was not "not tied to any section."24 He got
only 30 of the convention's 1,094 votes on the third ballot,
however.

In 1922 Watson and Smith renewed the native son

campaign, and at Madison Square Garden in 1924 they achieved
their goal.

John W. Davis was nominated on the 103rd ballot as

the Democratic candidate for president.

Although he was a

compromise candidate at a convention divided by the Klan issue,
Davis was considered a solid candidate whose "good looks" would
get him the women's vote.25

The Making of the Jacksonville Agreement
Meanwhile, the UMWA, beleaguered by ideological and regional
disputes, held its 29th Convention at Indianapolis in January,
1924 to decide how to approach the upcoming negotiations.

Lewis

and Vice President Philip Murray succeeded in suppressing the
"fifty-seven varieties" of radical ideas, and conservative trade
3 C.E. Smith to C.W. Watson, April 1, 1920, C.E. Smith Papers,
Series 1, Box 2.
24Pemocratic Party National
Francisco, June 16, 1920.

Convention

Proceedings.

San

^See Robert K. Murray, The 103rd Ballot (New York: Harper &
Row, 1976) for an account of the Madison Square Garden convention
and Davis's campaign.
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unionists triumphed at the convention.26 The union faced a
dilemma, however, when it dealt with the Klan question.

At the

1921 convention, Van Bittner, who had fought the Klan in an
organizing campaign in Alabama, introduced a constitutional
amendment to ban the Klan.

The amendment passed and the Klein was

added to the union's list of proscribed organizations.

However,

as the Klan grew in the next few years, it attracted many native
coal miners, particularly in the heavily-unionized midwest.

The

1924 convention was faced with the question of how to deal with
this delicate situation.

Bittner recommended that the ban

against the Klan be removed.

He explained that he remained

opposed to the organization, but thought the ban could not be
enforced.

The delegates rejected the proposal by an overwhelming

majority, however, and maintained the ban.27 The convention
also discussed the "West Virginia situation."

After Frank

Farrington criticized Lewis for the weakening of the UMWA in the
state, Lewis insisted that the union, which had spent a million
dollars protecting its "frontier" there in 1922, would redouble
its efforts.

Lewis asserted that the scale in West Virginia

would remain commensurate with that of the Central Competitive
field.

The convention voted to maintain the existing wage scale

and seek a four-year contract with the operators.

The delegates

26"Four years planned," Fairmont Times. January 23, 1924.
27See Ronald Lewis, Black Coal Miners In America, 104-107, for
a discussion of the Klan issue; "Miners want Four-Year Contract,"
Coal Age Vol. 25, No. 6 (February 7, 1924), 213; Fox, United We
Stand, 260-261.
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invited the coal operators of the Central Competitive field to
meet with them on February 11 at Jacksonville, Florida.28
With vivid memories of the 1922 strike, representatives of
the operators who convened at Jacksonville (none attended from
the Fairmont Field) were willing to accept the union's wage
demands and a long-term contract in order to ensure peace.

In

light of the unstable condition of the industry, a three rather
than four year contract was signed on February 19.

The contract

simply extended the wage scale and other provisions of the
existing contract until March 31, 1927.29 The Jacksonville pact
was hailed with enthusiasm by industry and union leaders.
Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover, who had been instrumental
in getting the coal operators to the table, called the compact
the "most constructive development in the bituminous industry for
years."

Hoover, who favored rationalization and mechanization of

the nation's mines, thought the high wages and long term of the
contract would spur operators to abandon inefficient methods.30
Coal Age thought the new agreement might eliminate marginal
operations and halt the industry's overexpansion.31 With the
promise of a UMWA organizing campaign in the nonunion fields,

28"Miners want Four-Year Contract," Coal Age. 213.
^Edmond M. Beame, "The Jacksonville Agreement: Quest for
Stability in Coal," Industrial and Labor Relations Review. Vol. 8,
No. 2 (January 1955), 196-197.
30Ibid., 197.
31"Long Step toward Stabilization," Coal Age Vol. 25, No. 8
(February 21, 1924), 329.
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union operators thought such a winnowing would come at the
expense of nonunion mines in the South.

The UMWA Journal hailed

the agreement as the "best wage and working agreement that ever
was negotiated between the Central Competitive Field and the
miners* union."

It added that the pact had silenced the "Reds

and their babbling asininity."

John L. Lewis announced that the

union would take "no backward step."32
Following the national conference, UMWA officials and
representatives from operators’ associations in each outlying
district met to negotiate regional agreements.

West Virginia

operators were reluctant to come to the table.

Operators in the

Kanawha Field refused to meet with the UMWA because the proposed
contract did not include wage reductions.

The two coal

operators' associations of the Fairmont field met to discuss the
upcoming negotiations.

The Northern West Virginia Coal Operators

Association announced that it would meet with the UMWA, but that
it would stress the handicap that the region faced by virtue of
increases in freight rates.33 The Monongahela Coal Operators
Association decided to meet separately with the UMWA scale
committee after negotiations were completed with the Northern
West Virginia association.34
On March 12, 1924 the Northern West Virginia Coal Operators
32,1Jacksonville Agreement signed," United Mine Workers Journal
Vol. 35, (March 1, 1924), 3.
33"0perators to discuss new wage scales," Fairmont Times. March
7, 1924.
^"Operators hold parley," Fairmont Times, March 8, 1924.
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Association, headed by George Brackett, executive secretary, and
E.S. McCullough, commissioner of labor, met with the UMWA scale
committee, composed of District 17 representatives and
International representatives Percy Tetlow and Van Bittner, at
the Southern Hotel in Baltimore.

The conference was opened with

a long speech by E.S. McCullough, who presented the operators'
case, justifying it with the logic of regionalism.

McCullough

called attention to the "artificial barriers" which confronted
Northern West Virginia operators, making it difficult for their
products to enter markets:
West Virginia is a producing state. She must find a
market throughout the length and breadth of this
country for the sale of her coal. She has not, like
many of the districts, large industries that consume
great quantities of coal. We must go out into other
markets to find a sale for our product. Into every
market which West Virginia enters she meets coal of
like quality to that we produce here. And in every
market into which we go we find these barriers raised
against our entrance— freight rates and
differentials.35
McCullough stated that since the UMWA entered the Fairmont Field
during World War I, the freight differentials had been widened.
The operators had done their best, spent "hundreds of thousands
of dollars to help the fight the battle" against the
differentials, but, because of the "political entrenchments and
the economic power", of the northern coal states, their efforts
had been futile.

The second artificial barrier, according to

3:>"Joint Conference Between Northern West Virginia Coal
Operators Association and United Mine Workers of America, District
No. 17," transcript of proceedings, UMWA, International Archive,
District 17, 1924.
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McCullough, was the UMWA.

The rules which were put into effect

by union agreements "militated against efficiency."

Moreover,

though most of the UMWA miners manifested the proper "trade union
spirit" of give and take, others did not.

Local strikes,

interference in operations, mine committees assuming "dictatorial
power," all reduced the productive ability of the companies.
Some miners believed that the union organization was "a sort of
Santa Claus, a big Christmas tree, where they could reach out on
the lower limbs and get what they wanted."

These men, a few of

them "reds," felt they could "extract from the companies the last
penny."

Yet another barrier which developed after the UMWA

organized northern West Virginia was one which "stared us right
in the face":

non-union mines operating in the same field who

put their coal on the market at ruinous prices.

McCullough

accused the UMWA of failing to hold the men it had organized in
the state: "right in Northern West Virginia at least thirty
percent of the coal from operative mines is being produced by
nonunion men."
McCullough reserved his harshest statements for the
"conspiracy" of the UMWA and the operators of Central Competitive
states.
Like the terrapin who draws his head back into his
shell, [they] closed themselves in their holy of
hollies, and said to the coal producing operators of
this country, "We will determine the price of mining
coal," while one of the largest states in the industry,
West Virginia, is denied admission into confines of
this sanctum sanatorium.36

36Ibid., 51-52.
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McCullough compared the situation of the Fairmont Field to that
of the colonies under George III, who attempted to "tax them
without representation."

The lesson was that men will eventually

"rise in rebellion" against the "chains that bind and shackle."
McCullough asked for redress from these "accumulated
wrongs."

He contended for a wage reduction, basing his argument

not only on the state of the market but also on the need to
liquidate excess capacity in the coal industry.

He reasoned that

the high wages of the post-World War I period had brought too
many men, many of them from other occupations, into the industry.
Why should "ministers, telegraphers, barbers" go back to their
old occupations when they can make "five dollars a day more than
they made in their own trade, and work only one-half of the
time."

McCullough concluded by pleading for an end to those

"artificial complications" which could be eliminated under union
conditions.

If nothing was done, an economic collapse would turn

the mines and "miners' habitations" in northern West Virginia
into "fields of desolation."

The operators in the district had a

right "to go into the competitive markets of this country
unfettered by any advantage that may be in the possession of
these other districts.

We have got a right to that, and by the

Eternal Gods we are going to fight for that right."37
Percy Tetlow responded for the UMWA.

Calling attention to

the fact that the UMWA was "one organization, and it is nation
wide," Tetlow calmly rebutted the regional arguments put forth by
37Ibid. , 7-24, 44-63.
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McCullough.

"Our contention as a union has been that wages and

working conditions of miners in one district should be the same
in other districts," Tetlow declared.

He noted, however, that

problems had arisen from the marketing of coal.

Districts remote

from markets faced higher transportation charges, which affected
the marketing of their product.

These differences, Tetlow

continued, had been recognized by the UMWA, and wage
differentials between the regions had been established.

In the

Fairmont Field, a differential of twenty-four cents a day for
daymen and a proportional one for tonnage men had been
established in 1922.
Tetlow devoted the majority of his remarks to the wage
question.

He drew attention to the national problem of

overproduction.

Noting the fifty percent excess capacity of the

coal industry, Tetlow stated that wage reductions would not solve
the problem.
It can only be solved in two ways, either by some
governmental action which will restrain and prevent
over-development, or by the economic forces, the
natural forces, that come into this industry or any
other industry— and the survival of the fittest will be
the solution. One of the two must be put into
practice.38
Tetlow said that "it is quite late now for any governmental
agency to be established to regulate developments."

Like Hoover

and Lewis, he argued that high wages and a long-term contract
would permit the "natural forces to work out some solution."
Eventually, the natural forces, the invisible hand, would
^Ibid., 39.
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eliminate the "high cost mines" and liquidate much of the excess
capacity.39
After his speech, Tetlow moved that the joint conference
"reaffirm the present wage scale now in effect for a period of
three years."

Approved by the UMWA representatives, the motion

was at first rejected by the operators.

However, in the

following session, after a promise by the union to mount an
organizing effort in the Fairmont field, the operators voted
"yes" and the motion carried.

A subcommittee was then set up to

iron out some of the differences on working conditions and to
draft an agreement.

By March 28 a contract which maintained the

present wage structure, with a day wage which ranged from $6.74
to $7.26, and a tonnage rate of $0,627 for machine-mined and
$0,866 for pick-mined coal, was ready for approval by the members
of the coal association.

Although a majority of the firms in the

association opposed it, a plurality voted for the agreement, and
it was ratified on April 1.*°
Without the support of Consolidation Coal Company, the
agreement would not have been approved.

C.W. Watson issued one

of his rare public statements to Coal Age in support of the
agreement.

Watson echoed the views of Hoover and Lewis on the

benefits of the new contract as a "peace measure," and as an
opportunity for the "free play of supply and demand" to provide a

39Ibid., 29-43.
40Ibid., 95; "Reach Wage Agreement for Northern West Virginia,"
Coal Age. Vol. 25, No. 12 (April 3, 1924), 504.
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"good medicine for industrial ills."

For the coal business, he

suggested,
In my judgement, the clearest road toward profitable
business this year, both for individual companies and
for producing districts, lies in the direction of cheap
coal. This does not mean the saving of a few cents per
ton here and there, so much as it means applying every
method of economy, efficiency, and improved machinery.
Those companies and those districts which are so
situated as to put these measures most fully into
effect will receive returns in proportion to their
efforts. In addition, if labor will cooperate in all
these economies and adjustments, it also will receive
its reward in employment.41
On April 3, representatives from the Monongahela Coal
Operators Association met with UMWA representatives at New York
City to work out an agreement for the Monongahela Railway mines.
Only four companies in the association— Soper-Mitchell, GilbertDavis, Cleveland & Morgantown, and Connellsville By-Product were
prepared to continue their relationship with the union. The
remainder were ready to go nonunion.

The four companies signed a

contract identical to that of the Northern West Virginia Coal
Operators Association.42
In the next three years, the Fairmont field would become a
battlefield as the UMWA sought to protect the Jacksonville
Agreement and the companies to throw it off.43 The positions
41"Watson points out advantages of three-years of Peace," Coal
Aae. Vol. 25, No. 11 (March 13, 1924), 400.
42R o s s , "The Scotts Run Coalfield," 31; "Operators to discuss
wage scale today," Fairmont Times, April 1, 1924.

43To avoid the unwieldy construction of "the Baltimore-New York
agreements," the term Jacksonville Agreement will be used
throughout this chapter to refer to the two Fairmont Field
compacts.
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held by both sides during the struggle were clearly stated at the
Baltimore conference.

The UMWA, as Percy Tetlow intimated, held

a national perspective on the situation in northern West
Virginia.

The UMWA wished to preserve its hold in the "border"

district in order to defend its southern "frontier" against the
open-shop movement of the South.

The UMWA's policy in northern

West Virginia was determined by the International.

In June,

1924, after an insurgent movement led by the Vice-President of
District 17, R.M. Williams, threatened to "take such steps as are
necessary to protect the interests of the membership of District
17," even if that meant abandoning the Jacksonville agreement,
Lewis suspended the autonomy of District 17.44 International
representatives were placed in charge of West Virginia— Van
Bittner in the north, and Percy Tetlow in the south.45 The
officers of District 17, who were more sympathetic to the
interests of state coal operators, were given no opportunity to
formulate policy.
The coal operators and their allies in the region, on the
other hand, had a regional perspective.

As E.S. McCullough

stated, the capitalists felt they had an inherent right to market

^"Resolution," June 1, 1924, Smith Papers, Series 1, Box 4.
45"Lewis Suspends Autonomy of West Virginia Union," Coal Age
Vol. 25, No. 24 (June 19, 1924), 918.
In the 1923 District 17
elections, R.M. Williams ran for Vice President against William
Petry.
He lost, but because of irregularities in the voting a
special convention was held which directed that a special election
be held. Williams won this election and became Vice President.
Coal Aae Vol. 24, No. 13 (September 20, 1923), 465; Hall, "The Role
of Rhetoric," 126-127.
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their product.

They were prepared to fight the UMWA or any

conspiracy of outside influences to secure that right.

Like

their predecessors in 1861 and 1910, capitalists rose up to
battle a oppressive outside force.

The spirit of regionalism,

submerged by nationalism and government intervention during the
war, re-emerged in the 1920s.

Fed by nativism and the revival of

traditional values, the regional ideology reigned in the 1920s.
Capitalists argued that the union posed a grave threat to the
regional economy and would thwart regional progress— a
proposition which they used to justify the abrogation of the
Jacksonville Agreement.

Van Bittner:

UMWA Field General

Van Bittner arrived in Fairmont on April 2, 1924 to enforce
the Jacksonville Agreement and direct the UMWA's organization
effort in the Fairmont Field.

As it turned out, Bittner would

remain in Fairmont for nine years, residing at the Fairmont
Hotel. Although Bittner would emerge in the 1930s as one of the
state's most powerful men, he has received little recognition by
state historians.46 Who was this unsung hero of the West
Virginia labor movement?

Van Amberg Bittner was b o m in

Westmoreland County, Pennsylvania in 1885.

His father, Charles

Bittner, was a miner and a loyal member of the UMWA.

According

to a story which he often told, Van was born while his father was
^A thesis on Bittner exists, but provides little on his nineyear stint at Fairmont: Thomas R. Tull, "Van A. Bittner: A Labor
Leader for Dynamic Times," M.A. thesis, Marshall University (1979).
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on strike.

Van's mother, Emma Ann Henck, was a strong-willed

woman who insisted that her son advance himself through
education.

Although he entered the mines at the age of twelve,

Van managed to finish high school in 1901.

He had a life-long

passion for learning, and collected books dealing with a variety
of topics, especially history and philosophy.

He also managed to

complete a correspondence course in engineering.

Bittner worked

as a general laborer, loader, and cutting machine operator in
several mines in southwestern Pennsylvania.
of the union quickly.

He rose in the ranks

After graduating from high school, he was

elected president of the UMWA local at Cherry Valley,
Pennsylvania.

In 1911 he became President of District 5, the so-

called Pittsburgh District.

He remained president there until

1916, when he was forced to resign because of a rank-and-file
rebellion over a wage agreement.

Following his resignation,

Bittner was appointed by President White as international
representative.47
As an International representative, Bittner served as a
statistician, lobbyist, organizer, "hatchet man," and convention
delegate.48 He probably played more of a role in the
organization of the Appalachian coal fields than any other
individual.

In 1918-1919, he helped organize the miners of

District 19 in eastern Tennessee and Southeastern Kentucky.

In

47Hall, "Role of Rhetoric," 133-134; Tull, "Van A. Bittner,"
2-26; "Who is Van Bittner," Fairmont Times, June 12, 1925.
48Tull, "Van A. Bittner," 15, 19.
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1920-1921 he headed the unsuccessful UMWA organizing effort in
Alabama.

In December of 1921 he was sent into District 14 in

Kansas to quell the rebellion led by District President Alexander
Howat, who had authorized an illegal strike.

In 1923 Bittner

presented the UMWA's case to the U.S. Coal Commission.

By 1924

he had the reputation as Lewis' right-hand man and the union's
main trouble shooter.

His untiring work in the Fairmont Field

eventually led to its reorganization in the early-1930s.

He

would also lead the New Deal-era reorganization effort in
southern West Virginia.
Like UMWA presidents John Mitchell, John White and John L.
Lewis, Bittner was a straight "trade unionist" who had little
patience with radical idealists.

Like Lewis, he socialized with

the operators and politicians and adopted the philosophy of
"business unionism."

For example, in 1915 Bittner formed a

friendship with Fairmont politician Matthew Neely which lasted
throughout his life.

In an interview with the Fairmont Times,

Bittner characterized himself as "a conservative among radicals,
although a radical among ultra-conservatives."

He was a "Trade

Unionist, but always bitterly opposed to Socialism and all
other -isms, and radical movements."

Bittner considered himself

a "preacher of the union gospel."49 The "union gospel" was an
appeal to both miners and the American public for "100 percent
organization" and an "American standard" of living for miners.
The appeal was legitimized by reference to principles derived
49"Who is Van Bittner," Fairmont Times. June 12, 1925.
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from two American reformist traditions.

The first strand was

democratic idealism, which was a legacy of the Revolution and the
egalitarian political culture of Jacksonian America.

The second

was the Protestant moral and social perfectionism which emerged
after the Second Great Awakening.
The UMWA's "union gospel" was an equalitarian philosophy
which was a m o d e m blend of these two lines of thought.

The

union synthesis transcended the narrow, Jacksonian version of
.American democratic thought.

The pre-modem democratic

philosophy was based on the notion that government, especially
aggrandizing central government, was the chief threat to
individual liberty and at best was a "necessary evil."

This

perspective was changed by the growth of big business in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

With the power of

capital arrayed against him, the common man and the labor union
looked to the federal government to right the wrongs that the
competitive economic situation had produced.

Drawing on the

ideas and strategies the Populists and Progressives, UMWA
spokesmen looked to the federal government to foster and insure
equality and be a countervailing power against big business.

The

UMWA had first gained this type of patronage in 1902, when
President Theodore Roosevelt intervened in anthracite strike.
Under Wilson, the UMWA had nearly accomplished its long-range
goal of organizing every miner in the nation.

With the "return

to normalcy" in the early 1920s, the union had lost the backing
of the federal government.

A major goal of the UMWA following
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the breakdown of the Jacksonville Agreement was to regain the
support of the federal government.

To do this in the

conservative climate of the 1920s, the UMWA had no choice but to
endorse a policy of ”100% Americanism.”

Lewis insisted that the

UMWA shed the militant image, acquired during the 1919 to 1922
period, show its commitment to "American ideals and standards,"
and wave the flag more vigorously than critics and opponents.50

Bittner's version of the union gospel stressed a religious
justification of union goals much more than Lewis's.

Based on

the Christian principle of the spiritual equality of all men,
this impulse had been secularized by the Progressives into the
"Social Gospel."51 Bittner went beyond this genteel, middleclass creed, however, and developed a more down-to-earth version
of reform Christianity that was similar to what historian Herbert
Gutman called "social Christianity."52 Bittner explained that
his philosophy was based on nothing more than what his mother had
taught him:

to always obey the "Golden Rule."

Bittner wished to

apply this moral imperative to all human relationships, including
50The best statement of the UMWA's mainstream philosophy can
be found in John L. Lewis, The Miners' Fight for American Standards
(Indianapolis: The Bell Publishing Company, 1925).
51See "The Presbyterian Social Creed," United Mine Workers'
Journal Vol. 31, No. 5 (March 1, 1920) ; "Methodist Church
Declaration on the Open Shop," United Mine Workers' Journal Vol.
32, No. 7 (April 1, 1921).
52Herbert G. Gutman, "Protestantism and the American Labor
Movement," Work. Culture. and Society. 113; see Ken Fones-Wolf,
Trade Union Gospel, xvi-xvii for a discussion of Gutman's work and
its relationship to the Social Gospel.
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economic ones.

Bittner was foremost a preacher, a master in

using Biblical imagery and in using parables from the Bible in
his speeches.

He would clearly identify the plight of the

downtrodden miners with that of the suffering Jews or with the
trials of Christ and his disciples.

The message was intended not

only to strengthen the resolve of the miners, but also to win the
approbation of the public.
Upon his arrival in Fairmont, Bittner immediately went to
work to stop the open-shop movement.

As in the 1922, the

Monongaheia Railway coal companies posed the initial challenge to
the UMWA.

Even before the Jacksonville Agreement was ratified in

the Fairmont Field, Brady-Wamer Coal Corporation, with mines at
Brady Station (near Lowesville) and Osage (at the mouth of Scotts
Run), had taken steps to operate its mines on a nonunion basis.
The resulting confrontation with the union, the first and second
battles of Brady, was the first in the long 1924 to 1933 mine
war.

Documented by the testimony of Sam Brady and Van Bittner at

Senate Interstate Commerce Commission hearings in 1928, the
confrontation at Brady set a pattern for the industrial strife
which took place during the period of the Jacksonville Agreement.
Involving two ex-governors, William Glasscock and John Cornwell,
it is worth examining in some detail.

The First and Second Battles of Brady
Brady Coal Company was founded by "Colonel" Sam Brady, one
of the most interesting characters in the mine war.

Samuel
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Dunlap Brady was b o m at Bradys Station, Maryland in 1869.

He

migrated westward with his family to Mineral County, West
Virginia in 1888.

He studied engineering at Allegheny Academy,

and became a surveyor for several railroad companies in the
1890s.

He served as lieutenant in the Third United States

Volunteer Engineers in the Spanish-American War, seeing some
action at Cienfluegos, Cuba.

From 1903 to 1815 he was chief

engineer for the Buckhannon & Northern Railroad Company.

In 1914

he established his residence in Fairmont, and along with his
brother, A. Spates Brady, entered the coal business.53

In 1920

Sam Brady established the Brady Coal Company and began operations
near Brady Station.

Due to the recession of 1922, the Brady Coal

Company came perilously close to bankruptcy.

Needing capital,

Brady joined with Cleveland coal broker, Whitney Warner, to form
the Brady-Wamer Coal Corporation in 1922.

Ex-governor John J.

Cornwell served as Trustee of the corporation; Cornwell would
remain Brady's personal counsel and business advisor until 1931.
With the additional capital, the company purchased machinery and
also coal property from the New England Fuel & Transportation
Company, a Boston-based company with mines at Everettsville and
Grant Town.

From 1922 to 1924 the Brady-Wamer Corporation

operated its mines under a labor agreement with the UMWA.

But,

after contracting with the Jersey Central Railroad to supply coal
at the low price of $1.60 per ton on March 20, 1924, the company

53Callihan, History of West Virginia Old and New. Vol. 2, 224225.
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decided to operate its mines nonunion and put into effect the
IS17 wage scale.

Brady immediately withdrew the company's

membership in the Monongahela Coal Operators Association and
notified UMWA officials of the change in labor policy.

He also

notified the company's employees, explaining that operations
would start on an open-shop basis on April 1, 1924.54
This was a declaration of war as far as the union was
concerned.

Rather than accept the reduced wage scale and open

shop, the union men of Local #4040 struck.

Not a single man

reported for work on April 2 at the Brady mines.

Brady-Wamer

held the upper hand, however, because it owned the homes of most
of the miners.

According to the house-lease agreement each of

the occupants had signed, they were tenants only "during the good
will" of the company.

Their occupancy could be terminated "at

any time on five days' notice."

They could be summarily

dispossessed if they quit or were dismissed from their jobs.
Eviction was a drastic step, however, and before he initiated
this remedy Brady and other company officials visited the miners
to try to persuade them to return to work.

Brady found a "great

deal of sentiment among people to accept the company's
proposition," but was told that the men had been "intimidated by
threats of personal violence and injury to themselves and their
children" if they did so.55 Hoping to win the miners back with

54"Testimony of Samuel D. Brady," Conditions in the Coal
Fields. Vol. 2, 2065-66.
55Ibid., 2,070-2,071; 2,088-2,089.
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a second work call, the company posted another notice on April 29
stating that it would start operations on May 1, 1924 at the 1917
scale.

Once again, not a single man reported for work.

miners and their families vacate the company houses.

Nor did

At this

time, the company believed it had no recourse but to evict the
recalcitrant miners if it wanted to recruit new employees and
continue its operations.

Brady explained:

Upon their failure to report for work they ceased to be
employees of this company and upon their failure to
vacate its houses they became, under the terms of their
agreements of lease and under the decisions of the
Court of Appeals of West Virginia, trespassers on the
company's property.56
On May 2, acting according to the terms of the leases, the
company notified its former employees that they must surrender
possession of the houses by May 9, 1924.

This notice was served

by a constable, and, in the eyes of Brady and his lawyers,
constituted sufficient legal action to warrant subsequent steps.
This notice did not, however, have the desired effect,
the miners, about two-thirds, ignored the call.
budge.

Most of

They refused to

Although Bittner made no public statements, the position

of the union was well known.

It had fought evictions during the

1922 strike and planned to do the same in 1924.
Due to the potential for violence as well as legal action
against them by the union, the company decided to proceed with
caution in dispossessing the miners.

In addition to the five

days notice required in the house lease, the company waited ten

56Ibid., 2068.
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more days before it moved.

Company officers decided to evict the

miners and their families on Monday, May 19.

In preparation for

the evictions, Brady, along with his attorneys, Charles A.
Goodwin and David C. Reay of Morgantown, met with Sheriff William
Yost and his attorney, ex-governor William E. Glasscock, on
Sunday, May 18 in Morgantown.57 Known for his anti-labor views,
Glasscock had been the nemesis of Mother Jones and the UMWA
during the Paint Creek-Cabin Creek strike of 1912-1913.58 As
legal counsel for Sheriff Yost, he advised the sheriff to permit
the evictions, to accompany Sam Brady and his force of company
agents, and to "allow no violence."
The advice of Glasscock and the other attorneys would permit
Brady to summarily evict the striking miners without legal
proceedings, thereby, the union later claimed, denying them their
right to due process of law.

The advice was based upon their

interpretation of the West Virginia Supreme Court case, Watt
Angel v. Black Band Coal Company. which was decided on March 24,
1924.

Angel had been summarily evicted and he then sued for

damages, but the court denied the suit, claiming that the
"relation of landlord and tenant did not exist," only "tenancy at
will."

The "occupancy of the house was merely incidental to the

employment."

The owner of the property had the right to evict

occupants, in person or through agents, should they break the
terms of the lease agreement.

This could be done without

57Ibid., 2068.
58Howard Lee, Bloodletting in Appalachia. 17-47.
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recourse to court proceedings and without the presence of
officers of the law.

Thus, a landlord had the right to come into

his house, take the occupant's furniture and possessions and
place them outside, then take physical possession of the house.
The only restriction of this right was that a breach of peace,
either resistance by the occupant or a show of force by the
landlord, could not be committed in the process.

If this

occurred, the landlord would have to resort to court proceedings
of unlawful entry and detainer.59 In effect, the Angel
decision, as interpreted by Glasscock and the coal company,
recognized the master-servant relationship between mine owner and
worker in this situation.

Reform of this asymmetrical

relationship, which was a legacy of the era of indentured
servitude, would come during the New Deal.
Proceeding under this advice, Sam Brady, his son Dunlap, and
"five colored men" with wagons rendezvoused with Sheriff Yost and
his two deputies at Brady Station on Monday morning.
sheriff and his deputies were armed.

Only the

With the protection of the

sheriff, Brady got the striking miners out of his houses in three
days.

Most of the miners moved out of their "free will and

accord," but five miners resisted.

They were acting according to

the advice of Bittner and District 17 president, Frank Keeney.
On May 19 Keeney issued a public statement from Charleston
advising miners to "take such steps that are necessary to protect
the union at Brady."

Keeney and UMWA counsel Harold Houston

59"Testimony of Samuel D. Brady," Vol. 2, 2071-2080.
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interpreted the Angel case differently from Glasscock.

Their

interpretation rested on the empirical fact that all evictions,
by their nature, perpetuated violence against the "human rights"
of miners and their families.

According to their argument, the

miners could not be evicted without court proceedings.
evictions at Brady were being conducted illegally.
Houston advised miners to defend their homes.

Thus, the

Keeney and

They urged Sheriff

Yost to "halt the wholesale evictions" and condemned the action
as "a survival of feudal arrogance still found in some parts of
West Virginia."60
Of the five who resisted eviction, the case of J.N. Morton,
his wife Annie and their small child, occupying house no. 8, was
the most troublesome for Brady, both at the time and later when
his actions came under public scrutiny.

In public and at the

Senate Interstate Commerce Committee hearings, Van Bittner
accused Brady of "committing murder and things worse than
murder."

These allegations were based on the Morton case.

According to Van Bittner's version of the eviction, this is what
happened:
Mrs. Norton [sic] was in delicate condition when they
began throwing families out of their homes. She has a
letter from her family physician, Doctor Coombs,
stating the condition she was in. When those mine
guards, with one of the owners of the mine, Samuel
Brady himself, came to her house to throw out her
furniture, she handed Mr. Brady this letter from Doctor
Coombs telling of her delicate condition. Mr. Brady,
in his usual gunman style, although he is not a gunman
himself, but he employed gunmen and was there with
^"Miners Union will protest evictions," New Dominion. May 20,
1924.
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them, and please pardon the language, he told her after
she handed him this letter, "To hell with your
condition. You are going out of this house." And she
was thrown out of the house and as a result of that the
child was b o m dead. Dr. Coombs and his assistant both
declared that there was no doubt in their minds that
action was the cause of the death of the child. That
case is now pending in the Federal court. ... That case
just shows the method used, that humanity was not
brought into consideration at all. The matter of a
court order was not brought into consideration. Law
and order were brushed aside, the legal as well as the
moral law, in the eviction of those people.61
Sam Brady told a much different story in his statement to the
committee:
[We] proceeded to house No. 8, occupied by J.N. Morton
and his wife. When we got there Mr. Morton was sitting
on his porch, and I advised him that I came there to
move him off the property and asked him where he wanted
his furniture and effects moved to. He said he didn't
give a damn where I moved him to and that he didn't
think I could move him out, that he had been advised by
the attorneys of the United Mine Workers that I could
not move him.62
After talking with Morton for awhile, trying to convince him to
leave, Brady and his group decided to get their lunch at the
boarding house.
When they returned they found the door of the house locked
and nailed shut with Morton and his wife inside.

Sam Brady

thereupon,
instructed one of the mine watchman to break down the
door, having been advised by our attorney before I went
there that day that if they locked themselves in we had
the right to break down the door of our own property,
but to be careful and not offer the tenants or their
families any violence. The door was broken down, and I
entered with two of the watchmen and found Morton
61"Testimony of Van Bittner," Vol. 1, 1,188.
^"Testimony of Samuel D. Brady," Vol. 2, 2085.
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standing in the front room, and I said to him, "Joe,
where do you want your furniture moved to?" ... He
said, "I don't give a damn where you move it." I then
called the men I had on the premises to move the
furniture. ... Morton then said, "you can't move me, my
wife is sick." I said, "What is the matter with your
wife?" He said, "She has gallstones." I said, "have
you got a doctor's certificate stating that I can not
move you out of the house on account of danger to your
wife?" He said he didn't have one nor did he need any.
At that time Mrs. Morton appeared in the kitchen door
carrying a baby on her hip. The child looked to be
about six months old. During the time that we were
moving out the furniture, Mrs. Morton did not say a
word to anyone nor did she act like she was ill, but
before we completely moved the furniture out of the
house, Mrs. Morton went out into the crowd which had by
this time congregated and spent the rest of the
afternoon running around in the mud, cursing and
damning the company and calling me very vile names.63
The Mortons' furniture and effects were transported to the Union
Hall, just off the Brady-Wamer property.

All of the evictions

were completed by May 21.
The union men had been pushed off company property, but they
still held an outpost, the Union Hall, on an adjacent lot.

This

became their base of operations in the ensuing confrontation.
According to Sam Brady, it was Annie Morton— not the union men—
who struck the first blow on the night of May 20:
The next morning we found that the house out of which
we had moved the Morton family had been entered in the
night by someone who had taken a pickaxe and vertibly
[sic] wrecked the entire interior of the house,
breaking out all windows and tearing the plaster from
the walls. While I have no personal knowledge of the
person guilty of this act, I am reliably informed that
this destruction was committed by Mrs. Morton.64
The real fight, the first battle of Brady, occurred the following
^Ibid., 2,086.
^Ibid., 2,087.
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evening.

As Brady told the Senate committee:
On the night of the 21st of May, large numbers of men,
many of whom were afterward shown, in a contempt
proceeding tried in the Circuit Court of Monongalia
County, to be members of the United Mine Workers of
America, assembled on the hills on three sides of the
company's mining village and fired repeated volleys,
estimated at from 300 to 500 shots with high-powered
rifles, into the dwelling houses of the company, which
were then occupied by its employees, including its club
and board house, which was being conducted by a
woman.65

The Morgantown Post's headline on May 22, 1924 proclaimed:
"Situation in Mining Town is acute, Sheriff Yost on hand to
prevent further outbreaks."

The newspaper told of the shootings,

and reported that two miners had been arrested.
Senate committee that two men were wounded:

Brady told the

"one of our own; and

we saw them carry one other man off from a distance."
Morgantown's other newspaper, the New Dominion. reported that the
outbreak was "believed by authorities to be planned."

To prevent

further outbreaks of violence, Sheriff Yost stationed deputies at
Brady.

The company hired and armed additional mine guards.66

In order to operate its mine, the company tried to recruit
new workers to replace the strikers.

However, members of the

UMWA,
each day met all trains at Brady Station and National
station and attempted by threats of assault and hoots
and jeers to intimidate and scare away all persons who
attempted to seek employment with this company.67

65Ibid. 2,080.
66New Dominion. May 21, 1924.
67"Testimony of Samuel D. Brady," Vol. 2, 2081.
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To prevent this, and to prevent further "acts of terror," the
company applied to the Circuit Court of Monongalia County on May
23, 1924 for an injunction.68
The company could not have found a more sympathetic judge
than the Honorable I. Grant Lazelle, elected to a six-year term
as Circuit Court Judge as a Republican in 1920.

Lazelle was from

an old-stock family which had been in the Morgantown area since
the

early nineteenth century.

The family had a farm and other

property on Robinson Run near Maidsville.69 In his views on
labor and collective bargaining, as well as his economic
interests, Lazelle was a company judge.

Later, in 1926, after

all of the operators in the Fairmont field had expelled the
union, Bittner appealed to the judge for an injunction to force
the companies to abide by the Baltimore agreement.

In his

judgment Lazelle not only denied the union's request, but also
unleased a tirade against the UMWA.

He stated that "collective

bargaining could be done provided it could be carried out."
However, the problem was that it could not be conducted
peacefully and without infringing upon the rights of those who
were not direct parties to the labor agreement.

Lazelle said:

I want to say this, that the time has not come, and I
know that every manin this house, whatever he thinks
about it now, will agree with me, that it never will
come, when two or three or four or half a dozen men can
sit down with that many other people around a table
some place and sell the labor of hundreds or even
“ ibid. 2,082.
69Bible records, reports of stock sales, Papers of CourtneyLazelle family, A&M 1875.
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thousands of people without their consent and compel
them to carry it out.70
Lazelle's views were in the mainstream of American
jurisprudence in the 1920s.

They were remarkably similar to

those of Chief Justice of the Supreme Court Howard Taft and other
Federal and state judges.

Labor had the right to organize and

bargain collectively, but it had only a very limited capacity to
strike or enforce collective bargaining contracts.

In 1917, the

Taft court ruled on the Hitchman case, which had originated in
the court of Judge Alston Dayton in 1907.

Although the Taft

court did not support Dayton in his opinion that the UMWA was
illegal, as a monopoly in restraint of trade under the Sherman
Antitrust Act, it did uphold his view that individual employment
contracts were binding and could be enforced by injunction.71
The court based its ruling on the premise that the "same liberty
which enables men to form unions ... entitles other men to remain
independent of the union."72
The court's recognition of the legitimacy of yellow-dog
contracts, coupled with its power to enforce its rulings with
injunctions, became the bane of UMWA efforts in West Virginia in
the 1920s.

In southern West Virginia in 1923, the Red Jacket

case brought 316 coal companies, whose workers had signed yellowdog contracts, together to bring suit against the UMWA to have it
70"Testimony of Van Bittner," Vol. 1, 1453-54.
71Lunt, Law and Order vs. the Miners, 58.
^Irving Bernstein, The Lean Years (Boston: Houghton Mifflin
Company, 1960) * 199.
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cease interfering with their operations.

The U.S. District Court

of Southern West Virginia ruled for the companies and granted an
injunction against the UMWA from using even peaceful methods of
persuasion and demonstration to win the allegiance of nonunion
workers.73 By 1923, eight coal companies in the Fairmont field
had secured injunctions against UMWA interference and
intimidation.74 State courts issued twenty-one injunctions
against UMWA activities between 1924 and 1928.75 When John L.
Lewis visited Fairmont on September 26, 1925 he was presented
with "enough injunctions to paper a room."76
Union officials and their partisans argued that the
injunctions denied miners and UMWA agents the Constitutional
rights of free speech, assembly, and petition for redress.

An

injunction granted in September, 1925 by Judge Meredith in Marion
County demonstrates how union pickets were denied the right of
free speech.

The order was obtained by thirty-six nonunion

miners at the Consolidation Coal Company mine at Watson.

The

men, women, and children were prohibited from these activities:
^Lee, Bloodletting in Appalachia. 78-83.
74The eight companies were West Virginia Coal & Coke and Big
Chief Coal Company in Barbour County; Moke-Cooperative Coal
Company, Shamrock Fuel Company, and Dodds, T h o m Sc Shimp Coal
Company in Marion County; Hudson Coal Company in Harrison County;
and New England Fuel & Transportation Company and Francois Coal
Company in Monongalia County.
Emmet, "Final Report on Labor
Relations in West Virginia (Fairmont Section)," 8
^"Testimony of John L. Lewis," Conditions in the Coal Fields.
Vol. 1, 412-413.
76"Law is first to greet John L. Lewis," Fairmont Times.
September 26, 1925.
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[Y]ell, jeer, hurray, shout, bark like dogs, whoop,
hiss, whistle like calling a dog, sing insulting and
contemptuous songs, make motions and demonstrations at
the plaintiffs and call them scabs, yellow dogs, sonsof-guns, mules, Jackasses, crabs, schimmelback, fire
workers, non-unions, starve-outs, drug store cowboys
and shieks. Curse the open-shop miners in English and
foreign languages, make threatening gestures and
express their hope that the mine will fall, killing
them; suggest that they will be cowhided, run out of
their houses, beat up, cleaned up, blown-up and shotup. Sing objectionable songs such as parodies on "Go
Long Scab," and "How do you do Mr. Scab," and "Shoot
them in the head, shoot them in the feet, shoot them in
the dinner-bucket, how are they going to eat."77
The UMWA argued that the use of injunctions had so eroded the
scope of individual rights that the pledge of republican
government, guaranteed by the U.S Constitution to each state, had
been broken.78
Apparently, Judge Lazelle's pro-company rulings were based
not only upon his interpretation of the law.

In 1926, he and his

family were discovered to own coal properties along Robinson Run
which they leased to the Paisley interests and from which they
obtained $54,000 per year in royalties.79 Thus, the judge had
heard cases and rendered decisions on the labor dispute while
receiving royalties from one of the major coal companies.
conflict of interest was not recognized by the judge.

This

Van

77«•Judge Meredith grants order," Fairmont West Virginian.
September 25, 1925.
^"Testimony of John L. Lewis," Vol. 1, 412-413.
Monongalia County Deed Book 167, Page 178, Samuel C. Lazelle,
et. al. to James A. Paisley, lessee, made on July 22, 1929 between
Samuel, Mary, Ella, Luther J. and I. Grant Lazelle and wife Nora J.
Lease for stun of $54,000 for Pittsburgh vein in Cass District, Copy
in Bittner Papers, Series 2, Box 1.
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Bittner, however, saw it and lamented at the Senate hearings,
Now, this is the sort of deal that you get in the
courts of West Virginia. I do not say that of all of
the courts in West Virginia, for there are some that
are better than others. ... But that is the influence
that coal operators have over many of the courts of
northern West Virginia.80
Judge Lazelle granted the injunction requested by BradyWarner Coal Corporation on May 23, 1924.

It was directed against

John L. Lewis, Frank Keeney, and all officials of Locals Nos.
4040, 4041, 4411, and 166.

It prohibited them from interfering

with the operation of the Brady mine, and from threatening or in
any way molesting employees or others seeking employment at the
mine.81
With the aid of the injunction and additional mine guards,
the company made an attempt to recruit workers and open up the
mine in the next two weeks.

Even though the composition of the

new labor force could not be ascertained, it is likely that it
was composed of a number of blacks.

According to the report of

Abram L. Harris on the strike in the Fairmont field in 1925,
which was filed with the West Virginia Bureau of Negro Welfare
and Statistics, large numbers of blacks were transported into the
area, mostly from southwestern Pennsylvania, and employed under
nonunion conditions.82 Although Harris did not mention the

^"Testimony of Van Bittner," Vol. 1, 1152.
81New Dominion. May 23, 1924.
82Abram Harris, "Strike of 1925 in Northern West Virginia,"
Bureau of Negro Welfare and Statistics of State of West Virginia
(Charleston, W. Va.: Jarrett Printing Company, 1926), 23-41.
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Brady mine in the report, he did write that the Osage mine of the
same company, which went nonunion in September, 1924, employed
125 blacks out of a total work force of 175.83 Judging from
what happened next at Brady, it is likely that a considerable
number were hired there as well.
Despite the fact that the UMWA constitution prohibited it,
many members of the union had joined the Klan.

Abrams wrote in

his report:
[I]t is well known by all men well informed regarding
conditions in the coal fields of West Virginia that
many Klans are largely made of native coal miners who
are members of the United Mine Workers.84
However, the vigilante group which intervened at Brady was not
the Klan, but a local group known as the "Regulators."

Although

it was not affiliated with the Klan, the Regulators bore
similarities to it.

It was a secret organization of natives

which enforced its own version of the law.

Rather than the

pointed white hoods of the Klan, the Regulators wore black masks.
The group may have had its origin with the Red Men of Wetzel
County, a group which was active in the 1870s and 1880s which was
also known as the Regulators.85
The Regulators would play a role in the second Battle of
Brady.

According to Sam Brady, the second was more violent than

^Ibid., 28.
^Ibid., 40.
85Waitman T. Willey, in his condemnation of the Red Men of
Wetzel County, also referred to them as "Regulators." Willey, "Law
and Lawyers— Their Relation to a Republican Form of Government,"
Constitution and By-Laws of the West Virginia Bar Association. 118.
361

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

the first:
About midnight on June 18, 1924, lights appeared up
against the hillside above the plant of the company and
several shots were fired, and about the same time a
fiery cross was lighted on the hilltop; and immediately
thereafter a couple of charges of dynamite were
exploded, and following that shots were fired from the
direction of the lights and fiery cross and from the
surrounding hills and localities between a schoolhouse
and the union hall and from down the Monongahela River
on both sides. ... The shooting was done with rifles of
large caliber and high range and many of the houses of
the company were shot through and approximately 700
shots were fired into the company's mining village and
plant, and while the shooting was going on dynamite in
barrels was rolled from the hill where the shooting
started, down into the mining plant and village of the
company and toward the houses occupied by its
employees. This shooting was by volleys and continued
at intervals until the sheriff of Monongalia County and
some of his deputies arrived on the ground.86
This time, however, the company was prepared for the attack and
replied in kind "with rifles and machine guns, the guards
directing their fire toward the hillsides and toward the Union
Hall, from which shots were fired into the company's mining
village, with the result that the Union Hall caught fire, blew
up, and burned to the ground."87
After the battle, Brady and Sheriff Yost found one union man
wounded near the Union Hall.
other union members.

They arrested him, along with three

Nearby, they found several cases of

dynamite with "fuses and caps intact" and a "touring car in which
there was a large basket containing bandages and other articles
usually found in a first-aid kit."

They also found "breastworks"

^"Testimony of Samuel D. Brady," Vol. 2, 2082.
87Ibid., Vol. 2, 2083.
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made of boxes and sandbags on one side of the Union Hall next to
the company property.88
The Morgantown Post proclaimed in its headline the following
day:

"Regulators in Brady Gun Fight, Union Hall B u m s and one

mine slightly wounded."

The newspaper noted that the Regulators

had left their mark by highlighting in flames the "fiery cross"
with the letter "R. ',89 The New Dominion reported that the
contest had reached the "magnitude of a pitched battle."
According to its account, about thirty "miners whose places had
been taken by nonunion miners" attacked the camp.90
The four men who were arrested, as well as fifteen other
members of Local No. 4040, were brought before Judge Lazelle.

In

return for a promise from the union counsel that the accused
would not "further molest the company at the operation of its
mine," the company dropped criminal charges.

Judge Lazelle cited

the men for contempt because of their violation of the May 23
injunction.91 Later, Sam Brady discovered that J.N. Morton, who
had resisted eviction, had been one of the leaders of the
attackers, having "purchased the cotton and oil used in burning
the fiery cross."92
After the arrests, the Brady mine operated free of
“ ibid., Vol. 2, 2084.
89Morgantown Post. June 19, 1924.
^New Dominion. June 19, 1924.
91"Testimony of Samuel D. Brady," Vol. 2, 2082.
92Ibid., Vol. 2, 2085.
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interference by the UMWA.

Encouraged by his success and pressed

by creditors, Brady-Wamer Coal Corporation attempted to open its
Osage No. 1 and No. 2 mines.

The company posted notices at the

mines on Scotts Run on August 27, 1924 providing miners with "the
opportunity to work at the 1917 scale" on September 2.

Once

again, the miners refused to "scab," and the company evicted
miners and their families.

For the Osage evictions the company

hired additional mine guards and armed them with submachine guns,
revolvers and blackjacks.

An attorney for the company, Charles

Goodwin of Morgantown, asserted that the evictions would be
accomplished "even if we [have] to shoot the union men down and
pile them up like crossties."

After whipping one man with a

blackjack for "saying something," the mine guards met little
resistance.93 By September 22, evictions were completed, and
the mines commenced operations on September 25.94
After Brady's testimony at the Senate Interstate Commerce
Committee hearings, John L. Lewis mockingly likened the battles
of Brady to the "First and Second Battles of Bull Run."95 Lewis
was being sarcastic, but his analogy holds nonetheless.

Like

Bull Run, the union losses at Brady inspired the nonunion forces.
In August, 1924 the companies which had not been signatories to

93"Affidavit of W.E. Bailes," Conditions in the Coal Fields.
Vol. 1, 1217.
94"Evictions at Osage ended," Morgantown Post. September 22,
1924; "Whistle at Brady-Warner plant blows," Morgantown Post.
September 25, 1924.
^"Testimony of John L. Lewis," Vol. 1, 408.
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the Baltimore or New York agreements joined together to revive
the Central West Virginia Coal Operators Association, which had
been abolished in 1918 when the Fairmont field was unionized.
Affiliated with the National Coal Association, the new
association united nonunion operators and gave them a political
voice.

The members of the association included Brady-Wamer Coal

Corporation, the New England Fuel & Transportation Company and
others small companies with operations along the Monongahela
Railway, along with several companies in southern and western
Harrison County, where a host of new companies had opened since
World War I.96 The United Mine Workers' Journal noted the
hypocrisy of nonunion operators associating for self-protection,
but not allowing the miners to do the same.97 On Scotts Run,
other companies soon followed Brady-Wamer's example.

By October

6, Bunker Hill, Shriver, the two mines of Continental, and
Chaplin Collieries had posted notices of a return to the 1917
scale or had started nonunion operations.98
Determined to stand up to the open-shop forces, Van Bittner
announced in July that the UMWA would mount an effort to
reorganize the field.

Bittner was provided with additional

International representatives, and had at his disposal most of

96,1
22, 1924.

Coal operators hold big parley,11 Clarksburg Telegram. August

97,,The Whale's Eyebrow," United Mine Workers1 Journal. Vol. 35,
No. 18 (September 15, 1924), 7.
^"Evictions at Liberty Mine," Morgantown Post. October 6,
1924.
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the officers of District 17 for the effort."

The union held a

series of "monster" meetings throughout the region.

On July 8,

6,000 miners attended a union gathering at Morgantown to kick-off
the campaign.

Several UMWA district officials harangued the

miners in Slavic and Italian, as well as English.

Bittner

challenged Sam Brady to a debate on the burning of the Union Hall
in Brady.

He also condemnedall

"mine thugs" and gunmen: "It's

too bad they are tolerated in the

state and protected by legal

processes, ... but what aboutour

moral law."100 On July 22,

"thousands" attended a meeting at Reynoldsville, west of
Clarksburg.

After speeches from the District 17 officials,

Bittner told the miners that the union would not allow a few,
small nonunion operators to dictate policy.

He claimed that the

open-shop operators were following a "suicidal policy, because it
costs them more to pay for gun men and attorneys that it would to
pay union wages."101 At Fairmont, the UMWA held a four-day
meeting at Ravine Amusement Park with "round and square dancing"
and bands from Monongah, Scotts Run, Annabelle, and Wyatt.102
On August 15, 1924 the United Mine Workers1 Journal declared
that the organization work was "going fine" in the Fairmont
"John L. Lewis to Van Bittner, telegram, April 12, 1924,
Bittner Papers, Box 7.
100"Union gathering at Morgantown," United
Journal Vol. 35, No. 15 (August 1, 1924), 4.

Mine

Workers1

101"Miners representatives at monster meeting," Fairmont Times,
July 22, 1924.
1°2"Mine workers to hold meet," Fairmont Times, August 10,
1924.
366

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

field.

Bittner reported that ten thousand men were working in

the field under union contract.

There had been 194 evictions,

"all illegal and done by private armed men," and two deaths in
"premature birth cases due to the evictions."

No general relief

system had been established because the men had been "taking care
of their own."

The Journal reported that ten mass meetings had

been held at ten different points in the field.103
The climax of the series of meetings took place at Brady.
After the burning of the Union Hall, Bittner decided that it
should be rebuilt in order to show that the union intended to
stay in West Virginia.

Miners volunteered their services, and

with help from other union crafts, a fire-proof building was
ready for dedication in mid-September of 1924.

The United Mine

Workers1 Journal covered the dedication ceremonies in great
depth; it featured a photo of the "labor temple" surrounded by
seven large American flags and decked with red, white and blue
banners.

It reported that between fifteen and twenty-five

thousand attended the ceremonies.

Van Bittner and other union

officials spoke, using loud speakers borrowed from the Davis-forPresident campaign.

Music was supplied by the Monongah Band, the

Scotts Run band, and the "famous Montana Colored Choir."
Bittner's speech was the main event, and the Journal noted that
he was interrupted by applause several times.
In the clearest and most dramatic language, Bittner laid out

i°3norganizational work going fine," United
Journal. Vol. 35, No. 16 (August 15, 1924), 6.

Mine Workers1

367

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

the union gospel.

"We have come here to dedicate this beautiful

temple of labor and to pledge our faith and trust in the UMWA,"
he began.

The UMWA is the "greatest labor union on the face of

the earth."

Bittner then sketched a history of the UMWA replete

with Biblical imagery:
For many years the pioneers of our great union
struggled with the problem of organization of mines
like Brady. We have had our Garden of Gethsemane, but
like the Savior, nearly two thousand years ago, they
refused to be tempted and were finally successful after
many weary battles and many trials and sacrifices to
establish the UMWA.104
The UMWA came to northern West Virginia in 1917, he continued,
but after the last contract expired, several companies refused to
sign the new agreement.

Others abrogated the agreement, dealing

with it as "the Kaiser treated a treaty— as a scrap of paper."
Despite this dishonorable action, the UMWA, the "greatest
fighting machine in the history of industry," would persevere,
and "the struggle will not cease until every mine is organized in
Northern West Virginia."
The UMWA was not an un-American organization as some had
charged, Bittner said.

It was a "law and order institution.11 To

the contrary, the nonunion operators were the violators of the
law, destroying "every principle of republican government" in
their camps.

They controlled their workers by keeping them

supplied with "poisonous liquor" and "in a drunken stupor so that
they may be satisfied with starvation wages and intolerable
104"Northem West Virginia miners hold great meeting
mountain top," United Mine Workers1 Journal Vol. 35, No.
(September 15, 1924), 8-9.
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on
18

working conditions."

Who were the real subversives in America?

There are "two classes of people in America who would seek to
destroy our government," according to Bittner.

Making an appeal

to the nativist sentiment in the audience, he stated:
First, the raving Red, who wants communism. Second,
the so-called respectable Yellow, who worships at the
shrine of greed and selfishness.
But, thank God we
have another class of men, white men, if you please,
who are fighting for the right, and between the polices
of destruction of the Reds and the respectable Yellows,
the white men will protect the liberties of our
country.105
Bittner condemned the evictions and the manner in which the
companies justified them.

The right to evict "is not my

conception of the justice and liberty attained by our
revolutionary forefathers; __

there is a moral right involved

that is higher than any legal right."

He concluded the speech by

reiterating the union's dedication to continue the fight to the
end.

The union would prevail because its cause was just; it was

fighting for "industrial freedom as Washington fought for
independence, and as Lincoln fought to save the Union and abolish
chattel slavery."106

The Breakdown of Law and Order
The confrontation at Brady set a pattern that was followed
again and again in the next three years.

A company would

announce its intention to operate according to the American Plan,
105Ibid.
106Ibid.
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evict recalcitrant miners, then, after hiring mine guards and
fortifying its mining plant, start production.

The UMWA

contested the de-unionization process at every stage and in every
arena.

UMWA organizers pleaded for miners to stick with the

union and labeled those who did not scabs.
evictions in the local courts.
repeatedly "marched the mines."

UMWA lawyers fought

In the field, UMWA pickets
With the legal system under the

control of the regional elite and unsympathetic to the UMWA
cause, the organization stood little chance of obtaining legal
remedies.

As a result, the UMWA, the "greatest fighting machine

in the history of industry," was left no alternative but to
contest the open-shop movement in the field.

As indicated at

Brady, the union was prepared to wage battle to protect the
contract and stop nonunion production.

In the next three years,

striking miners and their sympathizers went on a rampage of
incendiarism and destruction of mine property that would rival
that of the English Luddities.
The newspapers in the period from 1924 to 1927 are full of
reports of violent clashes between striking miners and mine
guards and law enforcement officials, as well as dynamitings,
riots, and shoot-outs.

Many of these incidents were blamed on

the strikers.107 Bittner and the top UMWA organizers condemned
107In 1924, for example: "Tipple razed by explosion," Fairmont
Times, August 8, 1924? "Confesses to dynamiting Flickersville
mine," Morgantown Post. September 24, 1924; "Miners taken into
custody for attempt to blow-up Everettville mine," Morgantown Post.
October 2, 1924; "Doc Urich arrested at Grant Town," Fairmont
Times, October 7, 1924? "Sandridge shot at Meriden," Morgantown
Post. October 8, 1924; "Ten arrested for assault at Grant Town,"
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violence in public, but also encouraged strikers to act on their
own.

For example, in a speech at the UMWA convention at Monongaih

on March 17, 1927, Bittner told the delegates,
You men have got to fight and die for the welfare of
your helpless little children if for nothing else. It
is your supreme duty and I hope that there is not one
slacker amongst you. Make up your minds that you have
got to stop nonunion production within the next few
weeks and for God's sake do not fail in your tasks as
there is too much at stake.
Then, if what you have already done fails, do not
come to me and ask for advice. Get out and do that
something else which is bound to be successful. You
have a brain of your own and from now on use it. We
officials can co-operate with you but you are depended
upon to do the actual fighting.108
An incident at a public meeting at Osage on April 8, 1925
illustrates the nature of union policy on violence.

According to

a company spy, "investigator F," a foreigner by the name of Paul
Dumar made a "talk of an extremely radical nature" proposing to
"knock the very Hell out of every damned scab" in Scotts Run.
Two UMWA officials jumped up and reprimanded him for the remarks
and "told the audience that he really did not mean what he said."
After the meeting, "F" had a talk with the two organizers.

They

told him,
that the union is careful about public remarks being
made to the effect that violence is and should be used,
and that was what prompted them to reprimand Dumar, but
Fairmont Times. October 14, 1924; "Two arrested at riot at Diamond
mines," Fairmont Times. October 19, 1924; "Conspiracy to destroy
tipple near Wyatt," Morgantown Post. November 15, 1924; "Boarding
house dynamited," Morgantown Post. November 21, 1924; "Store
blasted at Grant Town," Fairmont Times, November 25, 1924; "Girl is
fatally injured," Morgantown Post. November 26, 1924.
108"FW Reports," March 17, 1927, C.E. Smith Papers, Series 1,
Box 6.
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added that such tactics are necessary to win the fight,
but that they are not going to publicly tell anyone or
group of men to go and kill this or that fellow, but
the way to do this is to go about it quietly, and in
the dark; and that they would not make any remarks
about what is going to be done.109
Other union organizers were not so circumspect. For example,
Harry Kidd, an International organizer in the Clarksburg section,
told strikers at the Wyatt barracks:
I am not telling you to use it, but, Dynamite is a very
good thing to use. If somebody will put a shot beside
some of these houses, there will not be any men to go
to work the next day.110
C.E. Smith compiled a chart showing union and nonunion coal
production with a list of acts of violence at the various mines
for the period from June, 1924 to December 31, 1925.

Smith

recorded eighty-two acts of violence which resulted in injury to
persons or property destruction.111 He also asserted that "the
nonunion mines suffered practically all of the property damage
and the nonunion miners practically all the personal injury with
the exception of a few outsiders ... ,"112 in 1928 Smith made a
list of the UMWA members who had been sentenced by the courts for
acts of violence from 1924 to 1928.
twenty-one names.

Smith's list contained

Smith also noted that a number of arrests of

109"Report of Investigator F," April 8, 1925, Smith Papers,
Series 1, Box 4.
110,'Speech, 1927," C.E. Smith Papers, Series 1, Box 6.
111Newspaper accounts corroborate Smith's "Blueprint Chart of
Union and Nonunion Coal Production, 1924-25, with lists of
shootings and dynamitings, etc. at various mines," C.E. Smith
Papers.
112"Acts of Violence," N.d. ca. 1926, Smith Papers, Box 4.
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union strikers were made, but no trials were held because "after
things settled down at the mines— after injunctions— the cases
were not urged."113
Although the campaign of violence was directed primarily
against property, people— some of them innocent— were hurt and
killed in the outbreak.

On November 26, 1924 the five year-old

daughter of a nonunion miner at the Shriver mine near Osage was
shot and killed in an attack.114 The people of Morgantown were
outraged.

Groups of citizens organized into a "reserve force" to

"run down" the people responsible for the trouble.115 Union
officials denied responsibility, and claimed that the trouble was
the fault of hired detectives and mine guards.116 However,
according to a statement by the president of the company, Col.
Eberhart Bierer, Shriver Coal Company employed no mine guards or
watchmen.117
According to the elite of the region and state, the
breakdown of law and order in 1924 was caused by the usurpation
of moral and legal authority by two "supergovemments," the UMWA

113Handwritten note, February 28, 1928, C.E. Smith Papers,
Series 1, Box 6.
114"Girl is fatally injured," Morgantown Post. November 26,
1924.
115"$3,000 award for arrests," Morgantown Post. November 29,
1924.
116"Union not responsible," Morgantown Post. December 4, 1924.
117Morgantown Post. November 26, 1924.
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and the Klan.118 Both organizations, it was claimed, had their
own sets of laws and means of enforcement.

More generously,

Howard Gore related that these two organizations had not yet
"entirely found their place in the order of things."119
The two supergovemments not only opposed constituted
authority, but also played a role in the election debacle of the
regional champion, John W. Davis.

With his "liberal politics,"

Davis was expected to do well with labor.

However, Davis had

ties to Wall Street, he represented the coal operators before the
U.S. Coal Commission and was endorsed by Coal Age, so he won the
animosity of the UMWA.120 Lewis, a life-long Republican,
publicly supported Coolidge.

Although Bittner made no public

statements against Davis, Frank Keeney launched a bitter attack
on him on September 28 at Clarksburg.

Keeney claimed that

Davis's nomination came from a meeting of coal operators headed
by C.W. Watson at White Sulphur Springs during the Blizzard trial
in 1923.

Davis was "an enemy of the miners," according to

Keeney.121
118C.E. Smith used the term "supergovemment" to describe the
UMWA, though it was first used to characterize the Klan; Chicago
Daily News to C.E. Smith, January 29, 1924, Smith Papers, Series 1,
Box 4.
119Howard Gore to Fred 0. Blue, August 1, 1924, Gore Papers,
Box 12.
120Coal operators of both parties were happy with Davis because
they felt he would not attempt to regulate the coal industry. "Coal
operators rejoice at nomination of John W. Davis," Coal Age, Vol.
25, No. 27 (June 10, 1924), 91.
121"Keeney speaks
September 29, 1924.

at

courthouse,"

Clarksburg

Telegraph.
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The Klan, which Davis and other Democratic aspirants had
carefully avoided antagonizing at the Madison Square Garden
convention, also worked to defeat Davis.122 After wavering on
the issue, Davis came out against the Klan on August 22 in a
speech at Sea Girt, New Jersey.

He condemned it for "religious

intolerance" and claimed it did "violence to the spirit of
American institutions."123 The Sea Girt speech did little,
however, to help Davis politically.

In West Virginia, Davis and

the Democratic party was hurt by the weak gubernatorial candidacy
of Jake Fisher, who, like Davis, became identified with the
corporate interests.

Howard W. Gore, the agrarian Republican

candidate for governor from Clarksburg who promised not to "array
neighbor against neighbor, class against class and industry
against industry," got the endorsement of the Klan.124 The Klan
was determined to defeat both Davis and Fisher.

In Marion County

the Klan sought revenge on Republican Judge Emmet Showalter, who
122According to one delegate, 343 of the 1,143 delegates at the
1924 Democratic convention were Klan members, Democratic Party
National Convention Proceedings. New York, July 8, 1924.
123,1
Davis denounces Klan," Clarksburg Telegram. August 22,
1924; Murphy, The 103rd Ballot. 249-250.
124Howard Gore to William McKell, June 5, 1924, Gore Papers,
June 1-15, 1924.
E.T. England, the Republican candidate for
Attorney General blamed Fisher for his defeat in the primary.
Fisher sent a letter to every Italian on the eve of the election
saying that it was reported by the Clarksburg Exponent that both
England and Gore had been endorsed by the Klan.
This, England
complained, cost him the Italian vote; E.T. England to Howard Gore,
June 11, 1924, Gore Papers, June 1-15, 1924. Leighton Henry, a
traveling salesman from Clifton, West Virginia wrote Gore to tell
him that all of his "democratic friends" who were members of the
Klan were supporting him; Leighton Henry to Howard Gore, September
20, 1924, Gore Papers, September, 1924.
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had dared to speak out against it.

It had a "brigade" of three

thousand workers handing out the Klan slate on election day.125
The election of 1924 was a Republican landslide.

Davis

failed to carry West Virginia and won only the solid South.

The

favorite son, who some thought might be able to boost the coal
industry by forcing the ICC to lower freight rates, went down to
an "incredible slaughter.1,126 Gore beat Fisher by 40,000
votes.127 In Marion County, the Klan, despite the embarrassment
of the "Little Rosebud" case, bucked the Republican tide and
elected two Democratic candidates.

The Fairmont Times noted that

the "outstanding result of the election was the triumph of the
Klan in Marion County. It set out to rebuke Davis for his Sea
Girt speech, defeat Judge Showalter and elect John Riggins to
sheriff.

It accomplished all this."128

Altogether, 1924 was not a good year for the coal industry of
the Fairmont Field.

Production was down 30 percent from 1923.

Shipment to the Lakes was down 69 percent.

More importantly,

coal prices decreased from an average of $2.25 a ton in 1923 to

125Fairraont Times. November 6, 1924.
126"Davis may affect ICC policies," Fairmont Times, November 4,
1924; Murray, 103rd Ballot. 256.
1270n Christmas Day, 1925 Gore repaid part of his debt to the
Klan and the UMWA when he pardoned Reverend E.O. Jones, who was
convicted in the "Little Rosebud" case, and Edgar Combs, who was
convicted for his part in the Battle of Blair Mountain in 1921,
Parkersburg News. December 25, 1925.
128Chalmers, Hooded Americanism. 157; "Davis carries only solid
south," Morgantown Post. November 5, 1924; "The Local Election,"
Fairmont Times. November 6, 1924.
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$1.60.129 One reason for the decrease, according to the
Fairmont West Virginian, was the tendency of railroads to "club
down prices.”

The underlying problem was that the bituminous

coal industry was "overcrowded in all its branches; ... too many
people [were] trying to make a living in one industry."

The

small companies, which were supposed to have been eliminated by
the Jacksonville Agreement, proved more resilient than expected.
The large union companies attempted to cut costs by reducing
overhead through consolidation or by introducing labor-saving
machinery.

A $30 million merger was achieved by the Hutchinson

interests in southern West Virginia.

On December 30, 1924 they

announced the formation of the West Virginia Coal & Coke Company,
which was a combination of the southern division of Hutchinson
Coal Company, the Main Island Creek Company, and several smaller
companies in southern West Virginia.130 Although there was much
talk about it, no consolidation was achieved in northern West
Virginia.

Consolidation Coal Company, the technological leader

in the field, installed battery-powered, arc-wall cutting
machines at all of its mines and added to its fleet of storage
battery locomotives.

These innovations cut production costs, but

the savings were not enough to offset the reduced labor costs of

129"0pen shop movement to the fore in 1924 in northern West
Virginia," Coal Age, Vol. 27, No. 2 (January 15, 1925), 113.
130,,Merger of coal properties announced," Coal Age. Vol. 27,
No. l (January 8, 1925), 61.
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nonunion companies.131
The West Virginian also declared that a "troublesome labor
situation" had developed, and that, by the end of the year,
nonunion production matched union tonnage.

Many of the coal

operators, according to the newspaper, thought of the "good days
before unionization in 1918," and thought that these days would
return if the union were eliminated.

Others realized how

overdeveloped the coal industry had become since those days, and
warned that pushing the UMWA out would de-stabilize the industry
and make cut-throat competition even worse.

The West Virginian

predicted that developments in the labor war would be "thick and
fast in the next three months."132

Mine War in 1925 and 1926
As 1925 unfolded, developments were "thick and fast."

On

January 4, office buildings in downtown Clarksburg were shaken by
a blast which destroyed the tramway of the nearby Whiteman mine
of the Clarksburg Big Vein Coal Company.

This was the third time

the mine, which employed 60 men and had been operating nonunion,

131Despite the use of battery-powered cutting machines and
motors for main-line haulage, the Consolidation Coal Company
continued to use mules to gather coal cars.
Both the batterypowered machinery and the mules were used to avoid having live
power at the face of the mine, which would have been a potential
hazard in the company's gaseous mines. "Mine Cuts and hauls coal
with battery power," Coal Age. Vol. 27, No. 1 (January 8, 1925),
39.
132,,New Year brings increased price or slack coal," Fairmont
West Virginian. January 1, 1925.
378

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

was dynamited.133 The Clarksburg Chamber of Commerce passed a
resolution blaming the UMWA for the "wave of violence" and asking
it to leave the state.134 Vice-President of Sub-district No. 4,
James L. Studdard, responded to the resolution by telling the
Chamber of Commerce to mind its own business.
guard system for the violence.
miners along class lines.

He blamed the mine

Studdard also tried to rally

He asserted that the citizens in the

towns like Clarksburg were against the working class because none
worked for a living, and, therefore, "had no active brains in
their bodies."

While the working man "gives his brains a rest

while he works with his hands," the town dwellers "have to double
shift what little brains they have in an effort to keep from
working with their hands."135
As might be expected, violence followed in the wake of
evictions and the opening of nonunion mines.

Grant Town, the

site of the largest mine in the region, the New England Fuel &
Transportation Company's No. 1, was the scene of a great struggle
in 1924 and 1925.

In October, after making several unsuccessful

attempts to reopen its mines on a nonunion basis, the company
began evicting miners who refused to work nonunion.

After one of

the mine guards, Rex Lanham, was beaten up, the company obtained

133"Big blast shakes downtown Clarksburg," Clarksburg Telegram.
January 4, 1925; "Damage to aerial tramway at $2,000," Coal Age.
Vol. 27, No. 3 (January 22, 1925), 169.
134"Union asked to leave," Fairmont Times. January 8, 1925.
135"Studdard flays business groups," Fairmont Times. January 8,
1925.
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an injunction to prohibit all officers of the UMWA, as well as
Local No. 4047, from interfering with the "lawful right" of any
person to work at the No. 1 mine.136 After several men,
including "Doc" Urich, one of the leaders of the 1916 Farmington
strike who had been paroled, were arrested, the women, who were
not enjoined by the injunction, took their place on the picket
line.137 The women tried to prevent the evictions by "casting
pepper" into the eyes of the mine guards and deputy sheriff.

A

score of "foreign" women were arrested for that assault in midOctober.138 UMWA lawyers contested the eviction suits, which
had been accomplished without court orders.

Then, under

Bittner's order, the UMWA put the furniture of the evicted miners
back in the houses and "restored" them to the union members.139
From December 4 to 12, 1924, the eviction trials were held.
All were decided for the plaintiff.140 County authorities, with
the aid of the state police, attempted to evict the strikers on
December 31, but the miners, armed with clubs and revolvers,
congregated in such large numbers that they were unable to

136New England Fuel and Transportation Company vs. John Hogan.
et. al.. in C.E. Smith Papers, Series 1, Box 4.
137"Doc Urich arrested at Grant Town," Fairmont Times, October
7, 1924.
138Fairmont West Virginian. October 16, 1924.
139Intemational Executive Board. Minutes, January 5-14, 1925,
241, United Mine Workers of America, International Archives.
140"Eviction trials to plaintiffs," Fairmont West Virginian.
December 12, 1924.
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proceed.141 The strikers built fortifications— dugouts and
entrenchments— known as the "Grant Town forts" on a hillside
overlooking the tipple and mining town of the company.142 The
situation came to a head on January 15, 1925, when a "miniature
war" broke out near the boarding house.

Ray Tobin, a nonunion

miner, and John Kello, a striker, were killed in the shoot
out.143 The UMWA buried Kello on January 25 in the largest
funeral in the history of Marion County.
UMWA service and called Kello a martyr:

Van Bittner gave the
"he died for us."144

Services for Tobin were held quietly at the Catholic church in
Grant Town.

On January 22, the UMWA lawyers agreed to vacate the

company houses by February 2, and also to dismantle the
forts.145 By February 26, eighty miners and their families,
about one-tenth of the peak working force of eight hundred at No.
1 mine, had been evicted.

The UMWA erected wooden barracks for

141"Families evicted at Grant Town," Fairmont West Virginian.
December 31, 1924.
142Howard Lee wrote that the strikers, "mostly foreigners," had
a scheme to use the forts to shoot down the scabs as they left the
mine. Their plans were revealed by a "native American striker" to
State Police, who destroyed the forts and prevented the tragedy;
Bloodletting in Appalachia. 150.
143,1Sheriff aids deputies in GrantTown disorders,"
West Virginian.January 16, 1925.

Fairmont

144"Largest funeral in history of county," Fairmont West
Virginian. January 25, 1925.
145Union miners will vacate Grant Town," Fairmont West
Virginian. January 22, 1925; "Miners destroy alleged forts at Grant
Town," Fairmont West Virginian. January 31, 1925; Coal Age. Vol.
27, No. 7 (February 19, 1925), 347.
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the miners on leased property nearby.146 In the next three
years, these "union apartments" at Grant Town remained one of the
UMWA strongholds in the region.

The UMWA held numerous meetings

and rallies there, and depended upon the strikers for picket duty
at surrounding mines.
The UMWA faced many obstacles in attempting to enforce the
Jacksonville Agreement.
within its own ranks:

One of the gravest threats came from
an insurgent District 17.

The specter of

dual unionism was first raised on January 27, 1925 when the Mine
Workers' Association of West Virginia was chartered.

The new

union was headed by a former District 17 official, Thomas Cairns,
and had its headquarters in Charleston.

Here, there was

considerable resentment toward the International for not
providing enough financial support for the strike in the Kanawha
field.

According to Coal Age, the new union also had supporters

in northern West Virginia.

The union planned to "restore

tranquility to the state's strife-worn" industry.

It would make

contracts with the coal companies based on a new scale which
would insure the "uninterrupted operation of the mines."147
When asked by reporters about the new union, Bittner called it a
joke, said it had no chance in northern West Virginia, and

146"Union barracks erected," Fairmont West Virginian. February
26, 1925.
147,1
west Virginia miners for rival union," Coal Age. Vol. 27,
No. 5 (February 5, 1925), 225.
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dismissed it with "a wave of the hand."148
Despite Bittner's dismissal, opposition to the International
had developed
provided

in the Fairmont Field.

The International had not

much support for the strike in Sub-District 3 (Preston,

Taylor, and Barbour counties). By January, 1925 all but two of
the officers of the sub-district, including the president and
vice-president, had abandoned the union and were working in
nonunion mines.149 Another source of dissatisfaction came from
miners who, like the operators, thought of the International
representatives as an outside influence.

One miner wrote the

Fairmont Times to condemn the International organizers:
About twelve of them are from other states. I can't
see for the life of me why we need so many and why we
have to send out of West Virginia to get men to handle
the affairs. — They are drawing $10 per day and
expenses at first class hotels. They are, one and all,
fat, well dressed and prosperous looking. It is d___
easy for a man with good clothes, a full belly and a
good salary to go around to the miners shacks and tell
the "boys" to stand firm, hold tight, etc., but that
don't feed the poor kids nor keep out the cold.150
On February 3, John L. Lewis arrived in Fairmont to meet
with Bittner and other UMWA officials and to inspect the mining
towns in the region.

Brooks Fleming of Consolidation Coal

Company, M.L. Hutchinson of the West Virginia Coal & Coke
Company, and A. Lisle White, head of the Northern West Virginia
148"New mine union treated as joke," Fairmont West Virginian.
January 28, 1925.
149Intemational Executive Board. Minutes, January 5-14, 1925,
252, United Mine Workers of America, International Archives.
150R.B. Janis to Editor, Fairmont Times, February 13, 1925,
Papers of C.E. Smith, Series III, Box 27.
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Coal Operators Association, met with Lewis at the Fairmont Hotel.
The operators called for an adjustment of the wages.

Lewis

declined to discuss the matter, and declared there would be no
change of policy.151 He traveled to Dakota, Barrackville, and
Grant Town to visit the miners who had been evicted.

Before he

departed two days later, he told reporters that the evictions
were "a sad commentary on the region."152
In order to shut down the nonunion production and to fight
"starvation wages and open shop conditions," on March 6, 1925
Bittner called for a strike against all open shop mines in the
Fairmont field to begin on April 1, 1925.153 C.E. Smith, who
began his column, "Good Morning!" at this time, denounced the
strike as being created by "outside influences."

Smith decried

the "bureaucratic imperialism" of the UMWA and the ICC and
seconded the Huntincrton Herald-Dispatch. which asserted that West
Virginia coal had been "beset by conspiracies and conspirators
outside the state" for over twenty years.

Smith also identified

the adherents to the union cause within the region as the foreign
element.

The nonunion miners, he claimed, were predominantly

natives.

Later in the strike he asserted that "a typical

strikers1 picket line would show not more than 10 per cent native

151"Lewis declines to modify Jacksonville Pact," Coal Age, Vol.
27, No. 7 (February 19, 1925), 294.
152"Lewis inspects mining towns," Fairmont West Virginian.
February 4.
153"Operators make light of strike call," Fairmont Times. March
7, 1925.
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b o m whites, 10 per cent Negroes and the rest foreign b o m with
the Italian type predominating."154 Smith wished to define the
mine war in the black and white terms of us (native miners and
indigenous operators) versus them (a sinister alliance of outside
influences and the law-breaking foreigners).155
Smith's column became a propaganda sheet for the nonunion
operators.

Perhaps no man was more hated by striking miners.

Carl Bischoff of the Fairmont Chamber of Commerce informed Smith
that he was a "special object of attack in assemblies of the
furriners."

Bischoff reported that at Clarksburg he overheard

groups of men mention Smith by name and say that he was going to
"get it."

In Fairmont he overheard two wives of the "imported

agitators," who made "daily visits to the beauty parlors," say
that Smith was a "marked man."156 Smith was also a supporter,
though probably not a member, of the Klan.

Rather than targeting

nonunion black strikebreakers, Smith directed nativist sentiment
against the UMWA and the foreign strikers.
Smith was also on the inside of an espionage ring set up by
the nonunion operators to spy on the strikers and UMWA officials.
A small army of investigators were hired to attend union rallies
and meetings to get information on union officials and their
plans, or go into the mines and talk to the miners in order to
154Fairmont Times. July 17, 1926.
155"Good Morning!" Fairmont Times. March 7, March 9, March 12,
1925.
156Carl Bischoff to C.E. Smith, April 2, 1925, Smith papers,
Series 1, Box 4.
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"spot” the agitators and union men.

Great care was taken by the

agents to provide verbatim records of the speeches of UMWA
officials so that if they advocated violence it could be used
against them in a court of law.

According to one "operative" who

went over to the union side, Earl Mulholland (alias), the
Colorado Detective Agency, which set up an office in Fairmont on
November 10, 1924, the Baldwin-Feits agency, and the Corporations
Auxilliary Company had agents in the Fairmont area.

In a letter

to Bittner, Mulholland claimed that "Fairmont is full of union
sympathizers who in reality are service men ... .
as a dog's fleas."

They're thick

Mulholland named three, but did not know the

name of the most notorious, the "man in the band."

He informed

Bittner that his office had been "cased" several times "to see if
a dictaphone could be installed."

Mulholland warned the union

chief that the Baldwin-Felts agency had an office in the Fairmont
Hotel, where Bittner stayed.

One of the agents "was sitting

right across from you one day."157
Smith received regular reports from the investigators.

For

example, one submitted on March 12, 1925 told the business
transacted at Bittner's office, including arranging peace bonds
for union women who got into a fight with nonunion women at a
prayer meeting at Brady.

The agent also reported on a union

organizer named Herschey, who was head of the "Fiery Circle."
Herschey handled the union spotters, in this case sending a

157Earl Mulholland (alias) to Van Bittner, May 6, 1925, Bittner
Papers, Box 7.
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female worker into the nonunion mining camps to spread propaganda
favorable to the union among the wives of nonunion miners.158
On April 1, the traditional miners' holiday, the strike
began.

The UMWA invited William Green, president of the AFL,

Ellis Searles, editor of the United Mine Workers1 Journal, and
vice-president of the UMWA, Phil Murray, to speak at rallies at
Morgantown, Clarksburg, and Fairmont.159 The union also
sponsored a number of parades in the area, including one in
Fairmont where, according to the Fairmont Times. a union local
composed of foreigners carried the American flag upside down, a
matter which was reported to the police.160 According to the
Times the strike was a failure, but in his reports to the press,
Bittner claimed the strike call was "satisfactory."161 Both
sides accused the other of making false reports.162
On April 10, Governor Howard Gore arrived in Fairmont to
meet with UMWA officials and to survey the strike zone.

Gore

told a group of operators that he would not allow any more

158No name, March 12, 1925, Papers of C.E. Smith, Box 4.
159"Good Morning!" Fairmont Times. March 26, 1925.
160"21 take holiday, 95 work on first day of drive," Fairmont
Times, April 1, 1925.
161"Bittner claims strike call is satisfactory," Fairmont West
Virginian. April 3, 1925.
162"Brackett says Bittner makes false reports," Fairmont West
Virginian. April 3, 1925. The Associated Press warned C.E. Smith
not to "bootleg" car loading figures. Apparently, the Monongahela
Railway refused to supply figures to Smith, and he had been getting
the information from the Maidsville yardmaster. R.P. Conn, Jr. to
C.E. Smith, April 28, 1925, C.E. Smith Papers, Series 1, Box 5.
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evictions to be conducted without due process of law.

Gore went

to the Scotts Run section and visited union barracks at Osage.
He reasoned with both sides, and asked them to prevent violence.
He said that he wanted to avoid ’'additional blots on the state's
name."163 According to the West Virginian. "tears stood in the
eyes" of the men and women at Scotts Run as the governor mingled
with them and "impressed upon them as a father upon children that
they must obey the laws."164

Despite the disputed claims,

by April 17 it was clear that the strike was backfiring on the
union.

Consolidation Coal Company, which had retained its ties

with the union, shut down six more of its mines.165 This left
only eight of the company's thirty-six mines in the field still
in operation.

On April 20, the Soper-Mitchell Coal Company,

which had two large mines on Scotts Run, announced that it would
reopen on the American Plan.166 On April 24, Van Bittner, who
was attempting to wage a simultaneous strike in the northern
panhandle of the state, was arrested at Fairmont for violating
the terms of Judge Dayton's injunction.167
The UMWA received a harsh blow on May 13, when one hundred
163"Gore concludes survey of local strike situation," Fairmont
West Virginian. April 11, 1925.
164"Govemor Gore and strike," Fairmont West Virginian. April
13, 1925.
165"Six more Consol mines closed," Fairmont Times. April 18,
1925.
166Fairmont Times, April 20, 1925.
167"Bittner given bail of $2,000," Fairmont Times, April 25,
1925.
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union miners visited the UMWA headquarters in Fairmont and
demanded to be released from their obligation.168 On the
following day, Local No. 4009 of Shinnston withdrew from the UMWA
and petitioned Bethlehem Coal Company (distinct from Bethlehem
Mines Corporation, the subsidiary of the steel company) for a
meeting to arrange a new scale.

The miners' lawyer, John B.

Wyatt, traveled to Charleston to obtain a charter for a new
union, the Mountaineer Coal Miners Association.169 By June 1,
nonunion production was at 1,156 railroad cars for the week,
while union mines loaded only 173 cars.170
Coal Age warned that the loss of the Fairmont field would
create a "dangerous salient" in the union line, and that the UMWA
was "foredoomed to defeat" if it continued the fight for the
Jacksonville scale.

The journal warned that the Pittsburgh

field, where the union companies were shutting down because of
the pressure from the south, would be next.171 On May 14, Coal
Age reported that miners at a subsidiary of the Pittsburgh Coal
Company had organized a union of their own and arranged for
"living wages" on the basis of the 1917 scale.172 Consolidation
Coal Company continued to shut down its mines in the region.

The

168Fairmont Times. May 13, 1925.
169"One local bolts union," Fairmont Times, May 14, 1925.
170"New peak reached this week," Fairmont Times, June 1, 1925.
171"Fields near nonunion stronghold form dangerous salient in
union lines," Coal Age. Vol. 27, No. 13 (April 16, 1925), 583.
172"Seeing the light," Coal Age. Vol. 27, No. 17 (May 14,
1925), 723.
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company was losing money with its union policy.

On May 1, it

announced that it would not pay its quarterly dividend.
According to the Wall Street Journal. the company would
concentrate production in southern West Virginia and
Kentucky.173 C.W. Watson issued a statement:
It has not been possible to reduce expenses comparable
to the decline in coal prices. We believe the wisest
course is to conserve our resources. By so doing, we
are placing our company in a position to profit quickly
by any recovery in the industry.174
The big break against the UMWA came in June.

As a spokesman

for Consolidation Coal Company later claimed in the 1928 ICC
hearings, its employees repudiated the Jacksonville Agreement
before the company.

On June 2, union miners at Consolidation

Coal Company's Columbia mine near Clarksburg, after quitting the
union, petitioned the company to go back to work under the 1917
scale.175 This was the opening wedge that the company needed.
On June 4, it announced that it would operate its mines under a
company union.

The company indicated it would continue to

bargain collectively, but only with its employees, and that it
would provide them with a grievance mechanism.

In essence, the

company was adopting the Rockefeller plan, first used in
Colorado.

Other large union companies, including the Hutchinson

Coal Company and the two Hite companies, Virginia & Pittsburgh

173Fairmont Times, May 1, 1925.
174Cgal Age, Vol. 27, No. 19 (May 21, 1925), 761.
175,lConsol miners bolt," Fairmont Times, June 2, 1925.
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and Edna Gas Coal, followed suit.176
This abrogation of contracts, a "business sin" which
attracted nationwide attention, was rationalized by John "June"
Clark, president of the Northern West Virginia Coal Operators
Association.

Clark said that those companies which were

reopening had not, in fact, abrogated their contract.

The

contract was signed by the association, not the individual
companies.

By dropping out of the association, they would no

longer be held to the "group contract.1,177 C.E. Smith offered
no excuses for the action.

He declared that a "political

revolution was now being effected.

The tyrant was being thrown-

off," and Bittner's cause was now hopeless.
coal mining jobs be given only to natives.

Smith suggested that
He asked that the

region's newspapers stop providing coverage of the disorder
because it was "giving the state a black eye" and slowing outside
investment.178
Bittner wired Secretary of Labor James J. Davis asking for
an investigation, and threatened a strike of all the bituminous
workers in the nation if the companies did not comply with their
contracts.179 In an address before the UMWA convention of
i76nvice President Lyon declares company will operate under
company union," Fairmont Times. June 4, 1925; "Union gets jolt in
West Virginia," Coal Age. Vol. 27, No. 22 (June 11, 1925), 877.
177"Clark declares operators
Fairmont Times, June 24, 1925.

did

not

abrogate

contract,"

178"Good Morning!" Fairmont Times, June 24, 1925.
179"Bittner wants government aid," Fairmont Times, July 1,
1925.
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anthracite miners on June 30, John L. Lewis charged John D.
Rockefeller, along with Charles Schwab and Andrew Mellon, with a
"conspiracy to wreck our union and tear up a wage contract."180
Lewis also sent a telegram to Watson accusing his company of
"abrogation and utter destruction of the Baltimore
agreement."181 Rockefeller, who had visited the region in 1916
and worshipped in Fairmont,182 wrote to C.W. Watson asking for
the "facts in the matter, for the charge made is a serious
one."183 Watson replied with a letter and memorandum sketching
the history of the Baltimore agreement.

He stressed that the

company had operated under the agreement for over a year and
incurred heavy losses.

Over 1,000 of the company's employees had

left, a large number working for competitors while still
occupying company houses.

He cited the growth of nonunion

production in the field, and asserted that, "as a working
reality, [the agreement] no longer exists."

Moreover, the

contract had been repudiated by thousands of union members and
District 17 had been "put into a state equivalent to a
receivership."

The question came down to whether the individual

180Consolidation Coal Company, Work or Idleness in the
Bituminous Coal Industry: A Correspondence between John D.
Rockefeller. Jr.. C.W. Watson. President. Consolidation Coal
Company. and John L. Lewis. President. United Mine Workers of
America (New York: Consolidation Coal Company, 1925), i.
181Ibid., John L. Lewis to C.W. Watson, telegram, June 3, 1925,
9-10.
182Fairmont Times. June 19, 1916.
183Consolidation Coal Company, Work or Idleness. John D.
Rockefeller, Jr. to C.W. Watson, July 1, 1925, 5.
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employees wished to remain idle at the union scale or work at
prevailing wages.184 Watson sent the memorandum to both
Rockefeller and Lewis.
By August, the UMWA, as Watson claimed, was all but in
receivership in the Fairmont Field.
retained their union contracts:

Only a handful of companies

Simpson Creek Collieries Company

at Galloway in Taylor County, Four States Coal Company at
Annabelle in Marion County, and three Scotts Run companies,
Gilbert-Davis, Cleveland-Morgantown, and Connellsviile ByProduct.185 Bittner refused to call it quits, however.
meetings and picketing continued.

Union

Every day groups of thirty-

five to three hundred men, women and children were transported on
trucks from union barracks located throughout the region ro
various mines for picket duty.
The UMWA was not, however, the only organization which was
making a bid for the loyalties of the working class.

Many native

miners who had gone back to work under the American Plan belonged
to the Klan.

On Labor Day, the Klan held a parade and rally in

Fairmont which drew six thousand.

With its "white-robed line

swinging off the South Side bridge led by a band playing 'Onward
Christian Soldiers,'" the Klan march, according to C.E. Smith,
provided a "thrilling sight."186 The UMWA, which had soft-

184Ibid., "Collapse of the Baltimore Agreement," 11-14.
185"Gilbert-Davis claimed for union," Fairmont West Virginian;
Ross, "The Scotts Run Coalfield," 32.
186"Good Morning!" Fairmont Times, September 9, 1925.
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pedaled the Klan issue at the beginning of the strike because it
did not want to alienate its native members, finally recognized
the Klan as an adversary.

In August, for the first time, union

pickets began to inject the Klan into their chants and songs.

At

the Rachel mine near Mannington, they chanted: "We don't want the
American Plan or the Ku Klux Klan."187 Because of the Klan's
demonstration, the union held its Labor Day celebrations in the
surrounding mining towns.
roundly denounced the Klan.

At these rallies, union speakers
James Studdard received "prolonged

cheers" when he attacked the Klan as un-American, anti-labor, and
a "troublemaker" at a rally at Watson.188 Smith responded by
asserting that Bittner and the union were trying to stir up
dissension in the valley by attacking the Klan.
to create a "Herrin situation."

They were trying

Smith once again claimed that

the working miners were mostly natives and those who were
striking, "in overwhelming majority," were aliens.

He expressed

an idea undoubtedly held by many old-stock natives that Fairmont
and the region would be better off without this foreign
proletariat.

Under the "new order" of the American Plan, there

was a "closer relationship between the miner and his boss," Smith
wrote.189
On September 15, Van Bittner issued the second strike call

187Fairmont West Virginian. August 20, 1925.
188"Union speaker assails Klan," Fairmont Times, September 8,
1925.
189"Good Morning!" Fairmont Times, September 9, 1925.
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of 1925.

This strike, which was planned for the entire state,

would begin on September 25, and be kicked-off by a visit by
President Lewis.

Another series of meetings and rallies followed

in the drive to expand the membership.

Nonunion miners were

allowed to join the UMWA for one dollar.'190 Union organizers
secretly went in to the nonunion company towns or got hired to
work at the nonunion mines in order to recruit nonunion miners.
The recruits were promised rations and shelter, and were allowed
to remain at work until the strike began.

They were instructed

to line up more scabs to join the union.191 The nonunion miner
who dared to even talk about the union was taking a big risk,
however.

According to Ernest Mayle, the Simpson Coal Company

(which went nonunion in 1926) had "shysters" who would "lead you
to talk about the union" and then "send you down the river."

If

they found out you were a member of the UMWA, you would be fired
and "blackballed.1,192
The denial of free speech was not the only form of
repression adopted by the nonunion coal companies.

At some of

the mines, barbed-wire fences were erected around the mining
plants, machine guns and spotlights mounted on the tipples or at
other strategic locations, and well-armed mine guards or "yellow
dogs" hired to patrol the properties.

190"Bittner issues strike call,"
September 15.

To the union, the ultimate

Fairmont West Virginian.

191No name, March 12, 1925, C.E. Smith Papers, Box 4.
192John Stealy III, "Interview of Ernest Mayle."
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insult was that the companies, after trampling on the basic
rights of citizenship, erected huge American flags upon their
tipples.193 Not only did the nonunion companies force wage
reductions, but they also adopted other "rackets" to extract a
larger share of the value of the miner's labor.

Some of the

companies returned to paying by the car, rather than by the ton.
The "clean-up" system was put into effect at some mines.

Rather

than quitting work at his discretion, the miner was forced to
remain on the job until all the places which had been cut and
shot were loaded and cleaned-up.

Moreover, some of the companies

forced miners to trade at the company store in order to retain
their jobs.194
On September 26, strikers were joined by thousands of
working miners, who put down their picks and traveled to Fairmont
to march and hear John L. Lewis.

Every extra car of the West

Penn Traction Company was put into service as from fifteen to
thirty-five thousand people congregated.195 The march of ten
thousand miners and their families was the largest in the town's
history.

Featuring eight bands and forty flag bearers, the

193,,Dr. Broomfield assails law and coal operators," Fairmont
West Virginian. January 12, 1925; Stealy, "Interview of Ernest
Mayle;" Stealy, "Interview of Nick Demarra."
194Ibid.
195While the Fairmont Times estimated the crowd at 15,000, the
United Mine Workers' Journal Vol. 36, No. 19 (October 1, 1925)
wrote that 35,000 was a "conservative estimate."
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parade started on Fairmont Avenue and proceeded to the Old
Fairgrounds.196 In his speech, Lewis accused the operators of
"moral turpitude" for abrogating the Jacksonville Agreement, and
called on the federal government to intervene in enforcing it.
Since "the agreement was negotiated and executed with the aid and
cooperation of high government officials, ... the industry has a
right to expect that the moral influence and power of those same
officials will be utilized to preserve the integrity of the
agreement and to maintain, in the public weal, the tranquility of
the coal industry."

Lewis threatened a general strike of the

UMWA if someone at Washington did not make the companies live up
to the agreement.197
Observers thought the increased demand for coal caused by
the anthracite strike and the general revival of business might
help the UMWA strike by creating a labor shortage.

Many miners

who had come to the Fairmont Field from the Connellsville coke
field in 1922 and 1923 returned to Pennsylvania.

The surge in

demand for coke as an anthracite substitute had spawned boom
conditions there.

Every oven was in use and demand was so great

that coke was being made on the ground.

Bittner increased the

pressure on the operators, vowing to wage the campaign on "every
battle front."198 A series of mass meetings were held and
196"10,000 miners and supporters form huge line," Fairmont West
Virginian. September 26, 1925.
197"New Strike Move in West Virginia Launched with Parade and
Speeches," Coal Age. Vol. 28, No. 14 (October 1, 1925), 464.
198Moraantown Post. October 1, 1925.
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picketing continued.

Bittner claimed that four nonunion mines

were shut down and others crippled by the lack of manpower.199
The picketing had a pronounced effect at Monongah, where
Consol was attempting to open its mines.
the support of community leaders.

Here the strikers had

They were joined at the picket

line by Mayor Harry Bennett and several prominent women of the
town.

An open-shop miner at Monongah complained that the "so-

called scabs have no more protection in Monongah than a rabbit."
Even children were being used for picket duty, the miner wrote,
rather than being sent to school.200 When the sheriff served
the pickets an injunction, they "laughed in his face," and asked
him to define "schimmelback."

The pickets were hauled into the

court of Judge Meredith and charged with contempt.

The judge

asked them if they knew that the court had forbidden picketing.
One member of the Monongah band replied: "Yes, but I an a United
Mine Worker and I'll stay here on the picket line till I
die."201 On October 9, forty-nine of the pickets were found
guilty and ordered to report for sentencing on November 9.202
On November 10, the union received one of the worst setbacks in
the industrial struggle when Consol's No. 63 Monongah plant
dumped its first coal in 1925 with nonunion labor.

Monongah,

1" Fairmont West Virginian. October 3, 1925.
200"Good Morning!" Fairmont Times. October 5, 1925.
201The New York Times ran several photos of the Monongah
pickets in its October, 4, 1925 edition; "Contempt Cases," Fairmont
West Virginian. October 6, 1925.
202

it^g pickets found guilty," Fairmont Times. October 14, 1925.
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home of the UMWA's largest local in the region, center of
numerous UMWA meetings, marches, and conventions, had fallen.203
Bittner and the UMWA refused to give up the fight, however.
UMWA Local No. 4042 at Farmington resolved "to hold out here 20
years, if it takes it," in order to make the operators stick to
the Jacksonville Agreement.204 Coal Age reported that the
International was spending approximately one hundred thousand
dollars a month in the Fairmont field for relief.205 The
announcement on November 12 that Tropf Coal Company and Scatchell
Brothers on Scotts Run would resume work under union contract
strengthened the union in an area which was becoming its
base.206 John L. Lewis appealed once again to President
Coolidge to "maintain the morality and integrity" of the
Jacksonville Agreement.

The president's advisors responded

negatively, saying that there was no law under which the
government could proceed against the operators.207
Bittner asserted that the union would take care of those who
would continue the fight.

By the end of 1925, the organization

203"Monongah plant dumps coal today," Fairmont West Virginian.
November 10, 1925; "Monongah Mine to run open shop in West Virginia
Union Citadel," Coal Age. Vol. 28, No. 20 (November 12, 1925), 675.
204"Resolution
November 10, 1925.

of

Local

4042,"

Fairmont

West

Virginian.

205nvandal ism renewed in W. Va. Strike zone," Coal Age. Vol.
28, No. 24 (December 10, 1925), 816.
2°6"union miners return to work on Scotts Run," Fairmont West
Virginian. November 12, 1925.
207"Lewis finally makes direct appeal to President," Coal Age.
Vol. 28, No. 22 (November 26, 1924), 736.
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had provided for 1,197 families who had been evicted from company
houses.

The union housed these dispossessed people in barracks.

The union leased property from individuals, purchased the
construction materials, then had the strikers raise the
buildings.

The cost of construction ranged from $363.69 for the

one at Howesville (Preston County) to $15,747 for the complex at
Lumberport.

All were insured for a value slightly above

construction cost.

By the end of 1925 the union had built

barracks in forty-one different mining centers in the region.
Bittner, who called the barracks "towns," said that each complex
held from ten or fifteen to four hundred families.

Each of the

"towns" consisted of from two to eight dormitory buildings, each
with an outhouse and a few small outbuildings.

These were rude,

wooden buildings, many of them unpainted, with shed roofs.

The

interior of the buildings were divided to accommodate families.
Some furniture was also provided.

Since the union could not

obtain water or coal from the coal companies, it was necessary to
drill wells and lease coal mines to provide house coal.

The

barracks, which were "not equipped with the comforts of home,"
according to the United Mine Workers Journal. provided a safe
haven for the striking miners and their families.208

208UMWA International Executive Board, Minutes (March 22-29,
1926), 230, UMWA, International Archive; United Mine Workers1
Journal. Vol. 35, No. 24 (December 15, 1924), 6; Photograph
Scrapbook #1, Bittner Papers.
The UMWA also built barracks in
twenty-six places in the Kanawha field for 718 families; "Report on
Strike Situation in District 17," International Executive Board to
John L. Lewis, January 25, 1926, UMWA, International Archive,
District 17, 1925-1929.
400

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

A year of industrial strife was capped on New Year's Eve,
1925, when several men with high powered rifles fired into the
home of Frank A. Brooks, superintendent of Consol's Ida May mine.
Four men, who were later defended by UMWA attorneys, were
immediately arrested.

C.E. Smith claimed that the shots came

from nearby union barracks.209 Smith calculated that there had
been forty-six incidents of violence in 1925.210 Indeed, the
abrogation of the contract and the UMWA's refusal to re-negotiate
had unleashed a reign of violence which was probably just as
great as anything the region had undergone during the "border
wars" of the frontier period or the Civil War.

The turmoil

prompted the Fairmont Times to place on its mast head during most
of the 1925 the following: "Help the Times bring about an era of
Industrial Peace, prosperity, and goodwill in the Monongahela
Valley."
C.E. Smith thought that "with justice now in power," 1926
would bode well for the coal companies and the region.211 The
anthracite strike, which had started on September 1, 1925 had
opened up new markets for Fairmont coal.

By January, the

Monongahela Railway was shipping a "considerable" tonnage to New
York State in egg and nut sizes to serve as an anthracite

209"Attempted murder of women and
Fairmont Times. January 2, 1926.

children

at

Ida May,"

210C.E. Smith, "Blueprint Chart of Union and Nonunion Coal
Production, 1924-25, with lists of shootings and dynamitings, etc.
at various mines."
211"Chronicle of 1925," Fairmont Times. January 1, 1926.
401

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

substitute.212 Consolidation Coal Company had been trying to
penetrate this market for several years.

Consolidation Coal

Products Company, a subsidiary of Consol founded by C.W. Watson
in 1922, had begun developing an "artificial anthracite" in 1923
at its labs in Fairmont.

Experiments were conducted in low

temperature distillation, and a part of the Domestic Coke Works
at Fairmont were adapted to the process, which was known as
"Carbocoal."

The new smokeless product, Fairmont coal

briquettes, was ready for market in November, 1926, after the
anthracite strike was settled on February 12, 1926.213 Despite
the shipments on the Monongahela Railway and the development of
the artificial anthracite, the smokeless coal fields in southern
West Virginia reaped most of the benefits of the anthracite
strike and the general decline of the anthracite industry in the
late-1920s.
The onset of the British general coal strike on May 1
provided another marketing opportunity, however.

Fairmont coal

companies, particularly Consolidation Coal Company with its fleet
and overseas offices, had always done well in the export market.
Freed of the union, with the new markets, and an unusually severe
winter, coal companies of the Fairmont field set a production
record in 1926.

They shipped 32,520,246 tons, well above the

212Fairmont West Virginian. January 9, 1926.
213C.V. Mclntire, "Development in Low Temperature Distillation
of Coal at Fairmont, West Virginia," Proceedings of the
International Conference on Bituminous Coal (Pittsburgh: Carnegie
Institute of Technology, 1926), 650-663.
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1925 production record of 25 million tons.214 Yet, as Bittner
pointed out in an "Open Letter to the People of Northern West
Virginia," the increased production did not translate into
greater prosperity.

Although production was up, with coal prices

at about $1.50 per ton, sales realization was down.

As Bittner

put it:
Coal operators who really understand the situation will
tell you that there is 15 to 18 million tons to be
mined in northern West Virginia. It can be sold at
$2.50 per ton, which means 37 and one-half million to
44 million dollars per year. But, if the UMWA is
destroyed and 20 to 25 million tons are sold at $1.25
the sales would be 25 to 31 and one-fourth million
dollars.215
Bittner argued that a lean, efficient, unionized coal industry
would bring prosperity and be a "gain for the community."

The

only way to stabilize the industry, he asserted, was for all of
the coal companies to pay the union scale.

Reasoning as Hoover

and Lewis had at the onset of the Jacksonville agreement, Bittner
declared that full unionization would force the inefficient mines
out of the industry, and end the "system of destructive
competition."
Bittner also answered the assertion of C.E. Smith that

214Exact figures for 1925 are unavailable. The West Virginia
Department of Mines provided production totals based on the fiscal
year until 1924, when, because of a change in the mining laws, it
switched to the calendar year. The 1925 report of the Department
of Mines covered the period from July 1, 1924 to December 31, 1925.
The total of 25 million tons was obtained from the Fairmont Times,
January 1, 1926. The 1926 figure is from West Virginia Department
of Mines, Annual Report. 1950, 206.
215"An Open Letter to the People of Northern West Virginia,"
Fairmont West Virginian. March 23, 1926.
403

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

outsiders were attempting to control the destiny of northern West
Virginia:

it was "fake propaganda."

The vast bulk of the

tonnage produced in the state was sold outside and "70 percent of
the capital investment comes from outside."

It would be just "as

sensible to argue that no West Virginia mined coal should be sold
out ofstate, or no outside capital should be
sound the

invested as to

cry of 'outsiders' with relation to the UMWA.

We are

all Americans; state lines can not destroy the spirit of
fellowship."

Bittner condemned the nonunion system of low wages,

but this time for economic rather than humanitarian reasons.
"Low wages and depression go hand in hand.

Merchants are now

concerned that the men working in low wage nonunion mines are not
spending money in Fairmont, Clarksburg, Morgantown, and other
centers."

In a prophetic passage, Bittner warned that the coal

companies would,
continue for a time by borrowing money from banking
institutions, but, sooner or later, the wash is bound
to come and unless the bankers stop lending money to
coal companies that are unable to meet the payment on
their loans, the banks will crash— and all the people
of the community will suffer.216
Bittner was not the only person in Fairmont to sense that
something was wrong with the regional economy.

The West

Virginian editorialized that the town needed action by its
"leaders for progress."

The newspaper called upon C.W. Watson,

who had all but abandoned "Fairmont Farms," to come home because

216Ibid.
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"Fairmont needs you."217 In a letter to the Fairmont Times.
O.L. Harvey cited the mail order business and low wages as the
causes of the economic problem.

He blamed the coal companies for

shipping in "new people" from the South and Africa.

Harvey said

miners should work under the "American Plan instead of the
African Plan."218 Another letter writer from Morgantown was
more blunt.

Andy Lestak asserted that prosperity would return

when the "African and Alabama people are deported."

They had

been shipped here "from the cotton fields" to break the union,
not to produce coal.

They were taking "white men's jobs in the

mines," but they did not make enough money to buy anything in the
urban centers.

Now, the mining towns were "inhabited with negro

dope peddlers and bootleggers."219 A "colored reader" from
Carolina wrote to the newspaper to reply that there were as many
whites and foreigners as blacks working nonunion.

He suggested

that "prejudice holders" like Lestak should be deported.220
Judging from employment statistics for the period from 1924
to 1927, it is clear that the "colored reader" was correct.
Although there is enough evidence to indicate that blacks were
imported into the region as strikebreakers, the influx was not as
217"Fairmont's
February 17, 1926.

Call

to

Serve,"

Fairmont

West

Virginian.

218O.L. Harvey to C.E. Smith, February 22, 1926, Smith papers,
Box 27.
219Andy Lestak to C.E. Smith, March 3, 1926, Smith Papers, Box
27.
^"Colored reader" to C.E.
Papers, Box 27.

Smith,

March 16,

1926,
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Smith

great as some imagined.221 In 1925, the peak year of the
strike, black miners made up 2,580 (10.7 percent) of the total
mining labor force of 24,015 in the six-county Fairmont Field.
This was slightly less than in 1920, when the labor force of
26,275 men included 3,438 black miners (13.1 percent).

The

number of black miners increased to 3,200 in 1927, but this was
only 11.9 percent of the work force.

While Preston, Barbour,

Harrison, and Taylor counties reported decreases in the number of
black miners, Marion and Monongalia counties recorded increases
between 1924 and 1927.

The number of black miners in Marion

County went from 642 in 1924 to 1,606 in 1927, a 150 percent
increase.

In Monongalia County during the same period, the

number rose from 543 to 965, a 78 percent increase.

The

increases in Marion and Monongalia counties, which were the main
"battle zone" in the strike, along with the decreases in the
other four counties, suggests that blacks were used as
strikebreakers, but many were not retained by the companies after
the strike was broken and things returned to "normal.m222
In February, 1926 the UMWA called off the strike in southern
West Virginia.

Percy Tetlow wrote each local to tell union

miners to seek employment in nonunion mines, but retain their
union allegiance.

In March, the UMWA International Executive

221According to Abram Harris, blacks made up 33 percent of the
work force during the strike of 1925; Harris, Strike of 1925 in
Northern West Virginia. 24-27.
222"Nationalities of Persons Employed at the Mines and Coke
Ovens, By Counties," West Virginia Department of Mines, Annual
Report. 1923-1924, 1924-1925, 1926, 1927.
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Board decided to concentrate its efforts on northern West
Virginia.

Bittner urged the board to create a separate district

in northern West Virginia.223 At the International Executive
Board meeting in 1925 Bittner had raised the issue of a separate
district for northern West Virginia and stated,
... northern West Virginia is as much apart,
geographically at least, from southern West Virginia as
Indiana is. You can go from Indianapolis to Fairmont
just as quickly as you can go from Fairmont to
Charleston, and there are many, many miles intervening
where there is no coal territory at all, so the men in
the northern field are really separate and apart from
the organization in the southern part of West
Virginia.224
At the 1926 meeting, Bittner argued that the formation of the new
district would "have a good effect upon the membership of our
organization in northern West Virginia."

He made it clear,

however, that the board should not give "any thought to restoring
the autonomy" of the District:

"There is nobody that I know of,

either officer or member in northern West Virginia, that is
thinking about any such question as restoring the autonomy of the
organization in case a new District is formed ... ."

The board

unanimously approved a motion to set up the new district.225 As
a result District 31, composed of thirteen counties in northern
West Virginia, was formed on May 1, 1926.

James Studdard was

^International Executive Board. Minutes (March 22-29, 1926),
208-209, UMWA, International Archive.
224"District 17," International Executive Board. Minutes.
March, 1925, 255-256, UMWA, International Archive.
225International Executive Board, Minutes. March 22-29, 1926,
205-213, UMWA, International Archive.
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named acting President.226
While Bittner may have been correct in stating to the
International Executive Board that no one in District 31 desired
a restoration of autonomy, there was a dissident element within
the newly-formed district which resented the authority of the
International.

This dissident element was led by R.M. Williams,

chief organizer of the Monongalia County and former Vice
President of District 17.

The formation of District 31 and the

indiscretion of Williams, who had "taken-up" with Margaret
Fowler, wife of

miner Charles Fowler, provided Lewis and Bittner

with the opportunity to rid themselves of the troublemaker.227
When Bittner returned from Indianapolis following the
International Executive Board meeting, he presented Williams with
a letter from Lewis asking for his resignation.

Williams

responded by telling reporters that Bittner had "at last tramped
on a West Virginia snake who will fight back.”

He said that the

importation of UMWA organizers from other states had been a "big
mistake," and the miners had been "misrepresented, misinformed,
and mislead."

He would "throw down the gauntlet to Bittner and

226The thirteen counties were Monongalia, Marion, Harrison,
Preston, Taylor, Barbour, Randolph, Upshur, Lewis, Gilmer, Braxton,
and Webster; "Report on organization of District 31," April 2,
1926, UMWA, International Archive, District 31, 1926.
^Charles Fowler had informed John L. Lewis about Williams
"wronging him" on August 25, 1925; Charles Fowler to J.L. Lewis,
Bittner Papers, Box 7.
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his association ... and carry the fight to the rank and
file."228
Williams refused to resign, and on April 11, both he and
Margaret Fowler appeared along with UMWA representatives at a
union meeting at the Osage Theater in Scotts Run.

Williams

attacked John L. Lewis "in his throne," who wanted to "control
the love affairs of men in West Virginia."

Williams claimed that

the membership knew about his affair before he was elected to
Vice President of District 17 in 1923, and that he was fired two
days after the formation of District 31 because the International
feared an election.

Williams struck at the International

representatives— "Freemont Davis and Sanford Snyder of Ohio,
Studdard of Kentucky, Bittner from Pennsylvania, Billy Dineen of
Pennsylvania, Ish Barnes from Indiana, and so on."

They were

"jealous of one another, and lay in the hotels and drink liquor
and talk about each other."

Williams reiterated that he was "a

native West Virginian and going to fight for the miners of West
Virginia."

Williams told the miners to move out of the barracks,

and to organize under his leadership: "I am going to fight until
the ground is saturated with my blood or I run Van Bittner and
his International men out of this field."

Margaret Fowler told

the crowd, "I love R.M. Williams and hope to spend the rest of my
days loving him and fighting for unionism."

But, trouble started

when William Tumblazer, President of District 19 in Kentucky and
228"War within official ranks of miners' union threatened,"
Wheeling Intel1igencer. April 10, 1926; Fairmont West Virginian.
April 10, 1926.
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Tennessee, rose to speak.

Turnblazer communicated greetings from

"every union maii in Kentucky and Tennessee."

Williams

interrupted, "There aren't enough union men in those two states
to give the pass word."

After Tumblazer said, "Take that back,"

the two men started for each other, but bystanders prevented a
clash.229
Williams began a campaign to discredit the UMWA leadership
and enlist miners in the formation of a new union.

He and Fowler

produced a pamphlet setting out their views and requesting all
miners interested in working under a new agreement to notify
them.

They claimed that Bittner and his "gang of imported

villifiers and foreign dictators" were using fifty thousand
dollars a month to "disturb the peace of our people. ,,23°
Williams refused to relinquish his office, so a UMWA organizer,
Tony Teti, swore out a warrant against him.

On July 10, Williams

and Fowler were driving down Adams Street in Fairmont when they
spotted Teti in the Fanus Jewelry store.
store and walked up to Teti.

Williams entered the

He grabbed him, threw him to the

floor, and latched onto his ear with a vicious bite.

Teti's

female companion kicked Williams to get him to release his hold.
Fowler rushed in for the fight, brandishing a monkey wrench, but
police arrived to break it up.

Williams was later fined twenty-

^"Speech of R.M. Williams," N.d., Bittner papers, Box 7;
Morgantown Post. April 11, 1926.
^Fairmont West Virginian. April 24, 1926; R.M. Williams to
C.E. Smith, N.d., Smith papers, Box 27.
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five dollars for the attack.231
The Williams-Fowler onslaught was not the only problem that
Bittner and his organization faced.

In addition to this

challenge from the right, the UMWA was confronted by one from the
left.

In July an organizer from the International Workers of the

World, Ed Hayes, arrived in Morgantown to initiate an organizing
campaign.

Bittner asserted that the nonunion operators had

invited the IWW to the region, and wired Secretary of Labor Davis
requesting an investigation.232 The Woobly said that he had
come upon the requests of scores of industrial workers in the
area.233 There were also internal problems among the UMWA
strikers and organizers.

Fistfights periodically broke out at

several barracks, and there was a shooting at the Grant Town
barracks.234 Grant Town barracks were also raided on two
occasions by prohibition officers.235 Two of the four men
arrested at the Ida May barracks for shooting into the home of
Frank Brooks were convicted of attempted murder and violation of
the Red Man act.236 "B.X.," a company spy, reported infighting,

^ Fairmont West Virginian. July 10, 1926.
232Bittner charges operators with bringing in IWW," Fairmont
West Virginian. July 26, 1926.
^"Woobly is coming," Fairmont West Virginian. July 27, 1926.
^ Fairmont Times, January 4, 1926; January 21, 1926.
235"Union barracks at Grant Town raided," Fairmont West
Virginian. February 27, 1926; "Barracks yield complete still,"
Fairmont West Virginian. April 2, 1926.
^"Ida May case," Fairmont West Virginian. February 8, 1926.
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jealousy, and indifference among the organizers.

Quoting John

Hogan, one of the UMWA men, he wrote:
It does not take a stranger to notice the difference in
things at the Fairmont office. When Van A. Bittner is
away you can see them loafing and not doing a thing.
William Dineen has been drinking quite freely lately
and Freemont Davis, Studdard, and in fact all of them,
go out and leave the office as early as 4:30 p.m. But
when he is there they do not leave until 6:00 p.m., and
they get on the job before 11:00 a.m. It is a good
deal, and as Joe McCaffery says, 'The place would go to
H
if anything happened to Van A. Bittner.,237
The union's fortunes reached a new low in April, 1926 when
the three union coal companies in Scotts Run— ClevelandMorgantown, Connellsville By-Product Coal Company, and GilbertDavis— shut down their operations when their men refused to take
wage cuts.238 James Paisley instructed his general manager,
Stephen Arkwright, to close the Connellsville By-Product Coal
Company's four mines indefinitely because it was cheaper to buy
nonunion coal to fill orders than mine it themselves.239 In
response, Bittner tried a new tactic:

UMWA attorneys applied for

a writ of injunction to prevent the operators from abrogating
their contracts.

Unfortunately, the case was filed in the court

of Judge Lazelle, who refused to grant the injunction on the
grounds that "there was nothing he could take judicial notice

^"Fairmont, B.X. Reports," March 28, 1926, Smith Papers, Box
^"Pursglove men vote to refuse wage decrease," Fairmont West
Virginian. April 8, 1926; Ross, "The Scotts Run Coalfield," 32.
^Fairmont West Virginian. April 15, 1926.
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of."240 This was the case in which Lazelle's conflict of
interest— his royalties from the Paisley interests— was revealed.

The UMWA issued two strike calls in 1926.

Bittner issued

the first for July 5, a "Strike for Independence."

He

advertised the strike in a second "Open Letter to the People of
Northern West Virginia."

In this ad he used a moral, rather than

economic, argument to gain support.

Bittner scolded the nonunion

coal companies for the evictions of the "wives and little
children during the coldest days of winter." He asserted that
the money lenders were ejected from the Temple at Jerusalem for a
"far less dastardly act than that of the coal operators who
evicted the little children.1,241 Despite the appeal, the strike
had little impact except on Scotts Run, where two thousand miners
picketed.242 The second strike call was for October 18.

It was

even more ineffective than the first, in part because of
Bittner's absence.243 After having a gall bladder operation at
Cook Hospital in Fairmont on September 20, Bittner traveled to
his home at Crafton, Pennsylvania to recuperate.244
240"Lazelle refuses UMWA injunction," Fairmont West Virginian.
June 9, 1926.
241Fairmont West Virginian. July 1, 1926.
242"Leader disclaims reported failure of strike," Fairmont West
Virginian. July 8, 1926.
243"Few respond to strike," Fairmont West Virginian. October
18, 1926.
244"Bittner leaves Cook Hospital for home,"
Virginian. September 21, 1926.

Fairmont West
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The "Harvest" of the Jacksonville Agreement
As the end of the term of the Jacksonville agreement
approached in 1927, the UMWA held its International convention on
January 25 to establish policy for the upcoming negotiations with
the operators.

The union had incurred great losses in

membership, production from union mines, and territory since
1924.

There were no union mines operating south of the Mason-

Dixon line, and the open-shop movement had spread to District 5
(Pittsburgh). Still, the convention refused to take a backward
step.

It gave Lewis a raise in salary and ordered the scale

committee to stick with the Jacksonville scale in negotiations
with the operators at the upcoming Miami conference.245 The
operators of the Central Competitive field, besieged by
competition from the nonunion southern fields, pressed for
reductions at Miami.

They sought an "adjustable wage" which

could be altered in response to changes in the price of coal.
UMWA negotiators, headed by Bittner, refused to allow nonunion
wages in West Virginia to be the "standard for the industry" and
resisted the operators.

They claimed that an adjustment of

freight rates and scientific management and marketing would solve
the problem of southern competition.

The conference ended in a

failure; it adjourned on February 22 with no agreement.246 With
245The Monongah Band, introduced by Van Bittner as a "factor in
preserving the morale of the striking miners, was featured in the
convention; United Mine Workers1 Journal. Vol. 38, No. 3 (January
30, 1927), 30; Morgantown Post. February 2, 1926.
246United Mine Workers1 Journal. Vol.
1927), 1.

38, No. 7 (March 1,
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a strike eminent and all attempts at retaining the Central
Competitive field a failure, on March 28, the policy committee of
the union sanctioned the negotiation of district agreements, but
only on the basis of the Jacksonville scale.

There would be ,!no

backward step."247
In Fairmont, Bittner called for convention of District 31.
At the Monongah convention, the delegates passed a resolution
endorsing the actions of the International and issued a call for
operators in Northern West Virginia to meet for a wage
conference.

The delegates, according to Bittner, also "pledged

their lives and fortunes in the battle for industrial
freedom."248 To gain public support, Bittner placed five twopage advertisements in various newspapers of the region during
the week from March 24 to March 31.249 These ads provided a
clear and simple statement of the union's position from the
economic, political, and humanitarian points of view.

On March

31, after the operators failed to acknowledge his the call for a

247|,Union urges agreement to operate mines," New Dominion.
March 28, 1927.
248.,Union plans campaign for organization," Morgantown Post.
March 18, 1927.
249.,Let the Non-Union Coal Operators Call Off Their Dogs of
War," Morgantown Post. March 24, 1927; "400 Native-Born American
Mothers, Wives, and Daughters of Striking Miners Tell Why They are
Fighting for the Miners' Union in Northern West Virginia,"
Morgantown Post. March 25, 1927? "Miners Give Terrible Toll to
Serve American People," Morgantown Post. March 26, 1927; "UMWA and
the Business Man," Morgantown Post. March 28, 1927; "An Appeal to
the Men Working in the Nonunion Mines in Northern West Virginia to
Join the UMWA," Morgantown Post. March 30, 1927.
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joint conference, Bittner declared a strike on the following day.
On the eve of the strike, the various miners' associations
of the Consolidation Coal Company, which were formed in 1925 and
1926 under the Rockefeller plan as alternatives to the UMWA,
joined to place an advertisement in the newspapers opposing the
strike.

The advertisement countered the UMWA arguments, which

were based on universal principles, with a regional appeal:
Coal Miners! Read This! Day-Dreaming— That's All.
The Out-of-State gang of actors are at it again. The
present labor organization was formed when the UMW
practically abandoned 28,000 miners, after all offices
of that organization who were West Virginians were
kicked out and their places handed to carpetbaggers
from the Central Competitive District. Native West
Virginia officers, many of them, are now with the new
organization. We oppose outside interference and
believe in the right to work. The new organization has
brought new employment and contracts, better living
conditions, checkweighmen, good fellowship, and freedom
to purchase where we want.25
The strike call went largely unheeded, except in Scotts Run where
production was cut somewhat.

Barely one-quarter of the miners

even observed the eight-hour day holiday on April 1.
Although the UMWA would remain in the Fairmont Field, the
end of the term of the Jacksonville agreement in March, 1927
brought to a close an eventful and disruptive chapter in the
region's history.

To cap it off— and to mock those who foresaw

peace and prosperity in the future— New England Fuel &
Transportation Company's No. 3 mine at Everettville in southern
Monongalia County blew up on April 30, 1927, killing ninety-seven
miners.

The union accused the company of negligence, of hiring

250Moraantown Post. March 31, 1927.
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inexperienced miners and ignoring safety laws in the pursuit of
high production.
sabotage.

The coal operators accused the union of

Following an investigation by the coroner and Attorney

General Howard Lee, who rushed to the scene with Governor Gore,
it was determined that the company was at fault.
adequately rock-dusted the mine.

It had not

The superintendent of the mine

testified that for months prior to the explosion he had tried to
secure an appropriation for rock-dusting.251
Although striking union miners cannot be blamed for the
disaster, those at Everettville expressed no remorse at the loss
of life.

As Lee wrote,
It was there that I saw exhibited that snarling animal
hatred felt by members of the miners' union for
nonunion miners. Not far from the scene of the
tragedy, on privately owned land, was a large barrack
like structure built by the union to house strikers and
their families. Apparently, these former workers
believed that the explosion was a form of divine
punishment meted out to the scab miners who had taken
their jobs. And, with a heartlessness next to
savagery, they and their wives would pass nearby and
curse and jeer the grief-stricken women and children as
they hopefully waited; nor did the death announcement
calm their fury or abate their hatred. As bodies were
brought to the surface, they sang ribald songs, and
frequently used such vile utterances as "There's
another_______ strikebreakin' scab ___ -_________
gone straight to hell."252

251Lee, Bloodletting in Appalachia. 154. Rock-dusting, which
was initiated in the Fairmont field in the early-1920s but not
required by mining statutes until later, is the process of
spreading ground limestone on all of the surfaces of a mine by hand
or by pneumatic machinery. The covering prevents coal dust from
becoming air-borne, thereby decreasing the chances for ignition and
an explosion.
^Ibid., 154-155.
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Everettville was the third mining disaster to occur in the
Fairmont field during the period of the Jacksonville agreement.
Mine No. 41 of Bethlehem Mines Corporation blew on March 17,
1925, completely destroying the mine and taking a toll of thirtyfive lines.

The company, as well as C.E. Smith, suspected that

the mine had been blown up by someone who had planted a
nitroglycerin bomb inside.

The union claimed that the disaster

was caused by the employment of inexperienced scabs and a lack of
safety precautions.

The coroner's jury concluded that the cause

of the disaster was a slate fall that knocked a steel beam into a
motor trolley wire, igniting a pocket of gas.

But Howard Lee

concluded that the "circumstances strongly confirmed the
suspicions of the operators."253
On January 14, 1926 the Jamison No. 8 mine at Farmington
exploded, killing nineteen miners.

Fortunately, the mine had

been sprinkled with water the day before, so the blast did not
spread to both sections of the mine.

As a result, twenty-one men

survived the blast and were rescued.

Once again, accusations

were made against the coal company and the union, but nothing was
proven.254
Just as much as Susan Rock, Roy Tobin and John Kello, the
151 men who died in these three disasters were casualties of the
mine war during the Jacksonville "agreement."

As Van Bittner

^Ibid., 143-153.
^"Jamison inquest concluded today," Fairmont West Virginian.
February 26, 1926.
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stated, not a single mine explosion occurred in the seven years
prior to 1924.255 Notwithstanding Howard Lee's assertions, it
is doubtful that anyone will ever know who or what caused the
carnage.

Both coal operators and union were responsible for

practices which placed miners' lives in jeopardy.

The coal

companies hired strikebreakers with little or no experience in
mining, and pushed their men to produce more and more.

With

lower wages, miners had to produce more in order to make a decent
living.

As a result, safety precautions were often neglected.

On the other hand, and although the UMWA leadership did not
condone it, there were union militants who were capable of such
murderous acts.

Aside from the question of culpability, it must

be recognized that a spirit of cooperation and mutual respect
between management and labor is necessary to maintain safe
working conditions in the mines.

Clearly, such a spirit did not

exist from 1924 to 1927.

255Morqantown Post. March 30, 1927.
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CHAPTER 9: COLLAPSE AND REFORMATION
God gives us this world to enjoy, he did not
give it to this man or that man, but to all
his children. And there should be enough for
us all. He leaves the will of man at perfect
liberty. He neither constrains nor compels.
We must, ourselves, know right and wrong, and
between the two we must choose. And if we
fail to do the right thing, we just injure
ourselves. We invite our own miseries, but
remember God will not tolerate too long a
burden of human iniquity. Nature destroys
what is putrescent— and covers it with fresh
earth on which healthier things may grow.
Why can't we see our faults and acknowledge
them, and be united once again under the
Stars and Stripes.
— Margaret Fowler, ca.
19271
Like many others, oracle, "fallen woman," and union
organizer Margaret Fowler recognized the breakdown in society
which had come after three years of industrial strife.

A wrong

choice had been made, and someone must shoulder the burden of
human iniquity.

There was clearly a need for fresh earth, for

redemption and reform, but the question which remained was who
would be the redeemer.

C.E. Smith, the "mouthpiece" of the

nonunion coal operators, thought a return to the traditional
values of the Morgans, the Pricketts and other early settlers,
along with the expulsion of the UMWA, its leader, Van Bittner
(the "Simon Girty of his day"), and the foreign proletariat which
it supported— would reunite society and usher in a new era of
prosperity.2 He was seconded by Judge Schwench and the Klan,

’Margaret Fowler to C.E. Smith, n.d. ca. 1927, C.E. Smith
Papers, Box 29.
2"Good Morning!" July 16, 1926.
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who looked to the "invisible choir" to cleanse the valley of
iniquity.3 Unwilling to acknowledge defeat, Van Bittner and the
UMWA continued to believe that deliverance would come only
through acceptance of the union gospel.
Neither the Klan nor the UMWA were well positioned to act as
redeemers, however.

Plagued by scandals, the Klan declined as

quickly as it rose.

By 1928, the organization had faded in the

nation and region; its activities were no longer reported in the
region's newspapers.

The power of the UMWA was waning as well.

The miners' union continued to suffer great losses in territory
and membership.

By the fall of 1927 not only northern West

Virginia but also District 6 (Ohio) and District 5 (Pittsburgh),
which had been union since 1898, had fallen.4 The seventythirty ratio in production between union and nonunion territory
which had prevailed before Jacksonville had been reversed.5
Still, Lewis held to the no-backward-step policy.

In October,

1927 the operators in Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, and the Southwest
(Missouri, Oklahoma, Kansas, and Arkansas) signed "truce"

3"Judge Schwench speaks at Kiwanis Club luncheon," Fairmont
West Virginian. November 11, 1925.
4The UMWA made a determined effort to retain District 5. The
International suspended the autonomy of the district and placed
Vice President Philip Murray in charge of the strike. Murray, who
used Van Bittner at a speaker in several rallies, had to contend
with the Pennsylvania Coal and Iron Police, and the district was
lost in late-1925 and 1926. "Report of Vice President Murray on
Strike Situation," International Executive Board, Minutes, August
15-19, 1927, 113-136, UMWA, International Archive.
5"The Winning Complex," Black Diamond, Vol. 79, No. 7 (August
13, 1927), 18.
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agreements with the UMWA to end the strike.

The agreements

provided for a continuance of the Jacksonville scale until March
31, 1928.

A joint wage commission was set up to investigate

conditions and come up with recommendations for a wage agreement
for the following year.6 In February, 1928 the Illinois wage
commission reported that the state's coal was too expensive to
compete with nonunion coal and recommended a wage reduction of
twenty percent.

Lewis refused to accept its findings and called

another strike for April, 1928.

The result was the breakdown of

the UMWA's stronghold in Illinois and the Midwest.

Many northern

Illinois miners left the union and accepted work at lower
wages.7 The miners of Iowa and Missouri formed a new union, the
Southwest Miners' Association, which accepted a wage reduction.8

Challenges to the UMWA
By 1928 Lewis and the International was besieged by
rebellion from both the right and left.

As Maier Fox explains,

the decline of the coal industry "and of the power and prestige
of the United Mine Workers, ... had severe internal

6"The Hatchet is Buried," United Mine Workers' Journal. Vol.
38, No. 20 (October 15, 1927) , 1; "Illinois and Iowa Sign Trace
Agreement," Black Diamond. Vol. 79, No. 15 (October 8, 1927), 1-2;
"Strike Settled in Indiana and Southwest," Black Diamond, Vol. 79,
No. 16 (October 15, 1927), 8-9.
7Fo x , United We Stand, 269.
8"0perators Sign with New Union in Iowa," Black Diamond. Vol.
80, No. 7 (February 18, 1928), 1.
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repercussions.1,9 Lewis was opposed on the right by the various
regional unions, such as the Southwest Miners' Association, the
Federated Miners' Union of Western Pennsylvania, and the Mine
Workers' Associations of Northern West Virginia, which were
willing to abandon the no-backward-step policy and accept wage
reductions in order to get back to work.

The seeds of this

revolt were sowed with Lewis's authoritarian policy of taking
over district governments.

The leaders of these regional unions

were, for the most part, former UMWA district officials, such as
W.N. Rowan, Commissioner, and John Forinash, President, of the
Mine Workers' Association of Northern West Virginia, both former
District 17 officials who were disenchanted with the UMWA.
In addition to Rowan, Forinash, and R.M. Williams, other
rival unionists from the right challenged Bittner's authority in
District 31 after 1927.

In June, 1927 Frank McCartney of

Clarksburg, who was suspended from the UMWA in 1926 ostensibly as
an economy measure, invited Frank Keeney, former president of
District 17, to Shinnston in order to organize a new union in
West Virginia.10 The meeting, held on June 5 at the Rex
Theater, was crashed by about one hundred striking union miners
from barracks at nearby Viropa and Meadowbrook.

McCartney and

Keeney had taken the precaution of notifying the state police,
and eight attended the meeting to prevent disorder.

Keeney

9Fo x , United We Stand. 274.
10Frank McCartney to Van Bittner, October 8, 1926, Van Bittner
Papers, Box 7.
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accused the UMWA of abandoning union miners in the state and not
providing enough relief.

Between catcalls and the setting-off of

stink bombs by the men from the barracks, Keeney told the crowd
of five hundred that he had organized about five thousand miners
in southern West Virginia and was creating a new West Virginia
union which would set wages independently of the UMWA.

Before

Keeney could finish his speech the UMWA men stormed the stage.
Keeney, McCartney, and their five on-stage followers were
protected from the mob by the state policeman, who surrounded
them.

They were escorted out of the theater, placed in taxi

cabs, and rushed to Clarksburg.11
The challenge to the UMWA from the left was at first led by
John Brophy, who attempted to unseat Lewis in the 1926
presidential campaign.

Brophy's "Save the Union" campaign blamed

Lewis for the union losses, called for nationalization of the
mines, the creation of a labor political party, and a nationwide
organizing campaign.

Brophy lost the disputed election, but the

Save the Union campaign continued, drawing strength from the
widespread disenchantment with the UMWA.

In 1927 the incipient

movement was transformed and radicalized through the influence of
the Progressive Miners of Pennsylvania and William Z. Foster and
the Trade Union Educational League, which was linked to the Third
International.

Denied the opportunity to change UMWA policy by

Lewis's dictatorial policy, the leaders of the Save the Union
movement concluded that the UMWA was not worth saving.

They

11"Informant Report," June 5, 1927, Smith Papers, Box 6.
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created the National Miners Union on September 1, 1928.12
Drawing on the virtual army of striking or unemployed miners in
the northern fields, the new union gained thousands of recruits
in western Pennsylvania, Illinois, and southeastern Ohio, as well
as the anthracite districts.
The NMU, as one of its founders, Pat Toohey, related, was a
class conscious, Marxist union which, unlike the UMWA, was
willing to fight the government and overturn capitalism.13 With
the financial support of Communists, as well as of intellectuals
such as John Dos Passos and Theodore Dreiser, the organization
defied injunctions and fought for free speech.
posed a formidable challenge to the UMWA.

By 1928, the NMU

In addition to its

base of strength in the north, the NMU made inroads into
Bittner's territory in the Fairmont field.

According to Toohey,

the NMU organized locals at Scotts Run, where they had "quite an
effective organization," at Reedsvilie, and at Monongah.

Bittner

fought the "raving Reds" with the same technique that he used

12Fo x , United We Stand. 290-293.
13In a 1967 address at the Cathedral of Learning at the
University of Pittsburgh, Pat Toohey provided a short autobiography
and a history of the NMU.
Toohey was an Irishman born in
anthracite country. Both of his grandfathers were members of the
secret organization, the Molly Maguires.
He joined the UMWA in
1919, and in 1927 became secretary of the Save the Union committee.
He was one of the organizers of the National Miners Union in
September, 1928. Toohey claimed as the NMU's greatest achievement
the elimination of the injunction, the direct result of a mass
meeting at New Kensington, Pennsylvania in 1928 where he and John
Brophy were clubbed and arrested.
Their cause was embraced by
Clarence Darrow and the liberal press, and led to a movement which
resulted in the introduction of the Norris-Laguardia Act in 1931.
Pat Toohey Tapes, West Virginia and Regional History Collection.
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against Keeney and McCartney: their meetings were stormed and
disrupted.14
Lewis and the UMWA continued to pour hundreds of thousands
of dollars into District 31 to support Bittner's effort.

As its

last foothold in the state, Lewis believed that the International
must do "everything humanly possible to maintain our Union in
West Virginia."15 Bittner told the IEB in 1927 that if the
organization gave up the battle there, the state would be closed
and "you could not get in there under any circumstances.1,16
Lewis and the International concentrated their dwindling
financial resources on District 31.

According to Bittner's

testimony at the Senate ICC hearings in March, 1928, the
International spent one million dollars in northern West Virginia
from 1924 to 1928.

Although a full financial report of this

period is not available, the UMWA's official records reveal a
level of support for District 31 well above that of other
districts.

From March 22, 1926 to November 27, 1927 District 31

was provided with $335,000 of aid from the International.

This

was seventy-five percent of the International's expenditure of

14Ibid. Toohey had some harsh words for Van Bittner. Bittner
was a "shady, sleazy, rat-like figure" who was pushed out of
District 5 for being a "company man." He received a huge amount of
money as special representative of the International at Fairmont,
and "lived the life of a secure squire," but he "organized nothing-nothing."
^International Executive Board, Minutes, November 20-27, 1927,
333, UMWA, International Archive.
^International Executive Board, Minutes, November 22-27, 1928,
63, UMWA, International Archive.
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$446,072 on aid to all districts during this period, and fortynine percent of the International's total expenditure of $679,864
on all activities.

During the same period, District 5

(Pittsburgh) received only a $50,000 loan from the
International.17 Clearly, the International had given Bittner's
work the highest priority.

This is reflected not only in its

expenditures, but also in the space provided to the struggle in
the pages of the United Mine Workers' Journal.

The "Battle for the Interstate Commerce Commission"
Due to its losses in territory and membership and the rise
of rival unions, the UMWA found it increasingly difficult to
fight the open-shop forces in the field after the failure of the
1927 strike.

The union turned increasingly to the federal

government, particularly the Interstate Commerce Commission, for
relief.

Its efforts led to a full-scale investigation of

conditions in the coal fields of Northern West Virginia, Western
and Central Pennsylvania, and Eastern Ohio by the Senate
Interstate Commerce Commission in 1928.

Seeking to defend the

union mines of the Central Competitive field from nonunion
competition, the UMWA also played a role in the political battles
of the late-1920s at the ICC revolving around the Lake Cargo rate
cases.

Both developments drew national attention to the "West

Virginia situation" and rejoined the sectional battle between the
17"Statement of Expenditures Since Board Meeting of March 22,
1926," International Executive Board, Minutes. November 20-27,
1927, 332-333, UMWA, International Archive.
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northern and southern coal states.
The Lake trade involved the rail shipment of coal to the
Great Lakes (mainly Lake Erie) and then its transhipment to
markets in the Northwest and Canada.

The market, which amounted

to about thirty million tons in the 1920s, was lucrative.
Shipments to the lakes were undertaken in the summer and early
fall months, a time when other markets were sluggish.

Thus, the

lake trade provided coal companies with the opportunity to
operate their mines in this otherwise dull period.

The Lake

Cargo coal rate controversy, which had first become an issue in
1912, was a battle for markets between southern and northern coal
producing regions.

Coal-producing regions, which allied with one

and other to form sections, competed for a share of the market.
The competing sections fought their battles through the
Interstate Commerce Commission, which since 1910 had been granted
the authority to suspend rate increases.
With the overexpansion of the coal industry in the 1920s,
the competition for the Lake market became intense.

This

competition was largely based on the price rather than the
quality of coal.

Depending upon its point of origin, one-third

to one-half of the price which consumers paid for coal was its
carrying charge.18 Because of their proximity to the Lakes, the
18Since 1922 the Fairmont rate had been $1.81, Pittsburgh's
$1.66, Ohio's $1.63, Kanawha's $1.91, and Pocahontas' $2.06.
Mansfield, The Lake Cargo Coal Rate Controversy. 264. In 1925 the
Coal Age average spot price for coal was $2.06; Simon, "The
Development of Underdevelopment," Table 16: "Average Spot price and
Average Amount Received per Ton for Bituminous Coal, 1906-1929,"
62.
428

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Pittsburgh and Ohio producers had been granted a differential of
from eighteen to forty cents over West Virginia shippers.

The

issue in Lake Rate cases was the differential (rather than the
total freight charge) between shippers in the northern and
southern sections.
The UMWA's involvement in the Lake Cargo case was
necessarily limited by the fact that it was not a shipper, and
thus could not appear and testify before the ICC.

However, the

International exercised its influence to support the eastern Ohio
and Pittsburgh operators as they petitioned the ICC in 1925 for a
reduction of their lake rates.19 The ICC denied the petition of
the northern operators for a rate change in a decision rendered
on July 16, 1925.20 Fairmont and southern operators breathed a
sign of relief.21

The Lake Cargo case was reopened in July,

1926, however, after the rapid shift in business from the mostly
union north to the nonunion south was fully recognized.

The UMWA

took a deeper interest in the 1926 case, hiring a "confidential
representative," K.C. Adams, to work with the various northern
operators' groups to synchronize the "influence of all of these
groups to bring the highest degree of pressure upon the

19"Statement of John L. Lewis," International Executive Board,
Minutes. October 20-27, 1926, 247, UMWA, International Archive.
20Mansfield, The Lake.Cargo Coal Rate Controversy. 88-96.
21"Lake Rate decision
Virginian. July 25, 1925.

pleases

operators,"

Fairmont
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West

Interstate Commerce Commission."22
Hearings for this retrial of the Lake Cargo case continued
through 1926 to May, 1927.
attention.

The case attracted wide public

The economic competition between the northern and

southern coal fields was translated into a sectional political
controversy.

The Pittsburgh Chamber of Commerce became the main

voice of the northern interests, while southern shippers found
their main support in the Charleston area, where public meetings
and newspaper editorials expressed indignation at the age-old
conspiracy of the UMWA and the union operators to "lay their
fields idle and destroy their markets."

The ICC, purportedly an

impartial body, was subjected to political pressure from both the
north and the south.23
The southern interests won the first battle in the 1926-1927
ICC fight.

The issue was the nomination by President Coolidge of

Cyrus E. Woods, a Pennsylvanian and former counsel for the
Pittsburgh Coal Company, for membership in the ICC in December,
1926.

The nomination was seen by southerners as an attempt to

give an additional vote for lower Lake cargo rates from
Pittsburgh.

The UMWA supported Woods; West Virginia's senators,

Guy Goff, Republican, and Matthew Neely, Democrat, led the fight
against him, both at the Senate ICC hearings and on the Senate

^"Statement of John L. Lewis," International Executive Board,
Minutes, October 20-27, 1926, 250, UMWA, International Archive.
Mansfield, The Lake Cargo Coal Rate Controversy. 106-109.
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floor.

Senator Neely of Fairmont was the principal

inquisitor.24 He expressed utter contempt at the attempt to
"pack the Interstate Commerce Commission so that a differential
can be established so high that it will give Pennsylvania an
exclusive monopoly upon the soft coal industry of this country
—

.,,2S Despite wire-pulling by President Coolidge, the full

Senate rejected the nomination.
in the vote.

Party affiliation meant little

Republican Senators from the southern lake cargo

coal states— Goff of West Virginia, Sackett and Ernst of
Kentucky, and Weller of Maryland, joined with Democrats to defeat
Woods.26
In May, 1927 the ICC rendered its decision on the
reconsideration of Lake Cargo case.

In a split decision, the

commission reduced the Pittsburgh and southeastern Ohio lake
rates by twenty cents, half of the reduction asked.

If southern

shippers were upset about the increase in the differential, they
were incensed by the commission's dicta that southern carriers
"would not be justified in reducing the present rates from those
districts."

Although this was an opinion, not a ruling, it set

off cries of government coercion from southerners.

The ICC,

which was set up in part to obtain relief from high rates, had

24Ibid., 174-175.
^"Statement of Honorable M.M. Neely," U.S. Senate Committee
on Interstate Commerce, Hearing on the Nomination of Cvrus E. Woods
to be a Member of the Interstate Commerce Commission (Washington:
GPO, 1927), 128.
26Mansfield, The Lake Cargo Coal Rate Controversy. 176.
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set a precedent by advising against a reduction in freight
rates.27 The southern carriers, the Chesapeake & Ohio, Norfolk
& Western, and Louisville & Nashville, defied the commission's
dicta and reduced rates by twenty cents.

The B&O refused to give

the full reduction to Fairmont shippers, granting them only a cut
of ten cents.

On August 16, the ICC suspended the southern rate

reductions for six months and ordered the carriers to justify
them.

Thus began I^_ & S_^ Docket 2967. Lake Cargo Coal from

Kentucky, etc.. a second retrial of the 1925 case and the third
Large Cargo Case in five years.28
Victorious in the 1927 Lake Cargo case if not in the field,
the UMWA took other steps which led to the intervention of the
ICC.

The first step of the journey to the Senate ICC hearings in

1928 was taken in District 31.

On October 30, 1927 a convention

of the members of District 31 was held in Fairmont to rejuvenate
the campaign.

The convention was addressed by Philip Murray, who

spoke on the strike in western Pennsylvania, and Bittner, who
promised to renew the organization effort.

In announcing a new

tactic, Bittner, who since 1925 had maintained that the
businessmen of the region were "secretly with us," cited a recent
article in the Manninoton Press which condemned the "pluck-me
company stores" and the "closed company town."

The article

decried the no trespassing signs at the mining towns which kept

27Ibid., 109-114.
28Ibid., 116? "I.C.C. Suspends Freight Reductions,"
Diamond, Vol. 79, No. 8 (August 20, 1927), 15.
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Black

fanners from huckstering their produce to miners and called for
an elimination of the company stores.

Bittner told the

convention that the organization would mount a petition drive to
enlist the active support of businessman to get the operators to
the bargaining table.29
By the end of November, the UMWA had a total of 1,066
signatures of business and professional people from twenty-one
urban centers in the region.30 Barbers, merchants, plumbers,
grocers— the petit bourgeoisie— signed the petition.

Since this

group had traditionally supported the goals of the development
elite and some had joined the Klan's "invisible choir," the
petition drive signalled the beginning of a change in loyalties.
The signers blamed the nonunion coal operators and the reduced
wages of the past three years for the demoralization of business
and the general depression.

They condemned the fact that the

mining towns were closed and "armed guards prevented merchants
^"Says Union is Stronger," Black Diamond, Vol. 79, No. 17
(October 22, 1927), 6; United Mine Workers1 Journal. Vol. 38, No.
19 (October 1, 1927), 9.
30The twenty-one urban centers and number of signatures from
each:
Brownton-Galloway-Rosemont - 39; Tunnelton-Newburg - 31;
Kingwood-Howesville - 31; Star City - 29; Morgantown - 94;
Lowesville - 9; Monongah - 35; Grant Town-Fairview - 30; Rivesville
- 41; Barrackville-Farmington - 53; Mt. Clare-Lost Creek - 24;
Simpson - 6; Philippi - 45; Wilsonburg-Reynoldsville - 12; Fairmont
- 231; Clarksburg - 73; Grafton - 138; Scotts Run - 22; Shinnston 62; Lumberport - 26; and Worthington - 35. The occupations, as
represented in signatures from Worthington:
dentist, transfer,
barber, merchant, garage, confectioner, druggist, taxi, constable,
restaurant, banker, physician, service station cashier, pool hall,
auto dealer, feed store, theater, plumber, Pepsi company, Marion
Glass, grocer, shoe repair, jeweler, lawyer, hardware, cleaner,
salesman, furniture, and funeral home; UMWA, International Archive,
District 31, 1927.
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and other business men from soliciting trade, thus compelling the
miners —

to purchase all of the necessaries of life in the

company store."

The signers resolved:

That three years of low wages has demonstrated that
prosperity and happiness and contentment can only come
to the mining fields of Northern West Virginia through
a rehabilitation of higher wages, better working
conditions and more freedom in the mining camps and we
believe this can be brought about only through proper
negotiations between the coal operators and the United
Mine Workers of America, ... .
The signers asked Governor Gore, U.S. Senators Guy D. Goff and
M.M. Neely, and Secretary of labor James J. Davis to use their
influence to bring the operators and miners together to negotiate
a wage scale and end the strike.32 The United Mine Workers
Journal heralded the petition drive as a call for a "new deal in
the coal industry."33
The petitions were forwarded to the state's political
leadership, who did nothing, and Secretary of Labor Davis.
Davis, upon the urging of the UMWA, issued a call on December 10
for the bituminous coal operators of Ohio, Western Pennsylvania,
and northern West Virginia to meet with union representatives at
Washington on December 13.

Davis telegraphed the operators'

association in each of the coal fields, stating that the
31Ibid.
32Ibid.
■^This is the first use of the familiar 1930s term, "new deal,"
as far as this researcher has been able to ascertain. The Journal
had earlier noted that miners had been granted a "square deal" by
T. Roosevelt and a "raw deal" by the Republican administrations in
the 1920s. United Mine Workers Journal. Vol. 38, No. 24 (December
15, 1927), 13.
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conference would be a "frank discussion of problems affecting the
mining industry," emphasizing that the parley was called "with
the knowledge of the President."

The Fairmont Coal Operators*

Association, successors to the Northern West Virginia Coal
Operators Association, citing the record coal production in 1927,
answered that it "respectfully declined to attend."

The

Monongahela Coal Operators' Association, which was reformed in
1926, answered likewise.

Only a few operators, representing a

annual production of 10,800,000 tons, responded to Davis's call
and came to Washington on December 13.

A single operator from

the Fairmont field, F.R. Long, who had three mines near
Reynoldsville, attended.

In his opening statement, Davis

admirably summed up the situation in the coal industry:
Every one inside and outside the coal industry knows
what is wrong with it. The industry suffers from
overdevelopment and over production. This means for
the operators keen competition and uncertain profits.
For the mine workers it means intermittent work and a
wage controversy. The truth is that operators and
miners are both victims of the same set of conditions.
The trouble has been that instead of fighting the
conditions, each party has been fighting the other.34
Due to the lack of attendance by the principal operators, Davis
recessed the conference.

He later recommended that the mine

owners appoint a director or "czar," someone who would be "what
Judge Landis is to organized baseball," to eliminate excess
capacity and lead the industry "out of the swamp of depression."
If the mine owners failed to regulate their industry, Davis said

34"Davis Conference Poorly Attended," Black Diamond, Vol. 79,
No. 25 (December 17, 1927), 5-6.
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that the government would be left with no alternative but to
nationalize the mines.35
The failure of the major coal operators to show at the
Washington conference so angered Senator Hiram Johnson of
California that in January, 1928 he called for an investigation
by the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce.

The full Senate

then adopted Resolution 105, authorizing the committee to,
make a thorough and complete investigation of the
conditions existing in the coal fields of central
Pennsylvania, western Pennsylvania, West Virginia and
Ohio; also to ascertain whether the railroad companies
and their officials have been or are, by agreement or
otherwise, endeavoring to depress the labor cost of
coal produced by union mine labor; also whether in the
said coal fields wage contracts have been abrogated or
repudiated, whether defenseless men, women, and
children, without cause, have been evicted from their
homes, and generally what has transpired in said coal
fields.36
As the Senate investigations commenced in February, 1928,
the "battle for the ICC" reached its climax.

The final argument

of the Lake Cargo Coal from Kentucky. etc.. the second retrial,
commenced in the same month.

The West Virginia operators

enlisted the aid of Governor Gore, who wrote letters to governors
of the northwestern states, Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, North
Dakota and South Dakota, asking for their support and claiming a
"mutuality of interests" in retaining the southern rate
reduction.

Gore also appeared before the ICC in November, 1927.

35"Coal Industry Needs Czar," Black Diamond, Vol. 79, No. 26
(December 24, 1927), 1.
^Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce, Conditions in the
Coal Fields, 1: 1-2.
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Gore locked horns with Governor Pinchot of Pennsylvania, who
appealed to the ICC against the southern reductions.37 Lewis
and the UMWA supported Pinchot.

On February 21, 1928, the ICC

found that the proposed southern rates had "not been justified,"
and ordered them canceled.38 The northern operators had won
round three.
While the final arguments were being heard for the third
lake cargo case and the Senate investigations were proceeding,
yet another chapter of the ICC saga unfolded in the Senate
chambers. This was the campaign to "get" Commissioner of the
ICC, J.J. Esch, author of the 1927 lake cargo decision.

Esch's

term expired at the end of 1927, and Coolidge submitted his name
to the Senate for another term.

As in the Woods case, Senator

Neely, along with Senator Jim Reed of Missouri, led the
opposition.

Unlike Woods, Esch was a highly respected and

effective public servant.

He did not, however, handle Neely's

interrogation well before the Senate committee.

Esch was

rejected by the committee, and then by the full Senate on March
17, 1928, another victim of lake cargo politics. As Harvey
Mansfield asserted, the Esch vote showed "how strong sectional
interests could be."39
On February 10, 1928 Chairman of the Senate Interstate
37"Writes Northwest Governors," Black Diamond. Vol. 79, No.
(August 20, 1927), 15.
^^ansfield, The Lake Cargo Coal Rate Controversy. 120-121.
39Ibid., 178-183; "Congress Rejects Reappointment of Esch,
Black Diamond. Vol. 80, No. 12 (March 24, 1928), 38.
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Commerce Committee James E. Watson of Indiana launched the muchheralded investigation into the conditions in the coal fields.
Of the eighteen member committee, Watson, Frank R. Gooding of
Idaho, James Couzens of Michigan, Guy D. Goff of West Virginia
and Robert F. Wagner of New York, took the most active roles in
the hearings.

The UMWA, which was largely responsible for the

hearings, was permitted to present its case first with witness
Ellis Searles, editor of the United Mine Workers Journal.
Searles lashed-out at the operators for abrogating the
Jacksonville agreement and pled for federal enforcement of future
agreements.

Then, after hearing the testimony of UMWA Vice-

President Philip Murray, a subcommittee headed by Senator Gooding
traveled to western and central Pennsylvania to survey conditions
in the coal fields.

After two weeks in the field the

subcommittee returned to Washington on March 7.

Senator Gooding

called the conditions in the Pittsburgh district deplorable, a
"blotch upon American civilization."40
What was wrong with the coal industry?

On March 7 John L.

Lewis told the committee what everyone already knew:
"notoriously overdeveloped."

it was

The cause of the overdevelopment,

Lewis said, was the dramatic increase in nonunion production
following the breakdown of the Jacksonville agreement, which was
supposed to stabilize the industry by forcing the high-cost mines
out of business.

Rather than taking their medicine (i.e.

40Quoted in McAlister Coleman, Men and Coal (New York: Arno &
the New York Times, 1969), 132.
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bankruptcy), the coal companies abrogated their contract, reduced
wages, and increased production, thereby glutting the market and
deflating the price of coal.

The railroads and other big

consumers took advantage of the over-developed state of the
market by purchasing their coal supplies on the spot market at
greatly reduced prices.

Lewis blamed Consolidation Coal Company

for leading the contract-abrogating movement.

Its move in July,

1925 in the crucial "border district" of northern West Virginia
led the Pittsburgh Coal Company and others in District 5 to do
likewise.

Lewis reviewed the history of collective bargaining

since World War I.

He emphasized the pivotal role of the federal

government in each contract, and once again asked that it play an
active role in enforcing collective bargaining agreements.41
On March 20, Fanny Hurst, novelist and journalist, came
before the committee to report on what she had seen in the
Pennsylvania strike zone.

Hurst said that situation was so

serious that ameliorative measures would be "touching iodine to a
cancer."42 Van Bittner followed Hurst and testified for a day
and a half on conditions in northern West Virginia, providing
testimony on the Battles of Brady and other information
previously cited.

Asked what his solution was for the "coal

problem," Bittner replied that "all of the troubles" in the
industry— strikes, industrial strife, and overproduction—
"revolve around West Virginia."

With its 145 million tons, the

41Ibid., "Testimony of John L. Lewis," 376-390.
42Ibid., 1:981.
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state had de-stabilized the market, brought "cut-throat"
competition to the industry, and impoverished the mine workers.
Now, with the bankruptcy of many of the coal companies, the
state's operators were reaping the whirlwinds of their desperate
policy.

The basis of the West Virginia problem, according to

Bittner, was that over 80 percent of all the mineral lands in the
state were owned by absentee landlords, who are "solely
interested in exploiting the natural resources of the State."

He

explained:
That is why West Virginia is in such a deplorable
situation. It cannot help itself. It is going to take
something outside of West Virginia to cure that
situation.43
Bittner explained that the coal industry could not be "put on a
proper basis without the aid of some government agency."

He

suggested the creation of some agency like the Interstate
Commerce Commission to regulate the industry.

He also stated

that yellow dog contracts should be outlawed.44
On March 26, George Anderson, Vice-President of
Consolidation Coal Company, answered for the "industrial sins" of
his company.

Anderson referred to labor relations in the coal

industry as an "industrial battle," which had lasted longer than
the World War.
agreement?

Why did his company abrogate the Jacksonville

Anderson made it clear that the Northern West

Virginia Coal Operators were badly divided on the approval of the

43Ibid., 1: 1172.
“ ibid., 1: 1170.
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Baltimore agreement.

Only twenty-one of the eighty members

actually voted yes; the remainder were opposed, absent,
delinquent in dues, or already operating nonunion.
voted for the agreement because it wanted peace.

His company
It attempted to

operate under the agreement for fourteen months, but by April,
1925, nonunion production in the Fairmont field was eighty-five
percent.

As a result, the Baltimore agreement was not valid

"because it had no collective scope."

The company made the

"tough decision" to go nonunion after it examined the four
interests— stockholders, labor, consumers, and the public— that
it served.

It did not want to submit to the "uncompromising

demands and chants" of the union, which had gone into
receivership with the dissolvement of District 17.
had been a correct one, according to Anderson.

The decision

The "proof of the

pudding" was an increase in production from 3,360,000 tons in
1924 to 5,590,000 tons 1927, in employment from 4,180 to 4,500
men, in the number of days worked from 131 to 256 days, and in
average earnings from $1,195 to $1,517.

Moreover, the coal

communities had benefitted because of the decrease of
"idleness. "45
Senator Gooding asked, "Is the coal industry going to go
where labor is cheapest?

Where will it all end?"

Gooding

demonstrated how production in the nation had shifted from the
union to the nonunion fields since 1924.

While the production of

Illinois, which lived up to the Jacksonville agreement, declined
45Ibid., Is 1373-1375.
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from 61 to 45 million tons, West Virginia's went from 101 to 145
million tons.

Since the demand for coal had not increased in

this period, West Virginia's gains were made solely at the
expense of the union states.

The state had accomplished this

feat by underselling union producers with cheap labor.
"Does it all come down to the survival of the fittest?"

He asked,
Senator

Wheeler suggested that the result of the struggle would be the
"grounding down of the American worker."

Anderson replied that

the law of supply and demand was indeed a "jungle law," but he
knew of no way to change it unless someone can "clear out the
jungle."46
On March 26, Percy Tetlow, Acting President of District 17
took the stand.

Tetlow saw the violence and wage deflation

policy which had infected the coal fields as an "affliction that
spread from southern West Virginia north."

Wage reductions began

in southern West Virginia, then spread north to northern West
Virginia, Pennsylvania and Ohio.

Tetlow showed how the West

Virginia "affliction" had "come around" to hurt the state.

In

1923 the state produced 107 million tons and the sales
realization had been $285 million.

With 143 million tons in

1926, sales realization was only $244 million.

Thus, the state's

coal companies were receiving less for more tonnage.47
The Senate hearings answered all of its original queries in
the affirmative.

Yes, the railroads were endeavoring to depress

^Ibid., 1: 1376.
47Ibid., Is 1447-1477.
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the labor cost of coal; yes, wage contracts had been abrogated;
and yes, defenseless men, women, and children had been evicted
from their homes.
jungle"?

What could be done?

Who would "clear out the

While the coal operators advised against changes in the

law or government meddling and claimed they could get their own
house in order, Lewis, Tetlow, and Bittner wanted changes in the
laws along with regulation by the federal government.

All three

union leaders argued for changes in the laws in regard to the
issuance of injunctions, as well as federal help in enforcing
collective bargaining agreements.

Henry Warrum, the UMWA's

general counsel, suggested that in order to control the expansion
of the industry, Congress should exercise the right to license
coal companies engaged in interstate commerce.

With K.C. Adams,

Warrum worked with Senator Watson to draft corrective
legislation.

The Watson bill provided for the creation of a

commission to establish a code for the bituminous coal industry.
The code would guarantee the right to collective bargaining and
would regulate wages, prices, and profits.

The bill would grant

Congress the power to license coal companies and provide unions
exemption from the anti-trust laws.
out of the committee.

Watson's bill never made it

However, the bill would provide the

framework for future corrective legislation.48
The Senate hearings were the swan song of the UMWA in the
1920s.

The hearings failed to swing public opinion to the

union's cause.

With the conservative mood of the country, the

^Coleman, Men and Coal. 135; Fox, United We Stand, 307-308.
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case of the UMWA was hopeless.

In July, 1928 Lewis and the

International were forced to take the backward step that it had
fought since 1922.
been a folly.

Maintenance of the existing policy would have

The "jungle law" of supply and demand had forced

wages to levels well below Jacksonville, even in the northern
fields.

The UMWA had little resources to continue the fight.

It

had no agreements with the coal operators except in Illinois,
where miners finally acquiesced to wage reductions in 1928, and
in the anthracite districts, which were in rapid decline.

The

vast nationwide organization that the union had built up during
the World War era had been destroyed, or, as in northern West
Virginia, was being maintained as a shadow of itself by
International organizers and displaced miners.

On July 18 the

International Policy Committee abandoned the Jacksonville scale
and the demand for a nationwide agreement and advised districts
to "enter into wage negotiations with their respective operators
upon a basis mutually satisfactory."

Moreover, the policy

allowed districts to ratify new agreements at the district level
by conventions or referendums.49
While many districts were either abandoned or in the hands
of dissidents, District 31 remained in the hands of Bittner and
the International.

Notified of the change in policy, 750

delegates of District 31 met in convention at Fairmont on July
49"Resolution: To the Officers and Delegates to the Special
Convention of District 31, United Mine Workers of America," July
26, 1928, UMWA, International Archive, District 31, 1928;
"Jacksonville Scale is Discarded," Black Diamond, Vol. 81, No. 3
(July 12, 1928), 1.
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16, 1928 and resolved to pledge their "whole hearted support and
cooperation to our International and district officers" and to
the UMWA, the "only labor organization in this country that
protects the miners and their dependents and brings stabilization
to the coal mining industry ... ."50 Bittner forwarded the
resolution to Lewis with a letter asserting that the "sentiment
of our people is more than splendid," and that if there was "just
a little change in the market for the best" the district could
get several contracts with the coal operators.51 The Journal
carried an account of the convention and congratulated members of
District 31 for enduring "one of the most remarkable struggles in
the history of American labor."52 Nick Fontecchio, a District
31 organizer from Clarksburg, wrote to console Lewis.

The change

in policy was "no disgrace," he asserted, because it was done "in
order to save our great Union."

Fontecchio condemned the Save

the Union "aggregations and their treacheries," who had given
"support to the enemy," and concluded the letter with a poetic
flourish to remain loyal "as long as faith with freedom
reigns."53

50"Resolution: To the Officers and Delegates to the Special
Convention of District 31, United Mine Workers of America," July
26, 1928, UMWA, International Archive, District 31, 1928.
51Van A. Bittner to John L. Lewis, July 26,
International Archive, District 31, 1928.

1928, UMWA,

52"Mines of Northern West Virginia stand loyal," United Mine
Workers Journal, Vol. 39, No. 16 (August 15, 1928), 3.
53Nick Fontecchio to John L. Lewis, July 25,
International Archive, District 31, 1928.

1928, UMWA,
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Despite the setbacks in District 31, Lewis continued to
support Bittner and the reorganization campaign in District 31.
Although many of the barracks were abandoned and the large relief
checks halted, the International maintained Bittner and a large
force

of organizers in

in relief

District 31 and provided $7,500 per month

until April, 1929, when it was reduced to $1,000 per

month.54 In a speech before the West Virginia Federation of
Labor convention held at Clarksburg in October, 1928, Bittner
condemned the operators and the Communists and pledged to
continue the fight.

The battle had gone on for four and one-

half years, yet his "shock troops" still maintained the faith.
How had they survived for so long?

Bittner, preacher of the

union gospel, explained:
When the men come along for extra relief I tell them
the story of the Savior feeding the multitude with the
fishes and loaves, and they accept that theory and go
away satisfied. Sometimes I think these stories were
handed down to show us how to get over the difficulties
in life as the Savior did. I think perhaps in this
case they weren't really as many hungry as said they
were at first. And so it is with our people. They
were in better shape than they thought. They are
ashamed they asked for any more relief and they

54Despite the selling of barracks, the UMWA still had 930
families in them in November, 1928, according to Bittner's
statement before the International Executive Board, Minutes,
November 22-27, 1928. The disposal of the barracks caused some
consternation among the strikers occupying them. After receiving
two letters from disgruntled miners, Lewis referred the men to
Bittner.
John L. Lewis to Jessie Curry, of Monongah, April 4,
1929; John L. Lewis to John Mingancsick of Rachel, April 11, 1929.
The relief allowance of District 31 was reduced to $1,000 on April
1, 1929 as a result of a Lewis' effort to reduce expenses to an
"absolute minimum." Thomas Kennedy to John L. Lewis, March 26,
1929; John L. Lewis to Van Bittner, April 25, 1929, UMWA,
International Archive, District 31, 1929.
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apologize and go home and strike and keep up the good
work.

Demise of the Indigenous Coal Operators
What of the Fairmont coal operators?
since the expulsion of the UMWA?

How had they fared

With the arrest of the last of

the "mad b o m b e r s J a m e s Toney, in March, 1928, the operators
were free to work their mines without fear of sabotage or
interference.56 Production continued at a rate well above the
level of the union period:

it peaked in 1927 at just over

thirty-three million tons, declined to almost twenty-nine million
tons in 1928 and to twenty-seven and one-half million tons in
1929.57 However, the superabundance of coal led to depressed
prices: around $1.25 per ton run-of-mine, and $1.75 to $2.00 per

55,,Van Bittner tells West Virginia Labor How UMWA is Battling
for state interest," United Mine Workers Journal. Vol. 39, No. 20
(October 15, 1928), 8.
56Toney was arrested and convicted for blowing up a bridge on
the Western Maryland Railroad at Bingamon Junction in Marion County
on December 23, 1925.
Toney's UMWA lawyer, Thomas Townsend,
appealed the case and Toney was released on bond. In March, 1928,
Toney was arrested along with three other men, and charged with
attempting to blow up Mine 63 of the Consolidation Coal Company
near Monongah in September, 1927.
In July, 1928 Toney was
convicted of attempted murder and sentenced to five years in
prison. "Arrest Four in Bomb Case," Black Diamond, Vol. 80, No. 13
(March 31, 1928), 28; "Toney gets Five Years," Black Diamond. Vol.
81, No. 2 (July 14, 1928), 6; Lee, Bloodletting in Appalachia. 157161.
57West Virginia Department of Mines, Annual Report. 1950, 206.
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ton for prepared sizes in 1928.58 Owing to the low price of
coal, producers were making little or losing money.

Yet they

continued to produce, hoping for a change in business conditions.
Black Diamond, as well as the United Mine Workers Journal
enjoined the operators to stop selling coal below cost.59
Black Diamond blamed coal operators, who feared losing a market,
and coal brokers, who drove down prices, for the decline in coal
prices.60 James Orr, who had left the Hudson Coal Company near
Clarksburg in 1927 to find greener pastures in Utah, asked
Fairmont operators:
Why throw your coal on a market that does not exist,
and further encourage the buyers in the feeling that
coal has no market value?
Why let the buyer name the price that he pays for
your product, while the seller names the price that you
pay for everything you buy?
Why rush your business into the sheriff's hands?
Will we not reach them soon enough if we continue this
practice?61
The problem was that the proliferation of coal producers and
excess capacity had so weakened the position of sellers that
consumers, particularly the large ones— railroads, utility
companies, and manufacturers— could almost dictate prices.

In

58,,Fairmont, W.Va," Black Diamond, Vol. 80, No. 3 (January 21,
1928), 38.
59United Mine Workers Journal. Vol. 38, No. 1 (January 1,
1927), 1.
“ "Profitless Prosperity,"
(February 11, 1928), 16.

Black Diamond. Vol.

80,

No.

6

61"0ver the Picking Table," Black Diamond. Vol. 80, No. 3
(January 21, 1928), 21.
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short, it was a buyers' or a monopsonistic market.62
A. Spates Brady, the brother of Samuel Brady and himself a
coal operator in Mineral County, thought that the situation had
grown so serious as to become a "community and state-wide
proposition."

He explained the problem to ex-governor Cornwell:

The Coal Operators, particularly the large ones, seem
to have lost their equity in their properties and they
are simply running the mines to pay their own salaries
and sometimes they can not do this. I think there
isn't any doubt that the large operators have proved to
their own satisfaction that they can not put the small
coal operators out of business and that the fact that
large production reduces the cost of operation but at
the same time reduces the selling price far below the
reduction in cost by reason of large tonnage.
This was illustrated to me very definitely at a
dinner in Pittsburgh the other day. The man stated
that he only wanted one dinner. No doubt the hotel
could produce two dinners very much cheaper than one
but he did not care if they gave it to him. Now, this
is the trouble with the coal business in the Fairmont
region —
. As you suggest, we need somebody to take
the lead in this proposition. There is no use to
produce an enormous tonnage just simply to get the cost
of producing it down.63
Efforts were made to control production and increase the
power of Fairmont companies in the market.

Although the Fairmont

Coal Operators' Association was inactive, the Monongahela Coal
Operators's Association, reorganized in 1926, hired a "coal man"
of high repute, D.H. Pape, as executive director and waged a
highly visible campaign to promote safety, fight government
interference, and regulate coal marketing among the coal
companies on the Monongahela Railway.

One of the major goals of

62Simon, "The Development of Overdevelopment," 68.
^A. Spates Brady to John J. Cornwell,
Cornwell Papers, Box 142, File Folder 10.

October 24,
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1927,

the marketing program was to end the practice of shipping coal on
consignment.

This practice, which involved shipping coal to

marketing areas without a buyer, put producers at the mercy of
the machinations of coal brokers.

Pape was unable to get the

operators to halt the practice and was forced to resign in April,
1928.64 Charles A. Goodwin, counsel for Brady-Wamer Coal
Corporation and other Morgantown coal companies, informed ex
governor Cornwell that it "is not the coal industry that needs
stabilization, but the problem is, how to stabilize the coal
operators."

Cornwell wrote back to express his complete

agreement.65
The most ambitious attempt to stabilize the coal industry of
the Fairmont field was an attempt to consolidate many of the
mines in Marion, Harrison, Monongalia, Taylor, and Barbour
counties under the umbrella of a new one hundred to one hundred
and fifty million dollar corporation.

The initial meeting to

discuss the proposal was held in February, 1928 in Fairmont.

The

merger was explained at the meeting as a means to "save the life
of the coal mining industry in northern West Virginia," which was
being "endangered by forces which could not be successfully
combated" without cooperation.

The new corporation would ensure

a much stronger marketing position for Fairmont coal and would be

^"Monongahela Group Re-organizes," Black Diamond, Vol. 80, No.
13 (April 14, 1928), 7.
65Charles A. Goodwin to John Cornwell, November 10, 1926;
Cornwell to Goodwin, November 29, 1926, Cornwell Papers, Box 139,
October 11, 1926 to January 31, 1927.
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able to limit production.

The leaders of this consolidation

movement were indigenous operators— C.W. Watson, representing
Consolidation Coal Company, Harry B. Clark of Clark Coal & Coke
Company, Howard Showalter of Continental Coal Company, and Virgil
Highland, Clarksburg banker and an associate of Watson.66 By
March, the central committee of the merger committee had obtained
the acquiescence of companies representing seventeen million of
the coal fields' thirty million tons.

Engineers and auditors

were hired to appraise the properties of the agreeing
operators.67
The merger movement collapsed, however, soon after C.W.
Watson announced his retirement as President of Consolidation
Coal Company in April, 1928.

In a brief statement, Watson stated

that the decision was made on the advice of his physicians.68
However, there were rumors that Rockefeller was unhappy with the
manner in which Watson had handled the strike in northern West
Virginia.

Watson's absence at the Senate ICC hearings, and the

able testimony of Vice-President George Anderson, who took over
the presidency after Watson's retirement, were thought to be

“ "To Merge Northern W. Va. Mines," Black Diamond. Vol. 80, No.
7 (February 18, 1928), 8.
67"Perfect Merger Details," Black Diamond, Vol. 80, No. 10
(March 10, 1928), 8.
“ "Consolidation Changes," Black Diamond. Vol.
(April 14, 1928), 7.

80, No.

451

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

15

harbingers of his fall.69 Black Diamond memorialized Watson as
the individual who was most responsible for making Consolidation
Coal Company the greatest coal-producing company in the world.70
The failure of the merger signaled the demise of many of the
indigenous coal companies in the Fairmont Field.

Black Diamond

reported the bankruptcy of many of the indigenous companies.71
Brady-Wamer Coal Corporation, which had waged the first fight
against the UMWA in 1924, went into receivership in 1927.
Receivers were appointed for Bertha Consumers Coal Company in
1928.72 In February, 1929 receivers were appointed for Delmar
Coal Company, with operations in Taylor and Monongalia
counties.73 Soper-Mitchell Coal Company, with operations on
Scotts Run, went into receivership in 1929 and had its assets
sold by the court in June of that year.74 In April 1930, the
Gilbert-Davis Coal Company, with operations on Scotts Run, filed
for bankruptcy.75

Consolidation Coal Company struggled along

69Van Bittner, "Report of Conditions in District 31,"
International Executive Board, Minutes, August 15-19, 1927, 111,
UMWA, International Archive.
70"Over the Picking Table," Black Diamond. Vol. 80, No. 16
(April 21, 1928), 15.
71See, for example, "Fairmont, W.Va.," Black Diamond. Vol. 82,
No. 6 (February 9, 1929), 34.
^"Bertha Receivers Named," Black Diamond, Vol. 80, No. 10
(March 10, 1928), 13.
^Black Diamond. Vol. 82, No. 5 (February 2, 1929), 12.
74"Asks Order of Sale," Black Diamond. Vol. 82, No. 25 (June
22, 1929), 11.
^ Black Diamond Vol. 84, No. 16 (April 19, 1930), 10.
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until 1932, when it was ordered into receivership.76 The demise
of the indigenous coal operators and the fall of C.W. Watson,
along with the continuance of the large out-of-state companies,
particularly the captive firms such as Bethlehem and New England
Fuel & Transportation, constituted the out-of-state takeover of
the Fairmont Field's coal industry.
The bankruptcies and general demoralization of the coal
industry also took their toll on indigenous coal operators.

Many

of them, particularly the "tall timber," perished in the 1920s—
victims perhaps of the stress of the times.

The "Big Four," the

three Watson brothers and A.B. Fleming, was broken up by death
and C.W.'s retirement.

Although Fleming died of old age in 1923,

J.E. Watson, builder of the grand "High Gate," died prematurely
of locomotor ataxia in 1926; he was followed by older brother,
Sylvanus Lamb, who passed on in 1930.77 The second leading coal
family of the region, the Hutchinsons, met a similar fate.

Clyde

E. Hutchinson, the master of "Sonnencraft," died in 1926, a year
before his West Virginia Coal & Coke Company went into
receivership.78 I.e. White, the great promoter of the coal

76Charles E. Beachley, History of the Consolidation Coal
Company. 1864-1934 (New York: Consolidation Coal Company, 1934),
77.
^Fairmont Times, August 3, 1926; "Good Morning!" Fairmont
Times December 3, 1930; "Interview of Bart Watson," by author, May
6, 1991.
^"Sonencraft receives body of later master," Fairmont West
Virginian. September 29, 1926; "Receiver Appointed," Black Diamond.
Vol. 79, No. 24 (December 10, 1927), 6.
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industry, died in 1927 of complications following an
operation.79 In 1928, S.R. Hite, who had come to Fairmont in
1891 to establish several coal companies, died.80 Stephen N.
Elkins, who had used the proceeds from sale of the Elkins Coal &
Coke Company properties to start the National Fuel Company, which
had mines in Monongalia and Preston counties, died in 1929 at the
» age of fifty-two.

C.D. Robinson, Fairmont banker, investor and

coal operator died suddenly in 1929 at the age of fifty-seven.81
Samuel D. Brady, nemesis of Bittner and the UMWA, died of a heart
attack at his son's home in Morgantown on May 8, 1931.

Brady had

gone from a coal baron worth four to five million dollars in 1922
to a homeless, nearly penniless has-been in a space of nine
years.

Fellow operator and long-time friend, Harry B. Clark,

died at the age of fifty-three after a heart attack which
occurred as he prepared to dress to go to the funeral on May 12.
Black Diamond noted the deaths of the two "prominent coal
operators" and ventured the opinion that "business conditions
affecting the industry undoubtedly undermined their health."82
C.E. Smith wrote in 1928 that Fairmont had been "as one standing
at a door through which many people are making their exit, ...

^David R. Reger, "The Life
of Doctor I.C. White,"
Diamond. Vol. 79, No. 24 (December10, 1927), 8.

Black

80S.R. Hite Dies," Black Diamond. Vol. 80, No. 17 (April 28,
1928), 14.
81Black Diamond. Vol. 83, No.

17(October 26, 1929),17.

“ Black Diamond, Vol. 86, No.

20(May 16,1931), 14.
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watching a whole generation depart."83 The demise of a
generation of coal barons and developers would have long-lasting
political and economic consequences.

The loss of the region's

captains of industry meant there would be no one— at least from
the capitalist class— to provide the leadership needed to resolve
or ameliorate the crisis.

The economic cost would be the loss of

one of the main engines of regional growth:
coal profits by the indigenous operators.

the reinvestment of
With the lack of

profits in the coal industry during the 1920s and early-1930s,
this would not be a factor in development until the late-1930s
and 1940s, however.
The demise of the indigenous coal operators and their coal
companies was accompanied by the downfall of another capitalist
institution, the banks.

Since 1924 the banks had been propping-

up the coal companies with loans and extensions on repayments.
Many of the bankers reached the end of their rope in 1929— before
the stock market crash of October.

Bank failures occurred at

Belington in Barbour County and Buckhannon in Upshur County in
January, 1929.84 Floyd Teter of Belington explained to Governor
Cornwell that the "ordinary business man [was] staggering from
one side of the road to the other," and that the banks in the
small towns were refusing to loan any money.85 A run on the
83,1Good Morning!" Fairmont Times. November 28, 1928.
^Floyd Teter to John Cornwell, January 17, 1929, Cornwell
Papers, Box 144.
85Floyd Teter to John Cornwell, April 9, 1929, Cornwell Papers,
Box 144.
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National Bank of Fairmont, the bank of the major coal operators,
including the Watsons, began on June 26, and continued for two
days until the bank was forced to close.

The run started in

response to a rumor allegedly started by a union organizer that
the bank was going under.

The rumor was spread by the UMWA and

other unions, and depositors, who were waiting in line before the
bank opened its doors, withdrew their money.86 The Bank of
Monongahela Valley, the largest in Morgantown, was closed on
December 31, 1930.87

The Impact of the Great Depression
The regional economy went from bad to worse with the onset
of the Great Depression in 1930.

As the industrial plants of the

nation curtailed production, the demand for the region's coal and
other products plummeted.

Coal production decreased from 27.5

million tons in 1929 to 23.8 million in 1930, 19.3 million in
1931, and 15.5 million in 1932.

Coal prices declined as well.

In 1931 run-of-mine coal sold for around $1.00 per ton, and $1.35
to $1.50 was being offered for the prepared sizes.88 Employment
in the coal industry went from 21,570 in 1929 to 29,265 in 1930,
17,154 in 1931, and 14,143 in 1932.
spiral.

Wages were on a downward

While Consolidation Coal Company continued to adhere to

^"General Information - Fairmont, G.O. Reports," June 27,
1929, Smith Papers, Box 7.
87Pominion News. January 1, 1931.
^"Fairmont, W.Va," Black Diamond. Vol. 86, No. 17 (April 25,
1931), 26.
456

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

its "constructive policy" initiated in 1927 of holding the line
on wages and shutting down many of its mines, other companies
unashamedly slashed wages in order to stay in business.

With a

day rate of between $4.25 to $5.00 per day and $.40 per ton for
machine-mined coal, Consol paid what was essentially the 1917
scale.

Few of the other coal companies came close.

The day rate

ran from $2.70 to $4.16 per day, and the average rate for ton of
machine-mined coal was $0.3l.89 As William Robinette of the
Division of Mediation and Conciliation of the U.S. Department of
Labor, wrote to his boss in August, 1929:
The coal mining situation at Fairmont, W.Va. and
vicinity is in very bad shape, a few mines I was
informed are operating nearly full time, the majority
that are in operation, however, are only operating from
two to three days per week, with many others entirely
closed down.
There is no wage scale in that community so I was
informed, each company, and in some instances, each
mine have a different wage schedule with the result I
am told that there is general dissatisfaction among the
miners, who are scarcely making a living.
The miners I was told receive nothing for dead work,
such as moving slate, and setting props, laying track,
etc.— with this condition there is little wonder that
there is dissatisfaction among the miners.90
The wage reductions, along with the general collapse in the
economy and demise of the coal companies, provided Bittner and
the UMWA with an opportunity to reorganize the Fairmont field.
International Vice-President Philip Murray expressed the idea

^Joseph Angelo to Philip Murray, July
International Archives, District 31, 1929.

31,

1929,

UMWA,

William Robinette to Hugh L. Kerwin, August 31, 1929, Records
of Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, Department of labor,
National Archives, Record Group 280, Box 196, File 170-5249.
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that the new round of wage cuts might have a "salutary effect"
upon the miners, impressing upon them the "greater necessity for
organization.1,91 Since the change in policy in July, 1928
allowing for district-wide agreements, Bittner and his forces had
marked time and "awaited developments."

Lacking the financial

resources to support the strike and the proletarian army which it
had built up during the Jacksonville era, Bittner sold the last
of the DMWA's barracks and eliminated regular relief.
the strikers left the region.

Some of

Some went back to work for

nonunion companies, later recalling it as the "time we had to
scab on the union."92 Some of the strikers remained at the
barracks, paying a small rent to their new owners.93 Although
the field force could not be maintained, Lewis continued to
supply Bittner with International organizers, many from coal
fields where the cause appeared hopeless.

With District 31

officials, Bittner had an organizing force of about ten men.
Rallies and meetings were held, but on a smaller scale than
during the battle to sustain the Jacksonville Agreement.

Despite

91Philip Murray to William Dalrymple, February 21, 1930, UMWA,
International Archive, District 31, 1930.
92Quoted in Keith Dix, What’s a Coal Miner To Do?
The
Meehan izat ion of Coal Minina (University of Pittsburgh Press,
1988), 170.
930ne Monongah miner who had been on strike for five years
appealed to Lewis for aid. He had could not get other work, feed
his family of five children, nor pay the rent at the barrack; James
Watkins to John L. Lewis, May 25, 1930. Lewis wrote back to offer
his sympathy, but was unable to render aid "under the laws
governing the International Union ... ." John L. Lewis to James
Watkins, May 31, 1930, UMWA, International Archive, District 31,
1930.
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the hardship, Bittner claimed that the morale of the union men
remained strong.

One black miner, Anthony Gray, wrote in

January, 1930 to Lewis to inform him of conditions at Lumberport
in northern Harrison County.

The "scab miners" were loading coal

for thirty cents a ton and only getting credit for one out of
every two that they loaded.

The UMWA held a meeting there the

day before and Van Bittner, one of the "Crack Brains in this
state," spoke.

There was a large crowd.

Gray, who signed as an

"old Alabama miner," believed that some of the men are beginning
to realize that "every thing Van Bittner told them five years ago
has come to pass and more beside."

He closed by asking Lewis to

continue the fight.94 Neither Lewis nor Bittner considered
abandoning District 31.

Bittner explained to Lewis that

reorganizing the miners was the "desire of [his] life."95
The UMWA reorganization campaign of 1929 was opened in March
with a series of radio addresses by Bittner over the Fairmont
station, WMMN, which was owned by (and named after) Bittner's
personal friend, Matthew M. Neely.96 These messages indicate an
evolution of the UMWA strategy and philosophy since the
Jacksonville debacle.

The first principle of Bittner's message,

94Anthony Gray to John L. Lewis, January 19,
International Archives, District 31, 1930.

1930, UMWA,

^ a n A. Bittner to John L. Lewis,
International Archive, District 31, 1929.

1929,

May 10,

UMWA,

96"Tell the Public," United Mine Workers Journal. Vol. 40, No.
6 (March 15, 1929), 11; "Stabilization Plan for Northern West
Virginia," United Mine Workers Journal. Vol. 40, No. 23 (November
15, 1929).
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”100% organization” of coal miners, remained as before.
change was in the manner in which the case was argued.

The
Rather

than blaming Fairmont operators, Bittner condemned the "great
coal consuming interests" outside the state— the railroads,
public utilities, and steel companies— for bankrupting the coal
industry and impoverishing the coal miners of the region.

With

neither the coal companies nor the miners organized, the
consuming interests were free to pay what the market would bear.
As a result, both the miners and coal operators were "lost in the
shuffle."

Since the coal operators had demonstrated that they

were unable to organize the industry and prevent this
exploitation by outside interests, the UMWA was the only hope.
The UMWA's program would stabilize the coal industry and
eliminate cut-throat competition.

It would bring high wages for

miners, fair profits to the operators, and prosperity to the
businessmen in the region.

Bittner went as far as to say that

soon the coal operators would welcome the coming of the UMWA back
to northern West Virginia.

These radio addresses marked the

beginning of Bittner's emergence as a sort of populist statesman
for the region.97
With the coming of warm weather, Bittner mounted the
organization campaign.

The strategy was to strengthen the

organization with new members; no strikes were called.

Since

97,1
Coal; The Human Equation Involved," copy of address
delivered by Van Bittner on May 5, 1929, from Station WMMN,
Fairmont, West Virginia, UMWA, International Archive, District 31,
1929.
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there was no wage agreement in the field, the men were allowed to
continue working in nonunion mines, but had to pay dues of fifty
cents per month.98 Much of the organization work was undertaken
in the Scotts Run district, which had become the most productive
area in the field.

By December, nine hundred miners had taken

the obligation and signed with the union, most of them at Scotts
Run and nearby Maidsville."

A second goal of the

reorganization campaign was to take over Consolidation Coal
Company's Rockefeller plan unions. In a confidential letter to
Lewis, Bittner outlined the plan to destroy the company union in
the Fairmont field.

Those in authority in the various company

unions would call a convention and denounce the Rockefeller Plan
then pass a resolution stating that they desired to join the
UMWA.

To carry out the plan, Bittner asked for a six thousand

dollar appropriation from the International.100 Lewis wrote
back to express his "complete harmony" with the plan, but he was
unable to supply the requested aid.101 No convention as Bittner
outlined was held, but the organizers went ahead with the plan on
a smaller scale.

They held public meetings near the

Consolidation Coal Company mines and talked with officers of the
98William Dalrymple to Philip Murray, September 30, 1929, UMWA,
International Archives, District 31, 1929.
"william Dalrymple to Philip Murray, December 17, 1929, UMWA,
International Archive, District 31, 1929.
100Van A. Bittner to John L. Lewis,
International Archive, District 31, 1929.

May 20, 1929,

UMWA,

101John L. Lewis to Van A. Bittner,
International Archive, District 31, 1929.

May 21, 1929,

UMWA,
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company unions.

A minor breakthrough was achieved in November,

1929 when the officers of the company union at the Columbia mine
(near Clarksburg) of Consolidation Coal Company turned over their
entire membership along with $125.00 to organizer Joseph
Angelo.102 This turn of events was given an added significance
by the fact that the miners at the Columbia mine had been the
first to quit the UMWA in June, 1925.

Schism in the UMWA
The UMWA's progress on the Fairmont front was hampered by a
schism in the organization which nearly destroyed it during the
1929 to 1931 period.

Although most of the events transpired in

Illinois, the debacle had an pronounced impact on the
organization effort in the Fairmont Field.

The underlying cause

of the breakdown was the weakness of the UMWA.

By 1929 the union

had lost all of the bituminous fields in the nation to the openshop forces except Illinois (District 12) and a small area of
Indiana.

Even here, the power of the International was waning.

Since 1922, when District 12 Frank Farrington challenged
Lewis on the issue of district-wide agreements with the coal
companies, Illinois officials had resisted Lewis' authority and
tried to run the district without inference from the
International.

According to UMWA historian Maier Fox, Lewis was

probably looking for an opportunity to discipline Illinois

102Joseph Angelo to Philip Murray, November 16, 1929, UMWA,
International Archive, District 31, 1929.
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dissidents when evidence of improper handling of UMWA real estate
by Sub-District 9 officials was discovered in March, 1929.

The

International revoked the charter of the sub-district on June
8.103 With the support of District 12, Sub-District 9 officials
secured an injunction against the International's take-over, and
forced it into court in Franklin County, Illinois.

In the trial

Frank Farrington testified that the International had no right to
intrude upon the affairs of Sub-District 9 because it had ceased
to exist on April 1, 1929.

Farrington and the sub-district's

lawyer, A.C. Lewis, argued that since the International had
called off the scheduled 1929 convention (mainly because of lack
of funds), the UMWA was no longer in existence.

The

International prevailed in the hearing, and the injunction was
lifted.

However, after the International revoked the charter of

District 12 on October 10, district officials secured an
injunction against International officials.

This one was upheld

on January 23, 1930 by a Franklin County judge.104
Protected by the injunction, the leaders of the insurgent
movement, District 12 president Harry Fiswick, Farrington, and
John Walker, president of the Illinois Federation of Labor,
called for a "reorganization" convention in Springfield, Illinois
on March 10, 1930.

Lewis countered the rebels with a call for a

constitutional convention at Indianapolis on the same day.

The

103Fo x , United We Stand, 296-298.
104Ibid.; "Address of President Lewis," in "Summary Convention
Proceedings: Thirty-First Consecutive Constitutional Convention of
United Mine Workers of America," 4-7, UMWA, International Archive.
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insurgents enlisted the support of John Brophy and Alex Kowat,
the Kansas dissident, as well as Frank Keeney and W.M. Rowan,
head of Consol's company unions in the Fairmont field, and used
the journal, The Illinois Miner. as a propaganda sheet in their
campaign to reorganize the UMWA.105
Under Frank Keeney, the Reorganized United Mine Workers of
America made an attempt to organize West Virginia.106 Keeney
enlisted Fred Mooney in the cause, and assigned him to the
northern part of the state.

Mooney attempted to hold a meeting

at the old college grounds at Flemington (Taylor County) in
December, 1929, but Bittner's men stormed the place, pushed the
speakers off the stage, and took over the meeting.

Mooney

changed his tactics after the Flemington episode and began to
meet miners in "pairs and trios."

He quietly established several

105Fox, United We Stand. 298: "Address of Van Bittner" in
"Summary Convention Proceedings," 78-81.
106After being expelled for attempting to organize a dual
union, the Master Workmen of America, in the late-l920s, Keeney
applied for readmission to the UMWA on October 14, 1929.
The
matter was either rejected or not considered by the IEB; C.F.
Keeney to Percy Tetlow, October 14, 1929, UMWA, International
Archive, District 17, 1925-1929.
Another "traitor" who sought
readmission in 1929 was C.E. Lively, who had acted as a secret
agent of the Baldwin-Felts Agency during the Matewan affair and
played a part in the assassination of Sid Hatfield in 1921. In 1924
and 1925 Lively had served as a mine guard for "Uncle" Dan Howard's
Fairmont & Cleveland Coal Company mine at Parker Run near
Rivesville. He was dismissed at the request of Governor Gore, but
later served in the same capacity for Howard's Fairmont & Chicago
Coal Company at Barrackville; Fairmont West Virginian. July 20,
1925.
Claiming he was a "tool of others," Lively applied for
readmission in October, 1929.
Lewis passed his "astonishing
letter" on to Percy Tetlow, who claimed no confidence in the man;
John L. Lewis to Percy Tetlow, October 4, 1929, UMWA, International
Archive, District 17, 1925-1929.
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local anions.

Mooney found the miners were afraid, !Inot of the

coal operators, but of the network of spies maintained by the
United Mine Workers in each community."

The coal operators

allowed him full access to their property and permitted him to
talk to their employees.107 Mooney approached Tusca Morris of
Consol and asked him to turn over its company unions to him, but
Morris refused, later explaining to UMWA representative C.F.
Davis that he would "have nothing to do with that bunch."108
On January 24, 1930 Bittner telegraphed Lewis to express his
disappointment at the fortieth anniversary of the birth of the
UMWA:

"The old pioneers will turn in their graves at the action

of the Illinois officers in securing an injunction against the
union."

He encouraged Lewis to keep up the fight against the

"fanatical crooks."

He assured Lewis that everything was in good

shape in northern West Virginia, and that there was not any
sentiment for the rebels "and there won’t be any."109
Both the rump and regular conventions of the UMWA met as
scheduled on March 10, 1930.

Over four hundred delegates from

seven states convened in Springfield, including a representation
from Lewis' home local.

The delegates quickly adopted a

constitution before the Indianapolis convention had time to act,
107J.W. Hess, editor, Struggle in the Coal Fields, The
Autobiography of Fred Mooney (Morgantown: West Virginia University
Library, 1967), 142-147.
10SC.F. Davis to Van A. Bittner, February 3,
International Archive, District 31, 1930.

1930, UMWA,

109Van A. Bittner to John L. Lewis, telegram, January 24, 1930,
UMWA, International Archive, District 31, 1930.
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and elected a full slate of officers, including Alex Howat as
president.

Their strategy was to appeal to William Green,

president of the American Federation of Labor, for
recognition.110 Lewis carefully orchestrated the Indianapolis
convention.

The delegates declared the constitution still in

effect, and spent four days listening to speeches condemning the
insurgents.

Lewis gave the indictment of the "Fishwick Gang,"

and shred a copy of The Illinois Miner at the podium.

Bittner,

as well as Murray and other loyalists, including retired
president Frank Hayes, condemned the dissidents and expressed
their undying support for Lewis and the "true" UMWA.111 The
Indianapolis convention also passed a series of amendments to the
constitution which strengthened the power of the president and
the IEB.
Shortly after the conventions, John Walker of the
Reorganized UMWA attempted to convince American Federation of
Labor president, William Green, that his group was the "original"
UMWA.

Green refused to recognize the dissidents.

The

Reorganized UMWA summoned the leaders of the Indianapolis UMWA to
appear before it.

They failed to show.

the leaders of the Reorganized UMWA.

Lewis had the IEB expel

Neither side was willing to

back down, and the situation approached anarchy.

Until February

13, 1931, when a ruling was rendered on the injunction of
District 12 against the International, there were, in effect, two
110Fox, United We Stand, 299.
111"Summary Convention Proceedings," 10, passim.
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UMWA rival organizations.112
Bittner stood unequivocally behind Lewis.

He wrote Lewis to

advise him to hold a series of mass meetings in Illinois to fight
the "traitors."

Bittner promised he would "do anything" for

Lewis and the organization.113 Lewis wrote back to express his
agreement on the strategy of mass meetings, and asked Bittner to
address them.114 Throughout the remainder of the year, Bittner
traveled to Illinois, as well as Pennsylvania, several times to
deliver speeches in support of Lewis and the "true" UMWA.

Bittner's Reorganization Campaign
While he marshalled the support of District 31 in support of
Lewis and fought Mooney and his "gang," as well as the National
Miners' Union, in the field, Bittner was also able to continue
the reorganization effort.

The impetus for the 1930 campaign was

a change in wage policy by Consolidation Coal Company.

On May 1,

1930 the company announced that it could no longer hold the line
on wages.

In a statement issued on May 12, President George

Anderson explained that because of wage cuts by its competitors
the company had found itself in an "isolated economic basis in
the Fairmont Coal Field."

Moreover, successive cuts by

competition in the Pittsburgh field, "protected by a large local
112Fox,

United We Stand, 299-300.

113Van A. Bittner to John L. Lewis, April 5, 1930, UMWA,
International Archive, District 31, 1930.
114John L. Lewis to Van A. Bittner, April 7, 1930, UMWA,
International Archive, District 31, 1930.
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market and by freight rate differentials," had created an
impossible "inter-district situation."

Anderson condemned the

business methods of the company's competition, which had led to
"lower standards of living for labor and to lower standards of
business for capital," but admitted that the company must yield
to the "inexorable logic of facts."

He stated, however, that the

company had not "yielded in its convictions.

As it has twice

been the last to follow into the dreary path [of wage
reductions], so it will cheerfully be among the first to abandon
it."

Meanwhile, those companies who had "sold their,.wares under

the shelter of a big umbrella may have to take a wetting. ... The
Umbrella is Coming Down!"115
Consol continued to pay the highest wages in the field, but
its announcement heralded another round of wage cutting.

Once

again, the coal companies on the Monongahela Railway were in the
forefront.

James Paisley's Connellsviile By-Product Coal Company

on Scotts Run, which according to UMWA organizer William
Dalrymple had "won the championship for reductions," set the
pace.116 Sam Pursglove's companies on Scotts Run abandoned the
weighing of coal, according to Bittner, and were paying miners
seventy-six cents for loading a five ton car.

In a letter to

Philip Murray, Bittner claimed that with a wage of twenty cents
115"More Grief in Soft Coal," editorial from Wall Street
Journal. May 28, 1930 in Black Diamond. Vol. 84, No. 26 (June 28,
1930), 4; text of Anderson's statement in "The Umbrella Comes
Down," undated copy in Bittner Papers, Series IV, Box 1.
116William Dalrymple to Philip Murray, January 31, 1930, UMWA,
International Archive, District 31, 1930.
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per ton for loading machine coal, Scotts Run was "probably the
cheapest coal producing field in America," and that he had "never
seen anything to compare" with the conditions:
In going through the field it is nothing unusual to see
fifty or more miners' wives standing at the tipple
waiting until a car of coal is dumped in order that
they may get something from the Company store to send
into the mines to feed their husbands. ... The counties
are broke attempting as best they can to feed the
miners who are working. ... There are 20% of the miners
who never have a pay day.117
At a convention at Monongah on April 13, 1930 Bittner and
his supporters laid plans for the spring and summer drive.

The

convention decided to wage an active campaign against further
wage reductions and sign up more members.118 Bittner used
Anderson's "umbrella" statement in the campaign.

He had a

circular printed, "Starvation Must Stop," with the complete text
of Anderson's statement and his commentary.

Bittner claimed that

in his recognition of the bankruptcy of the wage-slashing policy,
Anderson's statement sounded "like the report of the President of
the miners to an International Convention of the United Mine
Workers of America."

It was proof that Anderson and Consol,

whose officers had called Bittner and the officers of the UMWA
the "Apostles of Starvation" in 1925, had had an awakening and
now subscribed to the UMWA philosophy.

In the circular, Bittner

urged coal miners to stop the wage reductions by refusing to work
l17Van A. Bittner to Philip Murray,
International Archive, District 31, 1930.

June 27,

1930, UMWA,

118Van A. Bittner to John L. Lewis, April 5, 1930, UMWA,
International Archive, District 31, 1930.
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for companies which failed to pay regularly.

The way things

stood, Bittner concluded, miners were forced to sacrifice and
degrade themselves "due to the insane policy of the coal
operators selling coal below the cost of production to large
corporations who are making most tremendous profits."

The UMWA

would support miners who demanded wages equal to that of the
highest scale prevailing in the field.119 Focusing on Scotts
Run, the organizers held a series of meetings with "free
entertainment" and parades, which led to the enrollment of scores
of new dues-paying members.120
On July 4, District 31 held a convention at the Monongalia
County Courthouse in Morgantown.

The convention, which was

attended by over five hundred delegates from most of the mines in
the Fairmont Field, sent a letter to President Hoover setting
forth the conditions in the field and asking him to bring the
operators and UMWA together in a general "stabilization
conference."121 The convention also initiated a petition drive
to enlist the support of business and professional men in the
effort.

The drive met with widespread success.

Not only

business and professional men, but also public officials,
fraternal organizations, many of the banks, and a few of the coal
119,1
Starvation Must Stop!", copy
International Archive, District 31, 1930.

of

circular

in

UMWA,

120William Dalrymple to John L. Lewis, April 9, 1930; William
Dalrymple to Philip Murray, April 14, 1930, UMWA, International
Archive, District 31, 1930.
121Letter with attachments, Van A. Bittner to John L. Lewis,
July 18, 1930, UMWA, International Archive, District 31, 1930.
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operators signed the petition.122 Bittner also called a
conference of union officials from five other states—
Pennsylvania, Ohio, Maryland, Kentucky and Tennessee— on July 17,
who directed a letter to President Hoover asking for the
stabilization conference.

The Fairmont West Virginian heartily

endorsed the conference and the union's fight against wage
reductions.123
The miners, for the first time since 1927, protested the
wage reductions by striking.

In July, 1930 about five hundred

miners at two mines near Rivesville walked off their jobs to
protest wage reductions of about 20% and the docking of coal
weights.

William Robinette, mediator in the Department of

Labor's Conciliation and Mediation service, tried to settle the
strike, but to no avail.124
The operators explained to Robinette that the miners had the
right to elect a checkweighman under the laws of the state, and
that they they could not restore wages until business got better.
With no relief forthcoming from the UMWA, the miners were unable
to hold out and the strike collapsed.125 A strike of three
122"District 31, Statement of Van Bittner," International
Executive Board, Minutes, 247-250, September 17-24, 1930, UMWA,
International Archive.
123Ibid.; Fairmont West Virginian. July 18, 1930.
124William Robinette to H.L. Kerwin, July 28, 1930, Records of
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, Department of Labor,
National Archives, Record Group 280, Box 196, File 170-5738.
125William Robinette, "Summary of Final Report of Commissioner
of Conciliation," July 24, 1930, Records of Federal Mediation and
Conciliation Service, Department of Labor, National Archives,
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hundred miners at Paisley's Connellsville No. 1 mine at Scotts
Run in August and September over working conditions had the same
result.126
As a result of the petitions from District 31, President
Hoover referred the matter of the stabilization conference to
Secretary of Labor James J. Davis in early August.

Hoover,

cognizant of the failed December, 1927 Washington conference,
told Lewis that he was not inclined to call a conference because
it "would be productive of no good results."127 Davis met with
Bittner and Percy Tetlow in early September to explain the
government's position.

Davis was willing to do anything to

remedy the "bituminous situation," but, according to Hoover's
orders, could not call a conference unless a definite program had
been decided between the miners and operators first.

In other

words, the government was willing to offer its good offices for
conciliation, but unwilling to mediate or impose a settlement.
Bittner complained that the government had mediated in the past
and had dictated settlements in 1902, 1906 and 1919.

His

arguments were to no avail; Davis could not act without the
support of President Hoover.

The UMWA's bid for government

Record Group 280, Box 196, File 170-5738.
126william Robinette, "Final Report on Miners Strike,"
September 11, 1930, Records of Federal Mediation and Conciliation
Service, Department of Labor, National Archives, Record Group 280,
Box 196, File 170-5738.
127John L. Lewis to Van A. Bittner, September 8, 1930, UMWA,
International Archive, District 31, 1930.
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intervention in 1930 ended in failure.128
Meanwhile, the Reorganized UMWA under Mooney continued its
campaign.

Despite the opposition from Bittner, Mooney had been

able to organize locals at Flemington and Galloway in Taylor
County, and Brownton in Barbour County.129 Mooney grew bold
enough to undertake another round of public meetings in January,
1931.

The first was planned for Fairmont at the Marion County

Courthouse on January 10, 1931.

Once again Bittner was prepared.

He had 1,000 men bused in from Scotts Run, Lumberport,
Clarksburg, Fairmont and other points to pack the courthouse
before Mooney and the other speakers, W.M. Rowan and Adolph
Germer of Illinois, arrived.

When Mooney tried to speak

Bittner's men hooted him down, and he could not be heard.

Mooney

appealed to Sheriff Conaway for protection, but the sheriff would
only offer him and his colleagues an escort to the Watson Hotel,
where they paid their bill and departed.

After taking over the

meeting, the loyalists sent for Bittner at the Fairmont Hotel for
a triumphant address.

Bittner orchestrated a resolution

condemning the leaders of the Reorganized as "traitors," and
pledging the allegiance of those at the gathering to the UMWA,
128"District 31," International Executive Board, Minutes.
September 17-24, 1930, 251-253, UMWA, International Archive.
129According to information obtained by John L. Lewis, the
Reorganized had contributed $1,300 to Keeney and Mooney for
organizing expenses in West Virginia during the period from March
15, 1930 to September 30, 1930. In addition to the three locals in
the Fairmont Field, they had also organized locals at Whitesville
and Ward in southern West Virginia. John L. Lewis to Van A.
Bittner, November 14, 1930, UMWA, International Archive, District
31, 1930.
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Lewis, and Van Bittner.130 A second meeting was scheduled by
Mooney on the following day, January 11, in Clarksburg at
Williams Hall.

Bittner packed the hall as in Fairmont, and

Mooney and company did not even attempt to speak.

Bittner, as

well as his lieutenants, Nelson Beatty, a black organizer, and
Joseph Angelo, wrote Lewis to inform him of the triumph.131
Bittner explained to Lewis that the meetings "would have done
your heart good."

In fact, they had,

accomplished much for our organization in this field.
Miners are stirred up as they have never been before,
and we expect to do everything we possibly can to carry
on the work of building our organization and executing
wage contracts in this field.132
Despite the storm trooper tactics of Bittner and his men,
Mooney was able to hold a successful meeting at Clarksburg on
January 25 at the Carmichael Auditorium.

Mooney asked for the

protection of the sheriff and city and state police to hold the
meeting.
debate.

He challenged Bittner or one of his lieutenants to
Once again Bittner's men packed the hall.

After Mooney

introduced the speakers, Sheriff Grimm announced that he was a
"believer in free speech," and threatened to arrest anyone who
started trouble.

Bittner's men retired to the street and the

130"United Mine Workers Prevent Meeting of Reorganized Union,"
Fairmont Times. January 11, 1931; Fred D. Thomas to Philip Murray,
January 12, 1931, UMWA, International Archive, District 31, 1930
(sic).
131Joseph Angelo to John L. Lewis, January 12, 1931; Nelson
Beatty to John L. Lewis, February 27, 1931, UMWA, International
Archive, District 31, 1931.
132Van A. Bittner to John L. Lewis, January 15, 1931, UMWA,
District 31, 1931.
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meeting proceeded.

In his autobiography, Mooney asserted that

Bittner opposed him, in part, because he was afraid that he would
“stumble upon some of the facts relative to tipples and railroads
being dynamited and tipples being burned during the previous
strike."

Mooney also roundly condemned the tactic of breaking up

meetings and suppressing free speech.133
The Reorganized United Mine Workers of America collapsed
after Judge Harry Edwards' rulings on February 12, 1931 on the
District 12 injunction case.

Edwards found that the UMWA

constitution had remained in effect, and that District 12 was
bound by that constitution.

It was not, however, a complete

victory for the Lewis faction because the judge rejected the
International's bid to take over of the district.
retained its autonomy.

District 12

The Reorganized rapidly disintegrated,

however, in both Illinois and West Virginia.134

The Scotts Run Strike
The collapse of the coal industry in 1930 brought widespread
poverty, hunger, and desolation to the coal fields.

Over six

thousand miners lost their jobs in 1930, and those who worked had
their earnings slashed to bare subsistence levels.

The

deplorable situation of the miners was aggravated by a severe
drought in 1930.

During the summer and fall, rainfall was so

133Hess, ed., Struggle in the Coal Fields. 144-145; 147-148.
134Fo x , United We Stand, 300-304; "Union Sustained," United
Mine Workers Journal. Vol. 62, No. 4 (February 15, 1931), n.p.
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light as to cause the Monongahela River to dry up.

Navigation on

the Monongahela River in West Virginia was suspended.135 The
drought led to a poor harvest and famine conditions among many
farm families, particularly in mountain counties.136 Since many
coal mining families had gardens or relied on relatives living on
farms to help them get by, they suffered from the drought as
well.137 The Red Cross, as well as the Salvation Army, came to
the aid of county governments in providing relief for the
destitute.

For the first time in history, the county governments

and charitable organizations of the region were unaible to provide
for all of the needy, and were forced to appeal for outside aid.
The tragedy of the situation in the coal industry was that
even those who had jobs were suffering.

In April, 1931

International organizer Joseph Angelo completed a survey of
working conditions and wages in northern Randolph, Harrison, and
Barbour counties.

Angelo found that there was considerable

variation among wages:

they ranged from Consolidation Coal

Company's $0.38 per ton loading machine-mined coal and $4.40 a
day for day men to the $0.22 per ton and $2.00 for day men at
Hood Coal Company at Shinnston.

The average wage was about $0.30

per ton for loading machine-mine coal, and about $3.50 a day for

135Johnson, Headwaters District. 199.
136Pominion News. February 21, 1931.
137For example, James Walter Brown, a miner who worked at
Randall, along Scotts Run, explained that during the hard times of
the 1930s he was "lucky" because he had a farm; James Stealy III,
"Interview with James Walter Brown," May 4, 1967.
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day laborers.

Angelo noted that many of the miners were getting

work only two or three days a week.

None of the companies were

complying with the eight-hour working day.

Rather, the clean-up

system was in effect, and the men worked from nine to twelve
hours per day.

No compensation was provided for timbering,

laying track, cleaning up slate falls, or other "dead work."138
Conditions were even worse at Monongahela Railway mines,
particularly at Amettsville and Scotts Run, where ruthless
competition between the coal companies and bidding between
brokers for railroad fuel had depressed prices and wages to the
lowest levels in the region.

A runaway deflation had created the

"cheapest coal field in America."

According to William

Dalrymple, the tonnage rate for machine-mined coal in Scotts Run
was only twenty-five cents.

To make matters worse, the companies

were no longer paying on the short ton basis, but on a long ton
which ran from twenty-five to thirty-five hundred pounds.

As in

the Clarksburg field, the miners were working long hours and
receiving no pay for overtime or dead work.

Some of the

companies had even told their men that they must deal with the
company store or be discharged.

In February, 1931 the Monongalia

County Circuit Court heard charges that Paisley's Connellsville
By-Products Coal Company had discharged men for failing to trade
in its company store, where prices were considerably higher than
those at the independent stores.

Judge Charles G. Baker of the

138Joseph Angelo to Philip Murray, April 24, 1931, letter and
report, UMWA, International Archive, District 31, 1931.
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Monongalia County Circuit Court fined the company and condemned
the practice as one which would lead only to "anarchy.”139
By the spring of 1931 miners at Scotts Run were on the verge
of revolt.
again.

On May 1, several of the companies slashed wages once

When the Pursglove Coal Company and the Scotts Run Fuel

Company announced wage cuts on May 11, 125 miners, many of them
members of the UMWA, at Purgslove No. 2 and the Jere mine went on
strike.

Bittner, who had no role in calling the strike, claimed

that the spontaneous action was a victory for the union.140 It
was probably a coincidence, but appropriate nonetheless, that the
strike which would lead to the reorganization of the Fairmont
field began just two days after the death of Bittner's old
nemesis, Sam Brady.
On May 12, the strikers were joined by other miners at
Pursglove Coal Company's Nos. 2, 4, and 4 mines:
about one thousand miners were on strike.

a total of

The UMWA held a mass

meeting at the Liberty Theater at Osage, where William Dalyrmple
assailed the companies for the wage cuts and asked for solidarity
behind the union.

Dalrymple explained that the new wages were

not enough for the miners to feed and clothe their families.

He

explained that the twenty cents a ton being offered by the Scotts
139"West Virginia Coal Operator under Indictment for Forcing
Company Store Down Miners' Throats," United Mine Workers Journal.
Vol. 42, No. 9 (May 1, 1931) ; Dominion Post. April 13, 1931;
William Dalrymple, letter to editor, United Mine Workers Journal.
Vol. 63, No. 7 (April 1, 1931), 10.
140"Scotts Run Miners go on Strike against Further Reductions
in their Already Miserable Wages," United Mine Workers Journal,
Vol. 42, No. 11 (June 1, 1931), 3; Dominion Post. May 12, 1931.
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Run Fuel Corporation (Pursglove offered twenty-six cents), was
actually twelve cents a ton because it cost the miners eight
cents per ton to shoot and prepare the coal.

Bittner announced

that the union was "not looking for trouble," and wired Hugh
Kerwin, Chief Conciliator of the Department of Labor, requesting
that a representative be sent to Morgantown.141 Kerwin complied
immediately.142
On the following day the walkout continued.
more mines on Scotts Run refused to work.

Miners at three

Eight of the thirteen

mines which operated on the six-mile run were closed down, and an
estimated thirteen to fifteen hundred miners were on strike.
Despite an inch of rain, the strikers formed picket lines around
the five mines still in operation.

Paisley's Connellsville By-

Products Coal Company requested assistance from Sheriff Herbert
C. Johnson to prevent the pickets from interfering with
operations.

The sheriff, according to the Dominion Post, found

no disorder, and made only one arrest— for drunkenness.

The UMWA

held another big meeting at Osage where Bittner and Dalrymple
asked the miners to stay out until an agreement was reached
between the coal companies and District 31.

The UMWA could offer

the miners no relief, but as Dalrymple told them, it was far

141"Scotts Run Miners go on Strike," United Mine Workers
Journal. Vol. 42, No. 11 (June 1, 1931), 3; Dominion Post. May 13,
1931.
142Hugh Kerwin to Thomas M. Finn, May 12, 1931, copy of
telegram, Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, Department of
Labor, National Archives, Record Group 280, Dispute Case Files,
File Folder 170-6261.
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better to "starve fighting than starve working."

The union

officials also urged miners to wage a peaceful campaign and "do
nothing that would bring criticism on their heads."143
Federal conciliators W.H. Rodgers and George H. Van Fleet
arrived in Morgantown on May 15, and began a survey of Scotts Run
on the following day.

They found every mine on the nan shut

down, and thirty-two hundred miners on strike.144 Picketing
continued, and, despite rumors of incoming strikebreakers, the
situation remained peaceful.

Over four thousand attended a May

17 UMWA meeting at Osage, which had become a daily occurrence, to
hear Bittner speak.

Citing the higher wages paid by

Consolidation Coal Company and other Marion County mines, Bittner
accused the Scotts Rian companies of making the miners pay for
their cut-throat competition.

He refrained from berating the

operators as in previous years, however, and placed the blame on
the railroads for driving down coal prices with their
unscrupulous bidding.

The Dominion Post reported that union

committees had been formed to extend the strike throughout
northern West Virginia, and warned that it was the "most serious
the county ever had because of the economic situation."

With no

relief coming from the UMWA and the local relief agencies unable

143Pominion Post. May 14, 1931.
144W.H. Rogers and George Van Fleet, "Preliminary Report of
Commissioner of Conciliation," May 21, 1931, Federal Mediation and
Conciliation Service, Department of Labor, National Archives,
Record Group 280, Dispute Case Files, File Folder 170-6261.
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to help, the strikers would face starvation conditions within a
week.145 In an editorial, the newspaper noted that public
sentiment was with the strikers, but that most people realized
that both sides were the victims of unfortunate circumstances.
It also warned that conditions were ripe for radicalism.146
Neither radical agitation nor acts of violence were
reported, however, during the first week of the strike.
Accustomed to the bombings and clashes of the Jacksonville era,
observers were surprised and thankful for the lack of violence.
Radicalism had little chance in the Scotts Run area because of
the strong presence of the conservative UMWA.

Despite several

attempts, the National Miners Union was unable to hold meetings.
Bittner was committed to the UMWA policy of reform rather than
revolution; to working within the system rather than overthrowing
it.

On May 15, he sent a wire to the chairman of the Interstate

Commerce Commission complaining of the railroads' purchasing
practices and asking the commission to use its influence to
compel the railroads to pay a "sufficient price for their coal
that will allow the miners and their families to live."147

145"Miners ready to oppose any outside labor," Dominion Post.
May 18, 1931.
l46"A Few Observations," Dominion Post. May 18, 1931.
147The railroads which Bittner named were the New York, New
Haven and Hartford Railroad, the New Central Railroad, the Delaware
and Hudson Railroad, the Rutland Railroad, the Central Railroad of
New Jersey, the New York Ontario and Western Railroad, the Lehigh
Valley Railroad, and the Canadian Pacific Railroad? "Scotts Run
Miners go on Strike," United Mine Workers Journal. Vol. 42, No. 11
(June 1, 1931), 3; Dominion Post. May 16, 1931.
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Bittner and the UMWA leaders appealed to the community for aid
for the strikers.

On May 19, the first relief arrived at Scotts

Run from Morgantown: two truck loads of supplies from an
"undisclosed" source.

Another development which brought hope was

the beginning of negotiations between a committee of operators
and the union.148
On May 20 a vast crowd packed the Monongalia County
Courthouse to attend a meeting called by the UMWA on the Scotts
Run situation.

Loud speakers were placed in the courthouse yard

so that the crowds outside could hear.

It was the first meeting

held outside Scotts Run during the strike.

Along with Bittner,

Dalrymple, and C.F. Davis of the UMWA, John B. Easton, president
of the West Virginia State Federation of Labor, spoke.

Bittner's

speech was one of his finest, and is worth quoting at length.

He

asserted in unassailable logic that the UMWA's program of
organization was the only way to bring prosperity back to Scotts
Run and the region.
Bittner began by asserting that he was "not a prophet nor
the son of a prophet," but had recognized for seven years what
would eventually come to pass in the mining industry without
organization.

Yet, he was not vindictive and was willing to

forget the bitter struggles of the past:
the dam."

"That is all water over

He first outlined the current situation:
We are faced with the strangest situation ever
presented, with a new era in strikes. Miners,
businessmen, coal operators, newspapermen, professional

148Pominion Post. May 20, 1931.
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men, all are striking against the consuming interests
who are taking coal out of our hills and through their
great power and influence have degraded the miners to a
point where they derive a mere subsistence from their
labors, and have degraded the capital assets of the
coal industry and of the business and professional men
who make their homes in Monongalia County.
Not only have they degraded labor and the coal
industry, but they have closed banks and destroyed the
confidence of miners, operators, and of all the people
of the community. Any power or interest that does all
of these things is a menace to the entire community.
Bittner, like regional spokesmen in 1887, 1910, and in the 1920s
battles in the ICC, condemned the railroads as the main outside
force which had stifled the region's development.

Rather than

condemning the railroads for poor service and discriminatory
freight rates as had been done before, Bittner assailed them for
clubbing down coal prices through coal brokers.

He explained how

the UMWA was working to change the purchasing practices of the
railroads through the ICC and surmised:

"We are all striking

against the autocratic power of these railroads, which have
degraded

our industry."

What could be done?It was clear

Bittner that neither the coal

to

operators, who were "victims of

their own foolishness," nor the bankers could "clean up this
situation."
There are three problems to settle: First, somebody
will have to feed these people. They are not going to
starve as long as anybody else has anything. Second,
we must move speedily to get the men back to work where
they can earn a living. Third, we are faced with a
situation where we are not able to solve all problems
without the help of some agency outside the coal mining
industry. ... If we don't open the mine soon, contracts
will be taken out of this field, and then there won't
be any situation to solve. Therefore, the operators
should meet with the miners and representatives of the
federal government to work out some solution. Let us
forget all of our prejudices. ... Let us go before the
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Interstate Commerce Commission and the secretary of
labor and place before them an eye picture of the
situation from the miners' and operators' standpoint.
There is nothing radical about these proposals.
All that is needed is a simple application of common
sense. Giving away coal is not common sense.
Working
for nothing is not common sense. Just let us start
from there and I am sure that we can get somewhere.
Let us forget the differences of the past.149
With this speech— and others like in the Scotts Run campaign—
Bittner established himself as a spokesman for the region's
economic interest.

Things had certainly changed dramatically

from 1924, when he had been seen as a puppet of outside interests
and the greatest enemy of regional development.
On May 22, the Scotts Run operators' committee submitted a
proposal through George Van Fleet to Bittner and the UMWA for a
rate of twenty-six cents per ton for machine-mined coal and a top
hourly rate of forty cents.150 Bittner, who had publicly
advocated a rate of $0.36 per

ton and $4.20

for daymen,rejected

the offer on May 23.151 Negotiations continued, however.
During the second week of the strike, May 19 to May 26, the
149"Scotts Run Miners go on Strike,” United Mine Workers
Journal. Vol. 42, No. 11 (June 1, 1931), 3; Dominion Post. May 21,
1931.
150This was the first time in the history of the Fairmont field
that hourly, rather than daily, rates were offered for the socalled day labor jobs: motorman, snapper, trackman, timberman,
driver, bratticeman, pumper, general inside labor, dumper, trimmer,
slate picker, car repairman, and general outside labor. Operators'
Committee to George H. Van Fleet, May 22, 1931, Federal Mediation
and Conciliation Service, Department of Labor, National Archives,
Record Group 280, Dispute Case Files, File Folder 170-6261.
151Van A. Bittner to George H. Van Fleet, May 23, 1931, Federal
Mediation and Conciliation Service, Department of Labor, National
Archives, Record Group 280, Dispute Case Files, File Folder 1706261.
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Scotts Run and Morgantown communities took a more active role in
providing relief for the strikers.

They made the strike, as

Bittner asserted, a "community proposition."

A relief committee,

headed by the merchant John Lee, was set up, and contributions
poured in from wholesale and retail merchants, restaurants,
bakeries, and community and church groups.
contribution to the committee.

The UMWA also made a

Monongalia County trucks were

used to transport the supplies to the main distribution center at
Osage.

The Citizens' Club, a group of Morgantown Italians-

Americans, served sandwiches and coffee to the pickets.

The

Pearsill Supply Company, which operated two stores at the mining
town of Pursglove, supplied several hundred pounds of meat.
Although the Red Cross refused to help the strikers, the
Salvation Army served meals daily at various points and had a
canteen for children.152 No violence was reported during the
second week.

One law enforcement officer explained the lack of

violence as a result of "everybody in the camps [being] of one
mind."

The operators were passive and unwilling to provoke the

strikers by attempting to import strikebreakers.153
As predicted, the strike spread in the second week, but only
to other mines on the Monongahela Railway at Maidsville and in
the Indian Creek field near Lowesville and Brady.

By May 24,

twenty-one mines were closed, and an estimated four thousand men

152Pominion Post. May 20, 1931; May 22, 1931; May 24, 1931; May
26, 1931.
153Pominion Post. May 24, 1931.
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were on strike.

On May 26, Patrick Fagan, president of District

6 in Ohio, promised to call a strike in his district at the
Paisley and Pursglove mines.

Bittner encouraged the miners to

strike, but only if they received wages less than thirty cents
per ton.

Acting under the advice of Conciliator Van Fleet,

Bittner did not permit sympathy strikes.

He ordered thirty-seven

miners back to work at the Eleanor mine of the Hite-Bames Coal
Company because their wages were above the thirty cent level.
Van Fleet stated that a sufficient number of miners had struck to
represent the miners' views.154
Negotiations to end the strike were hampered by the
inability of the operators to work together and develop a single
proposal.

The Monongahela Coal Operators Association had been

dissolved in 1928, so there was no organization in place.

Years

of cut-throat competition between the operators had left a legacy
of bitterness and distrust.

The Morgantown Post explained that,

The key to the situation, it seems to us, will be
found in the ability of the operators to agree on a
wage scale to which all will adhere and which all will
be certain is going to be respected. The "outlaw"
operator must be outlawed. Until the operators are
able to have confidence in the integrity of one
another, there is not much hope of achieving even that
semblance of stabilization which is necessary— and
properly so— for the continued operation of Scotts Run
coal mines.155
Individual operators continued to meet with Bittner and Van
FIeet, however.

154Dominion Post. May 25, 1931; May 27, 1931.
155Quoted in Fairmont West Virginian. May 27, 1931.
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On May 28 there was a breakthrough.

After two children and

a man collapsed of weakness from undernourishment while waiting
in a "hunger line," Bittner announced that the UMWA, after talks
with Howard Showalter, president of the company, had negotiated
an agreement with the Continental Coal Company, which operated
the Brock mine on Scotts Run as well as the Sands mine in
Rivesville.156 Bittner wired John L. Lewis to inform him of the
settlement and announced that "this means the beginning of a new
era of unionism in the mines of northern West Virginia."157 On
May 29, a similar agreement was reached with Chaplin Collieries
Company, and on May 30 with the National Fuel Company.158
Bittner called the settlements the "opening wedge" in the
movement to end the strike.159 On June 1, Bittner announced
that the remainder of the mines in Monongalia County would sign
the agreement.

On that day, one thousand Scotts Run miners

returned to work singing and cheering under the first UMWA
contract in the Fairmont Field since March, 1926.

Anthony Gray,

the "old Alabama miner" from Lumberport, wrote Lewis to explain

156W.H. Rodgers and George Van Fleet to H. L. Kerwin, May 28,
1931, copy of telegram, Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service,
Department of Labor, National Archives, Record Group 280, Dispute
Case Files, File Folder 170-6261; Dominion Post. May 28, 1931.
157Van A. Bittner to John L. Lewis, May 28, 1931, telegram,
UMWA International Archive, District 31, 1931.
158W.H. Rodgers and George Van Fleet to H. L. Kerwin, May 29,
1931; May 30, 1931, copies of telegrams, Federal Mediation and
Conciliation Service, Department of Labor, National Archives,
Record Group 280, Dispute Case Files, File Folder 170-6261.
159Pominion Post. May 29, 1931.
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that "the miners are coming back to the union.

Now the iron is

hot and we must keep it hot."160

Significance of the Scotts Run Settlement
In the first week of June, the strike spread rapidly from
Scotts Run and the Monongahela Railway mines to the Bear Mountain
field in Barbour County, the Shinnston field in northern Harrison
County, and to two mines in Taylor County.161 By June 20,
forty-four coal companies in the Fairmont field had been affected
by the strike.

Twenty-six had signed the District 31 agreement

and reopened their mines; the remainder were shut down because of
the strike or a lack of orders.

Five companies— Consolidation,

New England Fuel & Transportation, Bethlehem, Cosgrave Meehan,
Jamison, and the two Hite coal companies— were allowed to
continue operations during the strike.162 These large-tonnage
companies paid a higher wage scale than the agreement called for.
At this stage, Bittner was not willing to ask miners to join a
crusade for lower wages.
Although the agreement was hailed by most of the region's
newspapers— Fairmont West Virginian. Clarksburg Telegraph,
Morgantown) Dominion News, and Morgantown Post— because it

160Anthony Gray to John L. Lewis, May
International Archives, District 31, 1931.

21,

1931,

UMWA,

161Pominion Post. June 5, 1931.
162N.a., "Memorandum of Agreement, District 31, with attached
lists," June 20, 1931, UMWA, International Archive, District 31,
1931.
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allowed the miners to go back to work at a higher scale and
pointed the way to stabilization of the industry, C. E. Smith, in
an editorial in the Fairmont Times, wrote that it represented a
selling of "the long-suffering, and in some cases, the starving
miners down the river."

The only advantages gained, according to

Smith, were by the company and the mine union, the union securing
the contract and a working agreement as a wedge to re-enter this
field; the company having its men return to work to re-engage in
mining low-priced coal."

Smith charged the UMWA with that very

thing which it had been fighting against in the Fairmont Field
for seven years— depressing wages.

It had given "tacit

acquiescence to the premise that thirty cents is a living wage in
this valley."

With Consolidation Coal Company and the other

large operators in Marion County paying a higher scale, "we may
expect to see this rate prevail throughout the entire field, and
the large companies which have so admirably tried to maintain a
higher level being forced to yield."163
The coal companies signed the District 31 agreement
individually rather than under the aegis of a coal operators'
association.

Each agreement was identical, and provided for full

recognition of the UMWA, a closed shop, the check-off, the eighthour day, the formation of mine committees and a grievance
procedure, the freedom to trade outside the company store, union
checkweighmen, and increased wages.

The rate for loading

i63«The Scotts Run Victory," United Mine Workers Journal. Vol.
42, No. 12, 10; "Good Morning!" Fairmont Times, June 1, 1931.
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machine-mine coal was set at thirty cents per ton, and the
highest rate for "day labor" was forty-five cents per hour.
Other stipulations in the contract indicate that the UMWA had
yielded to the coal companies in order to obtain these favorable
provisions.

The operators were given the right to discipline the

work force.

For the first time, a employee could be discharged

for irregular work— defined as being absent from work for two
days in a row without an excuse.

Also for the first time, the

UMWA agreed to wage rates for machine loading of coal.

The rates

for cutting- and loading-machine operators were set at fifty-five
cents per hour; rates were slightly lower for facemen on a
loading machine crew.164 Since one of the main complaints of
the companies in 1923 and 1924 had been the unwillingness of the
UMWA to agree to wage rates for new machinery (the arc-wall
cutting machine) , this was a victory for the operators.165 The
major concession to the companies was a provision which allowed
for the reopening of wage negotiations at sixty-day intervals
following the signing of the contract.

In many ways the

164Ibid.
165Loading machines first appeared at Scotts Run in 1922, when
Shriver and Gilbert-Davis coal companies tested Joy loading
machines. They were shortly abandoned because of poor haulroads
and the fact that wage reductions negated their profitability.
Continental Coal Company emerged as the pioneer in mechanization.
In 1928 the company purchased a Jones "Coloader" for the Brock
mine, and operated it successfully.
Charles E. Lawall,
"Modernization in the Scotts Run & Maidsville Districts, West
Virginia," Mining Congress Journal, Vol. 24 (August 1938), 17-18;
James Morton Callahan, Jr., "Morgantown, 1925-1950, an Economic and
Social Study," M.A. Thesis, West Virginia University, 1953, 95-96;
Ross, "The Scotts Run Coalfield," 34.
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agreement was the harbinger of the modem age of mechanical
mining: hourly wage rates for all daymen, rates for machine
mining, recognition of the company's right to discipline the work
force, union recognition, and the eight-hour day.

Yet, with the

provision for a sixty-day renegotiation of wages, it was a
throwback to an earlier era when the sliding scale prevailed in
coal and other industries.
As important as it was in the Fairmont Field, the Scotts Run
campaign had an even greater impact nationally.

The strike

spread into Western Pennsylvania (District 5) during the first
week of June, and by June 4 four to five thousand miners were
out.166 Since the expulsion of the UMWA in 1927, the NMU had
emerged as the most powerful force in the Pittsburgh district,
however, and it contended with the UMWA for control of the
strike.

In an editorial entitled, "Why not Revive the United

Mine Workers?" the Pittsburgh Press reviewed the highlights of
the Scotts Run agreement and hailed it as a example for the
Pittsburgh district to follow:
Our Pennsylvania operators may be inclined to quote,
and to say: "What good can come out of West Virginia?"
But do not the West Virginia agreements point toward a
possible solution of the problem for the Pittsburgh
district? Revival and recognition of the United Mine
Workers of America in the Pittsburgh district would at
least provide a focal point for stabilization within
the district looking toward peace.167

166"Miners' Strike Spreads," Black Diamond. Vol. 86, No. 23
(June 6, 1931), 10: Dominion Post. June 3, 1931.
167Pittsburgh Press. June 6, 1931; quoted in "The Awakening,"
United Mine Workers Journal. Vol. 42, No. 12 (June 15, 1931), 2.
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The first UMWA agreement in District 5 since 1927 came on June 23
after Governor Gifford Pinchot, who returned to the governor's
office in 1931, used his good offices to get Sam Pursglove's
Pittsburgh Terminal Coal Corporation, the second largest producer
in District 5, to sign an agreement.168 Despite picketing by
the NMU, all of the corporation's eight mines were in operation
and its twenty-four hundred miners at work under the UMWA
agreement just three days later.169 Several other smaller
companies followed suit.

Observers thought that the operators,

alarmed by the anti-capitalistic program of the National Miners'
Union, would now embrace the relatively conservative UMWA.170
In the Hocking Valley in District 5 (Ohio) , UMWA miners sent
their congratulations to District 31 on June 2, held mass
meetings, and asked Lewis to provide aid for a reorganization
drive.171 On June 18, five hundred miners in the northern

16®Van Bittner to Gifford Pinchot, June 13, 1931, UMWA,
International Archive, District 31, 1931. Fox, United We Stand.
301, describes the agreement with Pittsburgh Terminal Coal
Corporation as a "rare negotiating success" in a footnote, but
fails to mention the Scotts Run settlements.
169The contract with Pittsburgh Terminal provided for a wage
scale considerably higher than the District 31 agreement: $0.50
per ton for loading machine coal and $4.50 a day for skilled inside
labor. The agreement had a provision for reopening negotiations at
ninety-day intervals. "Pittsburgh Terminal Coal Corporation Signs
a Contract with Miners' Union Covering 2,400 Men," United Mine
Workers Journal. Vol. 42, No. 13 (July 1, 1931), 1-2; John L. Lewis
to William Dalrymple, July 18, 1931, UMWA, International Archive,
District 31, 1931.
170Pittsburqh Sun-Telegraph. N.d., quoted in United
Workers Journal. Vol. 42, No. 13 (July 1, 1931), 2.
171Dominion Press. June 2, 1931; June 4, 1931.
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Mine

Panhandle of West Virginia refused to work and began picketing
mines in the Moundsville area.172 On June 19 Bittner announced
that he would "invade" southern West Virginia, where Frank Keeney
was making an attempt to call a strike in the Kanawha field under
the auspices of the West Virginia Miners' Union.173
The Scotts Run victory, the first for the UMWA in the
bituminous fields since 1928, when Josephine Roche's Rocky
Mountain Fuel company of Colorado signed an agreement with the
union,174 provided a much needed boost for Lewis and the
International.

Lewis wrote Bittner to express his gratification

on the "encouraging development."175 The International provided
Bittner with an additional organizer, William Powell of District
24, Michigan.176 Lewis wired President Hoover asking him to
convene a joint conference of bituminous coal operators and
miners to discuss the problems of the industry and find "a common

172,1strikers Picket More Mines in West Virginia," Black
Diamond. Vol. 86, No. 25 (June 20, 1931), 10; Dominion Post. June
19, 1931.
173Pominion Post. June 20, 1931. Bittner visited Montgomery in
Kanawha County and gave a speech sometime early in July.
An
account of this unsuccessful meeting (for the UMWA) is provided in
Edmund Wilson, "Frank Keeney's Coal Diggers: Part 2," The New
Republic. Vol. 67, No. 876 (July 13, 1931), 229-231.
174Fox, United We Stand. 309.
175John L. Lewis to Van A. Bittner,
International Archives, District 31, 1931.

June 3,

1931, UMWA,

176Philip Murray to Van A. Bittner,
International Archive, District 31, 1931.

May 22,

1931,
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UMWA,

basic understanding.1,177 The United Mine Workers Journal hailed
the Scotts Run agreement as "one of the most important
developments in the history of the United Mine Workers of America
in recent years ... a starting point from which a restoration of
unionism in the coal industry may become general."

The

development was seen by the Journal as nothing less than "The
Awakening. "17S
The UMWA offensive continued in July.

Several additional

coal companies in District 31 signed the agreement, including the
Rachel Gas Coal Company at Downs in Marion County, which was
operated by the Cosgrove-Meehan interests.

Despite the fact that

the company had been paying eight cents a ton over the District
31 rate, the miners voted unanimously to accept it.179 Mrs.
Dovie E. Cumberledge of Rachel, miner's wife and UMWA picketer,
wrote the Journal to express her joy:

"God only knows how

hungry, ragged, and cold I have been in the last seven years.
Oh, how happy I am tonight."180 Lewis awarded Bittner and
District 31 by providing additional funds, and requested him to
celebrate the victory by purchasing a five-string banjo for
Anthony Gray, the "old Alabama miner" who, in one of his letters

177United Mine Workers Journal. Vol.
1931), 3.

42, No. 12

(June 15,

178Ibid., 1-2.
179Van A. Bittner to John L. Lewis, telegram, July 18, 1931,
UMWA, District 31, 1931; Dominion Post. July 20, 1931.
180Mrs. Dovie E. Cumberledge to editor, United Mine Workers
Journal/ Vol. 42, No. 16 (August 1, 1931), 12.
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of encouragement, had expressed the desire to play once
again.181 By mid-July, the Panhandle miners had shut down all
but three mines in their field, and effected a UMWA wage
agreement with the Ben Franklin Coal Company of Moundsville.

The

strikers had made James Paisley's mines at Elm Grove the main
target of their picketing.182
President Hoover handed Lewis's request for a national
conference to Secretary of Labor Doak and Secretary of Commerce
Lamont.

Doak and Lamont wrote to the leading operators in the

country, including Howard W. Showalter, president of Continental
Coal Company, asking them to attend a bituminous conference on
July 9.183 The operators refused to meet with the UMWA, but
agreed to confer with Secretary Lamont.

After two days of talks,

the operators issued a statement explaining that a joint
conference would not help the bituminous situation.

Secretary

Doak met with Lewis and twelve other UMWA officials on July 14
and 15.

Doak announced that further conferences would be

scheduled, and that the National Miners' Union, which had
protested the conferences, would be excluded.184
181John L. Lewis to Van A. Bittner, July 1, 1931; Van A.
Bittner to John L. Lewis, July 9, 1931, UMWA, International
Archive, District 31, 1931.
182"Eastem Ohio and Panhandle Miners are Engaged in Battle to
Revive Union and Better Conditions," United Mine Workers Journal.
Vol. 42, No. 15 (July 14, 1931), 11.
183Van A. Bittner to John L. Lewis, July 24, 1931, UMWA,
International Archive, District 31, 1931; Dominion Post. July 3,
1931.
184Pominion Post. July 10, 1931; July 15, 1931.
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The Open-Shop Counter-Offensive
In August the UMWA campaign in District 31 peaked, then
began to stall.

On August 2, the sixty-day interval was reached

for some of the companies, and the contract was extended under
the same provisions for another sixty days.185 Several more
small companies were brought under the agreement.

By August 17,

the UMWA had six thousand miners working under union agreements,
and about six thousand more on strike.186 There were, however,
disturbing developments during the month as well.

Few operators

expressed an interest in the national stabilization conference,
and, despite an untiring effort by secretaries Doak and Lamont,
the effort collapsed by the end of the month.187 In a letter to
Senator Neely, Bittner blamed Treasury Secretary Andrew Mellon
for the unfriendly attitude of the Hoover administration.
Mellon, who had large investments in nonunion companies, was the
"one man who stands in the way" of a national conference,
according to Bittner.188
Another blow to the UMWA campaign in August was the
"invasion" of the Monongahela Railway field by force of ten to
fifteen NMU organizers.

The organizers solicited members, and

185Pominion Post. August 3, 1931.
186Pominion Post. August 18, 1931.
187Pominion Post. September 1, 1931.
188Van A. Bittner to Hon. M.M. Neely, July 17, 1931, quoted in
United Mine Workers Journal. Vol. 42, No. 17 (August 15, 1931), 13.
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picketed the New England Fuel and Transportation mine at
Everettsville, which the UMWA had permitted to operate during the
strike.

When the NMU attempted to hold a meeting at the

Riverseam mine near Booth, truck loads of UMWA members and
sympathizers arrived to break it up.

Despite its suppression,

the dual union gained a foothold, at first in the EverettsvilleBooth area in southern Monongalia County and then in Scotts
Run.189
August was marred by the first violence since the beginning
of the strike.

Although "good order" prevailed in most of the

Fairmont field, pickets and guards clashed at the Wendell mine in
Taylor County.

The Maryland Coal Company restrained the

picketers with an injunction and twenty-five UMWA members were
arrested.190 As a "community proposition," the UMWA campaign
stood to lose its support if the strike became violent.

The most

damaging development, however, was the beginning of an open-shop
counter-offensive.

On August 14, after a conference of the

Fairmont Coal Operators' Association at Clarksburg, Secretary
T.N. Moran announced that seventeen companies, whose mines had
been closed by the strike, would reopen their mines on the openshop basis.

Moran denounced the District 31 scale, which was

below that offered by many of the companies.191
189Pominion Post. August 13, 1931.
190Dominion Post. August 6, 1931; August 10, 1931.
191Moran refused to reveal the identities of the seventeen
companies. Dominion Post. August 15, 1931; Fairmont West Virginian.
August 17, 1931.
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Bittner was placed in the difficult position of having to
defend
field in

a wage scale based on conditions in the "cheapest coal
America." Although some miners were willing to accept

wagereductions

in order to gain UMWA protection and the promise

of higher wages

later, some were not.

The disenchantment with

the wage scale was expressed by the daughter of a Mona
(Monongalia County) coal miner in a letter to John L. Lewis.
Mary Marra wrote:
Yesterday as I was reading through your United Mine
Workers Journal, I read where a woman was happy because
a certain mine had signed with the union. The mine
where daddy works signed with the union too, and I
really am glad that it did, because the National Miners
Union can "go to grassand eat hay" for all I care.
But before the mine signed with the union daddy got
$3.20 a day and after it signed he gets $2.80. Now
what can a family of seven persons do on a wage of
$2.80?192
Admitting that he had no answer to the letter, Lewis sent it to
C.F. Davis, Acting Secretary-Treasurer of District 31, for a
reply.193
By August 18 it was clear that James Paisley, who had been
the only operator on Scotts Run to resist the organization drive,
planned to reopen his mine on a nonunion basis.

Paisley, who had

been one of the last to stick with the UMWA during the
Jacksonville agreement, had grown disenchanted with the union, in

192Mary Marra to John L. Lewis,
August
International Archive, District 31, 1931.

10,

1931, UMWA,

193John L. Lewis to C.F. Davis,
August
International Archive, District 31, 1931.

13,

1931, UMWA,
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part because of a personal feud with John L. Lewis.194 Bittner
announced that the UMWA would defy Paisley's open shop plan:
"He'll either sign an agreement or not work."195 Meanwhile, the
"back to work" movement began in Harrison and Marion counties.
Too weak to disperse his forces throughout the Fairmont field,
Bittner concentrated them in Scotts Run and tried to stop
Paisley.196
Picketing began on August 20 as Paisley's men began cleaning
up the mine.

Pickets surrounded the property and patrolled the

roads looking for incoming strikebreakers.

Paisley hired a force

of mine guards, and positioned two machine guns on the tipple.
On August 24, after hearing reports that the mine would load coal
on following day, Bittner called for a meeting at the Monongalia
Courthouse.

He told a large crowd of union miners:

You are soldiers in the trenches; this is your zero
hour. Go back to Scotts Run and do your duty. See
that Paisley doesn't scab those mines.197
On the following day, hundreds of UMWA pickets surrounded the
property and attempted to "march the mine."

As they moved closer

to the gate, mine guards fired canisters of tear gas, a new
weapon in the mine war.

The picketers withdrew, then reformed

their lines at a safer distance.

State and local policy

eventually intervened to stop the battle, and there were no
194Pominion Post. August 28, 1931.
195Pominion Post. August 19, 1931.
196Pominion Post. August 21, 1931.
197Pominion Post. August 25, 1931.
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serious injuries.

Rather

than the strikers, the police arrested

the mine guards who fired the tear gas.198
Bittner promised to end the strike if the companies agreed
to arbitration by President Hoover.

He wired Secretary Doak to

complain of the employment of strikebreakers and asked for
federal conciliators.

Doak sent Rodgers and Van Fleet back to

Fairmont on August 20, but the operators stated that there was
"nothing to arbitrate."199

At Bittner's request, the

two

conciliators remained until October 2 to observe
developments.200
The federal conciliators watched as the Fairmont field
descended into yet another series of bloody battles in the
decade-long mine war.

The strike against Paisley at Scotts Run

turned into the most violent and bitter struggle since Grant Town
in 1924-1925.

Paisley's machine gunners and mine guards stayed

busy throughout September, battling snipers in nighttime assaults
and breaking up marches with tear gas.

Picketing continued.

A

group of UMWA militants led by a black UMWA chauffeur, James
Fikes, hunted down and attacked scabs, who had been "shipped-out"
from Cleveland and southwestern Pennsylvania to break the

198Pominion Post. August 26, 1931.
199Dominion Post. August 18, 1931; August 20, 1931.
200W. H. Rodgers to Hugh Kerwin, September 24, 1931, Federal
Mediation and Conciliation Service, Department of Labor, National
Archives, Record Group 280, Dispute Case Files, File Folder 1706261.
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strike.201 The running battle spread from Scotts Run to the
remainder of the Monongahela Railway field in mid-September,
after Paisley reopened his Kelly's Creek Collieries mine at
Maidsville on the open-shop basis.

A knifing marked the

reopening of the Riverseam mine at Booth on September 11, after
miners petitioned the owners of the mine, the Diamond Alkali
Company of Pittsburgh, to reopen at the old scale of $0.27 a ton
per machine-mined coal and $3.20 a day.

When the Bryne Gas Coal

Company attempted to ship strikebreakers on a barge across the
Monongahela River from Jordan (formerly Scottdale or Murray,
Margaret Fowler's hometown) to the Bryne camp near Lowesville,
UMWA miners attacked and stoned them on the river bank and forced
them to flee; fourteen, including Fikes, were arrested and
charged with violation of the Red Man Act.202
On September 20 the Dominion Post condemned the violence and
noted that public opinion had shifted against the miners.203
The editor complained that Monongalia County had borne the brunt
of the strike.

After a short-lived strike at the mines of

Simpson Creek Collieries and the Maryland Coal Company, the union
had withdrawn from Taylor County.

On September 15, the UMWA

201Dominion Post. September 1, 1931;
September 4, 1931; September 5, 1931.

September

3,

1931;

202Dominion Post. September 14, 1931; September 15, 1931.
203Pominion Post. September 20, 1931.
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abandoned the strike at thirteen nines in Marion and Harrison
counties.204 The large companies in Marion County,
Consolidation, Bethlehem, and New England, which were paying a
higher scale, were not bothered by UMWA pickets.205
The UMWA was forced into an even more difficult position as
the end of the second sixty-day term of the contract approached
in late September.

The B&O Railroad, the largest consumer of

railroad fuel in the Fairmont field, announced that it would
abandon its policy of purchasing coal by contract, and buy it on
the open market from the lowest bidder.
cutting war was in the offing.

Another great price-

The union companies, led by

Continental Coal Company, demanded a reduction of twenty-five
percent in the District 31 wage rate.206 Upon hearing of the
initiative, Federal conciliator William Rodgers notified his
boss, Hugh Kerwin, to expect some "unusual developments."207
After meeting with the operators, Bittner agreed to recommend the
proposal to a District 31 convention, but also insisted that the
operators support his plan for a national stabilization
conference.

At the District 31 convention at Fairmont, Bittner

204W .H . Rodgers and George H. Van Fleet to Hugh Kerwin,
September 15, 1931, Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service,
Department of Labor, National Archives, Record Group 280, Dispute
Case Files, File Folder 170-6261.
205Pominion Post. September 24, 1931.
206Fairmont West Virginian. September 18, 1931.
207William Rodgers to Hugh Kerwin, September 18, 1931, Federal
Mediation and Conciliation Service, Department of Labor, National
Archives, Record Group 280, Dispute Case Files, File Folder 1706261.
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explained that the reduction would enable union companies to
"operate and place their coal on the market in competition with
nonunion companies."

He explained to the delegates that "we have

to scab these scabs out of the district."

Despite some

opposition, the convention approved Bittner's resolution and
instructed the District 31 scale committee to accept the
reductions.208 On October 2, an agreement was signed between
District 31 and forty-one coal companies.

The tonnage rate for

machine-mined was slashed from thirty to twenty-two and one-half
cents, and the top hourly rate cut from forty-five to thirty-four
cents.

The operators agreed to reduce house rentals, doctor

fees, and lamp charges by the same proportion, and eliminate
entirely blacksmithing charges.

Rodgers called the new

agreement, "an interesting experiment."209 Writing in the
Fairmont Times. C.E. Smith claimed to "almost stand aghast" at
the conspiracy of the UMWA with "certain union operators" to
depress wages and "destroy entirely the American standard of
living in this valley."210 M.L. Brown, secretary of the
Fairmont Board of Commerce wired Secretary of Labor Doak and John

208Dominion Post. September 29, 1931.
209William Rodgers to Hugh Kerwin, September 18, 1931; Van A.
Bittner to Hugh Kerwin, October 15, 1931, Federal Mediation and
Conciliation Service, Department of Labor, National Archives,
Record Group 280, Dispute Case Files, File Folder 170-6261.
210Fairmont Times. September 24, 1931.
503

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

L. Lewis to protest the reduction on the same grounds.211
The wage reductions and Bittner's collaboration with the
coal companies exposed the UMWA to attacks from the NMU.

Two

days after the reduction was approved, the NMU held an
uncontested and well-attended meeting at Jere along Scotts Run.
Frank Borich, secretary of the union, I. Hawkins, "negro
organizer," and Mary Smith, the "woman's organizer," spoke out
against the UMWA "sellout."

The organization tested its strength

by calling a strike, its first in the Fairmont field, for the
following day.

The strike was a "fizzle," according to the

Dominion Post. The paper reported that only a few NMU pickets
patrolled Scotts Run in the next few days, and that all of the
union mines were at work.212 The NMU turned to another tactic
which it had employed in Pennsylvania, the hunger march.

Under

the leadership of Mike Stone of Pursglove, the NMU staged a march
of 50 unemployed coal miners from Scotts Run to the Morgantown
City Hall on November 10.

Stone demanded a weekly payment for

each unemployed worker of $10, and an additional $13 for each
dependent.

Morgantown Mayor John Sanders, after learning that

the leaders were "outsiders," refused to hear their pleas.213
On December 1, Stone and his followers marched again, this time
211M.L. Brown to William Doak, September 26, 1931, telegram;
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, Department of Labor,
National Archives, Record Group 280, Dispute Case Files, File
Folder 170-6261. M.L. Brown to John L. Lewis, September 26, 1931,
telegram, UMWA, International Archive, District 31, 1931.
212Pominion Post. October 6, 1931.
213Pominion Post. November 11, 1931.
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to the Monongalia County Courthouse to flay county officials for
the relief effort.

Stone explained to the county officials that

1,000 people were starving, but they dismissed him when he was
unable to list the names of the heads of families of the
1,000.214 UMWA leaders warned the miners to beware of the
Communist NMU.

UMWA forces responded to the radical challenge in

a characteristic manner.

They broke up a widely-advertised NMU

meeting at National (near Brady) on November 29, and engaged in a
brawl with clubs and knives with Stone and several of his
followers on December 13 at Osage.215

An "Orgy of Cutthroat Competition”
Following the UMWA-approved cut, Consolidation Coal Company
announced a twenty-five percent wage reduction on December l.216
Consol's rate remained higher than the union wage scale, however.
As Louis Stark, a special correspondent of the New York Times.
reported, miners in the Fairmont Field had been "impoverished by
an orgy of cutthroat competition."

After a survey of conditions,

Stark wrote:
The strike-torn fields of northern West Virginia
present just now a vivid and tragic picture of "the
free play of competition" pushed to its logical or
illogical limit.
The northern group of counties adjoining the
Monongahela River on the east, the Ohio on the west and
214Pominion Post. December 2, 1931.
215Pominion Post. November 30, 1931; December 14, 1931.
216"Another Wage Cut," United Mine Workers Journal. Vol. 42,
No. 24 (December 15, 1931), 3.
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Pennsylvania on the north constitute a closely knit
"front" in the sectional conflict of the coal industry.
Northern West Virginia's embattled coal industry faces
similar and determined "armies" north, south, east and
west. As if that were not sufficient competition, the
northern West Virginia fields are themselves t o m by
intersectional strife. Each operator's hand is lifted
against that of his neighbor. Distrust is everywhere.
The result is chaos. And what chaos means in
northern West Virginia is this: Miners in some
sections are reduced to a standard of living comparable
to that of 1893. Many work but two or four days a week
and their net earnings when they actually work yield
but 80 cents to a dollar a day.
Bankruptcies of coal companies are frequent. ... In
some sections more than half of the concerns in
business eight to twelve years ago have shut down.
Ownership of properties changes so fast that people in
the business find it difficult to keep up with the
identity of new management.
Relief workers are besieged day and night, not only
by idle miners, but those on part time who require help
to eke out their meager pay to attain a minimum of
subsistence.217
In another article, Stark confronted the question of what
could be done to stabilize the coal industry.

He compared the

industry to a "runaway train with the engineer in a dead faint in
the cab and unable to apply the brakes in time to prevent a
smash-up."

The number of stabilization plans were "legion."

At

an international conference on bituminous coal held in November
at Pittsburgh, an executive of Pittsburgh Coal Company submitted
a chart showing scores of proposals, including consolidations,
production control, price control, sales programs, revision of
freight rates, changes in labor relations, federal ownership, and
classifying coal as a public utility.

After a study of the

217Extracts of Stark's articles appeared in "West Virginia
Mining Industry Impoverished by Orgy of Cutthroat Competition Among
Operators," United Mine Workers Journal. Vol. 43, No. 1 (January 1,
1932), 19.
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situation, Stark found that the stabilization plan being pursued
by the UMWA and the union companies in District 31 offered the
best way out of the descending spiral of the industry.

Stark

interviewed Howard Showalter, president of Continental Coal
Company and main proponent among the coal operators of the
District 31 plan.218
Despite his family connections, Showalter's emergence as an
industrial statesman in the 1930s was unexpected.

Prior to the

collapse of the coal industry during the depression, Howard
Showalter was hardly considered a captain of industry capable of
replacing Camden, Fleming, or Watson.

Showalter, who was the

brother of Marion County judge Emmet Showalter, was a Fairmont
businessman who got his start as a teller in the First National
Bank of Fairmont.

He rose to the position of vice president, but

was indicted for the misapplication of funds in 1917.

The "Get

Rich Quick Wallingford" was convicted and sentenced to five years
in a prison.219 Discredited, Showalter never became a coal
capitalist in his own right.

Instead, he became a manager of a

coal company owned by outside interests.

In 1923 he was retained

by Edward Hines, the Chicago coal and lumber magnate, to manage
the latter's newly-formed Continental Coal Company.

Along with

Stephen Arkwright, Showalter made Continental one of the most

218Louis Stark, New York Times. November 27, 1931; reprinted in
United Mine Workers Journal. Vol. 42, No. 24 (December 15, 1931),
8-9.
219Fairmont Times. September 11, 1917; September 20,
September 22, 1917.
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1917,

productive and technologically-advanced companies in the
state.220 First of the coal companies in the Fairmont field to
install (and keep) loading machines, Continental was also the
first to recognize the UMWA.
As president of Continental, Showalter was also one of the
leaders of the effort to improve the Monongahela River for
navigation.

The renewed interest in river navigation came in the

wake of the freight-rate controversies of the 1920s.

River

transport was seen as a way to reduce shipping charges by as much
as one-half.

The drought and resulting suspension of navigation

on the Upper Monongahela in 1930 led to a Congressional
appropriation for a study by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to
determine how navigation could be maintained.

At a hearing in

Morgantown on November 25, 1931 Showalter was one of the coal
operators who testified that river transport, especially "exriver coal" (coal shipped on barges, then unloaded into railroad
cars and transported to its destination), would enable the coal
companies of the upper Monongahela region to enter markets now
closed to them.

In the words of one operator, it "would put the

region on the map."

After the hearings, the Corps announced a

plan to improve and rebuild Locks No. 10-15 and construct a large
reservoir on the Upper Monongahela to supplement natural flow

^Dominion News. December 26, 1932; December 27, 1932; Ross,
"The Scotts Run Coalfield," 33.
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during drought.221
In the interview with Stark, Showalter stated his views on
stabilization:
If the entire [Fairmont] field were under a uniform
contract, and had to live up to the same regulations,
enforced by an independent union, all operators would
have to start at scratch. There could be no ruinous
price war based solely on the ability of an operator to
reduce wages again and again with his employees unable
to defend themselves.222
In addition to full unionization of the district, Showalter also
recommended that the operators of the district combine, giving
them the power to "prevent other districts from making inroads
into the market ... ."

With cooperation between the operators

and miners, it would be possible to curtail production and end
the problem of oversupply.

To be effective, such district-wide

cooperation would have to effected on a national scale.
Showalter also favored the appointment of a national coal
commission to act as arbitrator between labor and the operators'
associations.223

A World Turned Upside Down
Nineteen thirty-one ended with the Fairmont Field once again
divided between union and nonunion companies.

Another round of

the decade-long mine war was underway. The UMWA offensive, which
^ Morgantown Post. November 25, 1931.
Monongahela River
improvement and the construction of Tygart Dam in 1935-1938 are
treated in Johnson, Headwaters District. 104-105.
222Stark, in "Union Wage Would be Stabilizer for Coal," 8.
223Ibid.
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had held such promise as a means to resolve the coal problem not
only on the regional but also on the national level, had come to
a standstill.
again.

In this respect, it was 1924 or 1925 all over

Yet, developments in the years since Jacksonville had

altered political and economic conditions and the climate of
opinion to make the situation in 1931 dramatically different.
The campaign to uphold Jacksonville had failed mainly because of
the UMWA1s "artificially high" wage scale and the forfeiture of
public support because of incessant violence.

The UMWA itself

was perceived as a foreign menace, part of a conspiracy of
outsiders which since 1898 had sought to turn the region's mining
towns into "fields of desolation.11 As events unfolded in the
late-l920s, desolation came to the region's coal fields, but not
because of the UMWA.

The coal operators, as Bittner prophesied,

had been ruined by the destructive competition which they had
helped unleash.
discredited.

By 1930 they were prostrate, their policies

The UMWA's resurgence in 1931 came only after the

operators had forfeited their positions as the great developers
of the region.
The Scotts Run victory in 1931 signalled the beginning of a
new era of labor relations in which the world was turned upside
down.

The UMWA, rather than the coal capitalists, was the avowed

protector of regional interests.

The community supported the

strikers rather than the operators in 1931; as Bittner claimed,
the strike was a "community proposition."

Not only working

people and miners, but also many of the capitalist class
510
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supported the mostly peaceful UMWA campaign.

When strike

violence erupted, in many cases mine guards were arrested rather
them miners.
organization.

Nor was the UMWA perceived as a foreign
Bittner's seven-year stay in Fairmont, and the

formation of District 31 had established the UMWA's residency.
By reshaping the union gospel, Bittner had demonstrated that the
UMWA was the last bulwark against rapacious outside interests
which were impoverishing the region.
longer seen as a radical organization.

Moreover, the UMWA was no
Not only did it continue

to wave the flag and work within American institutions, but the
UMWA also suppressed the NMU, thereby establishing itself as a
defense against Communism and continuing the work begun by the
operators in 1919 of riding the region of radicals.
Another significant manifestation of a world turned upside
down was that in the 1931 campaign the UMWA did not hold out for
an "impossible" wage scale.

Indeed, the miners' union attempted

to enforce a wage scale that was lower than that being offered by
most of the nonunion companies.

Even Paisley's scale was equal

to or slightly above that of the UMWA.224 As a result, the lowcost, low-wage mines, which had been the target of the 1924 to
1927 campaign, were allowed to operate and compete successfully
with the high-wage nonunion companies, such as Consolidation Coal
Company.

The UMWA's justification for its policy was that it

"allowed the miners to live," to work, and not be a burden to the
community, and that it was only temporary expedient.

By holding

224Pominion Post. August 28, 1931.
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onto the UMWA, "outscabbing the scabs," miners would create a
union field which UMWA leaders could use as a base in the
national campaign to reorganize the industry.225

Bittner and National Lobbying Efforts
In 1932 the desperate situation in the coal fields of the
nation led Congress and the president to mount an effort to
reform the industry and ameliorate conditions.

The effort nearly

succeeded in providing the UMWA with what it eventually obtained
under the New Deal, a federal mandate to reorganize the coal
fields.

Both Lewis and Bittner played leading roles in the

liberal lobbying campaign for legislation intended to stabilize
the industry, provide relief to miners and their families, and
ensure civil liberty in the coal fields.

Prospects for reform

appeared bright in the first few months of the year.

Hoover's

Reconstructive Finance Corporation sailed through Congress and
was passed in January.

Although it provided no grants for direct

relief for miners as Lewis had asked, the bill provided credit to
governments and businesses upon which miners were dependent for
work and relief.226 Later in the month Senator Norris and
Representative LaGuardia introduced legislation to eliminate the
yellow-dog contract and strictly curtail the use of injunctions

^"The Scotts Run Victory," United Mine Workers Journal. Vol.
42, No. 12 (June 15, 1931), 10.
^"Senate Committee Hears the Facts About Miners' Unemployment
and Distress from President Lewis," United Mine Workers Journal.
Vol. 43, No. 2 (January 15, 1932), 1-2.
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in labor disputes.

The Norris-LaGuardia Act, which passed with

little opposition, also declared the right of labor to organize,
and provided for jury trials in contempt cases.227 Beyond the
courts, however, Norris-LaGuardia lacked an enforcement
mechanism, and it had no measures to stabilize the coal industry.

A bill to provide for the restructuring of the coal
industry, essential for the protection of the basic rights
affirmed in Norris-LaGuardia, was also introduced in Congress in
January by former Secretary of Labor, Senator James J. Davis, and
Congressman Clyde E. Kelly of Pennsylvania.

The Davis-Kelly bill

was designed to limit production and restore the equilibrium
between supply and demand in the coal industry so that prices and
wages would rise to "American standards."

Senator Davis promised

that the bill would return the country to the days "when anybody
who wanted to buy a silk shirt could buy one."228 The bill
called for the licensing of all coal companies engaged in
interstate or foreign commerce, and their strict adherence to
rules and regulations on production, wages, prices, and working
conditions, all of which would be promulgated and enforced by a
permanent coal commission.

As the legislation would impose one

type of regulation on coal companies, it would lift another.

The

bill permitted coal operators to form marketing pools or joint227,1
Anti-Injunction Bill As Passed by Senate Would Outlaw the
Hateful Yellow-Dog Contract," United Mine Workers Journal, Vol. 43,
No. 6 (March 15, 1932), 9; Fox, United We Stand. 308.
^Dominion Post. January 22, 1932.
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selling associations, measures which had been deemed
unconstitutional under the Sherman Anti-trust Act.

Under the

bill, employees were granted the right to belong to unions and
bargain collectively, and their First Amendment rights were
reaffirmed.229
Bittner played an important part in the UMWA's lobbying for
Davis-Kelly.

After the measure was endorsed by the Thirty-second

Consecutive Constitutional Convention of the UMWA in January,
Bittner held mass meetings of miners and businessmen in
Morgantown, where resolutions were signed by miners and
businessmen in support of the bill.230 Yet another petition
drive was launched to obtain supporters.

The bill received

nearly universal support, and one of the UMWA's long-time
enemies, Morgantown attorney Charles Goodwin, emerged as a
leading spokesman for the bill.231 Bittner also asked Howard
Showalter to testify before the Senate Sub-Committee on Mines and
Mining on behalf of the bill.

Showalter also agreed to call a

conference of union operators in District 31 to urge them to send

229"Davis-Kelly Bill Under Consideration," United Mine Workers
Journal, Vol. 42, No. 7 (April 1, 1932), 3-4: Fox, United We Stand.
308.
^"Report
of
the
International
Officers
Contains
Recommendations That Will Help Coal Industry," United Mine Workers
Journal. Vol. 43, No. 3 (February 1, 1932), 13; "Endorse DavisKelly Bill," United Mine Workers Journal. Vol. 43, No. 6 (March 15,
1932), 12; "Davis-Kelly endorsed at Mass Meeting," Dominion Post.
March 2, 1932.
s1Van A. Bittner to John L. Lewis, March 23, 1932, UMWA,
International Archives, District 31, 1932; "Local Attorney urges
Mass meetings on coal bill," Dominion Post. March 19, 1932.
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a committee to Washington in support of the bill.232
The Senate hearings were undertaken in the last two weeks of
March.

Along with Bittner and Showalter, John H. Hatfield of

Morgantown, president of the Rosedale Coal Company, testified on
behalf of the bill.

According to the United Mine Workers

Journal. Bittner created a sensation when he laid before the sub
committee a huge stack of petitions with the signatures of "every
coal operator, banker, businessman, professional man and other
citizens of Morgantown, Fairmont, Clarksburg, and other cities
and towns" in the Fairmont field.

He explained that the "entire

citizenship of that territory" was in favor of the bill.
Showalter told the sub-committee that he and other operators were
organizing a regional sales agency in the Fairmont field, which
"means collective bargaining in the merchandising of our
production," so they would not object to collective bargaining in
the "producing end of the product."

He warned that the bill must

be passed or the nation would be "doomed to further depression
such as the world has never known."

Hatfield explained that he

had opposed government intervention in business for twenty-five
years, but now realized that the coal industry could not put its
own house in order.

He favored the bill, including the

collective bargaining provisions.

Governor Pinchot of

Pennsylvania, whose Committee on Stabilization of the Bituminous
Coal Industry recommended similar measures, was another outspoken

^Va n A. Bittner to John L. Lewis, February 26,
telegram, UMWA, International Archive, District 31, 1932.
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1932,

supporter of the bill.233
Unlike Showalter and Hatfield, most of the coal operators in
the nation opposed the Davis-Kelly bill.

It was widely seen as a

law to bail out the troubled UMWA, which represented only about
fifteen percent of the miners in the country.

The nonunion

operators in southern West Virginia, Kentucky, Virginia, and
Tennessee opposed the bill through the National Coal Association,
the national lobbying organization.

The National Coal

Association had a program of stabilization which entailed the
establishment of regional sales agencies, such as the one
initiated by Showalter in the Fairmont Field or Appalachian
Coals, Inc. in southern West Virginia.

Although the National

Coal Association favored relaxing anti-trust laws, it condemned
as unconstitutional the licensing and collective bargaining
provisions of the bill.

Its strategy in contesting the bill was

to keep it in the sub-committee so that Congress, which was set
to adjourn in early June because of the upcoming national
conventions, would not have the opportunity to vote.

Despite

considerable sentiment in Congress in favor of some stabilization
bill, this is precisely what happened.

Hearings continued until

June 2, and Congress adjourned without taking action.234

^"Senate Sub-Committee Hears Reasons Why the Davis-Kelly Coal
Regulation Bill Should Pass," United Mine Workers Journal. Vol. 43,
No. 7 (April 1, 1932), 3-4.
^Fox, United We Stand. 308; "Davis-Kelly Bill Practically
Certain to Pass When Vote in Taken in Both Houses of Congress,"
United Mine Workers Journal. Vol. 43, No, 8 (April 15, 1932), 8-9;
Dominion Post. June 3, 1932.
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Rebellion in District 31
The failure of the Davis-Kelly bill was not the only setback
for Bittner and the UMWA campaign in District 31.

At the

Constitutional Convention in January, the Illinois dissident John
Eindmarsh, attacked Bittner for negotiating an agreement which
permitted repeated wage reductions.

Bitter defended the

agreement on the grounds that it had brought miners back into the
"true fellowship" of the union.
had been to achieve.

He explained how difficult it

He had addressed more than twelve hundred

mass meetings in the eight years he had been in northern West
Virginia, fought the traitors— the NMU, "a sort of Know-Nothing
organization," and Keeney, Germer and Howat— and had prevailed in
depression conditions in which every institution in the country,
including corporations and the government itself, had "2ost
ground."

When asked by Hindmarsh how the District 31 wage would

affect Illinois miners, who were getting $6.10 a day and $0.91 a
ton, Bittner explained that if the agreement had not been
reached, Illinois would be facing competition of fourteen cents a
ton instead of the present twenty-two and one-half cents.235
The convention failed to fault Bittner and voted to maintain the
policy initiated in 1928 of allowing each district the negotiate
the "best possible agreement.1,236
^"Record of the International Union is Defended When Attacked
by Fault Finders in Convention," United Mine Workers Journal. Vol.
43, No. 5 (March 1, 1932), 3-4; Dominion Post. January 28, 1932.
^Dominion Post. February 6, 1932.
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Bittner returned to Fairmont to face the same kind of
criticism from miners in District 31.

Officers of Local No. 5429

of Mona in Monongalia County protested to the International
Executive Board against the reduction in wages and other abuses
of the UMWA constitution by Bittner and his "Chair-warming
Outfit."

The officers found the wage reduction of twenty-five

percent and Bittner's admonition to "outscab the scabs" difficult
to swallow in light of the fact that the major coal companies in
the region, Consol, Jamison, Bethlehem, and New England,
continued to pay wages over one-third higher than the union
scale.

They condemned the sliding scale "for the reason that it

slides only one way."

Bittner’s use of "dead locals" to increase

his power angered the protesters.

Bittner had given hired

"pickhandle thugs" the authority to represent the non-working
locals, who outvoted the working ones at district conventions.
He had also broken the UMWA constitution by abrogating the
"penalty clause," which gave locals the power to govern the rank
and file, and by permitting miners to take a year to pay dues
rather than the prescribed ninety days.

The officers of Local

No. 5429 concluded the letter of protest by pledging their
loyalty to the UMWA and asking Lewis for a thorough investigation
of the situation in District 31.237
Dissatisfaction with Bittner's policy in District 31 grew in
May and June.

Some disgruntled Scotts Run miners threatened

^M.V. Madden, et. al to John L. Lewis, March 7, 1932, UMWA,
International Archives, District 31, 1932.
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rebellion.

Bittner was absent when the movement began, having

entrusted the care of his flock to International representative
William Balyrmple, a devoted and competent UMWA leader who
nonetheless lacked Bittner's charisma.

The uprising began soon

after a sixty-day adjustment period ended on April 30.

No wage

reduction was permitted at this time, but it was feared that the
operators would demand one in upcoming negotiations to renew the
one-year contract, which expired on May 31.

The miners

complained that their wages were barely enough to keep them off
of the public dole.

On May 5, the officers of some of the locals

on Scotts Run announced that their membership would strike on
June 1 to protest the low wages.

Fearing reprisals for the

unauthorized strike call, the officers of the locals refused to
reveal their names to the newspapers.238
The pot of dissension was stirred by the NMU, which
maintained its headquarters in the Fairmont field at Jere along
Scotts Run.

Sensing the dissatisfaction among the miners with

the UMWA, the NMU intensified its organization campaign.

The

NMU, which was simultaneously prosecuting an organization
campaign and strike at the mines of the Pittsburgh Terminal Coal
Company, held a successful meeting at the Monongalia County
Courthouse on April 6.239 Mike Stone spoke to a quiet crowd of
about three hundred as officers stood by to guard against

^Dominion Post. May 5, 1932.
^Dominion Post. June 6, 1932.
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disorder.240 Later in the month, Stone was arrested in
Clarksburg after distributing Communist literature, including an
announcement of his candidacy for governor of West Virginia.

He

was joined on the Communist Party ticket by two other NMU
officers from Scotts Run, Howard F. Johnson, a black from
Pursglove, and Eugene Rivera.241 By the end of May, the NMU had
gained hundreds of new members among the unemployed and insurgent
miners on Scotts Run and other Monongahela Railway mining
settlements.

The organization, which sought to take over the

UMWA insurgent movement, called for a strike against the "wage
cutting polices of the operators and the check-off graft of the
UMWA" on June l.242
Bittner returned to Fairmont in late May to negotiate a new
agreement with the coal operators and quell the rebellion.

After

gaining the approval of a District 31 convention to pursue
negotiations for a five-year contract with no wage reductions,
Bittner met with the coal operators' committee on May 28.

He

proposed a five-year contract with annual adjustments, as well as
a program for "constructive cooperation," which included a joint
freight commission, a stabilization commission, and a marketing
association— the stabilization provisions of the Davis-Kelly
bill.

The operators committee, headed by Showalter and Stephen

Arkwright, balked at such a long commitment, and suggested a one240Dominion Post. April 7, 1932.
241Pominion Post. April 25, 1932.
242Pominion Post. May 31, 1932.
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year extension of the existing contract.

Hoping to avoid a

strike, the UMWA scale committee accepted the offer and signed
the one-year agreement on May 30.243
As District 31 locals met to ratify the new agreement on May
31, the NMD made its boldest challenge.

The insurgents, who were

strongest in Granville (near Mona) and Cassville, sought to break
up the ratification proceedings.

At a meeting at the Liberty

Theater at Osage, Dalrymple had to pound his gavel for an hour
and fifty minutes before order was restored with the help of
state and county law enforcement officers.

The Dominion Post

reported that many of the UMWA members who "were causing trouble"
were also members of the NMD.

Allowed to speak, Dalrymple told

the miners that the UMWA would stand by the agreement and not
allow a strike.

If miners wanted to repudiate the agreement,

they would have to leave the UMWA.

Seizing the opportunity, the

NMD announced a meeting at Jere to launch their strike.

Tom

Johnson, an NMD organizer from Pittsburgh, predicted that over
one thousand miners would attend.244
Despite— or perhaps because of— the NMD challenge, the DMWA
locals ratified the agreement, defusing the NMD strike.

Only

about fifty insurgents, many of them unemployed, attended the
meeting at Jere.

The NMD strike proved ineffective.

The coal

companies reported no loss of manpower or unrest among the miners

243Van A. Bittner to John L. Lewis, DMWA, International
Archive, District 31, 1932; Dominion Post. May 28, 1932.
244Pominion Post. May 31, 1932.
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on June 1 and June 2 .245 Rebellious miners returned to the
fold.

They chose the "true fellowship" of the DMWA over the

radical doctrines of the NMD.

They preferred low wages to a

strike which would put them on the hunger line.

They realized

that the county and other local charitable organizations would
not provide relief to Communists.

Although it did not raise

wages, the agreement preserved District 31 as a union field.
After Bittner wired Lewis to inform him that "every local in
District 31" had ratified the agreement, Lewis wrote back to send
congratulations: "I think that you are doing very well to
maintain our organization under [the] circumstances."

Lewis

expressed the hope that the agreement would allow the DMWA to
"take advantage of any break which may occur in our favor."246
Bittner thought such a break had come in June, 1932 when
Consolidation Coal Company was ordered into receivership.

The

failure came after George Anderson, who held to the high-wage,
nonunion policy to the end, was forced to resign in May.

The

company had not paid interest on bonds or dividends on stocks for
three years, and an unnamed investor sued in order to force the
company to conserve its assets.

On June 2 a federal judge

appointed three receivers to operate the company's mines.247
C.E. Smith's Fairmont Times admitted that the depressed condition

245Pominion Post. June 1, 1932; June 2, 1932.
246John L. Lewis to Van A. Bittner,
International Archive, District 31, 1932.

June 2,

1932,

247Pominion Post. June 3, 1932.
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DMWA,

of the industry had hurt the company, but asserted that the
collapse came as a direct result of competition from low-wage
UMWA mines.

Bittner policy of "outscabbing the scabs" had

produced the coup, which, the paper predicted, would only lead to
another round of wage cuts.248

Bittner's Drive to End the Open Shop
On the same day as the Consol announcement, Bittner opened
the UMWA's drive to end the open shop in District 31.249 After
Consol and Bethlehem announced wage reductions of nearly onethird, which placed them slightly above the UMWA scale, Bittner
wired Secretary of Labor Doak, requesting that he call a joint
conference of operators and miners in District 31.
called for a strike.

He also

By June 16 the strike had affected Consol's

Monongah, Carolina, and Owens mines.

In addition, many miners at

the Hite mines at Lowesville, Rivesville, and Kingmont had joined
the UMWA.250 On June 20, scores of miners struck and formed
picket lines at Paisley's mines at Maidsville and Scotts Run,
where the wage scale was twenty cents per ton.

A committee of

fifteen sent a letter to Paisley demanding a UMWA contract.
Paisley ignored their demands and hired four additional mine
guards.

Several clashes resulting in the arrests of both mine

248Fairmont Times, June 1, 1932; June 9, 1932.
249Pominion Post. June 3, 1932.
250Dominion Post. June 17, 1932.
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guards and pickets occurred at the Paisley mines in the next few
days.251
To gain support for the strike, Bittner called for an
extraordinary convention of District 31 for June 23 at
Fairmont.252 At his urging, the delegates unanimously adopted a
resolution pledging to strike the nonunion companies if they
would not meet in a joint conference on June 28 and sign the
District 31 agreement.

If a strike was necessary, the union

mines in the district would be "protected."

After the majority

of the tonnage of the field had signed DMWA agreements, a general
conference would be held to set a wage which would assure miners
of a living wage and operators a fair profit.

The convention set

a wage of $0.30 per ton and $3.60 per day (the June, 1931 rate)
as the "minimum wage."

Referring to the Norris-LaGuardia Act,

Bittner asserted that the miners had a right to bargain
collectively, and that it was the patriotic duty of both miners
and operators to adhere to the law.253 Once again, Bittner
expected the community to take care of the strikers.

He

explained to the delegates that they "must not steal, but neither
need you go hungry.

Go out and get food when you need it."254

^ Dominion Post. June 21, 1932; June 22, 1932; June 23, 1932.
252,1
Call for Extraordinary Convention," Van A. Bittner and C.F.
Davis, June 18, 1932, UMWA, International Archive, District 31,
1932.
^"Miners of Northern West Virginia Start Drive for Decent
Wages, Conditions, Union Contracts," United Mine Workers Journal.
Vol. 43, No. 13 (July 15, 1932), 4.
^Dominion Post. June 24, 1932.
524

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

The strikes at Paisley's mines soon reached a head.

On June

26, a score of pickets rushed and attempted to "take" the
blacksmith and tool shops at the Scotts Run mine.

Mine guards

drove them back with a barrage of gunfire.255 On the following
day, mine guards at the Maidsville mine answered a rock barrage
by emptying their sawed-off shotguns loaded with No. 1 shot into
a group of about sixty strikers.

One striking miner, James

Shaffer, was killed, and six others were seriously wounded.

A

detachment of state police, positioned less than one hundred feet
from the scene, stopped the firing and arrested three guards and
two miners.256 On June 30, over one thousand attended the UMWA
ceremony for James Shaffer at the Liberty Theater at Osage;
Bittner delivered the eulogy over loudspeakers for yet another
UMWA martyr.257
The nonunion companies failed to respond to Bittner's call
for a joint conference, so he called for a strike against all
nonunion operations on July 4, "emancipation day."258 In a
speech at the Monongalia County Courthouse, Bittner compared the
situation in District 31 to that in Russia on the eve of
revolution.

Paisley was likened to the Czar of Russia.

As in

the Russian revolution, where the "middle classes endured
^ Dominion Post. June 27, 1932.
256Pominion Post. June 28, 1932;June 29, 1932.
257Pominion Post. July 1, 1932; on June 28 theDominion Post
informed its readers that Shaffer was a "wire thief," and had been
"living with a woman who was not his wife."
^Dominion Post. July 5, 1932.
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oppression and abuse as long as it could endure, then rose up and
struck the heads from their tormentors," there would be a "day of
reckoning.1,259 Picketing occurred at nonunion mines in Marion,
Harrison, Monongalia, Taylor and Barbour counties, but the
Dominion Post reported that production was affected only at
Consol's Owings mine near Shinnston, its Monongah mine, where
mounted state troopers were called in, and at the New England
Fuel & Transportation Company's mine at Everettsville.

New

England, which paid thirty cents per ton to loaders, was made a
special target of the UMWA strike.

Pickets were recruited from

the pool of unemployed in nearby mining settlements, and by July
6, 150 were on duty at Everettsville.260 The company shut down
its mines, but several clashes occurred between mine guards and
pickets.

After the acquittal of two mine guards accused of

murdering James Shaffer, a striking miner, Joe Orloff, evened the
score by stabbing to death a mine guard at Everettsville.
Orloff, described by the Dominion Post as a Russian Bolshevik,
was later found guilty of involuntary manslaughter, a
misdemeanor.261 By the first of August, the offensive was
waning.

Picket lines had virtually disappeared, and the nonunion

mines were back in operation.262
During the strike, Bittner made repeated appeals to the
^Dominion Post. July 16, 1932.
260Pominion Post. July 6, 1932; July 7, 1932.
261Dominion Post. July 26, 1932; November 25, 1932.
262Pominion Post. August 4, 1932.
526

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Hoover administration for federal intervention.

Basing his

requests upon the Norris-Laguardia Act, Bittner first asked for
government help in getting the operators to the table on June 17,
when he wrote Secretary of Labor W.N. Doak and asked him to call
a joint conference in northern West Virginia.263 A second
request was made after the Maidsville shooting in a wire sent to
Doak on June 27.264 On June 29, Bittner sent Doak a letter with
a petition from striking Consolidation Coal Company miners
requesting federal intervention.

He also asked Lewis to wire

Doak on the matter.265 In the letter, Bittner argued that since
Consol was operating under federal receivers, it should be
required to adhere to the labor policy declared in NorrisLaGuardia.

He asked to federal government to "use force" if

necessary to get the operators to the bargaining table.266
Bittner wrote Doak again on July 7 requesting action at
Consolidation Coal Company.

On July 19, he wrote Attorney

General Mitchell asking that he enforce Norris-LaGuardia in
regard to the Consol receivership.

A copy of this letter was

263Van A. Bittner to W.N. Doak, June
International Archive, District 31, 1932.

17,

1932,

DMWA,

264"Miners of Northern West Virginia Wage Battle Against
Hunger: Say They Will 'Starve Fighting,'" United Mine Workers
Journal. Vol. 43, No. 14 (July 15, 1932), 3.
265Van A. Bittner to John L. Lewis, June 29, 1932, telegram,
UMWA, International Archive, District 31, 1932.
266Van A. Bittner to William N. Doak, June 29, 1932, UMWA,
International Archive, District 31, 1932.
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forwarded to President Hoover.267
The appeals to Washington led to a conference, arranged by
Secretary Doak, with President Hoover.

Bittner, along with Frank

Hefferly, international representative, and Ellis Searles, editor
of the United Mine Workers Journal. met the president at the
White House on July 28.

Bittner prepared and read a statement

before the president at the meeting.

He drew attention to the

cut-throat competition of the industry in northern West Virginia
and its victims:

miners who were working yet still unable to

feed and properly clothe their families.

He also scored the

Consolidation Coal Company for hiring a "large army of mine
guards," jailing miners for peaceful picketing, and refusing to
meet with representatives of the UMWA.

Bittner asked the

president to inform the receivers of Consol that the public
policy of the nation provided labor with the right to organize.
He pointed out how important gaining an agreement with Consol
would be in solving the problem of stabilizing the coal industry.
Once the largest company in the field signed, other independents
would follow.

Such an agreement would have national

significance:
As northern West Virginia was the first district to
repudiate the wage scale with the United Mine Workers
of America, and was primarily responsible for the
downward trend of wages in the coal mining industry, it
is natural to assume that if wage scales were signed in
this field, that other large bituminous districts would

267Van. A. Bittner to Attorney General W. Mitchell, July 19,
1932, UMWA, International Archive, District 31, 1932.
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follow suit.268
According to the Journal. Hoover "gave close attention" to
Bittner's statement, and asked numerous questions.

The delegates

departed from the White House with the belief that the case would
receive the "active attention" of the federal government.269
Bittner wrote Lewis to inform him that Secretary Doak had told
him that the government was "going to do something and they would
get busy immediately."

He urged caution, however, because "we

have been disappointed so often."270
Indeed, the Hoover administration, despite its willingness
to listen to pleas, proved to be a major disappointment to the
DMWA.

An engineer with wide knowledge of the coal industry and

chairman of the U.S. Coal Commission, Hoover was expected to be a
friend of the miners' union.

Yet, even after the passage of

Norris-LaGuardia law and the insertion of a plank in the
Republican platform favoring collective bargaining, Hoover failed
to act.

Rather than simply a devotion to laissez-faire

philosophy, his inaction can be explained by the dismal failure
of the Jacksonville Agreement, which he wholeheartedly supported
as Coolidge's Secretary of Commerce.

After this debacle, Hoover

could hardly expect coal operators to acquiesce in another

268"President Hoover Is Asked to Intervene in Effort to
Stabilize Coal Industry in Northern West Virginia," United Mine
Workers Journal, Vol. 43, No. 16 (August 15, 1932), 4.
269Ibid.
270Van A. Bittner to John L. Lewis, August 1, 1932, UMWA,
International Archive, District 31, 1932.
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government-imposed settlement with the DMWA.
Moreover, the UMWA was much weaker in 1932 than in 1924.
After the resurgence of 1931, the union's fortunes waned
nationwide in 1932.

Although it held onto gains made in northern

West Virginia and Kansas, where Alex Howat's reinstatement and
election to presidency of District 14 strengthened its hand, the
DMWA lost ground or made no progress elsewhere.271 In the
Pittsburgh field (District 5) the DMWA offensive which led to the
organization of Pittsburgh Terminal stalled.

Despite the

organizing campaign in Ohio, the DMWA made no headway in District
6.

After the Hocking Valley operators announced wage reductions

of twenty-five percent, seven thousand miners struck on February
1 for higher wages and DMWA recognition.

Five months of turmoil

followed; troops were called in on two occasions to drive the
strikers off public roads.

In June, hunger drove the strikers

back to work on the terms of the operators.272 The DMWA faced
its toughest challenge in Illinois, where its authority was
challenged by another dual union.

The new miners' union was

founded after District 12 negotiators agreed to a wage reduction
of nearly twenty percent in August.

Many miners, particularly in

northern Illinois, refused to accept the reduction, and picketed
mines that attempted to reopen.

The dissidents held a convention

at Gillespie, Illinois on September 1, 1932 and founded the

271Fo x , United We Stand. 293.
272Pominion Post. January 25, 1932; March 21, 1932; April 15,
1932; May 25, 1932; June 9, 1932.
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Progressive Miners of America.

The Progressives fought the UMWA

with roving pickets and a militant woman's auxiliary.

On two

occasions they invaded the coal fields of southern Illinois via
motorcades.

The battle with the Progressives so impoverished

District 12 that in early 1933 its leaders requested Lewis and
the International to take over the district.

Violent clashes

between the two unions continued until late 1933, when
Roosevelt's National Labor Board guaranteed DMWA hegemony.275

Change on the Horizon
The biggest news of 1932 was the election of Franklin D.
Roosevelt to the presidency.

Although he was vague on what he

would do, Roosevelt had promised government assistance in
stabilizing the coal industry during the campaign.

If nothing

else, his election offered the prospect of a change in federal
policy.274 The turmoil and continued decline of the industry in
District 31 had made it abundantly clear that the UMWA could not
succeed in stabilizing the industry on its own.

As Bittner had

explained to the Senate committee in 1928, the cure for
destructive competition would have to come from "something
outside of West Virginia."
The DMWA redoubled its effort to obtain federal intervention

273Fox, United We Stand. 302-304; Dominion Post. August 26,
1932; September 20, 1932; October 13, 1932; January 4, 1933.
274Fox, United We Stand, 308; Johnson, The Politics of Soft
Coal. 136-139.
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in 1933.

In January Bittner testified before the Senate

Committee on Manufactures for the Costigan-LaFollette Relief
Bill, which would provide hundreds of millions of dollars for
direct aid to the needy as well as work relief.

Bittner favored

the passage of the bill but argued that there would be no need
for such relief measures if Congress would pass the Davis-Kelly
bill.

Davis-Kelly would stabilize the industry and allow miners

to return to work at decent wages.

Expressing what would soon

become a popular view, Bittner maintained that the prosperity of
"industrial civilization" rested on the "amount of wages the
workers of industry receive and thus spend."275
After the inauguration of Roosevelt in March, Lewis, along
with Congressman David J. Lewis of Maryland and Senator Carl
Hayden of Arizona, went before the president to argue for new a
coal- stabilization bill.

The proposed legislation would create

a national council of coal operators to prorate coal by
districts.
miners.

The bill would grant collective bargaining to the

The operators, organized into district boards, would set

minimum prices and mine quotas.

By striking the licensing

provision of Davis-Kelly, it was hoped that the new bill would be
less objectionable to operators.

Roosevelt withheld support for

the bill, but he encouraged the Secretary of Interior, Harold
Ickes, and Secretary of Labor, Francis Perkins, to continue

275"The Bittner Statement," United Mine Workers Journal. Vol.
43, No. 2 (January 15, 1933), 4, 13-14.
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meeting with the UMWA.276
In April Bittner called for a special convention of District
31 on May 4.

The delegates passed a resolution, a Declaration of

Policy" which declared war against the depression in the coal
fields and pledged their commitment to work for the complete
organization of the district.
formed at each mine.

Organization committees were to be

Bittner also had the delegates approve a

letter to President Roosevelt "praying" for his support for
federal legislation to stabilize the coal industry.

Bittner

recommended legislation not only as means to help the coal miners
and operators, but also as a "necessary element in starting our
country on the road to —

prosperity.1,277

Bittner attached

the convention's resolution to the letter and sent it to
Roosevelt, Ickes, and Perkins, as well as UMWA officers Lewis and
Murray.278 Murray thought the letter and resolution were an
"excellent idea," and promised to undertake similar action in
Districts 2, 5, and 6.279 Lewis congratulated Bittner on the

276Johnson, The Politics of Soft Coal. 141.
277"Northem West Virginia Miners in Special Convention to Urge
Roosevelt to Aid Coal Industry," United Mine Workers Journal. Vol.
44, No. 10 (May 15, 1933), 3-4; "Declaration of Policy of the
United Mine Workers of America," May 4, 1933, UMWA, International
Archive, District 31, 1933.
278Van A. Bittner to Franklin D. Roosevelt, May 5, 1933; Van A.
Bittner to Harold L. Ickes, May 6, 1933; Van A. Bittner to Francis
Perkins, May 6, 1933; Van A. Bittner to John L. Lewis, May 8, 1933;
Van A. Bittner to Philip Murray, May 8, 1933, UMWA, International
Archive, District 31, 1933.
279Philip Murray to Van A. Bittner,
International Archive, District 31, 1933.

May

9,

1933,
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UMWA,

"able" documents.

He informed him that, along with the Illinois

and Indiana operators, "representatives" from the UMWA had met
with the Secretary of Interior.

Lewis expected a coal bill to be

completed and ready for consideration of the president soon.280
Since the first of April, Roosevelt and his advisors had
been working on a national industrial recovery bill to stabilize
not only coal but other ailing industr.' -s.

Several groups were

working on a bill simultaneously; Senator Wagner's group played
perhaps the most significant role.

Wagner's main goals were to

expand public works and protect labor.

He met with

representatives of various labor unions, including Lewis of the
UMWA, who later took credit for the inclusion of what came to be
known as Section 7a of the bill.

In fact, Wagner’s bill was

based on previous coal stabilization measures, including his
stabilization bill of 1928 and the Davis-Kelly bill of 1932-33.
Jett Lauch, the UMWA statistician and lobbyist who participated
in the consultations, later recalled that Section 7a "was taken
verbatim from the Davis-Kelly bill."281
The National Industrial Recovery Act included government
licensing of business, authorization to industries to draft code
agreements that would exempt participants from antitrust laws,
and Section 7a, which guaranteed the right of labor to bargain
collectively and stipulated that minimum wage and maximum hour
provisions be a part of each code.

The bill also had a provision

280John L. Lewis to Van A. Bittner, May 10, 1933.
^Johnson, The Politics of Soft Coal. 143-144.
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for a public works appropriation of $3.3 billion.

The bill

sailed through the House and was passed by the Senate on June
1 3

.282

Finally, coal miners had their emancipation

proclamation.
On May 27, after the House passed NIRA, Lewis wired
International Representatives and district officials across the
country to order them to undertake "a vigorous organizing
campaign in each of the nonunion districts at once.”

Despite

financial difficulties, Lewis assembled the largest force of
organizers the UMWA had ever put into the field.

He assigned

Bittner to District 17, leaving the organization of District 31
to President C.F. Miley.

Altogether, about 100 UMWA officials

and volunteers went into the nonunion fields and brashly told the
nonunion miners "The President wants you to join the union."
They failed to explain whether this was the desire of President
Roosevelt or President Lewis, but since Roosevelt raised no
objection to the tactic, it made no difference.

Miners responded

to the organizing drive enthusiastically, and, for the most part,
the operators put up little resistance.

By the middle of August,

barely two months after Roosevelt signed the NIRA into law, the
UMWA had three hundred thousand new members.283
The complete reorganization of District 31 was thwarted at
first by the actions of the large nonunion coal companies.
Consolidation Coal Company, Bethlehem Mines Corporation,
282Ibid., 145-145; Fox, United We Stand. 311-312.
^Coleman, Men and Coal. 148-149; Fox, United We Stand. 312.
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Hutchinson Coal Company, Jamison Coal Company, and the Koppers
interests, which had taken over New England Fuel & Transportation
Company’s mines, refused to allow their employees to join the
UMWA, instead insisting that they belong to company unions.284
UMWA officials complained that Consol's guards had beaten up two
of its organizers at Jordan and that Bethlehem had discharged
twelve men at the Dakota mine for refusing to join the company
union.285 The remaining operators in the district presented no
resistance.

They met with District 31 officials in July and

developed a draft code of fair competition.

Until a final code

was hammered out, they negotiated an interim wage agreement with
District 31 officials.

The interim scale raised wages to the

same level as the June, 1931 District 31 agreement.286 After
the Appalachian Agreement was signed on September 21, 1933, all
of the holdouts except Bethlehem made agreements with the
UMWA.287 The captive mine company had been the first to break
from the UMWA in 1919, and now it was the last to sign up in
1934.

After a decade a struggle, the miners of District 31

finally had their union back.

284Frank Mile to John L. Lewis, June 21,
International Archive, District 31, 1933.

1933, UMWA,

285M.A. Teti to John L. Lewis, telegram, June 19, 1933; J.F.
Miley to John L. Lewis, June 26, 1933, UMWA, International Archive,
District 31, 1933.
286Frank Miley to John L. Lewis, July 29,
International Archive, District 31, 1933.

1933, UMWA,

287Black Diamond, Vol. 91, No. 5 (September 2, 1933),
Johnson, The Politics of Coal. 163.
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5-7;

CHAPTER 9:

CONCLUSION

After a long journey through over 150 years of regional
history, our story ends in 1933 with the triumph of the UMWA and
the fall of the indigenous coal operators.

The struggle of Van

Bittner and the UMWA for unionization in the Fairmont Field had a
national impact.

Bittner’s success provided an answer to

Pennsylvania coal operators who had long asked, "What good can
come out of West Virginia?”

Through his innumerable appeals to

Washington, Bittner was instrumental in gaining the support of
the federal government for the UMWA.

Bittner would also play a

role in the unionization of the rest of the state.

After his

appointment as President of District 17, he led the organization
drive in Southern West Virginia, proclaiming to a convention of
UMWA delegates at Charleston which included many veterans of the
1921 Armed March and Battle of Blair Mountain:

’’This is our day.

It is written in the stars that we shall survive.”1 Despite
decades of resistance to the UMWA, operators bowed to the
inevitable.

Like the UMWA in 1919 and 1921, they could not fight

the national government.

After the organization drive, Bittner

departed for Washington, where he played a leading role in the
coal-code discussions.

When he returned to Charleston he found

himself lionized as "the dominant figure of all the leaders who
center their activities in the state capital" and the

1"Historic Convention at Charleston," United Mine Workers
Journal. Vol. 44, No. 15 (August 1, 1933), 4.
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"personification of the New Deal."2
Bittner had come a long way from his early days in Fairmont
when no one would openly speak to him on the street.

Although he

never ran for office, Bittner became one of the state's most
potent political figures.

In 1934 he literally "made" Rush D.

Holt, supporting his bid for the U.S. Senate with UMWA funds and
helping him win the election with the votes of 100,000 union
miners.3 His support for Roosevelt helped the president carry
the state in 1936.

In 1940 he was instrumental in the election

of his close friend Matthew Neely as Governor of West Virginia.
More than any person, Bittner was responsible for forging the new
order of Democratic liberalism in state politics.

Even his long

time nemesis C.E. Smith, who eventually accepted the UMWA
triumph, acknowledged Bittner's large impact on state politics.
"By and large," Smith wrote, "he was one of the select group of
tall men who in the thirties calmed the millions who were waiting
for the Man on Horseback."4
The UMWA's triumph in West Virginia proved to be a political
and social revolution as significant in the state's history as
the bourgeois revolution of 1863.
emerged in politics.

As in 1863, a new order

As a result of the revolution, liberal

Democrats soon rose to power, replacing conservative Republicans.
2"Tribute to Bittner," Charleston Gazette, n.d., quoted in
United Mine Workers Journal. Vol. 44, No. 20 (November 1, 1933), 5.
William Coffee, "Political Chrysalis: The UMWA
Election of 1934," West Virginia History. 1984, 87.

in

^Fairmont Times, July 21, 1949.
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the

Moreover, political culture was transformed.

Boosterism and the

culture of development— Williams's "development faith"— which had
formed the ideological foundation for the revolution of 1863, was
shattered— if only
of 1933.

temporarily— by the working class revolution

Faith in industrial capitalism as the engine of social

progress waned.

The Committee of the Upper Monongahela Valley,

established in 1934 as a planning council by the Departments of
Labor, Agriculture, and Interior to plan for the "rehabilitation
and development" of the region, recommended the establishment of
"small-unit industries" such as handicrafts "as a balance to the
present large-scale industrial economy."5 The revolution of
1933 also empowered miners, and consequently had a large impact
upon life in the state's coal fields.

Through the UMWA, miners

assumed a more equal place with management in the workplace, and
the coal companies eventually relinquished their paternalistic
control over the coal towns.
The UMWA triumph in 1933 was more than a social and
political revolution, however.
victory for the union gospel.

It was also a moral revolution, a
As explained in chapter seven, the

union gospel was a synthesis of two strands of American reformist
thought, democratic idealism and Protestant moral and social
perfectionism.

While Lewis and other UMWA leaders argued the

union's case in the language of American political ideals,
Bittner, working in a highly-charged religious climate, harnessed

5Chapman, Report of the Committee on the Upper Monongahela
Valiev, i.
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the power of Christian values.

As Ken-Fones Wolf explains,

"Christian values, which were central to American culture,
allowed unions to gather support from a much wider cross-section
of the American people."6 However, the union gospel was not the
only form of social Christianity in the field.

As British

historian Eileen Yeo points out, Christianity was "contested
territory," not the exclusive property of one social group.7
Before he could succeed in winning the wide public support the
union needed, Bittner and his union gospel had to subdue an
adversarial strain of Christianity— the "coercive evangelicalism"
of Billy Sunday and the Ku Klux Klan.

Bittner's union gospel

emerged victorious in 1933 because it provided a moral and
emotional framework for restoring social harmony among different
classes and ethnic groups.
If the UMWA emerged as victors in 1933, the indigenous coal
operators and their allies were the vanquished.

As a reflective

Ned Smith surmised in 1945:
The Fairmont coal field is now about 50 years old and
its development over that period was as fine an example
of free enterprise as the country has ever seen. But
the results, by and large, have been the depletion of a
very large acreage and economic disaster for hundreds
of hardy souls who came near, though not quite, to
hitting the jack-pot. One by one these individuals
have fallen by the wayside. Most of them are now mere
memories in the folklore of their industry, and their
exploits and achievements are scarcely whispers in the
vast corridors of Time.8
6 Trade Union Gospel. viii.
7Quoted in ibid., viii.
8C.E. Smith, "Good Morning!" Fairmont Times. December 3, 1945.
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The coal industry of the region which emerged from the New Deal
was a far different beast than the one created in the nineteenth
century by the Watsons, Flemings, Camdens, and other indigenous
capitalists.

The reformed industry was a creature of national

economic and political forces:
determination had failed.

the struggle for regional self-

The DMWA was in the region to stay.

Producers were locked into paying wages that were equal to those
in other fields.

The days when Fairmont operators could maintain

a competitive advantage in the market by paying lower wages were
gone forever.

Also gone was the era of the small-time operator—

though the small independents would resurge later in periods of
high coal prices and in surface mining.

The coal industry was

dominated by large companies, such as Consol.

Although forced

into receivership in 1932, Consol was reorganized in 1934 and
remained the largest and strongest firm in the field.

Such large

companies were able to survive and flourish in part because of
their reserves of capital, which allowed them to mechanize their
mines and realize economies-of-scale in their operations.

Thus

one result of the 1933 reformation was a movement toward
oligopoly.

The number of firms operating in the field shrank

from 236 in 1920 to eighty-seven in 1935.

A smaller, leaner

industry dominated by a few large firms emerged.9
A related result of the reformation was a change in the
9Chester Zimolzak, "Changing Ownership Patterns in the West
Virginia Coal Industry: Oligopoly and its Geographic Impact,11 158180, in Howard Adkins, Steve Ewing and Chester Zimolzak, eds., West
Virginia and Appalachia:
Selected Readings (Dubuque, Iowa:
Kendall/Hunt, 1977).
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industry's locus of control.

Previously the Fairmont coal

industry had been dominated by indigenous capitalists, chiefly by
big-time operators like the Watsons, Hutchinsons, Clarks, and
Hites, but also by numerous small-time operators.

These

indigenous operators all but disappeared during the 1930s.

Those

which remained in the coal industry were reduced to positions of
secondary importance in reorganized corporations controlled by
powerful out-of-state interests.

Thus, the much-discussed

takeover cf the coal industry, at least in the Fairmont Field,
occurred in the late 1920s and 1930s— not earlier.10
By 1933, the indigenous elite of the Upper Monongahela
Valley, which had provided economic and political leadership for
the region and the state since 1863, had fallen from power.
was a tragedy in the classical sense.

This

The very qualities which

made the region's elite formidable— their ability to produce
great quantities of coal— also led to their demise.

The

overproduction of coal and the destructive competition that they
unleased eventually "came round" to destroy them.

In this sense

it can be said that the "last capitalist revolution" of 1863
devoured its own children.

This fall eliminated what had been a

powerful agent for regional change and development.

To coin a

clumsy, but useful term, the loss of indigenous leadership
"Appalachianized" the region.
10Of the 18.4 million tons of coal produced in the Fairmont
Field in 1934, 11.6 million were produced by firms controlled from
outside the region and state. West Virginia Department of Mines,
Annual Report. 1934; Keystone Directory for Coal Buyers for 1934
(New York: McGraw Hill, 1934).
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TABLE A.l: Nationalities of persons employed at mines and coke
ovens in Fairmont Field (Barbour, Harrison, Marion, Monongalia,
Preston, and Taylor counties) from 1907 to 1933.
Year

US/White

Negroes

Italians

Hungar.

Poles

1907-08

3,302

492

2,613

493

588

1908-09

4,220

349

2,056

575

429

1909-10

4,681

253

2,463

560

473

1910-11

4,857

310

2,607

516

480

1911-12

5,807

581

2,805

640

701

1912-13

5,588

403

2,895

775

709

1913-14

6,017

478

3,847

811

866

1914-15

6,603

446

4,199

770

885

1915-16

6,358

399

2,862

667

592

1916-17

8,302

1,113

3,010

716

533

1917-18

9,784

1,312

2,923

748

537

1918-19

10,299

1,136

3,126

1,084

470

1919-20

11,598

1,562

2,839

949

574

1920-21

13,715

1,960

3,438

1,288

1,006

1921-22

11,117

1,641

2,991

1,150

936

1922-23

16,702

2,192

3,835

1,304

1,196

1923-24

14,833

2,155

3,646

1,251

1,189

1924-25

14,820

2,580

1,931

770

715

1926

17,148

3,366

1,461

1,017

868

1927

15,951

3,200

2,185

967

907

1928

14,405

3,062

2,113

942

695

1929

12,713

2,955

1,777

812

630

1930

12,135

2,469

1,629

702

731

1931

10,438

1,811

1,411

711

655

1932

8,399

1,476

1,298

585

535

1933

10,474

2,036

1,564

703

685
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TABLE A.l:
Year

Nationalities in Fairmont Field (continued).
Austrians

Slavish

Russian

Other*

Total

1907-08

523

259

145

1,610

10,025

1908-09

283

589

70

2,786

11,303

1909-10

645

859

191

2,782

12,441

1910-11

752

860

265

2,310

12,957

1911-12

521

918

176

927

13,076

1912-13

484

800

397

816

12,867

1913-14

872

221

67

2,185

15,364

1914-15

963

927

580

1,245

16,618

1915-16

595

800

231

1,839

13,534

1916-17

787

612

155

1,177

16,405

1917-18

716

631

418

1,013

18,082

1918-19

1,002

565

638

766

19,086

1919-20

940

439

653

1,492

21,046

1920-21

1,036

752

812

2,268

26,275

1921-22

902

659

746

1,832

21,974

1922-23

923

997

684

2,682

30,515

1923-24

720

1,032

553

1,922

27,301

1924-25

393

545

492

1,769

24,015

1926

561

653

592

2,578

28,244

1927

595

714

597

1,689

26,805

1928

448

660

513

1,644

24,482

1929

386

532

458

1,307

21,570

1930

441

607

387

1,194

20,265

1931

379

465

362

922

17,154

1932

228

370

278

974

14,143

1933

410

564

372

1,046

17,854

♦Includes Belgians, Bohemian, Bulgarian, Croatian, English, French,
Gallacian, German, Granish, Greek, Hebrew, Horwat,
Irish,
Lithuanians, Litvitch, Montenegrian, Roumanian, Scotch, Servian,
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Spainish, Syrian, Swedish, Turk, Welch, and Unknown.
Source: West Virginia Department of Mines, Annual Report. 19071908-1933.
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Scott's Run Railway, feeder to Monongahela Railway, built in 1917.

Monongahela Railway, Fairmont to Brownsville, Pa., built in I9i2 as Buckhannon &
Northern Railroad, jointly owned by Pittsburgh 6 Lake Erie, Baltimore & Ohio and
Pennsylvania Railroad.

( 3) Fairmont, Morgantown & Pittsburgh Branch
1886, extended to Uniontown, Pa. in 1894.
(4 )

F

Cheat Haven 8
in 1913.

( 5)

of BSO, completed to Morgantown in

Bruceton Railroad, completed from Cheathaven,

Morgantown & Kingwood

Railroad, completed

Pa. to

in 1907.

(6 ) Paw Paw Branch of BSO, feeder line from Rivesville to

Grant Town.

( 7)

Baltimore S Ohio Mainline, Cumberland, Md. to Wheeling,

completed

(8 )

West Virginia Northern Railroad, completed

Crellin Branch of Kendall Lumber Company Railroad, Hutton, Md.
Tucker county.

(j£)

Helen's Run Branch of Western Maryland Railroad, completed in
Hutchinson to Idamay and Carolina (with trackage rights on BSO).
to

in

1853.

in 1894.
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from

Bingamon Branch of Western Maryland Railroad, completed in 1917 from Hutchinson
Wyatt (with trackage rights on BSO).
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in 1892.
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• Source*1 W.V. Geological Survey, Map & Mine Directory o f Northern West Virginia S Mary lot
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Railroad, completed from Central Junction to Century in 1901.

io Southwest, formerly Northwestern Virginia
in 1857 from Grafton to Parkersburg.

) Northern Division, Coal 8 Coke Railway, completed in 1898 from
Belington to Mabie, Randolph county.

B80 Southwest, Flemington to Galloway mine
of Grafton 8 Belington Railroad, B80,
ryburg Junction to Berryburg in 1900.

) Western Maryland Railroad Mainline, Baltimore, Md. to Belington,
formerly Belington 8 Beaver Creek Railroad, sold in 1905.
I Weaver Branch, Western Maryland Railroad, completed in 1900,
formerly Belington 8 Beaver Creek Railroad, sold in 1905.

ton Railroad, B80, completed and sold to B80
) Monongahela Branch of B80, formerly Monongahela River Railroad,
completed from Fairmont to Clarksburg in 1890, sold to B80 in 1900.
kickhannon 8 Tygart Valley Railroad, BSO,
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jinia 8 Maryland: Central Stotes Publishing, 1925:
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Route of Miners' March-1 9 0 2

Monongah - First organized strike in Fairmont Field, June, 1890; Willow Tree School, UMWA headquorters in 1902 strike.

(?) Miners' March of 1902. (Flemington to Grafton to Fairmont to Monongah to Clarksburg)
( 3)

Fairmont - Eugene V. Debs 8 J. D. Mahcne address 2 ,0 0 0 at Courthouse in 1897 strike;UMWA officials confer
with
C.W. Watson at Watson Building to work-out first collective bargaining agreement in Fairmont Field, June 13, 1918. UMWA
International office at Fairmont Hotel, 1924-1933; John L. Lewis addresses crowd of 2 0 ,0 0 0 at Fairmont Old Fair Grounds,
September 2 6 , 1925.

( 4)

Montana Mine - Strikers' march results in first injunction in Fairmont Field, August 15, 1897.

(5 )

Plnnickinnick Mine-Mother Jones and Thomas Haggerty arrested by U.S. Marshall, June 20, 1902.

©

Brody-Van Bittner addresses 15,000 to 2 5 ,0 0 0

at dedication of new Union Hall, September 14, 1924.

©

Grant Town- 6,0 0 0 attend funnerai of John Kello, Van Bittner delivers eulogy, January 26,

(8 )

Morgantown-William Green, Van Bittner 8 T. C. Townsend address

©

Scott's Run - UMWA secures contracts with 30 companies, May, 1931.

crowd

of- 5,0 00 ot

1925.

Stadium, April I,1925.

Sources ■ Van A. B ittner P a p e r s United Mine Workers o f America Journo/ .
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ABSTRACT
The industrialization of Appalachia traditionally has been
understood in terms of the penetration and exploitation of the
region by outside capitalists.

The role of indigenous

capitalists in the development of the coal and other industries
has been neglected.

Most development studies have focused on the

Central portions of Appalachia, virtually ignoring the northern
parts of the region, including the Upper Monongahela region of
Northern West Virginia.

Moreover, most studies of

industrialization have focused on the rural, rather than the
urban, parts of the region.

Furthermore, the study of the role

of coal miners and the miners' union (United Mine Workers of
America or UMWA) in regional development has been confined
largely to Central Appalachia.
This dissertation is an attempt to recast existing views of
Appalachian industrialization to encompass the historic role of
indigenous coal capitalists.

The geographical focus of the study

is the Upper Monongahela region, a ten-county section of Northern
West Virginia.

Particular emphasis is placed on the Fairmont

Field, the six counties located in the northern part of the Upper
Monongahela region.

Also, the study focuses on the urban node of

the region, the Fairmont-Clarksburg area.

The study covers the

period from 1776 to 1888 in a synoptic manner, reserving the
largest proportion of space to a delineation of the labor
movement and the so-called mine war in the 1924 to 1933 period.

571

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Research focused on manuscripts, including the A.B. Fleming,
Van A. Bittner, C.E. Smith, and John Cornwell papers, as well as
the papers of Districts 17 and 31 of the United Mine Workers of
America.

A great deal of time was spent examining newspapers, as

well as monographs, scholarly articles, and government reports.
The study demonstrates that indigenous capitalists played a
leadership role in the industrialization of the Upper Monongahela
region until the late 1920s, when they fell from power as a
result of the Depression.

It concludes that the UMWA centered

its efforts to reorganize the nation's coal miners on the
Fairmont Field during the 1920s, succeeding in re-establishing
the union there in 1931, two years before the passage of the
National Industrial Recovery Act.
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